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

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HISTORY OF FRANCE,

FROM THE

EARLIEST PERIOD TO 1789.

By HENRI MARTIN.

Pulvis veterum renovabitur.

PART VII.

This work has received the Great Gobert Prize from the Academy of Inscriptions and Belles-Lettres, and the French Academy.

MARTIN'S HISTORY OF FRANCE.

THE AGE OF LOUIS XIV.

By HENRI MARTIN.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FOURTH PARIS EDITION

By MARY L. BOOTH.

VOL. II.

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AGE OF LOUIS XIV.

CHAPTER I.

LOUIS XIV. (CONTINUED.)

PREPONDERANCE IN EUROPE. REVOCATION OF THE EDICT OF NANTES. The Ministerial Heritage of Colbert is divided between Le Pelletier, Seignelai, and Louvois. Preponderance of Louvois. Louis XIV. fails in his Projects concerning the Empire. Invasion of Austria by the Turks. Siege of Vienna. The Poles save Austria. War between France and Spain. Taking of Luxemburg. Affairs of Treves and Liege. Truce of Twenty Years between France, the Emperor, the Empire, and Spain. Louis XIV. at the Summit of his Power. Bombardment of Genoa. The Doge at Versailles. New Expeditions against the Moors. Accession of James II. Projects of Catholic Restoration in England supported by Louis XIV. Louis XIV. having become a Widower, espouses Madame de Maintenon. *Dragonnades.* REVOCATION OF THE EDICT OF NANTES. Persecutions. Protestant Emigration. French Industry transplanted to Holland, England, and Brandenburg. Affair of the Palatine Succession. DEFENSIVE LEAGUE OF AUGSBURG between the Emperor, Spain, Sweden, Brandenburg, Saxony, Bavaria, the Palatinate, and the Circles of the Empire. Affair of Cologne. Pope Innocent XI. favors the League of Augsburg. Rupture between Louis XIV. and the Pope. Movements in England. Preparations of the Prince of Orange against James II. Louis XIV., instead of succoring James II. by a Diversion against Holland, takes the Offensive against the Emperor.

1683–1688.

THE heritage of the great minister that France had just lost was divided among several hands. The son of Colbert, Seignelai, a young man[1] full of fire and intelligence, and initiated, almost from infancy, into the affairs of state, but, very different from the illustrious deceased, moved by ambition and pleasure rather than by duty, "attempted to usurp all the employments of his father, and obtained none."[2] Madame de Maintenon, sympathizing little with such brilliant and haughty natures, and, at this moment, united by interests and views with the Le Telliers, had probably some part in the repulse experienced by Seignelai. The King only left to the son of Colbert the functions of which he had obtained the reversion and divided the labors from 1672; that is, the admin-

[1] He was thirty-two.

[2] *Lettres de madame de Maintenon*, t. II. p. 888.

istration of the marine, of commerce, of the royal household, and of ecclesiastical affairs. Seignelai was, in the marine, a brilliant speciality, somewhat analogous to what Lionne had been in diplomacy. He resembled Lionne much in ardent pursuit of pleasure and facility of work; only Seignelai had more dignity of character. He had not the principles of his father concerning all points of government,—principles, besides, that he would not have been in a position to apply: in the maritime administration, without wholly neglecting the solid, that is, the merchant service,[1] he attached himself too ardently to the brilliant, to the navy, and carried into it the violent and aggressive spirit of Louvois; he had at least preserved the paternal sentiments on another important point, on religious persecutions, and protected the Reformers as much as he could within the limits of his official power.

Louvois obtained a share in the spoils of his rival. He purchased, from the family of Colbert, with the King's permission, the superintendency of arts and constructions,[2] an employment to which the tastes of Louis gave high importance. Louvois strove to make himself as agreeable to Louis as superintendent of constructions as he was necessary to him as minister of war. He flattered without scruple the King's passion for building, and urged him to expenses without caring for the resources which it was the business of another minister to provide.

This other minister, the comptroller-general of finances, on whom had devolved the rest of Colbert's succession, had been chosen by the King only after some hesitation between three competitors. Louis had hesitated between De Harlai, Gourville, and Le Pelletier. De Harlai, attorney-general to the parliament of Paris, had in his favor an illustrious name sustained by incontestable knowledge, capacity, and probity. Gourville was that adventurer, so sagacious, so restless, and so bold, who had formerly been justly prosecuted as an accomplice in the wasteful expenditures of Fouquet, then condemned by contumacy to the gallows, and who, in this strange position, welcomed by all the princes and grandees of the countries where he gayly displayed his opulent exile, had succeeded in obtaining employ in the French diplomatic service, and finally in returning to France, where he governed the household of the great Condé. He was a man fit for anything, who, in default of moral sense, displayed an audacity of spirit and even a certain kind of generosity that shielded him from contempt. It would have

[1] He efficiently protected sea-fishery and the coasting-trade.

[2] Those were the fine arts and the public works united.

been very amusing, but certainly very scandalous, to see the contumacious extortioner who had been condemned to the gallows by Colbert himself, succeeding him. The third candidate, Le Pelletier, councillor of state and formerly *prévôt-des-marchands* of Paris, was a near relative of the Le Telliers. The King consulted the Chancellor Le Tellier. The astute old man at first praised equally the three men in regard to whom the mind of Louis was fluctuating; then, called upon to explain himself, he ruined Gourville by insinuations concerning his too great attachment to the House of Condé, and De Harlai by allusions to his imperious and usurping character; "as to Le Pelletier," he finally said, "he is a good and honorable man, with much capacity, and very laborious; he would take, like soft wax, whatever impression it might please your Majesty to give him; yet I do not think him fit for the finances; he is not hard enough." "What! not hard enough?" exclaimed the King; "it is not my will that any one should be hard to my people!" Le Pelletier was chosen.[1]

Le Pelletier was in reality one of those circumspect and docile men who submit without resistance to established sway; moreover, he was perfectly upright and sincerely religious, but had more honesty of purpose than force and activity to execute his intentions. He had the weakness, in order to please his patrons Le Tellier and Louvois, to decry the administration of his illustrious predecessor to the King; he deviated from the course of Colbert through complaisance and desire to innovate, then returned to it through conviction, but without sufficient knowledge.

The ministry was thus reconstructed, foreign affairs remaining in the hands of Colbert de Croissi, brother of the great Colbert, a man precise, but neither brilliant nor suggestive, who limited himself to following exactly the instructions of his master. Louvois almost shared, in fact, with Croissi, the ministry of foreign affairs, by the spies and correspondents that he maintained all over Europe under the pretext of military affairs, and he certainly had much more influence than Croissi in the general direction of external politics.

The preponderance of the Le Telliers in the council of the King was, while the old chancellor lived, at least equal to what Colbert's had been in the earlier years of the government of Louis XIV. Louis, in fact, notwithstanding his pretensions of receiving no inspirations but from himself or from heaven, notwithstanding his active and jealous surveillance over all departments of adminis-

[1] *Mémoires de Gourville*, p. 578. *Mém. de Choisi*, p. 608.

tration, was very apt to let himself be governed, and always was governed, to a certain point; stronger in will than in genius, he generally received the impulse that he supposed he was giving; only, it was necessary to use much address; if he perceived that any one was aiming to rule him, he ruined him, and he usually did perceive it in the end. This is the explanation of that *inconstancy* with which he has been reproached towards his ministers, and also of the favor which he finally accorded to men who were shielded from such ambition by their mediocrity. Only one person maintained over him, till his last hour, a power, if not unlimited, at least immovable; but this person was Madame de Maintenon, and the whole life of Maintenon was a masterpiece of management.

Louvois, as Colbert had formerly done, endeavored to lead the King by his tastes. Scarcely installed in the superintendency of arts and constructions, he wished to cause Colbert to be forgotten by gigantic works. He vigorously pursued the completion of Versailles, where the court had been permanently established since 1682, the King having ceased to divide his time between this principal residence and the other châteaux.[1] Louvois completed the palace of Versailles by erecting the two wings, the stables, and the magnificent orangery sheltered between the two Babylonian stairways of the prodigious terrace.[2] The construction of the north wing caused the disappearance of the *Grotto of Thetis*, a theatre and monument symbolic of the amours of the royal sun. Louis thus seemed to efface the recollections of his youth at the moment when he passed from the arms of La Vallière and of Montespan under the pious discipline of Maintenon.

The architect of Versailles, Hardouin-Mansart, built, meanwhile, a new royal residence under the direction of Louvois. Even before being wholly fixed at Versailles, Louis, at certain moments "wearied of the beautiful and the crowd," had become persuaded "that he sometimes liked the diminutive and solitude";[3] he had traversed the picturesque hills, the green chestnut-groves, the deep and shady valleys that lie between Versailles and Saint-Germain, and there, near where the famous machine was constructed to raise the waters of the Seine to the height of the plain

[1] He continued, nevertheless, to spend a part of the autumn of each year at Fontainebleau.

[2] The disposition of the terrace and the double stairway reminds us of the artificial eminence on which was built the royal palace of Persepolis (Tchelminar). The traveller Chardin had recently brought back its design, which may have inspired Mansart and Lenostre. We owe this remark to the learned M. Guigniaut.

[3] Saint-Simon, t. XIII. p. 89.

of Versailles, he had chosen the narrow valley of Marly to build a *hermitage*. Marly was to be for him a retreat where he might sometimes rest from public affairs by a private and free life. But Louis could no longer be simple; the pomp of his rôle followed him everywhere as it were in spite of himself, and the hermitage became a palace, in truth a palace silent and concealed. Mansart erected under the shades of Marly a splendid pavilion for the King, with twelve smaller pavilions for the courtiers admitted to the favor of following Louis into this privileged retreat; it was again the mythologic symbolism of Versailles: the royal sun reappeared there surrounded by the twelve signs of the zodiac. A broad expanse of verdure, the freshness of which was preserved by a truly incomparable cascade[1] and by numberless fountains, enveloped this fairy-like abode. In it reigned a veiled sumptuosity, a sort of chiara-obscura in harmony with the secret that the court, after the death of the Queen,[2] was not slow in suspecting between the King and Maintenon. Marly and Maintenon, these are two names that cannot be separated in our memories: these two names remind us as it were of some evening hour when we speak only with suppressed voice, — of something characterized by discretion, repose, and cautiousness, — of a long twilight after the blazing splendor of the earlier portion of a great reign.

At the epoch at which we have now arrived, the twilight is, however, still far away, — the sun of Louis is at its zenith, and Marly is as yet only a modest branch of Versailles, radiant with all its splendors.

To finish Versailles, to embellish Marly, was only to continue Colbert,[3] — it was not sufficient for the pride of Louvois. The new superintendent exercised his ingenuity to find some creation that should be his own. The insufficiency of the waters taken to Versailles by the conduits of rain-water and the machine of Marly furnished him the occasion that he sought. The machine of Marly, so much admired on account of its colossal proportions, required an enormous expenditure of force for a moderate result, — hydraulic mechanics was not yet sufficiently perfected for such enterprises; but what could very well be done at that time was to turn aside a river by a system of aqueducts and canals. Already, under Colbert, the creator of the canal of Languedoc, the celebrated Riquet, had entertained the bold idea of bringing the waters of the Loire

[1] It fell from the top of the hill over sixty-three steps of white marble.
[2] Maria Theresa had died July 30, 1683.
[3] Marly was commenced in 1679.

to Versailles over the heights of Satory. An investigation of altitudes caused success to be deemed impossible. Louvois, scarcely installed in the superintendency of constructions, ordered the geometrician La Hire to measure the altitude of the river Eure, much higher than that of the gardens of Versailles, and requested a plan of Vauban to bring the Eure some twenty-seven leagues into the basins of the royal residence. After much hesitation, Vauban pronounced the project feasible; the works were of a character to confound the imagination; this was what Louvois demanded, and it so happened that he discovered that this sumptuous enterprise was at the same time an adroit homage to the friend of the King,—one of those exaggerated flatteries such as the viziers of ancient Oriental despots could alone offer to the favorites of their masters.

Before the end of 1684 a new bed was begun to be dug for the Eure, starting at Pontgoin, twenty-six kilometres[1] above Chartres. In the course of 1685 twenty-two thousand soldiers and eight thousand laborers were distributed along the line of works and completed the *new river*, from Pontgoin to Berchères (ten leagues); the headquarters of this army were established at Maintenon, on the domain and under the windows of the château of the favorite; and the construction of an aqueduct was begun which was to have, in the bottom of the valley of Maintenon, in a distance of one kilometre, not less than three rows of arcades rising together to the height of two hundred and sixteen feet (seventy-two metres). The total length of the aqueduct was to exceed four leagues, from Berchères to Houdreville, where the necessary descent of ground was again found for conducting the water by a simple canal as far as the pond of Trappes, one of the reservoirs of Versailles. "It is a beautiful sight," wrote Madame de Maintenon, "to see a whole army working at the embellishment of an estate." It is true she added: "Men are indeed fools to give themselves so much trouble to embellish a spot where they have but a few days to dwell."[2] This mixture of satisfied ambition and of half philosophic, half Christian disdain for this same ambition, reveals her entire character: the love of grandeur and the weariness of grandeur never ceased to share this soul, at bottom disquiet, under the appearance of an unalterable calm.

The *spectacle* that Madame de Maintenon vaunted unfortunately cost more than gold; it cost men. Maladies, that contemporaries attributed to stirring up the earth in marshy places, carried off many

[1] A kilometre is a thousand metres, and a metre is about thirty-nine inches. Tr.

[2] *Lettres de madame de Maintenon*, t. II.; January 28, 1687.

officers and soldiers, which caused the enterprise to be looked upon with an evil eye, even at court. For the first time, admiration was tempered with reserve.

As to the expense, it promised to be so great, in spite of the low price of the work executed by the army, that the King shrunk from the original plan; it was resolved to reduce to about one league and a quarter the four leagues of projected aqueduct, supplying its place with embankments. Nevertheless, the *expenditures for constructions*, which were six millions under Colbert, in 1682, rose, in 1686, to fifteen millions.

It belonged to the new comptroller-general to provide for this increase of expenditure, as well as the expenses of military and maritime movements. From the year following Colbert's death the villain tax rose three millions. Increase of salary was sold to all royal officers on the footing of five and a quarter per cent., and the renewal of the annual duty for nine years, which was a guaranty of the hereditability and vendibility of offices, was likewise sold to all holders of office without distinction. This was recurring to the expedients of great war, if not in time of peace, at least in time of petty wars, without peril and without efforts. In truth, a scarcity which, in 1684, required the purchase of foreign corn, and diminished the product of imports, excused these extraordinary resources and necessitated the reduction of the villain tax anew as early as 1685. But what nothing could excuse was the strange operation by which Le Pelletier extinguished the floating debt: he contracted a loan at five and a half per cent. to pay off the floating debt consisting principally of loans that cost only five per cent. It was the reverse of Colbert's operations which borrowed at five and five and a half per cent. to reimburse loans contracted at seven and eight per cent. The consolidated debt was thus increased by 3,200,000 francs of *rentes* stock from 1684.

It would, however, be severe to judge Le Pelletier without restriction by this unlucky beginning. This minister endeavored to return to a better course. He improved the financial organization by obliging fiscal agents to pay into the treasury the interest of any sum which they retained after it was due. He founded public workshops for the extinction of mendicity, — a great design continually attempted and always abandoned. He suppressed or largely reduced the export duties on French silks, and greatly decreased the duties on the export of wines and brandies by way of the Loire. He authorized the unrestricted exportation of grain for two years, without duties or with duties reduced one half, in

order to dispose of the abundant harvests that followed the dearth of 1684. In 1687 he sent into all the generalities councillors of state and commissioners to examine the accounts of fiscal agents and of clerks employed by the farmers of the revenue. This is the origin of the inspectors of finances.

We may form a different estimate of the increase of duties on cloths, woollens, and Holland linens, an increase whereby Le Pelletier returned to the tariff of 1667 and to the plans of Colbert at a moment when the King, perhaps far from being in the right, thought it no longer necessary to conciliate the Dutch; but we can in no case justify the excessive rigor shown by this comptroller-general in the application of regulations imposed by Colbert on manufactures. Le Pelletier exaggerated the intention of Colbert on the point where it should have been tempered, and, on the contrary, abandoned it on points where he should have adhered to it with tenacity. Colbert had neglected nothing to make France conform to its geographical position — the highway and entrepôt of European commerce. Le Pelletier shackled transit by duties on foreign merchandise which traversed France; he then suppressed transit and even entrepôts, under the pretext of facilities for smuggling afforded by circulation of foreign products! The clamors of the revenue-farmers thus procured the destruction of one of Colbert's finest institutions (March 1688). This disastrous error, of itself alone, at least counterbalanced all the services that Le Pelletier could have rendered.

The farmers of the *five great farms*, while they took from France the benefit of entrepôts, paralyzed the progress of French commerce in America. The duties ceded to the King by the West India Company in 1674 had been joined to the lease of the revenue-union (*fermes-unies*). In 1687, the beaver-trade was subjected to new restrictions in the interest of the farmers, who also obtained onerous privilèges in the West Indies. This unfortunate system contributed to ruin the French hat-trade[1] for the benefit of England.

In short, Le Pelletier, with good sense in details, a weak character and narrow views, was one of those ministers who, in ordinary times, can glide along with the current of affairs, if they cannot direct them, but whose incompetency is manifested by the first crisis.

The only crisis that could disturb France and necessitate great financial combinations was the renewal of the coalition against Louis XIV.; the situation of Europe postponed this at the time when Le Pelletier entered the department of finances. The year

[1] Forbonnais, t. II. pp. 1–40. Bailli, t. II. pp. 2–6. P. Clément; *Le Gouvernement de Louis XIV. de* 1683 *à* 1689.

of Colbert's death was marked by great events, that French policy had contributed to produce, although French arms took no direct part in them. France for a moment ceased to be the chief object of attention among nations.

The French government, however, displayed much diplomatic and military activity. Before the summer of 1683, four camps, formed in Franche-Comté, in Alsace and in Lorraine, seemed to announce a new campaign; but this was only a political demonstration; action, war, was elsewhere, in Hungary, in Austria.

The attempts of Emperor Leopold to impose on imperial Hungary the political and religious despotism that weighed upon Bohemia and Austria proper, had ended, as we have seen, in a terrible insurrection, aided by the sabre of Polish volunteers in the pay of France, and by Transylvanians and Wallachians, encouraged by the Ottoman Porte. The Emperor, terrified by the successes of the Magyar insurrection, which was complicated by a revolt of Silesian peasants, had attempted to negotiate with the Hungarians and to renew with the Turks the truce of 1664, which was to expire in 1684. He had liked better to negotiate at Constantinople than to accept the offers of Poland and Russia, who pressed him to unite with them against the Turk.

In a Hungarian diet convoked at Sopron or Œdenburg, Leopold granted the reëstablishment of the old national constitution; the foreign viceroy gave place to a palatine elected by the Diet; liberty of worship was restored to Protestants; the Emperor promised that the confiscated lands of the magnates put to death should be returned to their heirs or compensated for by indemnities; that arbitrary imposts and exceptional tribunals should be abolished; that the foreign troops should be recalled (1681). These concessions were too extensive to be sincere. The great chief of the insurgents, Emeric Tekeli, put no confidence in them, and taught his countrymen to distrust them. A recent attempt at assassination against his person had taught him that Austrian policy was always the same. He only accepted a truce. Nevertheless, his position was difficult: his countrymen were in part shaken by the offers of the Emperor; important aid, expected by him from Poland, failed him on account of the coolness that intervened between Louis XIV. and Sobieski. It was through complaisance to Louis that Sobieski allowed the Marquis de Béthune, ambassador of France in Poland, to raise thousands of Polish volunteers for the war in Hungary. Sobieski, before ascending the throne, had married a French woman, daughter of the Marquis d'Arquien, captain of the Guards

to Monsieur, the King's brother. The Queen of Poland was very desirous that Louis should make M. d'Arquien duke and peer. The mistake was committed of stopping at trifles and not granting this unimportant favor. It would seem that France was no longer in need of friends or of conciliating anybody, when we see how her diplomacy was sometimes conducted! Austria, on the contrary, held out hopes to the Queen of Poland of the hand of an archduchess for her son. The Queen imparted to her husband her resentment against the court of France. Sobieski, a heroic warrior, but a short-sighted politician, broke up the assemblages of volunteers, without comprehending to what extent Poland was interested in favoring the affranchisement of Hungary. Tekeli, abandoned by the Poles, saw no other course for him to take than to connect himself closely with the Turk and precipitate the Ottoman empire upon Austria.

He succeeded in doing this, not without aid, at least indirectly, from France. Leopold, at this moment, proposed to the Sultan a new truce. The Ottoman Porte, by the counsels of France and of Tekeli, required impossible conditions: Leopold was to pay an annual tribute, and to dismantle Gratz and the new fortress of Leopoldstadt, built on the Wag to cover Presburg and Vienna, and to cede to Tekeli Neytra, Esseg, Muran, and the isle of Schütt, the most important military positions on the Drave and the Danube. This would have been equivalent to signing his own abdication. Leopold accepted war.

The Grand-Vizier Kara-Mustapha began immense preparations. The Ottoman Porte had free disposition of all its forces. It had concluded, in 1679, with Poland, through the influence of France, a peace honorable to the Poles, although leaving Kamieniec in the hands of the Turks with a part of their conquests. Muscovy, in its turn, had just made a treaty with the Porte. The Ottoman empire was therefore in a condition to throw upon the Danube the largest force it had put in motion during the whole century. In the course of 1682, Tekeli, proclaimed prince of Upper Hungary under Ottoman suzerainty, wrested from the Imperialists, with the aid of the Turks, who broke the truce, nearly everything that Leopold had preserved in that region. The population, partly through hatred of the Austrians, partly through fear of the Turks, followed Tekeli in a body. The following spring, the great Ottoman army took up position around Belgrade, under the direction of the vizier, the principal author of the war. This army was twice as large as that defeated at Saint-Gothard nineteen years

before. It was not Hungary, it was Austria, it was Germany, that was at stake. It could be foreseen that, as in 1529, the tempest of Islam would burst upon Vienna. The Emperor, ever since the preceding year, had been calling for aid from the Diet of Ratisbon, the electors, the princes, the circles of the Empire. The assistance required had been granted; but although the diet had recently improved the military organization of the circles, it was still necessary to endure many delays, and accept succor inadequate to such peril. Austria had understood this, and had at the same time addressed her appeal to a military force, more irregular, but more active than the Germanic body, to Poland. There was at Warsaw a very active diplomatic contest, wherein the Austrian ambassador had the Papal nuncio for his auxiliary, and the ambassador of France for his adversary. If Poland had refused, or only delayed to promise coöperation to Leopold, the Empire would have been reduced to implore the sword of France, and the dream of Louis XIV., the election of the Dauphin to the crown of *the Romans*, would have been near realization. The French ambassador spared nothing to reassure Sobieski in regard to the projects and real power of the Turks, and to convince him that Poland had nothing to lose by the ruin of the House of Austria. Hatred of the infidels, religious and chivalrous spirit, turned the scale with him. March 31, 1683, a treaty of alliance was signed at Warsaw between the Emperor and the King of Poland: Sobieski promised a contingent of forty thousand men against the Ottomans.

Louis XIV., as it seems, still hoped that this treaty would not be executed, and that the Empire would be obliged to have recourse to France. Great movements of troops took place on the French frontier. At the close of May, 1683, the court set out from Versailles for the eastern provinces. Louis passed the month of June in inspecting the eastern garrisons, and the four camps established at Bellegarde in Burgundy, at Molsheim, at Bouquenon, and at Sarre-Louis. Germany viewed this armament with anxiety, still doubting whether she was not to be taken between the Turks and the French. Such was not the intention of Louis XIV.; he was very willing indirectly to stir up the Turks, but not to compromise the most Christian crown by an open alliance with the Turban. On the contrary, he offered aid to the Emperor. Prouder or more embittered than in 1664, Leopold refused.[1] Louis returned from Lorraine to Versailles in the course of July, but he left his troops assembled and ready to march.

[1] *Mém. militaires de Feuquières*, t. I. p. 97. *Mém. de St.-H.* ... (Saint-Hilaire), t. I. p. 335.

Meanwhile, the Turks were before Vienna.

At the beginning of June, the Duke Charles of Lorraine, Generalissimo of the Emperor, had attempted to take the offensive by a diversion against Upper Hungary; but the march of the Turks across Lower Hungary had quickly recalled him to the south of the Danube. The crossing of the Raab, victoriously defended in 1664, was this time forced, and Duke Charles had only time to effect his retreat on Vienna, so as not to be swallowed up by the enormous mass of assailants. It is pretended that the Grand-Vizier had under his command nearly two hundred thousand combatants, besides the multitude of useless people that follow in the wake of Asiatic armies. Clouds of Tartars, Servians, Transylvanians, and Wallachians had swollen the Ottoman army, to say nothing of Tekeli's Magyars, who were operating on the other bank of the Danube. It seemed as if the time of barbarian invasions had returned. At the first news of the approach of the Turks, the Emperor fled with all his family, in the midst of the imprecations and cries of despair of his people. He did not stop till he reached Passau. Half the population of Vienna followed the example of Leopold. The brave Duke of Lorraine hastened to reassure the Capital abandoned by its sovereign, who had foreseen nothing, had provided nothing for its defence. Duke Charles reinforced the garrison, enrolled the citizens and students, burned down the extensive and beautiful suburbs, cut off as much as possible the outskirts of the city, then put the Danube between his little army and the Turks, who, July 14, pitched their tents under the walls of Vienna.

The little Imperial army was only able to repulse Tekeli and hinder the enemy from extending his lines on the north bank of the Danube; it was not in a condition to trouble the siege operations. The German contingents were tardy; Poland had as yet sent only a few light troops; the suspicious Emperor had wished to call on Sobieski only in the last extremity. This extremity had been reached, and the Emperor extended suppliant hands towards the King of Poland. Sobieski, wounded by the conduct of Leopold, had seemed to have lost much of his ardor; at the cry of despair addressed to him, his Polish generosity prevailed. "If Warsaw, Cracow, and Vienna were besieged at once," he exclaimed, "I would leave the first two, and hasten to the last!"[1] He set out at the head of fifteen thousand lances.

[1] *La Cour de France turbanisée*, Cologne, 1686, p. 88. This is a very curious Imperialist pamphlet. The ill-natured anecdote told by Choisi about the setting out of Sobieski is evidently false and ridiculous. *Mém. de Choisi*, p. 666.

Had the Turks been commanded by a Solyman the Great, or even by a Kiouprougli, succor would have arrived too late; all the courage of the Viennese and their garrison would not have sufficed to prolong resistance nearly two months; but Kara Mustapha, full of pride and incapacity, steeped in luxury and voluptuousness, resembled Xerxes or Darius more than the redoubtable Osmanli conquerors whose footsteps he pretended to follow. He believed himself so sure of his conquest, that he dealt carefully with the city, not wishing to take it by assault, lest he should be obliged to give up to the soldiers the treasures he fancied he should find in the Imperial palace. The defenders of Vienna were exhausted, their fortifications were half ruined; but discontent and disorder reigned in the camp of the besiegers, who were conscious of not being properly led. September 12, the German-Polish army finally descended from the heights of Kalenberg, which command Vienna on the northwest, the defiles of which the Grand-Vizier had not even dreamed of occupying. Seventy thousand combatants, led by Sobieski, Charles of Lorraine, the Electors of Bavaria and Saxony, and a host of German princes, marched directly to the camp of the Turks. The Ottomans still outnumbered their adversaries more than two to one; but the Grand-Vizier knew no better how to defend himself than he had known how to attack. After seeing his advanced posts carried, he retreated at evening with so much haste that he forgot the standard of the prophet in his tent. Sobieski sent to the Pope this oriflamme of the infidels. Night and the weariness of the victors saved the flying army; but all the riches accumulated in the camp of the sumptuous barbarians remained in the hands of the liberators of Vienna, with an immense amount of artillery and immeasurable stores of provisions.[1]

The people of Vienna received Sobieski as a Messiah, or as our Orleans had once received Jeanne Darc. As to the Emperor, bearing with the impatience of little souls the burden of gratitude, he had no other care than the maintenance of Imperial etiquette in his obligatory interview with Sobieski. The question was debated in his council how an emperor should receive an elective king. "With open arms, if he has saved the Empire!" exclaimed the generous Duke of Lorraine. Duke Charles was not even understood. Leopold and Sobieski met only on horseback and in the open field. Leopold did not find a word, not even a gesture, to

[1] The chains that bound together the bridge of boats thrown across the Danube by the Turks, are in the Museum of Artillery at Paris, whither Napoleon had them transported after the capture of Vienna in 1805.

thank the man to whom he owed his Empire. Such was the impression of this strange reception on the Poles that they regretted "having saved this haughty race; they wished it had perished beyond recovery." They seemed to have a presentiment of what their country was one day to expect from Austrian gratitude.[1]

Their discontent, however, did not diminish their valor; they did not return home till they had aided the Germans in pursuing the Turks into Hungary and in cutting to pieces a portion of the Ottoman army near Strigonia (or Gran), in a battle much more sanguinary than that of Vienna had been. Strigonia, the ecclesiastical capital of Hungary, which had been in possession of the infidels for three quarters of a century, fell again into the hands of the Christians (October 8, 1683); and many places, on both sides of the Danube, submitted themselves to the Emperor.

Scarcely had the campaign on the Danube been ended, when the attention of Europe was directed to another theatre, and the French reëntered the lists in their turn.

Louis XIV., in the spring of 1682, had suspended an armed revendication of his pretensions against Spain, in order not to divide, he said, the forces of menaced Christendom. He did not preserve this generosity to the end. Spain persisted in ceding nothing in the Netherlands besides the countship of Chiny; English mediation no longer resulted in anything but negotiations with the Emperor and the Empire, transferred from Frankfort to Ratisbon. The delay granted by Louis to Spain having expired at the end of August, 1683, Louis, who had just raised forty thousand men, proceeded, according to his custom, by the way of military execution, without meaning thereby to break the peace. The French troops entered Flanders and Brabant, and laid the open country under contribution. The cabinet of Madrid issued a declaration of war, which it was not in a condition to follow up (October 28). Marshal d'Humières marched on Courtrai; the city, besieged November 2, yielded November 4; the citadel capitulated on the 6th. The Marshal then turned his attention to Dixmude, which opened its gates without resistance (November 10). These two places constituted the equivalent demanded by Louis for Luxemburg, which he pretended belonged to him. After this forcible possession the army stopped, and the King granted the

[1] See *Letters of J. Sobieski*, published by M. de Salvandi, Paris, 1826. *Mém. de Choisi*, p. 642, for details of the ingratitude of the Austrians. *Mém. de M. de* ——, ap. *Collect. Michaud*, 8d series, t. VII. 688. *Histoire de J. Sobieski*, by M. de Salvandi. Coxe, *History of the House of Austria*, Vol. IV. c. LXVI.

Spaniards a new delay till the end of January. This period passed, he would no longer be obligated to abide by the conditions offered. The governor of the Netherlands responded by a violent manifesto against France. The French army compelled the whole country, through terror of conflagration, to pay contributions, as far as the gates of Brussels. The Spaniards undertook reprisals;[1] the garrison of Luxemburg made raids into French territory; the Marshal de Créqui overwhelmed the city of Luxemburg with bombshells without besieging it (December 19), a cruel species of warfare that takes vengeance on inoffensive populations for acts to which they are strangers, that Louvois was to apply with continually increasing severity. The Great Elector, Frederick of Brandenburg, had first given an example of it in his war against Sweden.

It was in vain that Spain cried in distress to all her allies. The Emperor and Sweden were not in a condition to interfere. The King of England had made a show of breaking the secret engagements that compromised him with his own people; but Louis XIV. had easily closed his mouth by promising him another million. Charles II. counselled the Spaniards to yield. As to Holland, the Prince of Orange, without consulting the States-General, had sent to the governor of Belgium fourteen thousand soldiers, instead of eight thousand, which the United Provinces, by the treaty of guaranty, were obliged to furnish the Spaniards in case of invasion; but he could not obtain a levy of sixteen thousand men which he demanded to support this first succor. The merchants, and especially the burghers of Amsterdam, energetically opposed the war, and the Dutch troops had orders not to leave the Spanish strongholds and not to take the field against the French. Whilst the Dutch disputed, Louis XIV. acted. January and February of 1684 having passed without Spain yielding, Marshal d'Humières treated Audenarde as Créqui had treated Luxemburg: he caused a storm of bombs and red-hot shot to hail on Audenarde during three days (March 23–25). A month later, the French troops were everywhere put in motion. The King in person took the command of nearly forty thousand men assembled in Hainault. A second army of thirty-two thousand combatants was formed on the Meuse and the Moselle; Marshal de Créqui led it to invest Luxemburg (April 28). The King, by threatening Mons and Brussels, prevented the enemy from attempting anything for the relief of

[1] The King had given orders to burn "fifty villages of the Spanish dominion" for every French village burned by the enemy. *Œuvres de Louis XIV.*, t. IV. p. 269. On the affairs of the Netherlands, see *Mém. du Comte d'Avaux*, t. I. II. III.

Luxemburg. The siege was conducted by Vauban. In spite of the natural strength of the place, protected by the small river Alsitz and by numerous works cut in the rock, the governor asked to capitulate after three weeks of bombardment. The artillery of Vauban had already opened large breaches in the bastions of rock, and the garrison, which had been found too weak to dispute seriously the external works, was not in a state to await an assault. Luxemburg surrendered June 4. Vauban immediately set to work to make it a stronghold that should rival Metz and Strasburg, — a powerful guardian of the French frontier between the Meuse and the Moselle, forming a line with Sedan, Sarre-Louis, and Landau.

Henceforth Treves was hemmed in between Luxemburg, Thionville, and Sarre-Louis, on one side, and, on the other, the advance-post of Mont-Royal, that separated Treves from Coblentz. Nor was this enough: the Elector of Treves had been fortifying his capital since the peace; Créqui marched on the city and obliged the Elector to raze its exterior works and fill up its fosses (June 20). If Treves had not been the seat of one of the eight Electors, and if Louis XIV. had not hesitated to give the Holy Roman Empire so violent a blow, he would have reannexed this famous city to his crown, as having been dependent on Metz in the time of the kingdom of Austrasia, or as having been the Roman metropolis of the Gauls.

In spite of the desperate efforts made by the Prince of Orange, the Dutch had been kept back by French diplomacy, very skilfully conducted on this point. On beginning the siege of Luxemburg, Louis XIV. had informed the States-General that he should content himself with this place, which would in no respect endanger their *barrier*, only adding to it Beaumont in Hainault, Bouvignes, and Chimay, already occupied by his troops; that he should give up Dixmude and Courtrai dismantled, that he should consent, for Spain as well as for the Emperor and the Empire, to a truce of twenty years, if it proved too difficult to establish peace. The taking of Luxemburg changed nothing in these conditions, and, June 17, the States-General engaged to propose to Spain, the Emperor and the Empire, a project of accommodation on the bases offered by the King of France; they promised to abandon Spain if she did not agree to it.

June 29, Louis XIV. signed, with the United Provinces, a treaty by which he obligated himself to cease hostilities in the Netherlands, reserving the right to carry his arms into the other States of the Catholic King. This was, on the part of Louis, a

sort of relative moderation; for he might, to all appearance, have taken Belgium in a single campaign, even if obliged afterwards to defend it against Holland and England when aroused. The policy of Louis XIV. in Belgium, wholly aggressive as it was, was not devoid of prudence, and might have gone even farther without giving France cause of complaint. What was excessive was not the end, but the means, the harshness of which irritated the people against France.

The dismantling of Treves, as offensive to the Holy Roman empire as it was useful to the French frontier, denoted less conciliation towards Germany than Louis showed towards Holland. Another intervention of the French on the territory of the Empire was much more blameworthy in point of justice and humanity. Since Louis XIV. had caused the demolition of the citadel of Liege, an instrument of tyranny for the prince-bishops against the city, the people of Liege had regained their former liberties and governed themselves almost like a republic. The Elector of Cologne, bishop of Liege, was desirous of again subjecting them to the yoke: they resisted. The Elector, since the peace of Nimeguen had restored to him his minister Fürstenberg, released from an Austrian prison, had renewed his connection with Louis XIV. He invoked the aid of the Great King. A part of the army that had taken Luxemburg was sent on to Liege to reinstate there the officers of the prince-bishop (July–August). The city was not in a condition to defend itself. The two burgomasters or consuls were hung as rebels. The liberties of the citizens of Liege were abolished by the prince-bishop, who sold to an oligarchical corporation of six hundred citizens the exclusive right of participating with him in the election of burgomasters and municipal councillors. The brave Liege population, so sympathetic with France, had not been accustomed to see the French government in complicity with their oppressors; they resented it long and bitterly.[1]

The war, meanwhile, suspended in Belgium since the month of June, continued at other points between France and Spain. The Marshal de Bellefonds had entered Catalonia at the beginning of May, had defeated the Spaniards at the crossing of the Ter, had attacked Gironde without success, then, with the coöperation of the fleet, had taken some small maritime places. These advantages were of little importance; but, during this time, auxiliaries that cost Louis XIV. nothing were dealing far more terrible blows to

[1] *Mém. de d'Avaux*, t. III. Limiers, *Histoire de Louis XIV.*, t. IV. p. 124. *Moniteur* of February 15, 1791, edit. in 4to., t. VII. p. 377.

Spain in her American colonies. The buccaneers of Saint Domingo had not ceased their depredations since the peace of Nimeguen; they paid little attention to the prohibitions of the King in this respect, and the King did not trouble himself much as to whether his prohibitions were respected. The peace broken, they redoubled their fury. Their descents succeeded each other like thunder-claps. After having taken and sacked Vera Cruz and Campeachy, they entered the South Sea, and pillaged fifteen of the richest cities of the Peruvian and Chilian coasts. If these unconquerable men, who recalled, in the seventeenth century, the fierce heroism of the Normans of the ninth century, had been, like them, capable of becoming conquering pirates, they might have overthrown the colonial empire of Spain almost as easily as the Spaniards had formerly overthrown the Mexican and Peruvian empires. More savage than the old Scandinavian pirates, the greed of adventure, the passion for a wandering life, hindered them from establishing themselves in any place; but they caused the effeminate descendants of the conquerors of America cruelly to expiate the crimes of their ancestors. The Spanish-Americans fled before them like flocks before the lion. The Spaniards of Europe at least preserved their honor intact in their decline: they remained always brave!

Spain could hope for aid from no one. Equally irritated against the Dutch and the King of England, she had again intrusted negotiation to the Emperor. She gained nothing by it. Although the Pope had influenced Venice to unite herself with the Emperor and Poland against the Ottoman Porte, Leopold needed all his resources for the war of Hungary, as the Turks were making desperate efforts to avenge their rout at Vienna. French troops began to move toward the Rhine. Louis XIV. desired at any cost a solution of his differences with Germany. Leopold yielded for Germany's sake and his own. August 15, a double truce of twenty years was signed at Ratisbon, the first between the Emperor, the Empire, and the King of France, the second between France and Spain. Louis XIV., during these twenty years, was to remain in possession of Strasburg and its dependencies as well as of all that the chambers of reannexation had adjudged to his crown before August 1, 1681. In 1681, he had offered, in order to keep Strasburg, to restore all the rest of the reannexed territory, even Freiburg. The delays of his adversaries had therefore been of immense profit to him. As to Spain, the conditions were those designated by Louis at the opening of the siege of Luxemburg.[1]

[1] 1 Dumont, 2d part, t. VII. p. 81.

From the peace of Nimeguen to the truce of Ratisbon, France had therefore gained, at least as possessions in fact by provisional title, two fortified first-class places and a whole province, the duchy of Luxemburg. Two other provinces, the Electorate of Treves and the cis-Rhenish Palatinate, were almost wholly in the hands of Louis XIV., thanks to the military positions that the decrees of the chambers of reannexation had acquired for France between the Rhine, the Sarre, and the Moselle. The alliance of the Elector of Cologne extended the ruling influence of Louis XIV. over the rest of the left bank of the Rhine. France had rapidly approached the aim designated by Richelieu, — "the restoration to Gaul of the boundaries fixed by nature."

The truce of Ratisbon marks the culminating point at which the French monarchy and the man that personified it had arrived together. France still fully accepted this personification, and the prestige of Louis the Great had lost none of its lustre. Everything prospered with this favorite of fortune. While his personal grandeur was triumphantly expanding, his dynasty was strengthened by the birth of two grandsons, the dukes of Burgundy and Anjou (August 6, 1682–December 19, 1683). The elder promised him an heir, a continuator; as to the second, he perhaps dreamed, from the first day, of the royal future which the uncertain state of the Spanish succession enabled him to perceive and pave the way for. The public enthusiasm which manifested itself at the birth of the elder of these children had shown to what extent France believed her destiny linked to that of Louis XIV.[1]

The feelings of Europe were very different for this monarch whom it had admired so much, whom it still admired, but at the same time feared and hated. Europe endured only with a shudder that proud dominion that forced everything to bend, that imposed itself everywhere, but by material force and no longer by moral ascendency. At the very moment when Spain and the Empire bowed their heads in signing the truce of Ratisbon, a fresh catastrophe, the bombardment of Genoa, excited to the highest point the general irritation.

The French government had always beheld with much displeasure the intimacy existing between Spain and Genoa since the time of Charles V. and Andrea Doria. Spain had always been especially circumspect towards the Genoese, who were at once her

[1] The memoirs of Sourches, of Choisi, the *Mercure galant*, etc., give curious details concerning the joy caused by the birth of the Duke of Burgundy; Versailles was open to the public; the Great King permitted himself to be embraced by all comers, etc.

bankers and her maritime auxiliaries, much weakened, it is true, in their naval power. The Genoese, on their side, were interested in maintaining friendly relations with the possessors of Milan, Sardinia, and the two Sicilies. Louis XIV. had desired to break this alliance and to make the Genoese accept his protectorate instead of that of the Catholic King. Genoa had refused and had bound herself closer to Spain.[1] A bitterness had resulted, and soon some of those grievances which the strong never fail, when they wish, to find against the weak, had arisen. Genoa had just constructed four galleys to be added, it was said, to the squadron which she kept, by virtue of treaties, at the service of Spain. Louis had *forbidden* the *Seigniory* to launch these galleys: the Seigniory had *disobeyed*. The Genoese had sold munitions to the Algerines when at war with France. They had procured Spanish soldiers from the territory of Milan. They had refused to permit salt belonging to France destined for Montferrat and Mantua to pass through Savona. They refused to redress the grievances of Count de Fiesco, protégé of the King and grand-nephew of the famous conspirator Fiesco of Lavagna, whose property had already been confiscated and his family proscribed by the Seigniory of Genoa. Lastly, they had held language disrespectful to the *glory* of the King.

The Genoese might have been imprudent in divulging a disposition unfriendly to France; but, in order to find in such grievances a cause for war, it was necessary to admit that Louis XIV. had the right to treat Genoa as a rebel vassal, because she had heretofore recognized the suzerainty of Charles VI. and Louis XII. Louis did not say this, but he acted as if he had said it. He threw the envoy of Genoa into the Bastile, as he would have done a factious subject. This Turkish procedure gave the Dutch and German pamphleteers a fine opportunity to raise a cry against the *grand Turk of the French* and *turbanized France*, who learned their manners from their good friends the miscreants.

Louis, unfortunately, did not stop at this petty vengeance. After having violated the law of nations, he was about to trample under

[1] The Spanish marine had the port of Genoa almost at its own disposal, as if it were its owner. In the mean time, the galleys of Spain, to the number of thirty-five, were anchoring there, when they were informed that a French man-of-war was becalmed near the Isle of Elba. All the galleys went out to take her. This vessel, called *le Bon*, Captain Relingue, defended itself at first for five hours against twelve galleys, then nearly all the rest of the day against all the galleys united. The wind finally freshened, and *le Bon* gained Leghorn safe and sound. This is one of the most splendid feats of our maritime annals. See L. Guérin, *Histoire maritime de France*, t. I. p. 584.

foot civilization and humanity. This time, another than Louvois was the tempter. The son of Colbert, the minister of the marine, seized with emulation of Louvois' violence, desired to do on the sea what his rival was doing on the land, urged the King to "thunder down proud Genoa," and embarked on the fleet commanded by Duquesne, in order to reap in person a glory that his father would have shunned. It is said that Duquesne left it all to him, and that this great mariner, wounded at the sight of the young minister taking from him the direction of the operations, shut himself up in his cabin and gave no orders. It is certain that Duquesne never served afterwards. The fleet set sail from the isles of Hyères May 12, 1684, and arrived before Genoa on the 19th. Ten bomb-ketches, each armed with two mortars, formed a line, at cannon-shot distance from the walls, from the light-house to the suburb of Bisagno. They were supported by fourteen men-of-war, twenty galleys, and two fire-ships. The next morning, the senate sent deputies to Seignelai, who signified to them the King's ultimatum. It was necessary to deliver up the four galleys launched in spite of the prohibition of His Majesty, to grant transit for salt through Savona, and to dispatch to the King four senators to ask his pardon; otherwise, the Genoese were to expect the destruction of their city.

The proud city could not resolve on such an abasement. Seignelai received no response, and, the ketches having advanced into the harbor against the request of the commander of the Genoese galleys to retire, the Genoese opened fire. The terrible engines of destruction responded, and did not cease to belch forth conflagration and death during four days; from May 18 to May 22, five thousand bombs burst over Genoa. The palace of the Doge, the palace of the Bank of Saint-George, the arsenal, the general magazine, a great part of the lower town, crumbled in the flames. The 22d, Seignelai renewed his propositions. The agents of Spain, seconded by the popular exasperation, kept the senate from yielding. The 23d, the bombardment recommenced. The 24th, a descent was effected on the suburb of San-Pier d'Arena, that extends from the west of the city beyond the light-house. After a vigorous resistance that cost the Commodore Leri his life, the suburb was taken and reduced to ashes. The sumptuous palaces of the Genoese nobles and merchants, which made this suburb one of the most beautiful places in Europe, were blown up with barrels of powder. From the 25th to the 27th, they showered bombs with such fury, that, on the morning of the 28th, the immense magazines of the fleet were exhausted. They had hurled, since the 18th, 13,300 of these terrible projec-

tiles! Most of the palaces that had given to Genoa the name of the *marble city* were battered down; although Genoa was not so artistic a city as Florence or Venice, a priceless number of objects of art perished. The lower town, the Genoa of the Middle Ages, was almost wholly destroyed; this was also the case with the upper town, the Genoa of the Renaissance.

The fleet set sail again on the 28th and 29th of May. Tourville remained cruising on the Ligurian coast with a few vessels, in order to indicate that the Great King would relinquish his grasp of his victim only with unconditional surrender. To this Genoa did not at first seem disposed; exalted rather than cast down by despair, she concluded an offensive and defensive league with Spain, and called the Spanish galleys into her harbor. Vain recourse to a protector that could not protect herself! Spain did not even succeed in causing the Genoese to be included in the truce of Ratisbon; threatened on the coast of Catalonia by the fleet that had been the executioner of Genoa, she abandoned her unfortunate allies. It was the first time that she resigned herself to such a disgrace, for fidelity to alliances had generally been the honorable side of her policy. The Genoese invoked the mediation of the Pope, who interposed, although he was himself on ill terms with Louis XIV. Louis modified his material exactions: he ceased to demand the four galleys, on condition that they should be disarmed and that Genoa should dismiss the Spanish troops and renounce all leagues and associations contracted since the 1st of January, 1683. He said no more about the transit of salt, contented himself with one hundred thousand crowns for his protégé Fiesco, and was pleased not to impose indemnity for losses suffered by French merchants whom the people of Genoa had pillaged, stipulating that the republic should devote an equivalent of this indemnity to the reparation of church-edifices ruined by the bombs; but he made the Genoese purchase these concessions by the greatest humiliation that a free State could undergo. He demanded that the chief magistrate, the Doge of Genoa, in spite of laws that forbade him to put his foot outside of the city, should come in person, with four senators, "to testify, in the name of the Republic of Genoa, its extreme regret for having displeased His Majesty, in most respectful and submissive terms."

Resistance was impossible; the treaty was signed at Versailles February 12, 1685. May 15, in this same palace of Versailles, the chief of the seigniory of Genoa, the Doge Imperiale Lescaro, appeared before the throne of Louis XIV. and presented the submission of his republic to the monarch, "who surpassed in valor,

in greatness and in magnanimity all the kings of past ages, and would bequeath his immovable power to his descendants." It was Seignelai who had dictated all those hyperboles and the ceremonial of the audience. In other respects, Louis endeavored to make the Doge and the senators forget, by the friendliness of his reception, what was most painful in their mission, and treated them much better than Louvois, Croissi, and Seignelai. "The King," said the Doge Imperiale, "takes away the liberty of our hearts by his manner of receiving us; but his ministers give it back to us."

Whatever might be the personal impression of the noble travellers in regard to the King, the moral effect of the war of Genoa was deplorable. This sterile satisfaction of pride, extorted by such barbarous means, made France more enemies than the conquest, so useful and so national, of Strasburg and Luxemburg.[1]

The expedition of Genoa was followed by other maritime expeditions and other bombardments more justifiable against the Barbary States. The African regencies were a prey to an anarchy that permitted no regular intercourse with them: treaties were violated as soon as concluded. The Tripolitans had already forgotten the fear which Duquesne had caused them at Scio, and had resumed piracy at the expense of French commerce. Vice-Admiral d'Estrées, whom the King had made Marshal of France, was sent to chastise them with a squadron that Tourville commanded under him. The terrible bomb-ketches had their customary effect against Tripoli. After three days of bombardment (June 22–24, 1685), the inhabitants implored peace and submitted to pay five hundred thousand livres of damage for their piracies; they released their French slaves, or those taken under the French flag, and acknowledged the supremacy of the French flag above all others. Returning from Tripoli, the squadron presented itself before Tunis, that had given some causes of complaint, and that hastened to repair them by renewing her treaty with France (August 30, 1685). Tourville was detached towards Algiers, which also made reparation for some infractions of the treaty of the preceding year.

With the Barbary States everything had always to be done over again. Algiers, so severely chastised, was incorrigible. After new depredations, D'Estrées was ordered, in 1688, to renew the expedition of 1683. Tourville, with the vanguard of the fleet, met, in the Straits of Alicante, the vice-admiral of Spain, Papachin; the instructions of the King required him to exact a salute from all for-

[1] Quinci, *Histoire militaire de Louis XIV.*, II. 86. Dumont, t. VII. 2d part, 87. L. Guérin, I. 158. E. Sue, *Histoire de la marine française*, III. 444.

eign navies, except the English, which was neither to ask nor to receive. Tourville required the salute from Papachin. The Spaniard refused. Papachin had two vessels of seventy-four and fifty-four guns. Tourville had one of fifty-four, one of thirty-eight, and a smaller one. He attacked without hesitation, and compelled the two Spanish ships to strike their flags (June 2, 1688). This was not the only passage at arms of this kind that grew out of the question of the flag. While admiring the valor of our seamen, it must be acknowledged that this was an unfortunate imitation of English pretensions to the tyranny of the seas.

Three weeks afterwards, the bomb-ketches reappeared before Algiers. The execution was still more frightful than under Duquesne; in the course of sixteen days ten thousand bombs were hurled upon a city of moderate size. All the structures that had escaped destruction in 1683, or that had been rebuilt since, were burned, crushed, pulverized. Six vessels were sunk in the harbor (July, 1688). There followed a new treaty in September, 1689, a treaty as ill observed as all the preceding. A first-class invasion, a serious attempt at conquest, would have cost no more than these continually repeated expeditions; but there was occupation in another direction and in other struggles; and the embassies of the Barbary States that came repeatedly to bring to the Great King words of peace and submission, were more flattering to his pride than fertile in results.[1]

Frequent deputations from remote countries, attracted by the renown of the King of France, and by the multiplication of relations, thus succeeded each other at the court, and made, thus to speak, an obligatory part of the pomps of Versailles. Already, before the war with Holland, the envoy of a chief from the coast of Guinea, of the black King of Ardrat, had been received with as much ceremony as if he had been the representative of a great power. Two Muscovite ambassadors had appeared before Louis XIV. in 1668 and 1681.[2] In 1684, there came, from the farthest east, another deputation that excited the most lively curiosity, and singularly flattered the King. An adventurer named Constance Phaulkon, a Greek by birth, brought up among the English, had become minister of the King of Siam, the most powerful prince of

[1] Quinci, t. II. pp. 118–147. L. Guérin, t. I. p. 540. E. Sue, t. III. p. 503. Dumont, t. VII. 2d part, p. 105.

[2] Louis XIV. sent, on his side, an agent into Russia, and it is said persuaded the two young czars, Ivan and Peter, from uniting themselves with the Emperor and Poland against the Turks. See *la Cour de France turbanisée*, p. 168. There came a third Muscovite embassy in 1685; see *les Mém. de Sourches*, t. IV. p. 118.

the eastern peninsula of the Indies. Constance sought support, among the maritime States of Europe, both for himself and for the kingdom that he governed. The King of Siam was at war with all the Indian princes, his neighbors, and disquieted by the Dutch, who possessed Malacca, and held sway over the Sunda Islands; the progress of French settlements in Hindostan had attracted his attention: Constance persuaded him to solicit the friendship of the King of France. The Siamese envoys embarked in 1681, on a vessel of the Oriental Company; they perished by shipwreck. A second deputation arrived in France in the autumn of 1684; it was not addressed directly to the King, but only to his ministers. Constance prayed them to induce their master to send an embassy to his prince, and threw out hints that the Indian monarch might be led to embrace the Christian religion. Thereupon, zeal for conversion took fire: the Jesuits, who, some time before, had succeeded in introducing themselves into China as mathematicians and astronomers, thought they saw a new empire already subjected to their missionaries. Six of them, destined for China, repaired at first to Siam with the envoy of Louis XIV. The ambassador Chaumont was received in the most brilliant manner by the Indian King; liberty of commerce and free teaching of Christianity were granted, and Constance offered to receive a French garrison in two places admirably situated for trade: these were Bangkok, near the mouth of the Menam, the principal river of Siam, and Mergui, on the bay of Bengal. A new embassy, more imposing, set out for France with M. de Chaumont, and had an audience of Louis XIV., September 1, 1686. The physiognomy, the costume, the ceremonies of the Siamese *opras* (mandarins) for a long time gave food for conversation at court and in the city. Louis XIV. sent to Siam six vessels carrying two political agents, fourteen Jesuits, and a body of troops. Bangkok and Mergui were faithfully delivered to the French (September–October, 1687).

The beginning was brilliant; the end did not correspond to it. The King of Siam, the great protector of foreigners, but very unpopular among his subjects, was seized with a mortal malady. The encroaching proselytism of the Jesuits, and the favor shown to the French, had excited a lively irritation among the Siamese people, who professed Buddhism, the prevailing religion of central and eastern Asia. One of the *opras*, or grandees of the kingdom, put himself at the head of a conspiracy, seconded by the Buddhist priests (talapoins); the chief of the embassy returned from France was himself one of the principal agents of the plot: the favorite

Constance was killed by the death-bed of the King; the chief of the conspirators seized the throne, and the small French garrisons of Bangkok and Mergui, swallowed up in the midst of a whole people in revolt, were compelled to capitulate and reëmbark (November, 1688). Religious propagandism thus caused the failure of a settlement that might have succeeded, if it had been solely political and commercial, like those of the Dutch and the English.[1]

This result was very far from the hopes conceived four years before, on the arrival of the first Siamese envoys. At this epoch, that is, during the first months that followed the truce of Ratisbon, the policy of Louis the Great foresaw no check on any point of the horizon. Save the dream of the Empire, which receded in proportion to the efforts of Louis to arrest it, the projects of the King were on the road to success, and all of his enemies seemed powerless to injure him. The authority of the Prince of Orange appeared greatly weakened in the United Provinces, and the campaign of 1684 had been unfortunate in Hungary for the Austro-Germanic arms, in spite of diversions made by the Poles in Wallachia and by the Venetians in Greece. The Turks had forced the Duke of Lorraine and the Elector of Bavaria to raise the siege of Buda with very great loss (November, 1684). In England, save some oscillations, everything was progressing to suit Louis XIV. Charles II., since he had dissolved his Parliament in 1681, had steered straight towards absolute power, aided by the gold of France, and by the royalist reaction that had taken place among the upper classes of English society. The Duke of York, lately tossed about by so many storms, had been recalled without hindrance from Scotland to London by his brother (June, 1682), after the Scotch Parliament had declared the order of succession inviolable under penalty of high treason. The natural son of the King, the Duke of Monmouth, the most ardent chief of the party opposed to the Duke of York, was imprisoned, and violent persecutions were directed against the leading Whigs, who had projected certain movements in England and Scotland. Just as they had recently accused the Catholics of having desired to assassinate the King in order to elevate the Duke of York to the throne, they were accused of having engaged in a plot hatched by a few fanatics for the purpose of killing the King and his brother for the benefit of the Prince of Orange, of Monmouth, or of the republic. Shaftesbury fled, and went to die in a foreign

[1] *Mém. de Choisi*, p. 610 (Choisi formed part of the embassy of Chaumont). *Relation du chevalier de Chaumont*, ap. *Archives curieuses*, 2d series, t. V. Flassan, t. IV. p. 78. La Martinière, t. IV. p. 868. Larrei, t. II. p. 76.

land; the Earl of Essex committed suicide in prison; Lord Russell was condemned to death: he would have probably obtained pardon if he had consented to acknowledge armed resistance against arbitrary acts as never allowable; he refused, and died a martyr to the right of resistance. After him Algernon Sidney mounted the scaffold, who, pursuing an ideal more elevated, but less accessible than that pursued by the other leaders of the opposition, had never ceased to aspire to the reëstablishment of the republic, whilst his friends only aimed at a change of dynasty (July–December, 1683). He met his end stoically, esteeming it a glory to die for the *good old cause*. The King's son, Monmouth, purchased his pardon by shameful revelations concerning the projects in which he had participated, and by humble submission to his father and his uncle. He retired to Holland. The very day of Lord Russell's execution, the University of Oxford hurled an anathema against the doctrine that the civil authority proceeds originally from the people, and that violation of the social contract by the prince frees the people from the duty of obedience. Passive obedience was everywhere taught by the Anglican clergy, and the tribunals punished every contrary allegation as a crime of high treason. The old liberties of the Middle Ages were breached on every hand. The franchises of the city of London and of many other corporations were suppressed, less, in truth, for the purpose of definitively abrogating them than for that of reëstablishing them under another form for the benefit of the Tories and the exclusion of the Whigs. The Duke of York reëntered the council of the King (June, 1684): at the same time persecutions against Papacy were relaxed; capital sentences pronounced against Catholic priests were commuted; the Catholic lords, confined for five years, were released, and Titus Oates, the denouncer of the famous Papist plot, was put into the pillory as a calumniator. Charles II., it is true, in order to allay the apprehensions of the Anglicans, compelled the Duke of York to give his second daughter, the Princess Anne, a Protestant like the first, in marriage to a Protestant prince, the King of Denmark's brother.

At the close of 1684, the fickle Charles II. showed some symptoms of veering about anew; the excessive zeal of his brother wearied his indifference, and Louis XIV. had ceased to pay his pension since the truce of Ratisbon. He secretly promised Monmouth to recall him and again to dismiss York; he had, it is said, some inclination to convoke Parliament. However this may have been, he had no time to retrace his steps. He was seized with apoplexy February 12, 1685, eluded the offer of the sacraments made by

an Anglican bishop, and received them in secret from a Catholic priest sent by the Duke of York. He died a lukewarm Catholic, after having lived an epicurean (February 16).

The Duke of York, become James II., occupied, without the least opposition, that throne from which a powerful party had pretended to exclude him. He at once ostentatiously exercised his religion in his royal chapel, and opened the prisons to Catholics and dissenters who had been incarcerated for refusing to take the oath; but as an offset, he protested that he would maintain the legal government of Church and State, and convoked the parliaments of England and Scotland. Public opinion sustained him, although he had at the same time begun with the arbitrary prorogation of imposts extinguished with Charles II. The parliament of Scotland set the Parliament of England an example of royalism. It rejected with *abhorrence* maxims contrary to the *sacred* and *absolute* authority of the monarch, and granted him an impost for the whole period of his reign. The English Parliament also granted a life impost. Meanwhile, a double attack was made from without upon the new King. The Duke of Monmouth and the Earl of Argyle, at the head of a few hundred Whigs, dissenters, and republican refugees from Holland, made a descent, one into England, the other into Scotland (May–June, 1685). The municipal authorities of Amsterdam had closed their eyes to the preparations of the refugees, and Monmouth, who pretended to have rights to the crown of England, Charles II., he said, having secretly espoused his mother, had promised the English republicans not to arrogate to himself the title of King if he succeeded, but to await the decision of Parliament. Monmouth, disembarked the 21st of June, on the coast of Dorset, issued a proclamation against "the usurper James of York," whom he accused of all sorts of crimes, among others of having poisoned Charles II.; he collected several thousand men in the southwestern counties, took the title of King notwithstanding his engagements, lost the battle of Sedgemoor, July 15, was arrested in his flight, and beheaded on the 24th. His ally Argyle had suffered the same fate three weeks before. The parliaments of England and Scotland had supported the King with extraordinary subsidies and energetic measures. The military commanders and magistrates of James II. punished the real or supposed abettors of the rebellion with a barbarity that has doomed to a frightful celebrity the names of Kirke and Jeffreys. Women who were respected by all were burned alive for having given asylum to those proscribed. The miserable agents of James II. had not even the excuse of

fanaticism, and joined to their ferocity the basest cupidity. Chief Justice Jeffreys has remained in history the ideal of the wicked judge. His master, worthy of him, made him lord-chancellor as a reward for acts that merited a thousand deaths.

It would seem that James II., menaced by his kindred, devoted to the most perilous projects, ought to have leaned without reserve upon the King of France. Such was not the case; and Louis XIV., who had hastened, at the accession of James, to send him five hundred thousand livres to supply his first needs, then another sum to corrupt members of Parliament, was unwilling to promise him the reëstablishment of the pension which his brother had received, without being assured of his good intentions. He had been informed that James, even while expressing his gratitude more like a vassal than a sovereign, had received in a friendly manner the protestations of the Prince of Orange against Monmouth, and was negotiating with the States-General. In fact, the defensive treaty of March, 1678, between England and the United Provinces, was renewed August 17, 1685. James, whilst he was endeavoring to effect an insensate and impossible counter-revolution in his own kingdom, had occasional fits of independence with respect to foreign influence. The little healthy feeling that was left him was destined to concur in his ruin.[1]

He paused, however, in the course he had taken in regard to foreign policy; he refused to renew with Spain the treaty of 1680, which his brother had not executed, also to accept any proposition which might lead him into war with France (November–December, 1685), and gave his whole attention to internal affairs. He opened the second session of Parliament with the triple design of securing a good standing army, of abolishing the Test Act which excluded from office all but adherents to the Anglican Church, and of the law of *habeas corpus*, the guaranty of personal liberty (November, 1685). The opposition, for several years so much borne down, then began to lift its head. Louis XIV. vigorously supported James II., and authorized his ambassador to aid him with two millions in case of revolt. The heirs of Philip II. and Ferdinand II., Spain and Austria, and the Pope himself, through hostility to the King of France, on the contrary counselled the English monarch to moderation. There was a complete reversal of parts in Europe.

The enterprise for which James II. was about to stake his throne

[1] See Macaulay, *History of England from the Accession of James II.*, ch. 4, 5. From the period at which this excellent work begins, there is need of no other guide on the affairs of England. It is only necessary to make some reservations in regard to what concerns France.

coincided with that which was destined, in the hands of Louis the Great, to deal such a terrible blow to the true glory and true interest of France. The means, like the situations, were very different, yet the end was the same, the triumph of Catholicism. In England, where Catholicism was oppressed, it was first necessary to conquer for it the right to live, equality with the established worship, without prejudice to pursuing its domination later; in France, where it was dominant, the time seemed to have come to annihilate before it all dissent: the work of destroying Protestantism approached its catastrophe.

An extraordinary and mysterious event, occurring in the private life of Louis XIV., naturally contributed to hurry the Great King down this declivity. The Queen Maria Theresa had closed, July 30, 1683, an existence that left recollections only by the contrast of her nature, passive, simple, and naïve even to rusticity, with all the sparkling feminine figures that surrounded Louis the Great. Louis for some time had been living with the Queen in an exemplary manner, and had renounced his mistresses. To the great surprise of the court, he persisted in his *conversion* after the death of Maria Theresa; but it was quickly suspected, that, if he did not become entangled anew in gallant intrigues, it was because he had secretly renewed legitimate ties. The suspicion was true. In the course of 1684 (the precise date is unknown) a marriage mass was celebrated by night in an oratory of Versailles; the witnesses were a gentleman by the name of Montchevreuil and one of the King's valets-de-chambre, Bontemps; the officiating priest was Father La Chaise; the nuptial benediction was pronounced by the diocesan, the Archbishop of Paris, Harlai; the parties married were the King of France and the widow of Scarron![1]

Such was the issue of the singular relations between Louis XIV. and Madame de Maintenon. He was then between forty-six and forty-seven years old; she was nearly fifty. The virtue of Madame de Maintenon was of the kind that, without forgetting celestial rewards, knows well how to secure a first reward on earth.

No impartial mind, however, could find in this union, however strange it might have appeared, reason for blaming Louis XIV. Louis was unwilling to create a new queen by espousing a foreign princess, or to beget new children to France, now that the continuance of his race was guaranteed by two grandsons. He knew that the multiplication of princes of the blood was a grievous gift to France. He desired nevertheless a legitimate wife. He had

[1] Noailles, *Histoire de madame de Maintenon*, t. II. ch. 2, 3.

about him a person whose society had become his greatest pleasure and as it were a necessity of his life; the age of this woman was a guaranty against the complications that might be caused by the birth of children of uncertain condition. He therefore contracted with her a marriage of conscience, without authentic act and without civil effect. It was, after all, less a weakness than a victory over prejudices. It is equitable to judge the fact in itself, and not by the consequences that are attributed to it.

Every one, however, did not thus judge of it. A little before the accomplishment of this marriage, Louis XIV. having communicated his project to Louvois, then at the summit of favor, the minister threw himself at the feet of the King and conjured him, with tears in his eyes, not to dishonor himself by espousing the widow of Scarron. Louis pardoned this insult in a servant who was necessary to him and who had offended him only through zeal for his *glory;* but Madame de Maintenon, from whom the King had not the discretion to conceal this scene, did not pardon him and went over to the side of Seignelai against Louvois. She certainly had much weight in the advance made by Seignelai in the King's favor, and in the sort of equilibrium that was established between this young minister and his rival.[1]

Thus established in a firm position, Madame de Maintenon increased her influence, already very great, and exercised it in an almost insensible, yet almost universal manner, without ever obtruding herself or directly intervening in affairs, which Louis would not have tolerated, and without ever clashing with what in Louis was a determined course or decided inclination, which would have been useless, or, at the very least, would have exposed her to dangerous collisions. Through love of economy and desire to relieve the people, she would have been glad if the expenditures for buildings and the pomp of the court had been reduced; she never dared

[1] *Mém. de Choisi*, liv. VII. Saint-Simon pretends that the scene between the King and Louvois was repeated several years afterwards; that, the King having had the weakness to promise Madame de Maintenon that he would *declare* his marriage, Louvois drew his sword, praying the King to kill him rather than force him to behold *such a disgrace*. Louis, moved and troubled, then gave his word that he would never make this declaration. Saint-Simon contends that Madame de Maintenon aimed not only to make her connection with the King publicly known, but also to cause him to declare her Queen. The judgment of Madame de Maintenon was too sound, and her ambition too prudent, too free from impulse and vanity, to make this assertion probable. She doubtless desired that her position should be less equivocal, and that her marriage should receive the authenticity that morganatic alliances of princes have in Germany; she could not even obtain this, and probably did not carry her hopes further.

insist upon this point; through a spirit of moderation and prudence, she desired to divert Louis from ideas of aggrandizement and conquest; on this point she was bolder,[1] but, unfortunately, she diverted Louis from war for a season only to urge him on to something worse than war. In this respect she did not at first meet with so much opposition as might have been expected from Louvois, who did not show himself opposed to the truce of Ratisbon. Louvois had at present, in order to maintain himself with the King, two other points of support than war, that is, arts and constructions, and the extinction of heresy. He willingly consented to hasten first this latter enterprise, to which the King gave himself up entirely after the truce of Ratisbon. Better would it have been to have continued his efforts, even by war, to extend France to her natural boundaries, than to have made such a murderous and fatal use of the truce! We have therefore to deplore the relative moderation of Louis XIV.!

For many years the government of Louis XIV. had been acting towards the Reformation as towards a victim entangled in a noose which is drawn tighter and tighter till it strangles its prey. In 1683, the oppressed had finally lost patience, and their partial attempts at resistance, disavowed by the most distinguished of their brethren, had been stifled in blood. After the truce of Ratisbon, declarations and decrees hostile to Protestantism succeeded each other with frightful rapidity; nothing else was seen in the official gazette. Protestant ministers were prohibited from officiating longer than three years in the same church (August, 1684); Protestant individuals were forbidden to give asylum to their sick coreligionists; the sick who were not treated at home were required to go to the hospitals, where they were put in the hands of churchmen. A beautiful and touching request, written by Pastor Claude, was in vain presented to the King in January, 1685. Each day beheld some Protestant church closed for contraventions either imaginary or fraudulently fabricated by persecutors. It was enough that the child of a *convert* or a bastard (all bastards were reputed Catholic) should enter a Protestant church for the exercise of worship to be interdicted there. If this state of things had continued long, not a single Protestant church would have been left. The Protestant academy or university of Saumur, which had formed so many eminent theologians and orators, was closed; the ministers were subjected to the villain tax for their real estate (January, 1685). The quinquennial assembly of

[1] See his letter of June, 1684, cited by Rulhière, p. 159.

the clergy, held in May, presented to the King a multitude of new demands against the heretics; among others, for the establishment of penalties against the *converts* who did not fulfil their duties as Catholics. The penalty of death, which had been decreed against emigrants, was commuted into perpetual confinement in the galleys, by the request of the clergy. The first penalty had been little more than a threat; the second, which confounded with the vilest miscreants unfortunates guilty of having desired to flee from persecution, was to be applied in the sternest reality! It was extended to Protestants living in France who should authorize their children to marry foreigners. It was interdicted to Reformers to follow the occupation of printer or bookseller. It was forbidden to confer on them degrees in arts, law, or medicine. Protestant orphans could have only Catholic guardians. Half of the goods of emigrants was promised to informers. It was forbidden to Reformers to preach or write against Catholicism (July–August, 1685).[1]

A multitude of Protestant churches had been demolished, and the inhabitants of places where worship had been suppressed were prohibited from going to churches in places where it was still permitted. Grave difficulties resulted with respect to the principal acts of civil life, which, among Protestants as among Catholics, owed their authenticity only to the intervention of ministers of religion. A decree in council of September 15, enacted, that in places deprived of the exercise of worship, a pastor chosen by the intendant of the generality should celebrate, in the presence of relatives only, the marriages of Reformers; that their bans should be published to the congregations, and the registries of their marriages entered on the rolls of the local court. Similar decrees had been issued concerning baptisms and burials. Hitherto Protestantism had been struck right and left with all kinds of weapons, without any very definite method: these decrees seemed to indicate a definite plan, that is, the suppression of external worship, with a certain tolerance, at least provisionally, for conscience, and a kind of civil state, separately constituted for obstinate Protestants.[2]

This plan had, in fact, been debated in council. "The King," wrote Madame de Maintenon, August 13, 1684, "has it in mind to work for the *entire* conversion of heretics; he has frequent conferences for this purpose with M. le Tellier and M. de Châteauneuf (the secretary of state charged with the affairs of the so-called

[1] *Anciennes Lois françaises*, t. XIX. pp. 469–527. *Hist. de l'Edit de Nantes*, t. V. liv. XXI. XXII. *Mém. de Foucault*, in the sequel of those of Sourches, t. II.

[2] Rulhière, p. 296.

Reformed religion), in which they wish to persuade me to take part. M. de Châteauneuf has proposed means that are unsuitable. Things must not be hastened. *It is necessary to convert, not to persecute.* M. de Louvois prefers mild measures, which do not accord with his nature and his eagerness to see things ended."[1]

The means proposed by Châteauneuf was apparently the immediate revocation of the Edict of Nantes, which was judged premature. As to the *mildness* of Louvois, it was soon seen in operation. Louvois pretended to be moderate, lest the King, through scruples of humanity, should hesitate to confer on him the management of the affair. He had his plan ready: it was to recur to the *salutary constraint* already tried in 1681 by the instrumentality of soldiers, to the *Dragoonade.* Colbert was no longer at hand to interpose obstacles to this.

An occasion soon presented itself: at the close of March, 1685, Louis XIV. was informed that an important project was being concocted between the two branches of the House of Austria and the young Elector Maximilian of Bavaria. The Emperor was to give in marriage to the Elector his daughter Maria Anna, whom he had had by a sister of the King of Spain, and wished, it was said, to obtain from Don Carlos II. the government of the Netherlands for his future son-in-law. It was certain that the feeble King of Spain, although married six years before to a niece of Louis XIV., would die without posterity. At his death, the government of the Netherlands would be transferred as an estate to the Electress of Bavaria and her husband, and the cabinet of Vienna would doubtless strive to obtain the annexation of Bavaria to Austria in exchange for some other shred of the Spanish succession. Louis XIV. took his resolution with customary vigor. In a fortnight, Louvois had assembled an army-corps at the foot of the Pyrenees. An ambassador, Feuquières, went in great haste to signify to the Spanish cabinet that, if the projects they were brewing were not instantly disavowed, the army assembled in Béarn would immediately carry war "into the most vital parts of the Spanish monarchy." Louvois had induced the King to adopt a plan of invading Spain by way of Navarre, proposed during the Dutch war by Gourville, a mind fit for anything; this plan had then probably been put aside, because Louvois feared that the war would end too quickly. Spain, not in a condition to bear the collision, hastened to give all the

[1] In another letter, several months anterior, Madame de Maintenon says that P. La Chaise "inspires the King with great things; that soon all the subjects of the King will serve God in spirit and in truth." Rulhière, p. 157.

assurances exacted of her, and the army did not cross the mountains.[1]

The army, however, was not disbanded. It had been resolved to employ it against other enemies. The King, having obtained what he wished of the Spaniards, reassured them and even strove to interest them in his religious projects. "You will give them to understand," he wrote to his ambassador, "that all my designs tend only to strengthen the peace of Europe, and to profit by so favorable a conjuncture of time, in order to add to the happiness of my subjects that of a perfect and entire reunion in the bosom of the Church, and in order to contribute, as much as shall lie in my power, to the increase of our religion in all the Christian States where it is beginning to revive."[2]

These last words alluded to England and the enterprise of James II.

Louvois had persuaded the King that in the moral situation of Protestant communities it would be enough *to show them the troops* to compel them to abjure. *The troops had been shown*, therefore, to the Reformers of Béarn; the intendant of that province, Foucault, had come to Paris to concert with the minister the management of the enterprise; Louvois could not have found a fitter instrument than this pitiless and indefatigable man, who had the soul of an inquisitor under the garb of a pliant courtier.[3] On his return from Paris, Foucault, seconded by the parliament of Pau and the clergy, began by the demolition, on account of *contraventions*, of fifteen out of twenty Protestant churches that remained in Béarn, and the *conversion* of eleven hundred persons in two months (February–April, 1685). He then called for the assistance of the army to complete the work, promising "to keep a tight rein over the soldiers, so that they should do no violence."[4] This was for the purpose of allaying the scruples of the King. The troops were therefore concentrated in the cities and villages filled with Reformers; the five remaining Protestant churches shared the fate of the rest, and the pastors were banished, some to a distance of six leagues from their demolished churches, others beyond the jurisdiction of the parliament of Pau. Terror flew before the soldiers; as soon as the scarlet uni-

[1] Rulhière, p. 197. *Mém. de Gourville*, p. 559. Noailles, *Hist. de madame de Maintenon*, t. II. p. 407.

[2] Rulhière, p. 200.

[3] He was very learned, and, by a contrast in which the Reformers were destined to mark the finger of Providence, he had discovered and published the celebrated treatise of Lactantius on the punishment of persecutors, *De mortibus persecutorum*.

[4] *Mém. de Foucault*, p. 277.

forms and the high caps of the dragoons[1] were descried, corporations, whole cities, sent their submission to the intendant. An almost universal panic chilled all hearts. The mass of Reformers signed or verbally accepted a confession of the Catholic faith, suffered themselves to be led to the church, bowed their heads to the benediction of the bishop or the missionary, and cannon and bonfires celebrated the *happy reconciliation*. Protestants who had hoped to find a refuge in liberty of conscience without external worship saw this last hope vanish. Foucault paid no attention to the decrees in council that regulated the baptisms, marriages, and burials of Protestants, because, he said in a despatch to the minister, "in the present disposition to general and speedy conversion, this would expose those who waver, and harden the obstinate." The council issued a new order confirmatory of the preceding ones, and specially for Béarn. Foucault, according to his own words, "did not judge proper to execute it." This insolence went unpunished. Success justified everything. Before the end of August, the twenty-two thousand Protestants of Béarn were *converted*, save a few hundred. Foucault, in his Memoirs, in which he exhibits his triumphs with cynicism, does not, however, avow all the means. Although he confesses that "the distribution of money drew many souls to the Church," he does not say how he kept his promise of preventing the "soldiers from doing any violence." He does not recount the brutalities, the devastations, the tortures resorted to against the refractory, the outrages to women, nor how these soldiers took turns from hour to hour to hinder their hosts from sleeping during entire weeks, till these unfortunates, stupefied, delirious, signed an abjuration.[2]

The King saw only the result. The resolution was taken to send everywhere these *booted missionaries* who had succeeded so well in Béarn. Louvois sent, on the part of the King, July 31, a command to the Marquis de Boufflers, their general, to lead them into Guienne, and "to quarter them all on the Reformers . . . . observing to endeavor to diminish the number of Reformers, in such a manner that, in each community, the Catholics shall be twice or three times more numerous than they; so that, when, in due time, His Majesty shall wish no longer to permit the exercise of this religion in his kingdom, he may no longer have to appre-

[1] The dragoons especially were used, as serving on foot or on horse, and adapted to everything.

[2] *Hist. de l'Édit de Nantes*, t. V. liv. XXII. *Mém. de Foucault*, pp. 278–287. These memoirs of a persecutor are, notwithstanding much reticence, the contemporary monument in which are best seen the manner and motives of persecution.

hend that the small number that shall remain can undertake anything." The troops were to be withdrawn as fast as this object should be obtained in each place, without undertaking to convert all at once. The ministers should be driven out of the country, and by no means should they be retained by force; the pastors absent, the flocks could more easily be brought to reason. The soldiers were to commit "no other disorders than to levy (daily) twenty sous for each horseman or dragoon, and ten sous for each foot-soldier." Excesses were to be severely punished. Louvois, in another letter, warned the General not to yield to all the suggestions of the ecclesiastics, nor even of the intendants. They did not calculate on being able to proceed so rapidly as in Béarn.

These instructions show precisely, not what was done, but what the King wished should be done. The subalterns, sure of impunity in case of success, acted much more in accordance with the spirit of Louvois than according to the words dictated by Louis. The King, when by chance he heard that his orders had been transcended, rarely chastised the transgressor, lest it might be "said to the Reformers that His Majesty disapproves of whatsoever has been done to convert them." Louis XIV. therefore cannot repudiate, before history, his share of this terrible responsibility.[1]

The result exceeded the hopes of the King and of Louvois. Guienne yielded as easily as Béarn. The Church of Montauban, the headquarters of the Reformation in this region, was *reunited* in great majority, after several days of military vexations; Bergerac held out a little longer; then all collective resistance ceased. The cities and villages, for ten or twelve leagues around, sent to the military leaders their promises of abjuration. In three weeks there were sixty thousand conversions in the district of Bordeaux or Lower Guienne, twenty thousand in that of Montauban, or Upper Guienne. According to the reports of Boufflers, Louvois, September 7, reckoned that, before the end of the month, there would not remain, in Lower Guienne, ten thousand Reformers, out of the one hundred and fifty thousand found there August 15. "There is not a courier," wrote Madame de Maintenon, September 26, "that does not bring the King great causes of joy, to wit, news of conversions by thousands."[2] The only resistance that they deigned to notice here and there, was that of certain provin-

[1] See the letters of Louvois in Rulhière, p. 212. Yet M. de Noailles (t. II. p. 417) cites another letter, in which the King speaks of examples to be made against officers who *should escape*.

[2] Rulhière, p. 287.

cial gentlemen, of simple and rigid habits, less disposed than the court nobility to sacrifice their faith to interest and vanity.

Guienne subjected, the army of Béarn was marched, a part into Limousin, Saintonge, and Poitou, a part into Languedoc. Poitou, already *dragooned* in 1681 by the intendant Marillac, had just been so well labored with by Marillac's successor, Lamoignon de Basville, aided by some troops, that Foucault, sent from Béarn into Poitou, found nothing more to glean. The King even caused Louvois to recommend that they should not undertake to convert all the Reformers at once, lest the rich and powerful families, who had in their hands the commerce of those regions, should avail themselves of the proximity of the sea to take flight (September 8). Basville, a great administrator, but harshly inflexible, was sent from Poitou into Lower Languedoc, in the first part of September, in order to coöperate there with the Duke de Noailles, governor of the province. The intendant of Lower Languedoc, D'Aguesseau, although he had zealously coöperated in all the restrictive measures of the Reformed worship, had asked for his recall as soon as he had seen that the King was determined on the employment of military force; convinced that this determination would not be less fatal to religion than to the country, he retired, broken-hearted, his spirit troubled for the future.[1]

The conversion of Languedoc seemed a great undertaking. The mass of Protestants, nearly all concentrated in Lower Languedoc, and in the mountainous regions adjoining, was estimated at more than two hundred and forty thousand souls; these people, more ardent, more constant than the mobile and skeptical Gascons, did not seem capable of so easily abandoning their belief. The result, however, was the same as elsewhere. Nîmes and Montpelier followed the example of Montauban. The quartering of a hundred soldiers in their houses quickly reduced the notables of Nîmes; in this diocese alone, the principal centre of Protestantism, sixty thousand souls abjured in three days. Several of the leading ministers did the same. From Nîmes the Duke de Noailles led the troops into the mountains. Cévennes and Gevaudan submitted to invasion like the rest, as the armed mission advanced from valley to valley. These cantons were still under the terror of the sanguinary repressions of 1683, and had been disarmed, as far as it was possible, as well as all Lower Languedoc. Noailles, in the earlier part of October, wrote to Louvois that he would answer *upon his head* that, before the end of November, the province would

[1] *Vie de M. d'Aguesseau*, ap. *Œuvres de d'Aguesseau*, t. XIV.; Rulhière, p. 209.

contain no more Huguenots. If we are to believe his letters, prepared for the eyes of the King, everything must have taken place "with all possible wisdom and discipline"; but the Chancellor d'Aguesseau, in the Life of his father the intendant, teaches us what we are to think of it. "The manner in which this miracle was wrought," he says, "the singular facts that were recounted to us day by day, would have sufficed to pierce a heart less religious than that of my father!" Noailles himself, in a confidential letter, announced to Louvois that he would ere long send "some capable men to answer about any matters which he desired to know, and about which he could not write." There was a half tacit understanding established between the minister, the military chiefs, and the intendants. The King, in their opinion, desired the end without sufficiently desiring the means.[1]

Dauphiny, Limousin, La Rochelle, that holy Zion of the Huguenots, all yielded at the same time. Louis was intoxicated. It had sufficed for him to say a word, to lay his hand upon the hilt of his sword, to make those fierce Huguenots, who had formerly worn out so many armies, and had forced so many kings to capitulate before their rebellions, fall at his feet and the feet of the Church. Who would henceforth dare to doubt his divine mission and his infallible genius!

Not that Louis, nor especially those that surrounded him, precisely believed that terror produced the effects of *grace*, or that these innumerable conversions were sincere; but they saw in this the extinction of all strong conviction among the heretics, the moral exhaustion of an expiring sect. "The children at least will be Catholics, if the fathers are hypocrites," wrote Madame de Maintenon. At present, it was necessary to complete the work and to prevent dangerous relapses in these subjugated multitudes. It was necessary to put to flight as quickly as possible the *false pastors* who might again lead their old flocks astray, and to make the law conform to the fact, by solemnly revoking the concessions formerly wrung by powerful and armed heresy from the feebleness of the ruling power. Louis had long preserved some scruples about the violation of engagements entered into by his grandfather Henri IV.; but his last doubts had been set at rest, several months since, by a *special council of conscience*, composed of two theologians and two jurisconsults, who had decided that he might and should revoke the Edict of Nantes.[2] The names of the men who took upon

[1] Rulhière, p. 215.

[2] *Mém. du Duc de Bourgogne*, cited by the Abbé Proyart; *Vie du Dauphin, père de Louis XV.*, p. 98 *et seq.*

themselves the consequences of such a decision have remained unknown: doubtless the confessor La Chaise was one of the theologians; who was the other? The Archbishop of Paris, Harlai, was not, perhaps, in sufficient esteem, on account of his habits.[1] The great name of the Bishop of Meaux naturally presents itself to the mind; but neither the correspondence of Bossuet, nor the documents relating to his life, throw any light on this subject, and we know not whether a direct and material responsibility must be added to the moral responsibility with which the maxims of Bossuet and the spirit of his works burden his memory.

After the council of conscience, the council of the King was convened for a definitive deliberation in the earlier part of October. Some of the ministers, apparently the two Colberts, Seignelai and Croissi, insinuated that it would be better not to be precipitate. The Dauphin, a young prince of twenty-four, who resembled, in his undefined character, his grandfather more than his father, and who was destined to remain always, as it were lost, in the splendid halo of Louis the Great, attempted an intervention that deserves to rescue his name from oblivion. "He represented, from an anonymous memorial that had been addressed to him the evening before, that it was, perhaps, to be apprehended that the Huguenots might take up arms . . . that, in case they did not dare to do this, a great number would leave the kingdom, which would injure commerce and agriculture, and thereby even weaken the State." The King replied that he had foreseen all and provided for all, that nothing in the world would be more painful to him than to shed a drop of the blood of his subjects, but that he had armies and good generals whom he would employ, in case of necessity, against rebels who desired their own destruction. As to the argument of interest, he judged it little worthy of consideration, compared with the advantages of an undertaking that would restore to religion its splendor, to the State its tranquillity, and to authority all its rights.[2] The suppression of the Edict of Nantes was resolved upon without further opposition.

Father La Chaise and Louvois, according to their ecclesiastical and military correspondence, had promised that it should not even cost the drop of blood of which the King spoke.[3]

[1] What would enable us to suppose, however, that it was Harlai, is, that he formed with La Chaise the ordinary council of conscience, for appointment to benefices, till La Chaise caused him to be dismissed by the King, in order to remain sole arbiter of appointments.

[2] *Mém. du Duc de Bourgogne*, loc. cit.

[3] *Lettres de madame de Maintenon*, ap. Rulhière, p. 220.

The aged Chancellor Le Tellier, already a prey to the malady that was to bring him to his grave, drew up with trembling hand the fatal declaration, which the King signed, October 17.[1]

Louis professed, in this preamble, to do nothing but continue the pious designs of his grandfather and his father for the reunion of their subjects to the Church. He spoke of the *perpetual and irrevocable* edict of Henri IV. as a temporary regulation. "Our cares," he said, "since the truce that we facilitated for this purpose, have had the effect that we proposed to ourselves, since the better and the greater part of our subjects of the so-called Reformed religion have embraced the Catholic, and inasmuch as by reason of this the execution of the Edict of Nantes . . . remains useless, we have judged that we could not do better, in order wholly to efface the memory of evils that this false religion has caused in our kingdom, than entirely to revoke the said Edict of Nantes, and all that has been done since in favor of the said religion."

The order followed to demolish unceasingly all the churches of the said religion situated in the kingdom. It was forbidden to assemble for the exercise of the said religion, in any place, private house or tenement, under penalty of confiscation of body and goods. All ministers of the said religion, who would not be converted, were enjoined to leave the kingdom in a fortnight, and divers favors were granted to those who should be converted. Private schools for instruction of children in the said religion were interdicted. Children who should be born to those of the said religion should for the future be baptized by the parish curates, under penalty of a fine of five hundred livres, and still more, if there were occasion, to be paid by the parents, and the children should then be brought up in the Catholic religion. A delay of four months was granted to fugitive Reformers to reënter the kingdom and recover possession of their property; this delay passed, the property should remain confiscated. It was forbidden anew to Reformers to leave the kingdom, under penalty of the galleys for men, and confiscation of body and goods for women.[2] The declarations against backsliders were confirmed.

A last article, probably obtained by the representations of the Colberts, declared that the Reformers, "till it should please God to enlighten them like others, should be permitted to dwell in the kingdom, in strict loyalty to the King, to continue there their com-

[1] And not the 18th, as the historians say. See *Mém. de Foucault*, p. 294.

[2] This was interpreted, as to women, as meaning perpetual detention and not death. *Mém. de Foucault*, p. 320.

merce and enjoy their goods, without being molested or hindered under pretext of the said religion."[1]

The Edict of Revocation was sent in haste to the governors and intendants, without waiting for it to be registered, which took place in the parliament of Paris October 22. The intendants were instructed not to allow the ministers who should abandon the country to dispose of their real estate, or to take with them their children above seven years of age: a monstrous dismemberment of the family wrought by an arbitrary will that recognized neither natural nor civil rights! The King recommended a milder course towards noblemen, merchants, and manufacturers; he did not desire that obstinacy should be shown "in compelling them to be converted immediately without exception . . . by any considerable violence."[2]

The tone of the ministerial instructions changed quickly, on the reception of despatches announcing the effect of the edict in the provinces. This effect teaches us more in regard to the situation of the *dragooned* people than could the most sinister narratives. The edict which proscribed the Reformed worship, which interdicted the perpetuation of the Protestant religion by tearing from it infants at their birth, was received almost as a boon by Protestants who remained faithful to their belief. They saw, in the last article of the edict, the end of persecution, and, proud of having weathered the storm, they claimed the tolerance that the King promised them, and the removal of their executioners. The *new converts*, who, persuaded that the King desired to force all his subjects to profess his religion, had yielded through surprise, fear, want of constancy in suffering, or through a worthier motive, the desire of saving their families from the license of the soldiers, manifested their regret and their remorse, and were no longer willing to go to mass.

All the leaders of the dragoonades, the Noailles, the Foucaults, the Basvilles, the Marillacs, complained bitterly of a measure that was useless to them as to the demolition of Protestant churches and the prohibition of worship, and very injurious as to the progress of conversions. They had counted on rooting out the worship by converting all the believers. The revocation of the Edict of Nantes sinned, therefore, in their eyes by excess of moderation! Louvois hastened to reassure them in this respect, and authorized

[1] *Hist. de l'Édit de Nantes*, t. V.; *Preuves*, p. 184.

[2] The letters of Louvois to Foucault, intendant of Poitou, of October 17; — to Marillac, intendant of Rouen, October 21; — to the Duke de Noailles, October 28; — ap. Rulhière, pp. 225, 226.

them to act as if the last article of the edict did not exist. "His Majesty," he said, "desires that the extremest rigors of the law should be felt by those who will not make themselves of his religion, and those who shall have the foolish glory of wishing to remain the last must be pushed to the last extremity. . . ." — "Let the soldiers," he said elsewhere, "be allowed to live *very licentiously!* . . ." (November, 1685.) [1]

The King, however, did not mean it thus, and claimed that persecution should be conducted with method and gravity.[2] But men do not stop at pleasure in evil: one abyss draws on another. The way had been opened to brutal and cynical passions, to the spirit of denunciation, to low and mean fanaticism; the infamies with which the subaltern agents polluted themselves recoiled upon the chiefs who did not repress them, and on this proud government that did not blush to add to the odium of persecution the shame of faithlessness! The chiefs of the dragoonades judged it necessary to restrain the *bad converts* by making examples of the *obstinate;* hence arose an inundation of horrors in which we see, as Saint-Simon says, "the orthodox imitating against heretics the acts of pagan tyrants against confessors and martyrs." Everything, in fact, was allowed the soldiers, but rape and murder; and even this restriction was not always respected; besides, many of the unfortunate died or were maimed for life in consequence of the treatment to which they had been subjected; and the obscene tortures inflicted on women differed little from the last outrage, but in a perversity more refined. All the diabolic inventions of the highwaymen of the Middle Ages to extort gold from their captives were renewed here and there to secure conversions: the feet of the victims were *scorched*, they were strappadoed, suspended by the feet; young mothers were tied to the bedposts, while their infants at the breast were writhing with hunger before their eyes. "From torture to abjuration, and from this to communion, there was often not twenty-four hours' distance, and their executioners were their guides and

[1] *Hist. de l'Édit de Nantes*, t. V. p. 869. Noailles, *Hist. de madame de Maintenon*, t. II. p. 488. Foucault had not waited for the new instructions of Louvois. He had convoked, November 2, what remained of the gentlemen not converted in Upper Poitou, and had declared to them that "it was an illusion that could come only from a blind preoccupation, to wish to discriminate between the obligations of conscience and the obedience that was due the King." He had protested against those who pretended to draw, from a certain article of the edict, "the conclusion that His Majesty would leave them liberty of conscience, when he had formerly deprived them of it." *Mém. de Foucault*, pp. 805, 806.

[2] Letters cited by Noailles, t. II. p. 470. The King prescribed that the dragoons who pillaged should be hung; but we do not perceive that a single one was hung.

witnesses. Nearly all the bishops lent themselves to this sudden and impious practice."[1] Among the Reformed whom nothing could shake, those who encouraged others to resistance by the influence of their character or social position were sent to the Bastile or other state prisons; some were entombed in subterranean dungeons — in those dark pits, stifling or deadly cold, invented by feudal barbarism. The remains of animals in a state of putrefaction were sometimes thrown in after them, to redouble the horror! The hospital of Valence and the tower of Constance at Aigues-Mortes have preserved, in Protestant martyrology, a frightful renown. The women usually showing themselves more steadfast than the men, the most *obstinate* were shut up in convents; infamous acts took place there; yet they were rare. It must be said to the honor of the sex, often too facile to the suggestions of fanaticism, that the nuns showed much more humanity and true religion than the priests and monks. Astonished to see Huguenot women so different from the idea they had formed of them, they almost always became the protectors of victims that had been given them to torment.[2] The abduction of children put the final seal to the persecution. The edict of revocation had only declared that children subsequently born should be brought up in the Catholic religion. An edict of January, 1686, prescribed that children from five to sixteen years of age should be taken from their heretical relatives and put in the hands of Catholic relatives, or, if they had none, of Catholics designated by the judges![3] The crimes that we have just indicated

[1] Saint-Simon, t. XIII. p. 116. He goes even further, and accuses most of the bishops of having "encouraged the executioners." It is certain that, as the official Memoir that was presented by Minister Breteuil to Louis XVI. on the condition of Protestants in France affirms, the greater part of the clergy, following the doctrine of the Jesuits, admitted without delay and without difficulty to the holy table all who were driven to the church by the dragoons. See Rulhière, p. 310.

[2] *Hist. de l'Édit de Nantes*, t. V. p. 901.

[3] Ibid.; *Preuves*, p. 192. M. le duc de Noailles thinks that this law was not executed: we have examples of its execution even in the most illustrious families; see, in the *Correspondance administrative sous Louis XIV.*, t. IV., *Introd.* pp. XVII–XXII., the history of the Duke and Duchess de La Force. Their children were torn from them by the police; then the Duke, a feeble character, being *converted*, his wife brought him back to Protestantism. The husband and wife were shut up, the one in the Bastile, the other in the château of Angers. The Duke abjured anew; he was released; he fell ill; his wife was allowed to rejoin him; but an exempt of the police had orders to watch them day and night, and never to leave them alone. When the malady increased, the wife was shut up in a separate apartment, and, during the last fortnight of her husband's illness, she was not allowed to approach the bed where he died a few steps from her without having seen her. We know of nothing more characteristic than this anecdote. Another edict of January, 1686, deprived heretical wives and widows of all matrimonial advantages and of the right to make a will.

might, in strictness, be attributed to the passions of subaltern agents; but this mighty outrage against the family and nature must be charged to the government alone.

With the revocation, the dragoonade was extended, two places partially excepted, over all France. When the great harvest had been sufficiently gathered in the south and west, the reapers were sent elsewhere. The battalions of converters marched from province to province till they reached the northern frontier, carrying everywhere the same terror. Metz, where the Protestants were numerous, was particularly the theatre of abominable excesses.[1] Paris and Alsace were alone, to a certain extent, preserved. Louvois did not dare to show such spectacles to the society of Versailles and Paris; the King would not have endured it. The people of Paris demolished the Protestant church of Charenton, an object of their ancient animosity: the ruling power weighed heavily upon the eight or nine thousand Huguenots who remained in the capital, and constrained two thirds of them, by intimidation, to a feigned conversion; but there were no striking acts of violence, except perhaps the banishment of thirty elders of the consistory to different parts of the kingdom, and the soldiers did not make their appearance. The lieutenant of police, La Reinie, took care to reassure the leading merchants, and the last article of the Edict of Revocation was very nearly observed in Paris and its environs. As to Lutheran Alsace, it had nothing in common with the system of the Edict of Nantes and the French Calvinists: the treaty of Westphalia, the capitulation of Strasburg, all the acts that bound it to France, guaranteed to it a separate religious state. An attempt was indeed made to encroach upon Lutheranism by every means of influence and by a system of petty annoyances; but direct attacks were limited to a suppression of public worship in places where the population was two thirds Catholic.[2] The political events that soon disturbed Europe compelled the French government to be circumspect towards the people of this recently conquered frontier.

The converters indemnified themselves at the expense of another frontier population, that was not dependent on France. The Vaudois, the first offspring of the Reformation, had always kept possession of the high Alpine valleys, on the confines of Piedmont and Dauphiny, in spite of the persecutions that they had repeatedly endured from the governments of France and Piedmont. The Piedmontese Vaudois had their Edict of Nantes, that is, liberty of

[1] *Hist. de l'Édit*, t. V. liv. XXIV.

[2] *Documents sur l'Alsace*, published by Van Huffel, p. 142 *et seq.*

worship in the three valleys of Saint-Martin, La Luzerne, and La Perouse. When the dragoonade invaded Dauphiny, the Vaudois about Briançon and Pignerol took refuge in crowds with their brethren in the valleys subject to Piedmont. The French government was unwilling to suffer them to remain in this asylum. The Duke Victor Amadeus II. enjoined the refugees to quit his territory (November 4). The order was imperfectly executed, and Louis XIV. demanded more. The Duke, by an edict of February 1, 1686, prohibited the exercise of heretical worship, and ordered the schools to be closed under penalty of death. The *barbes* (ministers), schoolmasters, and French refugees were to leave the states of the Duke in a fortnight, under the same penalty. The Vaudois responded by taking up arms, without reflecting on the immense force of their oppressors. The three valleys were assailed at the same time by French and Piedmontese troops: the French were commanded by the Governor of Casale, Catinat, a man of noble heart, an elevated and philosophic mind, who deplored his fatal mission and attempted to negotiate with the insurgents; but Catinat could neither persuade to submission these men resolved to perish rather than renounce their faith, nor restrain the fury of his soldiers exasperated by the vigor of the resistance. The valleys of Saint-Martin and La Perouse were captured, and the victors committed frightful barbarities. Meanwhile, the Piedmontese, after having induced the mountaineers, who guarded the entrance of the valley of La Luzerne, to lay down their arms, by false promises, slaughtered three thousand women, children, and old men, at the Pré de la Tour! The remotest recesses of the Alps were searched; a multitude of unfortunates were exterminated singly: more than ten thousand were dragged as prisoners to the fortresses of Piedmont, where most of them died of want. A handful of the bravest succeeded in maintaining themselves among the rocks, where they could not be captured, and, protected by the intervention of Protestant powers, and especially of the Swiss, finally obtained liberty to emigrate, both for themselves and their coreligionists.[1]

There has often been seen in history much greater bloodshed than that caused by the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, scenes of destruction planned more directly and on a vaster scale by governments, and sometimes the same contrast between an advanced state of civilization and acts of savage barbarity; but no spectacle wounds moral sense and humanity to the same degree as this per-

[1] *Hist. de l'Édit des Nantes*, t. V. p. 926. *Mém. chronolog. et dogmat.*, t. III. p. 285. *Mém. de Catinat*, t. I. pp. 20, 256. Paris, 1820.

secution carried on coldly and according to abstract ideas, without the excuse of struggle and danger, without the ardent fever of battle and revolution. The very virtues of the persecutors are here but an additional monstrosity: doubtless, there is also seen, at a later period, among the authors of another *reign of terror*, this same contrast that astounds and troubles the conscience of posterity; but they, at least, staked each day their own lives against the lives of their adversaries, and, with their lives, the very existence of the country involved in their cause!

A million and a half of Frenchmen[1] were in terror and despair; yet songs of victory resounded around Louis the Great. The aged Le Tellier lifted to heaven the hand that had just signed the Revocation, and parodied, on the occasion of an edict that recalls the times of Decius and Diocletian, the canticle by which Simeon hailed the birth of the Redeemer. He died a fanatic, after having lived a cold and astute politician (October 31, 1685);[2] he died, and the most eloquent voices of the Gallican Church broke forth in triumphal hymns, as over the tomb of a victorious hero! "Let us publish this miracle of our days," exclaimed Bossuet, in that funeral oration of Le Tellier, wherein he nevertheless exhibited apprehensions of new combats and of a sombre future for the Church; "let us pour forth our hearts in praise of the piety of Louis; let us lift our acclamations to heaven, and let us say to this new Constantine, to this new Theodosius, to this new Marcianus, to this new Charlemagne . . . 'You have strengthened the faith, you have exterminated the heretics; this is the meritorious work of your reign, its peculiar characteristic. Through you, heresy is no more: God alone could have wrought this wonder.'" The gentle Fléchier himself echoed Bossuet, with the whole corps of the clergy, with the great mass of the people. Paris and Versailles, that did not witness the horror of the details, that saw only the general prestige and the victory of unity, were deaf to the doleful reports that came from the provinces, and applauded the *new Constantine*. "This

[1] We believe that we can approximately estimate the number of the French Reformers in 1685 at this figure, after their losses for twenty years, by conversion and emigration. Contemporaries vary in their estimate from eight or nine hundred thousand to two millions. The first amount is much too small, the second too great. According to the correspondence of the intendants, it would seem that the south alone contained full 800,000; — they were very numerous in Poitou, Saintonge, and the neighboring regions; probably at least 300,000. The generality of Rouen numbered 20,000; the rest of Normandy probably much more. Some hundreds of thousands must have been scattered over the rest of France.

[2] His successor was state-councillor Bucherat, who has no marked place in history.

is the grandest and finest thing that ever was conceived and accomplished," wrote Madame de Sévigné.[1] All the corporations, courts of justice, academies, universities, municipal bodies, vied with each other in every species of laudatory allusion: medals represented the King crowned by Religion "for having brought back to the Church two millions of Calvinists"; the number of victims was swollen in order to swell the glory of the persecutor. Statues were erected to the "destroyer of heresy." This concert of felicitations was prolonged for years; the influence of example, the habit of admiring, wrung eulogies even from minds that, it would seem, ought to have remained strangers to this fascination; every writer thought he must pay his tribute; even La Bruyère, that sagacious observer and excellent writer, whose acute and profound studies of manners appeared in 1687; and La Fontaine himself, the poet of free thought and of universal freedom of action.[2] In fine, the Pope, although it wounded him to praise an enemy, did not think that he could dispense with responding to the official announcement of the Revocation by a brief in which he testified to Louis his joy at an act so worthy of the Most Christian King (November 13). The report being spread in England and elsewhere that he disapproved of the conduct of the King of France, he decided, rather tardily it is true, to celebrate the Revocation by a consistory *ad hoc* and a *Te Deum* (March, 1686).[3]

At the moment when Louis was drinking such deep draughts of adulation, at the moment when he was writing to Rome that there remained but twelve or fifteen thousand heretics in his kingdom, and that some of these were converted every day,[4] the work promised to the admiration of future ages was falling on all sides. The Protestants, accustomed to the slow, methodical oppression of edicts and decrees, were stunned by the unexpected irruption of brute force and military tyranny. The first stupor passed, they recovered their senses, and the new outrages ordered by Louvois exalted instead of depressing them. The flame of zeal, which was losing its vitality among them, was revived by the tempest; the old hatred of Papacy was rekindled in their inmost hearts; the

[1] Letters of October 28 and November 24, 1685.

[2] La Bruyère, *Caractères*, chap. *Du souverain et de la république*. However, the approbation is here somewhat equivocal. La Fontaine, *épît. à M. de Bonrepaus*, of February 5, 1687.

[3] A cardinal having blamed the King for having used force, the Pope replied that, "when the King was obliged to employ force, he did well to use it." Despatch of the Duke d'Estrées, ambassador at Rome; ap. Noailles, *Hist. de madame de Maintenon*, t. II. pp. 447-452.

[4] Letter to Cardinal d'Estrées, November, 1685; ap. Noailles, t. II. p. 481.

pretended converts rejected with horror the *mark of the Beast*, as, in their apocalyptical language, they called the tokens of Catholicism; the example of *confessors* and *martyrs* lifted up *those who were fallen;* a multitude of *new Catholics* ceased to appear in the churches and to send their children to *Papist* schools; in the article of death they sent away the priest and refused the sacraments. The anger of the government then flashed forth in proportion to its disappointment; after having struck the *obstinate*, it fell on the *bad converts;* it charged the military chiefs to exercise, in concert with the bishops and curés, a sort of inquisition over the new Catholics: the order was given to apply to the most refractory the edict relating to the seizure of children, and a declaration was issued, April 29, 1686, against the converts who refused the sacraments in their sickness; if they lived, they were to be condemned to the galleys and to confiscation as backsliders; if they died, their corpses were to be drawn on hurdles and buried on the highway, like those of suicides and duelists. The power raged in vain: the moving spring of terror wore out, and souls recovered their temper. At the same time with coercion persuasion was tried: in the autumn of 1685, a host of preachers, belonging to the different religious orders or to the secular clergy, was sent into the west and south, to supply the scandalous deficiency of the clergy of those provinces; five or six hundred Jesuits served in the front rank; Bourdaloue preached in Languedoc, Fléchier in Brittany; at the head of the missions of Poitou and Saintonge appeared a new man who was beginning one of the most brilliant careers of our history, the future rival of Bossuet, the young Abbé de Fénelon. The partial successes obtained by these illustrious missionaries were not sufficient to fill the two hundred and fifty new churches which the King, in the first illusion of triumph, had hastened to order built.[1] A double movement took place, in the contrary direction of what was designed by the authority, which had banished the shepherds, intending to retain the sheep. On one hand, a number of ministers, repenting of having left, through obedience to men, the care of souls that *God had confided to them*, recrossed the frontiers under different disguises, and rejoined their flocks. Religious meetings began to be held again, here and there, in moun-

[1] Louis XIV. had appropriated a first fund of two millions to this purpose and for the enlargement of many of the old churches. Letter of P. La Chaise to Jesuit Fabri, November 25, 1685; ap. Noailles, t. II. p. 488. A measure more useful, because it really profited the clergy and the true Catholic people, was the permanency of situation and proper allowance granted to parish vicars, hitherto revocable at the will of titularies and tithing-men (January 19, 1686).

tain retreats, and sometimes even in cities. On the other hand, the emigration, which had not ceased since 1681, assumed immense proportions.

The government redoubled its rigor. The penalty of death was decreed against ministers reëntering the kingdom without permission, and the galleys against whomsoever should give them asylum; penalty of death against whomsoever should take part in a meeting (July 1, 1686). And this penalty was not simply a dead letter! Whenever the soldiers succeeded in surprising Protestants assembled for prayer in any solitary place, they first announced their presence by a volley; those who escaped the bullet and the sword were sent to the gallows or the galleys.[1] Measures almost as severe were employed to arrest emigration. Seamen were forbidden to aid the Reformers to escape, under penalty of a fine for the first offence, and of corporal punishment for a second offence (November 5, 1685). They went further: ere long, whoever aided the flight of emigrants became liable to the galleys for life, like emigrants themselves (May 7, 1686). Armed barks cruised along all the coasts; all the passes of the frontiers were guarded; the peasants everywhere had orders to rush upon the fugitives. Some of the emigrants perished in attempting to force an exit; a host of others was brought back manacled; they dared not place them all under the galley-master's lash; they feared the effects of their despair and of their numbers, if they should mass them in the royal galleys; they crowded the prisons with those who were unwilling to purchase pardon by abjuration. The misfortunes of the first emigrants served to render their co-religionists, not more timid, but more adroit: a multitude of pilgrims, of mendicants dragging their children after them, of nomadic artisans of both sexes and of all trades, incessantly took their way towards all the frontiers; innumerable disguises thus protected the *flight of Israel out of Egypt*. Reformers selected the darkest winter-nights to embark, in frail open boats, on the Atlantic or stormy Channel; the waves were seen to cast upon the shores of England families long tossed by tempests and dying with cold and hunger. By degrees, the guards stationed along

[1] And, in the galleys, they were sent on the most fatiguing and perilous expeditions. "As nothing can contribute so much to make the galley-slaves pliable, who are still Huguenots, and have been unwilling to yield to instruction, as the fatigue they would undergo during a campaign, do not fail to put them on the galleys bound for Algiers." Letter of Seignelai, April 18, 1688. Seignelai was afraid of seeming too lukewarm. *Correspondance administrative sous Louis XIV.*, t. IV., *Introd.* p. xxvi.

the shores and the frontiers were touched or seduced, and became saviors and guides to fugitives whom they were set to arrest. Then perpetual confinement in the galleys was no longer sufficient against the accomplices of the *deserters;* for the galleys an edict substituted death: death, which fell not upon those guilty of the pretended crime of desertion, was promised to their abettors (October 12, 1687). Some were given up to capital punishment; many nevertheless continued their perilous assistance to emigrants, and few betrayed them. Those Reformers whom the authority wished most to retain in the kingdom, the noblemen, the rich citizens, manufacturers, and merchants, were those who escaped easiest, being best able to pay for the interested compassion of the guards. It is said that the fugitives carried out of France sixty millions in five years.[1] However this may be, the loss of men was much more to be regretted than the loss of money. The vital energy of France did not cease for many years to ooze away through this ever-open ulcer of emigration!

It is difficult to estimate, even approximately, the number of Protestants who abandoned their country, become to them a barbarous mother! Vauban estimated it at a hundred thousand, from 1684 to 1691. Benoit, the Calvinist historian of the Edict of Nantes, who published his book in 1695, estimates it at two hundred thousand; the illustrious *refugee* Basnage speaks vaguely of three or four hundred thousand. Others give figures much more exaggerated,[2] whilst the Duke of Burgundy, in the memoir that we have cited above, reduces the emigration to less than sixty-eight thousand souls in the course of twenty years; but the truly inconceivable illusions preserved by this young prince, concerning the moral and political results of the Revocation, do not allow us to put confidence in his testimony; he was deceived, took pleasure in being deceived, and closed his ear to whomsoever desired to

[1] Vauban, cited by Rulhière. This figure does not seem exaggerated, according to the facts found in the precious memoirs of Count d'Avaux, ambassador in Holland. D'Avaux reports (t. VI. p. 105), that, before the end of 1687, so much French money had entered Holland "that these Amsterdamers found that there was too much, and could not put theirs out at a higher rate than two per cent. I know," he added, "that in England more than nine hundred and sixty thousand louisd'or have been put out at interest." The exportation would have been greater still, if the King had not forbidden the new converts to sell their real estate, lest they might carry away its value if they fled.

[2] According to Rulhière (p. 378), who cites a letter of an intendant of La Rochelle, the diocese of Saintes alone (Saintonge and Aunis) had lost a hundred thousand inhabitants before 1695; we cannot help thinking that there must be some error in this.

undeceive him.[1] The amount from two hundred thousand to two hundred and fifty thousand, from the Revocation to the commencement of the following century, that is, to the revolt of Cévennes, seems most probable. But it is not so much by the quantity as by the quality of the emigrants that the real loss of France must be measured. France was incomparably more weakened than if two hundred thousand citizens had been taken at hazard from the Catholic mass of the nation. The Protestants were very superior, on the average, if not to the Catholic middle class of Paris and the principal centres of French civilization, at least to the mass of the people, and the emigrants were the best of the Protestants. A multitude of useful men, among them many superior men, left a frightful void in France, and went to swell the forces of Protestant nations: France declined both by what she lost and what her rivals gained. Before 1689, nine thousand sailors, *the best in the kingdom*, as Vauban says, twelve thousand soldiers, six hundred officers,[2] had gone to foreign countries; the provincial nobility had not been so easy to convert as the courtiers. The best general and the best naval officer that France had, Duquesne and Schomberg,[3] were Protestants. The aged Duquesne had not returned to sea since the expedition of Genoa, discontented with Seignelai, discontented also with the King, who left him in the rank of lieutenant-general, and gave, contrary to the principles laid down at the commencement of his reign, the survivorship of two vice-admiralties to the sons of D'Estrées and De Vivonne.[4] Duquesne was allowed to die tranquil in his religion, but was not allowed to go to die on Protestant soil; even his remains were not given up to his emigrant children, who erected to him, at Eaubonne, in Switzerland, an empty sepulchre with this inscription: "This tomb awaits the remains of Duquesne. . . . Stranger, shouldst thou ask why the Dutch have erected a proud monument to De Ruyter vanquished, and why the French have refused a tomb to the vanquisher of De Ruyter, the fear and the respect inspired by a monarch whose power extends afar, do not permit me to answer." (1688.)

[1] See the *Mémoire* cited in the *Vie du Dauphin*, by the Abbé Proyart, t. II. p.98 *et seq.*

[2] Vauban, cited by Rulhière, p. 257. The sailors were chiefly Poitevins, Rochelois, and seamen of Charente and Gironde. The number of emigrant officers was greater than Vauban said.

[3] The only captain who was perhaps superior to Schomberg, Créqui, the successful imitator of Turenne, died in the mean time, 1687. None remained but Luxembourg that could be compared with Schomberg.

[4] Every one knows Duquesne's answer to the King, who told him that his religion did not allow him to recompense his services as they deserved. "Sire, I am a Protestant, but I had always supposed that my services were Catholic." Rulhière, p. 358.

Marshal de Schomberg obtained with much difficulty permission to quit France and retire to Portugal, a country which he had formerly saved from Spanish invasion; but the Portuguese inquisition, jealous of the trophies of the Revocation, soon made this sojourn insupportable to him; he broke his last ties with France by abandoning his property, and went to lend his terrible sword to the enemies of Louis XIV. and of Catholicism! The Marquis de Ruvigni, the former deputy-general of the Reformed Churches, took the same course. Men eminent in other respects went to organize at the Hague, at Amsterdam, at Leyden, a war of another nature, a religious polemic, much more brilliant than the political polemic of the Imperial pamphleteers at Ratisbon or Cologne, but coöperating to the same end, that is, to rouse Europe against the Great King. The learned minister Claude, encouraged by the Prince of Orange, gave to the Protestant world an eloquent picture of the persecution, and instigated resistance within, a coalition without; the violent and indefatigable Jurieu incessantly agitated the pretended converts by his impassioned letters and his burning pamphlets, while Louis XIV. combated them in vain by the vigilance of his agents, Bossuet by the authority of his word.[1] Jurieu paved the way from afar for the insurrection of Cévennes, by proclaiming the right of armed resistance in the face of the divine right of Bossuet. Finally, a still more terrible adversary prepared other arms against the persecutors: Jurieu opposed to intolerance a fanatical enthusiasm; Bayle was to oppose to it universal doubt, and, without arraying force against force, only waging war on ideas with ideas, was to sap much more profoundly than Jurieu the edifice of Bossuet and Louis XIV. We shall recur to this laborious pioneer who cleared with patient hand the ground in which the eighteenth century was to germinate. Other men of high capacity, writers, scholars, orators, without taking so active a part in the struggle, at least deprived France of their talents: Basnage, the historian of the Jewish people and of the United Provinces; Lenfant, the historian of the councils of Basel and of Constance; Beausobre, the historian of Manicheism; Rapin-Toiras, author of the History of England; the Abadies, the Saurins, the Ancillons, the Tronchins, the Constants, the Candolles, who went to transplant at Geneva, in Holland, in Germany, families in which merit and learning seemed hereditary; Denis Papin, an immortal name in the annals of science, — this medico-physicist of Blois carried with him, far from his

[1] Louvois himself in some sort coöperated with the ministers, by refusing to violate the secrecy of letters, not through scruples, but in order not to lose the profit brought him by foreign mails, which were in his department. See Foucault, p. 346.

country, the thought that was to conquer, for the advantage of human activity, one of the most powerful motive forces that nature conceals, and thus to centuple the productive force of human labor.[1] Whilst men were preparing an instrument of incalculable power for the industry of the future, the most skilful chiefs and agents of contemporaneous industry went in multitudes to settle in foreign lands. Industrial capacities, less striking than literary capacities, inflicted losses on France still more felt and less reparable. France was rich enough in literary glory to lose much without being impoverished; such was not the case with respect to industry; France was to descend in a few years, almost in a few months, from that economical supremacy which had been conquered for her by long efforts of a protective administration; populous cities[2] beheld the branches of commerce that constituted their prosperity rapidly sinking, by the disappearance of the principal industrial families, and these branches taking root on the other side of the frontiers. Thus fell, never to rise again, the Norman hat-trade, already suffering on account of regulations that fettered the Canadian fur-trade. Other branches, in great number, did not disappear entirely, but witnessed the rise of a formidable competition in foreign lands, where they had hitherto remained unknown; these were so many outlets closed, so many markets lost for our exportation, lately so flourishing. A suburb of London (Spitalfields) was peopled with our workmen in silk, emigrated from Lyons and Touraine, which lost three fourths of their

[1] The conquest of steam had already begun. Salomon de Caux (see Vol. XII., Martin's *Histoire de France*, p. 18) had, in 1615, proposed the application of steam to mechanics; but he had seen but one means of elevating water in a tube, only an exhausting machine. Denis Papin took the decisive step in finding the means of transforming this special motor into a universal motor, by the invention of the piston. To him equally belong the means of rapidly forming a vacuum in the cylinder and a combination between the elastic force of steam and the property that steam possesses of condensation by cold. Established some time at London, and elected in 1681 a Fellow of the Royal Society by the support of Boyle, then a fixed emigrant after the Revocation, and settled in Germany as Professor of Mathematics in the university of Marburg, he published the essential principles of his discovery, in 1690, in the scientific collection so well known as the *Actes* of Leipzic. The attempts of the Englishman Savery, for the application of the same principles, were eight years later (1698) and Denis Papin will remain in the chain of inventors the essential link between Salomon de Caux, who meditated the first germ of the idea, and James Watt, who applied it on an immense scale and established its dominion over the industrial world. See *Notice sur les machines à vapeur*, by M. F. Arago, ap. *Annuaire du bureau des Longitudes pour l'an* 1887. Huyghens and Roemer, who seemed to have adopted France as their country, left it about the same time with Papin, and in part for similar reasons. Their fame and their condition of foreigners would have saved them from persecution; but their sojourn at Paris had become too painful to them.

[2] Caen, for example; see Noailles, t. II. ch. 4. Tours lost her ribbon-trade.

looms;[1] the manufacture of French silks was also established in Holland, with paper-making, cloth-manufacture, etc. Many branches of industry were transplanted to Brandenburg, and twenty thousand Frenchmen carried the most refined arts of civilization to the coarse population thinly scattered among the sands and firs of that sombre region. French refugees paid for the hospitality of the Elector Frederick by laying the foundation of the high destinies of Berlin, which, on their arrival, was still but a small city of twelve or fifteen thousand souls, and which, thenceforth, took a start which nothing more was to arrest.[2] Like the Hebrews after the fall of Jerusalem, the Huguenot exiles scattered themselves over the entire world: some went to Ireland, carrying the cultivation of flax and hemp; others, led by a nephew of Duquesne, founded a small colony at the Cape of Good Hope.

France was impoverished, not only in Frenchmen who exiled themselves, but in those, much more numerous, who remained in spite of themselves, discouraged, ruined, whether they openly resisted persecution, or suffered some external observances of Catholicism to be wrung from them, all having neither energy in work, nor security in life; it was really the activity of more than a million of men that France lost, and of the million that produced most.

The great enterprise, the *miracle of the reign*, therefore miscarried; the new temple that Louis had pretended to erect to unity fell to ruin as it rose from the ground, and left only an open chasm in place of its foundations. Everything that had been undertaken by the governing power of France for a century in the direction of national, civil, and territorial unity had gloriously succeeded; as soon as the governing power left this legitimate field of unity to invade the domain of conscience and of human individuality, it raised before itself insurmountable obstacles; it compromised

[1] La Touraine fell from eight thousand to twelve hundred; Lyons, from eighteen thousand to about four thousand. *Correspondance administrative sous Louis XIV.*, published by G. A. Depping, ap. *Documents inédits*, t. III., *Introduction*, p. lix.

[2] The Great Elector took the capital of the refugees at fifteen per cent., and gave to the French colonists an especial governor. The Province of Holland exempted them from all imposts, and assured them annuities to the amount of one hundred thousand florins. Amsterdam alone gave them an additional income of eighty thousand florins; other provinces and other cities, in proportion. In England, James II. himself, urged on by public opinion, dared not refuse to add, at least in appearance, some official aid to the much more abundant aid of private individuals; but he had the perfidy — he a *Papist* — to presume to compel them to purchase, by adhesion to the *heretical* episcopacy of England, the morsel of bread he offered them and that they refused. On this side fortune was soon to change in favor of the refugees. See La Martinière, t. IV. p. 858, and Macaulay.

itself in contests wherein it was equally fatal to conquer or be conquered, and gave the first blow to the greatness of France. What a contrast between the pretensions of Louis that he could neither be mistaken nor deceived, that he saw everything, that he accomplished everything, and the illusions with which he was surrounded in regard to the facility of success and the means employed! The nothingness of absolute power and of government by one alone was thus revealed under the very reign of the Great King!

A year had scarcely passed since the Revocation, when the veil was already in part rent away; the infallible monarch, for the first time perhaps, hesitated, lost his presence of mind, took some steps backwards. Louvois was unable to close every avenue to rumors from without, and the powerful influence that had aided Louvois with the King, as to the principle of the Revocation, seconded him no longer in questions of its application. Madame de Maintenon, alienated from Louvois by personal resentment, held aloof from him equally by opinion. Recently ill disposed towards Colbert and Seignelai, she gradually approached the family of the great minister; conformity of taste for devotion and regularity of life had united her to the daughters of Colbert, the Duchesses de Chevreuse and de Beauvilliers; she urged on the husbands and supported the brother of these two ladies with the King. To this rigid society, to the maxims of which the epicurean Seignelai submitted through policy, the Bishop of Châlons, Noailles, strongly opposed in his sentiments to his brother the governor of Languedoc, the ex-intendant D'Aguesseau, and the young chief of the mission of Poitou, the brilliant Abbé de Fénelon, attached themselves. All these new friends and counsellors of Madame de Maintenon were opposed to the system of inquisition and persecution, by humanity, by patriotism, or, especially, as far as the greatest number was concerned, by the Jansenist spirit and horror of the sacrilege imposed on the *bad converts*. Some bishops of the south, generously separating themselves from most of their brethren, had protested in the same direction and refused to coöperate, they and their curés, with the intendants and military chiefs, in watching and tyrannizing over the *new Catholics*.[1] At different points, according to the testimony of Foucault, the *old Catholics* equally refused to denounce the secret meetings of the new converts. Madame de Maintenon began to be terrified at what had been done, at what she had contributed to

[1] See the beautiful letter of the Bishop of Saint-Pons, Percin de Montgaillard, to M. de Boufflers; ap. Noailles, t. II. p. 491. The Cardinal Le Camus, bishop of Grenoble, took the same course. See *Hist. de l'Édit de Nantes*, t. V. p. 988.

produce; she who had, in her own family, stolen and carried off children from their parents for the purpose of converting them, wrote that she no longer liked "to take upon herself towards God, or before the King, all such conversions";[1] she was returning to her natural sentiments of moderation, and was tending to return, thus to speak, to her level. In 1686, D'Aguesseau addressed to the King a new memorial against the material constraint used towards the new converts. October 8, 1686, instructions of the King to the governors and intendants forbade forcing the new converts to frequent the churches and receive the sacraments, and prescribed to them to shut their eyes to refusals of extreme unction, unless scandal resulted from it. The King desired that they should rely on the zeal of the curés and missionaries. He ordered the guards to be withdrawn by degrees and without ado from the coasts and frontiers, on account of the important injury caused to commerce by this rigorous surveillance. Thus, the thought of imposing the inquisition on France had made Louis XIV. blush, and he had felt, without being willing to acknowledge it, abhorrence of a system that made France a jail, from which it was forbidden to escape under penalty of the galleys. His pride and his convictions closely associated did not allow him to abandon the end, but he recoiled before the means. He would not set at liberty the *obstinate heretics* who encumbered the prisons and the benches of the galleys, and who would hasten to strengthen the hearts of their coreligionists and debauch the converts; he deported a number to the West Indies, whence many escaped and reached the English islands; he banished most of the rest, either individually, or in companies, retaining their property, without edict, without legal form. Some remained in prison (1687–1688).[2]

Meanwhile, the instructions of the King, in regard to the new Catholics, however secret, had swiftly transpired; the pretended converts immediately profited by the relaxation of authority to cease all Catholic practices, and the intendants raised new cries to the court, which interdicted *salutary* rigors, a *constraint little more than moral*, as Foucault euphoniously says. As soon as it was seen that the frontier was open, emigration rushed thither with new impetuosity. Louvois, sometimes mingling levity with his cruel violence, had said that if they were permitted to leave, they would all remain. The Protestants hastened, on the contrary, to profit by this momentary facility. The King, irritated, then reëstablished

[1] Letter to Marquis de Villette, ap. Rulhière, p. 246.

[2] *Mém. de Foucault*, t. II. p. 825. *Édit de Nantes*, t. V. liv. XXIII. XXIV.

the guards by sea and by land. The *meetings* reappeared. Some attempted to resist the dragoons. They were dispersed by force; executions then recurred; even those who had not resisted were sent to the galleys. The conduct of the government presented no longer anything but variations and inconsistencies, — but inexplicable alternations of indulgence and cruelty. From the year 1688 the importance of external events absorbed the King in other preoccupations and deprived him of leisure to determine upon and carry out a regular plan for the extinction of the *remains of heresy*. This confusion was prolonged during a period of ten years.

Whilst Louis XIV. was making the destruction of Calvinism his great interest, and was turning against his subjects, against France, all the effort of his power, the general situation of Europe was considerably modified. The rebound of the Revocation, the fermentation caused by the stories and the moving sight of the fugitives, of the Protestant *martyrs*, had overthrown in Holland the party of the French alliance, had reanimated, in all its ardor, the hatred of 1672, and had restored to the Prince of Orange all his preponderance in the government of the United Provinces. Meanwhile, the affairs of the Emperor and the Empire were reëstablished. The campaign of 1685 had been wholly to the advantage of the Imperialists: Eperies and Neuhausel having fallen again into the hands of the generals of the Emperor, and the seraskier Cheitam-Ibrahim, in an effort to recover Strigonia, having lost a battle against the Duke of Lorraine and the Elector of Bavaria, the Turks attacked Tekeli; this illustrious Hungarian chief was taken by surprise and led a prisoner to Constantinople, as accused of treason: he succeeded in justifying himself to the Sultan, and was honorably sent back to Hungary; but his liberation did not repair the evil caused by his arrest; most of his friends and lieutenants, indignant at the Turks, had treated with the Emperor, and had delivered Caschau and many other places of Upper Hungary to the Duke of Lorraine.[1] Germany, encouraged, lifted her

[1] Two French princes of the blood, the Princes de Conti and de la Roche-sur-Yon, had served in the campaign of 1685 as volunteers in the Imperial army, without having obtained the permission of the King, who was greatly displeased with them for their intemperate zeal against the *infidels*. These two princes had been accompanied by a young man of high birth, who, finding no career open in France, went to seek one at the court and in the armies of the Emperor. This was Eugène de Savoie-Soissons, son of a prince of a younger branch of Savoy, and grand-nephew, by his mother, of Cardinal Mazarin. His mother was that witty and intriguing Countess de Soissons, Olympia Mancini, so influential in the young court during the earlier years of Louis XIV. She had lost the friendship of the King by an attempt to embroil him with La Vallière; then, in 1680, she was found implicated

head and began to show her impatience of the pressure to which she was subjected by France. Germany was convinced that the truce would protect her no better than the peace had done against the usurpations of the Great King; she even exaggerated the present ambition of Louis in this respect, and some new encroachments on a small scale, and as it were by habit, would have sufficed to confirm her in her disposition of distrust and anger, even had not a grave question been raised at this moment between the Empire and the House of France.

The Elector Palatine had died May 15, 1685, and, with him, had ended that palatine branch of Bavaria which had played so important a part in the political and religious history of Germany since the sixteenth century. The Duke of Neuburg, chief of the nearest branch, a Catholic, and father-in-law of the Emperor, had immediately taken possession of Heidelberg and the Electorate. Louis XIV. claimed a part of the inheritance for his sister-in-law, Madame, the Duchess of Orleans, sister of the deceased Elector. Madame had renounced by her contract of marriage the feudal property, but by no means the allodial property of her family, and the government of France claimed for her, on this ground, all the personal property of the Palatine House, even to the artillery with which the fortified places were supplied, and a great part of the real estate. This pretension caused great excitement throughout the Empire; but, this time, Louis XIV. did not, as usual, proceed directly to hostile acts; instead of taking justice into his own hands, he appealed to the judgment of the Pope: it was a very marked advance to Innocent XI., who thanked him for it at the same time that he thanked him for the Revocation, but became no more friendly on this account. The new Palatine, and the Emperor, who had intervened as sovereign judge of the difference, did not at first accept this arbitration. Louis threatened. The Palatine consented to the arbitration. Louis, in his turn, deferred sending to Rome, and the controversy was procrastinated, owing to the concern with which the destruction of heresy filled the King's mind. Better had it been, after all, to make war on foreign nations than on the consciences of his subjects, and to labor for the cession of the cis-Rhenish[1]

in the celebrated poisoning affair, that compromised so many persons of the first quality. Louis considered that he was granting her a favor in allowing her to quit France. Her disgrace recoiled upon her family; her youngest son, Eugène, who was called the *Abbé of Savoy*, because he had at first been destined for the Church, having asked the King for a company, met with a refusal. This refusal was destined to cost Louis and France dear.

[1] Louis specially revendicated for his sister-in-law the duchy of Simmeren and

Palatinate to his sister-in-law, than to precipitate a million of Frenchmen into ruin or exile.

It was very difficult to shun the renewal of a general war. Louis, by this unexpected forbearance, only gave his enemies time to make overtures to each other and to come to a mutual understanding. A vast diplomatic movement took place against France from one end of Europe to the other. The Revocation had excited a lively irritation in all the Protestant States, whose own intolerance, however, scarcely entitled them to reproach Louis XIV. At this very moment the Lutheran States made difficulty in receiving Calvinist refugees, and in certain countries refused them the right to public worship, and excluded them from corporations. All, nevertheless, Lutherans and Calvinists, were roused to harmony of feeling by the concordance of events in France and England: they saw therein a plot concocted between Louis XIV. and James II. for the general destruction of Protestantism. James II., having been unable to obtain the concurrence of his Parliament in the abolition of the Test Act, the establishment of a standing army and the suspension of *habeas corpus*, had resolved to dispense with it; he had prorogued Parliament (November, 1685) and caused the high court of justice (the Court of King's Bench) to decide that the King could suspend penal laws, and consequently was not obliged to respect exclusions founded on the Test Act. He introduced Catholics everywhere, even into the privy council, authorized the establishment of convents in London, and ostentatiously sent an ambassador to Rome. The Protestants believed, on just grounds, that they saw therein the counsels of Louis XIV. and of the Jesuits, and even thought the connection between the two kings more intimate than it really was. The Catholic States, nevertheless, gave Louis no credit for what irritated the *heretics*, and Louis, in completing the alienation of the ancient friends of France, had no hope of compensation from her old adversaries. In the two leading Catholic governments, Austria and Spain, political animosity was as intense as religious animosity could be among the Reformers. As to the Pope, the blows given to heresy did not make him forget "the attempts made in France against the submission due to the Roman Church." More antipathy was felt at Rome to the authors of the Declaration of 1682 than to the Calvinists. The resentment of which Louis XIV. was the object, reacted even upon James II., whom it was desired to see united with the Empire and Spain

the county of Spanheim. See Limiers, *Hist. de Louis XIV.*, t. IV. p. 194, on the contract of Madame.

against France, and these dispositions were soon to produce political combinations still more surprising than the alliance between Spain and Holland had been.

The schemes of the Prince of Orange, ardently seconded by the new Elector Palatine, ended in great results. The manifest weakening caused by the Revocation to France encouraged all the enemies of Louis XIV.; it was felt to be a counterpart of that persecution of Hungarian Protestants that Louis himself had turned to such account against Austria. Early in 1686 Holland and Sweden renewed their old defensive treaties (January 12, 1686). Sweden and Brandenburg, lately bitter rivals, contracted an alliance of mutual defence, February 10. By a secret article, the two parties agreed to defend the liberty of conscience and the peace of religion against the scourges that might devastate the Empire "after other neighboring countries." They counted, for this defence, on the concurrence of the Emperor and the Catholics themselves. They counted on Austria and Bavaria to defend the treaty of Westphalia against France. What a deplorable revulsion in politics! A secret treaty was afterwards concluded, May 7, between the Emperor and the Elector of Brandenburg. The Great Elector, during some years, had inclined towards France, without, however, designing, as far as we can presume, to observe very faithfully his mysterious engagements to Louis XIV. The Emperor and the United Provinces having settled some grievances he had against them, the interest of the Empire, especially the interest of Protestantism, prevailed with him, and, as in the war of Holland, he set the other princes the example. His compact with Leopold was founded on "the necessity of being united in order to avert from the Empire new losses such as it had sustained by its intestine divisions, by the culpable intelligence of some of its members with foreign nations, and especially by the fraud and the violence of its external foes." The same danger being liable to recur on account of the palatine succession, the Emperor and the Elector entered into alliance for twenty years for the purpose of causing the peace of Westphalia and the truce of Ratisbon to be respected. The Emperor and the Elector engaged to defend, to the last extremity, every member of the Empire attacked under pretext of *reannexation* or *dependencies;* if the Elector Palatine were attacked, the Emperor was to furnish for his defence twelve thousand men, and the Elector of Brandenburg eight thousand.

July 9, 1686, a second secret compact was signed at Augsburg between the Emperor, the Kings of Spain and Sweden, as mem-

bers of the Empire, the Elector of Bavaria, the Circles of Bavaria and Franconia, the princes of the House of Saxony, and the princes and States of the Upper Rhine and Westerwald. The Spanish government had just bowed its head once more before France, on the occasion of a commercial entanglement,[1] and passionately embraced the hope of finally obtaining that vengeance which was always escaping it.

By this act, the head and the members of the Empire united for the entire establishment of public security, founded on the observance of the treaties of Westphalia and Nimeguen, and the truce of Ratisbon. In case one of the associates should be menaced, the Emperor undertook to give notice to all the others that they might hold themselves in readiness to march their troops to the aid of the imperilled ally. If an attack was made, all the allies were to assemble to fix upon the means of constraining the aggressor to desist and repair the damage he might do. The allies were to remain united and to employ all their forces till the end sought was obtained. Each of the allies agreed to aid places exposed to invasion: if any of them was not in a condition to do so, the association was to provide for it. Each was to procure the advantage of the other and the safety of all. The association obligated itself to put on foot sixty thousand men, of which the Emperor was to furnish sixteen thousand, the Elector of Bavaria eight thousand, the King of Spain, for the Circle of Burgundy, six thousand. These troops were to be frequently drilled and required to go into camp some weeks every year. A common treasury was to be established at Frankfort. Each of the allies was to have its own magazines. The Emperor

[1] Regulations and prohibitions not being sufficient to prevail against the force of events, since the destruction of Spanish manufactures, Spain and her colonies were in the habit of purchasing abroad the merchandise they no longer produced, and, for want of articles of exchange, paid for it almost exclusively in the gold and silver of America. Nearly all of the commerce of the West Indies had passed into the hands of the Dutch, the English, and the French, whom the shippers of Cadiz served as commissioners, direct access to the colonies being interdicted to foreigners. The French were interested in this commerce to the extent of thirty or forty millions of francs. The Spanish government, weary of struggling unsuccessfully against contraband trade, had finally accorded the exportation of precious metals, under certain restrictions and a heavy tax called *indult*. These conditions were applied with partiality, to the detriment of the French, who were annoyed in every way, whilst the Dutch and English were favored. In 1685, 500,000 crowns belonging to French merchants were seized in America, under pretext of some legal infraction. Louis XIV. sent a squadron to blockade Cadiz; two galleons were captured. The cabinet of Madrid, fearing greater losses, reimbursed the 500,000 crowns. See P. Clément, *le Gouvernement de Louis XIV.*, p. 178. De Sourches, II. 89. The young queen, Marie Louise of Orléans, had offered all her precious stones to pay this, in order to avoid renewing the war.

was to have supreme direction of military operations; the Elector of Bavaria was to command the army. Foreign powers might be admitted into the association by the Emperor. The engagement at first was for three years: if, during this period, the public safety should be amply guaranteed, the association was to disarm; if not, it was to be prorogued. All difference between the allies was to be amicably decided. None of the allies could negotiate separately with an open enemy; nothing was to be done or decided but with unanimous consent.

The Elector Palatine, who was most directly interested in the treaty, gave in his adherence September 2; the Duke of Holstein Gottorp on the 7th.[1]

Such were the first acts of the celebrated League of Augsburg. The principles it laid down were at first purely defensive; but its chief instigator, the Prince of Orange, hoped to derive from it other consequences. He did not attempt to connect Holland immediately to the league of the Empire: the States-General would have still hesitated to take so decisive a step, without provocation on the part of Louis XIV.; besides, William had to reserve his influence over Holland for another design, and the League of Augsburg was, in his mind, but a powerful diversion which he kept in reserve.

Louis XIV. was not informed of the stipulations of Augsburg till the end of two months, and then very imperfectly: he believed the treaty more aggressive; he was advised that Holland was engaged in it, and that the end sought was to break the truce of Ratisbon. He threatened to enter Germany with sixty thousand men. The Emperor and the German princes denied all hostile intention, and affirmed that they only demanded the maintenance of treaties. Louis, as a defiance to the League, ordered a new fort to be built opposite to Huningue, on the right bank of the Rhine and on the territory of the Margrave of Baden, and signified to the Elector of Brandenburg and the dukes of Brunswick that they were not to attack the King of Denmark, then at war with the city of Hamburg. Denmark was the only ally that remained to Louis. As to the fort on the Rhine, this enterprise irritated the Swiss at least as much as the Germans, and completed the alienation from Louis of the Protestant cantons, which were overflowing with French and Piedmontese refugees.[2]

If the King had listened to Louvois, he would not have been

[1] Dumont, *Corps dipl.*, t. VII. 2d part, pp. 122-139.

[2] *Mém. du marquis de Sourches*, t. II. p. 167. Abridgment of the Memoirs of Marquis de Dangeau, published by Madame de Genlis, t. I. p. 169.

satisfied with so little: he would have taken the offensive, under pretext of preventing the machinations of his enemies and securing the rights of Madame in the palatine succession, but, in reality, to make new conquests in Belgium and on the Rhine, and to aid indirectly the Turks and Tekeli, by obliging Germany to divide her forces. Louvois began to think the return of war necessary to his credit, and, moreover, he could sustain his opinion with sufficiently weighty reasons. The pacific influence of Madame de Maintenon prevailed, and the proud minister was constrained to yield. The power of the King's wife became more and more manifest: the King fell into the habit of working in her apartment and before her with the ministers, and Louvois could not conceal the pique he felt towards her, although Madame de Maintenon, while the King was "at work," seemed more occupied with her distaff than with the discussion.[1]

The state of the King's health had seconded Madame de Maintenon. Louis, whose robust constitution had long seemed unalterable, had been suffering for four years with an affection that was at that epoch very common, and that had become quite grave towards the beginning of 1686: this was an anal fistula. Thus, at the moment when the concert of praises was redoubled, when clouds of incense were rising on every hand, when the model courtier, La Feuillade, was erecting on the *Place des Victoires* a statue, or rather an idol, to the *immortal man*, and was consecrating it by ceremonies of pagan adoration,[2] Nature was threatening to remove the god by

[1] It sometimes happened, when the matter was embarrassing, that the King would say, "Let us consult reason;" then he would add, turning towards her, "What does *Your Solidity* think of it?" He gave her this name out of respect to the excellence of her understanding. Noailles, *Histoire de madame de Maintenon*, t. II. p. 196.

[2] La Feuillade, with the concurrence of the city of Paris, had constructed, on the site of a hotel that belonged to him, the place which he called *des Victoires*, in commemoration of the triumphs of Louis XIV. He erected on it at his own expense a colossal group in gilded lead, that represented Louis the Great crowned by Victory and treading beneath his feet a Cerberus, a symbol of the coalition. Four slaves in bronze were chained to the four corners of the pedestal. This monument, the work of the Brabant sculptor, Van Bogaerts (Desjardins), was dedicated, March 28, 1686, with extraordinary pomp. La Feuillade marched around it three times at the head of the French Guards, of which he was colonel, with such prostrations as the Romans used in the inauguration of the statues of their emperors. He had resolved to found votive lamps to be burned day and night before the statue, as in other times before the images of the gods. The King, however, thought this too much and did not permit it. La Feuillade consoled himself by announcing his intention of preparing himself a tomb under the statue of his master. See *Mém. de Choisi*, p. 602. *Mém. du marquis de Sourches*, t. II. p. 86. *Tableau de Paris*, par Saint-Victor, t. II. pp. 113–118, with the design of the monument destroyed in 1792. The four bronze slaves have been transferred to the Invalides.

a vulgar and almost humiliating malady. Louis allowed the ulceration to be aggravated by his unwillingness to permit an operation as soon as it was necessary: he was unaccustomed to suffering. He finally decided to submit to the operation, November 18, and summoned to his side, at this painful moment, only Madame de Maintenon and M. de Louvois, as it were to reconcile, before his bed of suffering, his wife and his *necessary* minister. The operation, borne with courage, was successful; yet new incisions soon became necessary, and Louis was not really cured till the month of January following. France and Europe had awaited, with profound anxiety, the issue of his malady: the report of his death was circulated several times. His reception by the Parisians when he went, January 30, 1687, to thank God for his cure at Notre Dame, then to dine at the Hôtel de Ville, recalled the transports that had been witnessed at the birth of his eldest grandson, and showed how popular he still was. The whole population, with the exception of the unfortunate Protestants, was intoxicated[1] with joy.

The malady of Louis XIV. was destined to divide his reign into two almost equal parts.[2] Had this reign terminated in the midst of his career, he would have left the memory of a greatness and prosperity without example in history. The greatness was to survive the prosperity, and other destinies were reserved for the last years of the reign.

The remote successes of the rivals of France, without directly affecting her, were already reverses to her. From 1685, the Imperialists were everywhere successful against the Turks, and men began to understand, even to exaggerate the real weakness of that

[1] *Mém. de Sourches*, t. II. pp. 1, 18, 24, 41, 206. *Abrégé de Dangeau*, t. I. p. 180. Larrei, *Histoire de Louis XIV.*, t. II. p. 71. The great Condé died shortly after the operation on the King, December 11, 1686. He had atoned, during long years, for the political and other sins of his youth, by showing himself the most obsequious of courtiers and the type of decorum. When he was solicited to write the memoirs of his life, he replied: "Everything that I have done is only fit to be forgotten; it is necessary to write the history of the King; every other would henceforth be superfluous." In the last years of his life he even turned to devotion, and thus succeeded in putting Chantilly in unison with Versailles. "The news of the communion of the Prince," wrote the Marquis de Sourches in 1685 (t. I. p. 88), "surprised many; it was asserted that he had not kept Easter for seventeen years." One of the most earnest desires of the King was to secure great establishments to his natural children: Condé flattered this passion by soliciting from the King, for his grandson the Duke de Bourbon, a daughter of Louis and Madame de Montespan. This young princess having been attacked by the small-pox, sick himself, he hastened from Chantilly to the court, and fatigued himself so much that he died in consequence of his zeal. This was being a courtier to the death. His funeral oration was one of the most magnificent masterpieces of Bossuet.

[2] From 1661 to 1686; from 1687 to 1715.

great Ottoman body, the object of so much terror. The Pope and the Emperor had succeeded in calming the discontent of Sobieski with ungrateful Austria: Innocent XI., by urgent appeals to the zeal of the Polish hero, — appeals supported by large subsidies; Leopold, by promising to secure to the children of Sobieski the conquests that their father should make. Sobieski had ceded to the Russians Smolensk, Tchernigov, Kiew, and other places on the Dnieper, which they occupied only under a provisional title, for the purpose of obtaining their coöperation against the Turks and Tartars, vassals of the Sultan; then he had invaded Wallachia and Moldavia: betrayed by the Greek hospodar, Cantimir, who had promised to join him, he was unable to maintain himself in the Roumanian provinces, and was reduced to the sterile glory of a victorious retreat, effected in a difficult country, before superior forces of Turks and Tartars. In sacrificing the true interests of Poland, he had only facilitated the success of the Imperialists by a great diversion. Whilst the Turks were defending Wallachia and Moldavia against the Poles, Austria wrested from the Sultan, by a treaty with Prince Michael Apaffi, the suzerainty of Transylvania, hitherto the fulcrum of the Hungarian insurrection; and Buda, the capital of Ottoman Hungary, was carried by assault in presence of the Grand-Vizier, who could afford it no aid (September 2, 1686). Almost the whole population, Christian or Mussulman, was slaughtered by the Imperial troops, more ferocious than the *Infidels* themselves. A part of southern Hungary followed the lot of Buda. The Venetians were not less successful than the Imperialists in this campaign: they made up for the loss of Candia by the conquest of the Morea; the western coast of Greece and Turkish Dalmatia fell in part into their hands.

Civilization and humanity had no cause of gratulation for the advantages gained by the League: the cannon of the Venetians had destroyed in Greece incomparable monuments of antiquity, spared by Ottoman barbarity,[1] and the return of Hungary under Austrian domination was signalized by a long series of atrocities, that justified the Hungarians for having preferred the suzerainty of the *Infidels* to the yoke of Austria. The magnates recently submitted having shown some disposition to renew connection with Tekeli, the cabinet of Vienna assembled at Eperies, under this pretext, an extraordinary tribunal, which seemed to propose to itself the annihilation of the Magyar nobility as its aim. It required thirty executioners at once to suffice for the work: the scaf-

[1] The sculptures of Phidias in the Parthenon remained intact till 1686!

fold remained ready for nearly a whole year, and the *bloody theatre of Eperies* merited, in the history of tyrants, a renown equal to that of the Duke of Alva's *bloody tribunal.* When Hungary appeared sufficiently drained of blood, sufficiently overwhelmed with terror, the Emperor sent the remaining magnates to Vienna, and compelled them to abandon, in the name of their nation, the ancient right of electing kings and of forcibly resisting infractions of national privileges by the royal power. The Hungarian diet, convoked at Presburg, ratified this destruction of the national constitution, acknowledged the crown hereditary in the male line, and proclaimed the young Archduke Joseph, son of Leopold, associated in the crown (December 9, 1687). The financial administration of Hungary was delivered up to a board, one half of which was composed of Germans. The last effort at independence which the diet dared make, was to refuse to extend the hereditability to the female line. Leopold, after the coronation of his son, finally suppressed the tribunal of Eperies, confirmed what privileges remained to the Hungarian nation, and promised to annex to the kingdom of Hungary the conquests that he had made and should make from the Turks. His ministers, the instigators of his frightful vengeance, and the Jesuits, having such influence over his mind, had urged him to establish a wholly absolute government in Hungary, and to suppress anew the Protestant worship; he had at least the good sense to resist and not to push to the last extremity a courageous people, who would soon have oscillated from fear to rage.[1]

The Duke of Lorraine and the Elector of Bavaria had, nevertheless, followed up the course of their successes. August 12, 1687, they had gained a brilliant victory over the Grand-Vizier at Mohacs, on the same plains where, one hundred and sixty-six years before, King Louis Jagellon and Hungarian independence had fallen together under the scimitar of the great Solyman. The Imperialists profited by their triumph to violate their recent treaty with the Prince of Transylvania, who, they said, maintained intelligence with the Turks, and to assume military occupation of this country. The discords of the Turks completed the fortune of their vanquishers. The army, beaten at Mohacs, after having expelled the Grand-Vizier Solyman Pacha, to whom it attributed its defeat, had marched on Constantinople, dethroned the Sultan, Mahomet IV., elevated to his place his brother Solyman, who had been vege-

[1] *Hist. des révolutions de Hongrie*, t. I^er^, liv. III. IV.; The Hague, 1739. Coxe, *Hist. de la maison d'Autriche*, t. IV. ch. 66.

tating from infancy a prisoner in the seraglio,[1] and seemed much more eager to ransom the capital and the Ottoman provinces than to return against the enemy. The new Sultan manifested a desire to treat with the Emperor, and openly censured the war undertaken by his predecessor against the faith of a truce.

All these grave events caused as much dissatisfaction at Versailles as satisfaction at Vienna. The French government manifested its disquiet only by increasing its haughtiness in proportion as its rivals became more formidable; it finally ceased to be absorbed in its deplorable religious preoccupations, and seriously set to work to counterbalance the progress of the Emperor. Its situation was complicated by a new quarrel with an adversary who had not, like Leopold, armies at his disposition, but had other means of injury, and used them vehemently: it was Pope Innocent XI. The franchises enjoyed at Rome by the ambassadors of Catholic powers had been the cause of dispute. Each ambassador was sovereign, not only in his palace, but in his quarter: the officers of the Pope were deprived of all authority over a great part of Rome, which rendered police almost impossible and secured to malefactors inviolable retreats in all these privileged asylums. Innocent XI., following the example of Sixtus V. and some other pontiffs zealous for good order, wished to bring these abuses to an end, and resolved to receive no more ambassadors who should not renounce the franchise of their quarters. The courts of Poland, Spain, England, the republic of Venice, the cabinet of Vienna, successively acceded to the intentions of the Holy Father. At the commencement of 1687, the Duke d'Estrées, ambassador of France, having died, the Pope ordered the Farnese palace (the palace of the French ambassador) to be occupied by his officers, and abolition of the franchises to be proclaimed; he then explained anew to Louis XIV. his motives, and informed him of the consent of the other princes. Innocent XI. had been wrong on other points against the King of France; but, this time, it must be acknowledged that he was right. Louis, nevertheless, haughtily responded that "his crown had never been governed by the example of others, but that God had established it to serve as an example and rule to others, and that he was resolved, as long as he reigned, never to allow it lose any right."[2]

It is difficult to understand what important interest the crown of France could have in hindering the constable from arresting a

[1] This was perhaps the first time, since the fifteenth century, that the Sultans had infringed upon the custom of slaying brothers to inaugurate their reign.

[2] Larrei, *Hist. de Louis XIV.*, t. II. p. 74.

thief in the streets adjacent to the Farnese palace. Louis, however, kept his word, and, the Pope having hurled a bull of excommunication against whomsoever should pretend to maintain the franchises of the quarters (May 12, 1687), the King sent the Marquis de Lavardin as ambassador to Rome, with orders to cede no right. Lavardin entered Rome like a conqueror, at the head of a thousand men armed from head to foot, most of them officers, noblemen, or marine guards (November 16). The Pope refused him an audience, as one excommunicated, and interdicted the French church of St. Louis, where the ambassador worshipped (December 26). The ambassador protested, and the attorney-general, De Harlai, appealed as from an abuse from the bull of May 12 and the sentence of December 26. He appealed to a future council, and not to Innocent XI. better informed, as had been the practice, he said, towards other popes, whom their age permitted to act by themselves, and whose character and ideas promised justice and impartiality. The advocate-general Talon was still more ardent and explicit. Though he could not find good reasons in favor of the franchises, he blamed the Pope, and rightly, for having made an undue use of spiritual weapons in a purely political matter: he attacked the systematic refusals of bulls to bishops appointed by the King, — refusals which, persisted in since 1682, kept at this moment thirty-five dioceses without canonically constituted pastors, — and he maintained that the bulls might be dispensed with and ordination made by the metropolitans of the bishops elected by the King, if the Pope continued to refuse to execute the concordat. He accused the Holy Father of protecting Jansenism, a faction hostile "to all ecclesiastical and secular powers," and of tolerating the new errors of quietism.[1] He decided, besides the appeal to a future council-general, that the King should be entreated, 1st, to order the holding of provincial councils, or of a national council, in order to provide for the disorders caused by the vacancy of the bishoprics; 2d, to interdict all commerce with Rome and all sending of money. The parliament of Paris rendered a corresponding decree (January 22–23, 1688).[2]

This was a question of schism clearly put by the magistracy. The King did not go so far, and deferred responding to the wishes of the parliament. An important affair, that affected the essential

[1] We shall recur to this mystic sect, which was soon to play an interesting part in France.

[2] *Mém. chronolog. et dogmatiques*, t. II. pp. 804–816. Larrei, t. II. pp. 72–82. Limiers, *Hist. de Louis XIV.*, t. IV. p. 242.

interests of France much more closely than the quarrel about franchises, had just arisen and made Louis desire an accommodation with the Pope; but Innocent was not the man to suffer a means of vengeance more efficacious than the worn-out thunders of excommunication to escape him. Louis experienced that it is not well to humiliate an adversary that we are neither able nor willing to annihilate.

We have seen with what devotion the Swabian house of Fürstenberg was attached to France: of the two chiefs of this house, the one, Prince William, minister of the Elector of Cologne, had bound the Elector to French policy; the other, the Bishop of Strasburg, Egon, had been of great influence in the annexation of Strasburg to France. Egon having died in 1682, William entered the Church, and Louis XIV. procured him the bishopric of Strasburg, then a cardinal's hat. Louis was preparing for his useful auxiliary a higher fortune, the succession of the Elector of Cologne, Bishop of Liege, Maximilian Henry of Bavaria Leuchtenberg, a valetudinary prince, whose end seemed near.

In the beginning of 1688 the chapter of Cologne, long manipulated by the intrigues of Fürstenberg and the money of France, elected Fürstenberg coadjutor of the Archbishop-Elector: the consent of the latter had been purchased at a high price by the King. The alarm spread throughout the Empire; Fürstenberg Elector! As well introduce M. de Louvois or M. de Croissi into the electoral college! But the Empire could count on Rome; the Pope quashed the election. The Archbishop-Elector died in the mean time (June 3). Louis XIV. made a last attempt with Innocent XI. He sent to him a confidential agent with a letter from his own hand. The agent and the letter were not received. During this time the League of Augsburg made haste to seek a competitor for Fürstenberg: it put forward the young Prince Clement, brother of the Elector of Bavaria. Clement of Bavaria had neither the age nor the other requisite conditions: the Pope granted him dispensations and a brief of eligibility. The chapter of Cologne proceeded, July 19, to the election of a new archbishop. The constitutions of the Electorate of Cologne established that the candidate who was already attached to some other benefice must receive a two-thirds vote, sixteen out of twenty-four, in order to be irrevocably elected; if he had only a simple majority, he was to address himself to the Pope by way of *postulation*. Fürstenberg had wished to remove this obstacle by resigning the Bishopric of Strasburg, but the Pope had refused him permission. If all the votes that had called him

to the coadjutorship had remained faithful to him, he would have received two thirds of the suffrages and would have been elected, in spite of the Holy Father; but Dutch letters of exchange had counterbalanced the gold of France and had turned two or three votes: Fürstenberg had only fourteen against nine given for Clement of Bavaria. The majority of the chapter, nevertheless, resolved to sustain its choice, and to consider the authorization previously given by the Pope to Fürstenberg, to be at once Bishop of Strasburg and canon of Cologne, as equivalent to a brief of eligibility. Louis XIV. signified, by his ambassadors at Ratisbon, at the Hague, at Brussels, that he should sustain the archbishop-elect and the chapter of Cologne in their rights towards and against all, and informed the governor of the Catholic Netherlands that he should enter Belgium if the Dutch entered the territory of Cologne to sustain Prince Clement. Already French troops had passed into the service of Fürstenberg, and occupied in his name most of the towns of the Electorate. The capital, nevertheless, in virtue of its rights as a free and Imperial city, maintained itself without a garrison, and its attitude was hostile to France. At Liege, Fürstenberg met with a complete check: the resentment of the populace, recently so harshly treated, had gained the chapter. The protégé of Louis XIV. was discarded, and a nobleman of the country was chosen for prince-bishop, who did not, however, restore to the inhabitants of Liege their destroyed liberties.[1]

Louis XIV. had no longer to conciliate any one; he was certain that the Pope, not content with rejecting Fürstenberg, was about to proclaim Prince Clement, the choice of the minority. September 6, the King broke forth against Innocent XI. in a manifesto in the form of a letter addressed to Cardinal d'Estrées, charged with the interests of France in the sacred college. D'Estrées had orders to communicate the letter to the Holy Father and to all the cardinals. It was very harsh. Louis declared that he had lost all hope of bringing Innocent back to the sentiments of a common father, and of obtaining any justice from him. "There is strong probability," he said, "that the conduct of the Pope is about to cause a general war in Christendom. *This conduct gives to the Prince of Orange the boldness to do everything to indicate that he has formed a design of going to attack the King of England in his own kingdom,*

[1] *Œuvres de Louis XIV.*, t. VI. p. 4. *Abrégé de Dangeau*, t. I. p. 331. *Mém. du comte d'Avaux*, t. VI. p. 207. *Mém. de madame de La Fayette*, ap. Collect. Michaud, 3d series, t. VIII. p. 214. *Mém. de Saint-Hilaire*, t. I. p. 376. Protestation of the Canons of Cologne, in Dumont, t. VII. 2d part, p. 178.

and of taking as the pretext for such a bold enterprise, the maintenance of the Protestant religion, or rather the extirpation of the Catholic religion. I can no longer acknowledge the Pope as mediator of the contests to which the palatine succession has given rise; I shall succeed in causing the justice that is due my sister-in-law to be rendered to her by the means that God has put into my hands . . . and I shall continue to give to Cardinal de Fürstenberg and the chapter of Cologne all the protection they shall need." He added that, if his ally the Duke of Parma was not immediately put in possession of the duchies of Castro and Ronciglione, which the Holy See had continually deferred restoring to him since the treaty of Pisa, the French troops would enter Italy, and Avignon would be seized.[1]

The Pope replied by proclaiming Clement of Bavaria Archbishop of Cologne, and by excommunicating the parliament of Paris and the Advocate-General Talon. September 20, the attorney-general reiterated the appeal to a future council from whatever the Holy Father should do against the rights of the crown; he at the same time declared, "according to the express command of the King, that the intention of His Majesty was to remain immovably attached to the Holy See, as to the centre of the unity of the Church."[2] The prudent policy of Bossuet triumphed over the ambition of the Archbishop of Paris and the ardor of parliament. Louis XIV. was resolved, in breaking with the Pope, to shun every appearance of schism with the Holy See. Twenty-six bishops present at Paris *respectfully* approved, September 27, "the wise conduct of His Majesty." The university joined its appeal to that of the parliament. October 7, the French troops occupied Avignon without more resistance than in 1663.

The part taken by Innocent XI. in the affair of Cologne was to have grave consequences, and it was long since the papacy had had such weight in the political balance of Europe; but it was not to the profit of Catholicism, for, in giving a very sensible blow to Louis XIV., Innocent XI. effectively served the cause of the Reformation, which was bordering upon a decisive crisis. The reproach addressed by Louis to the Pope, of emboldening the Prince of Orange to attack the King of England, was well-founded, and it is very probable that Holland, if she had seen France mistress, through Fürstenberg, of the Electorate of Cologne, would not have dared to second the designs of William. The Holy Father

[1] La Martinière, t. IV. p. 391.

[2] Bausset, *Vie de Bossuet*, t. II. p. 201.

smoothed the way to the *anti-papal* revolution that was being prepared in England. He had gone so far as to negotiate secretly with the Prince of Orange, and to promise to contribute to the pay of the Imperial army, which the Prince, as Innocent believed, would command on the Rhine against the French.[1] Every one knows the saying by which a contemporary characterized the situation: "For the repose of Europe, it would be necessary that the King of England should become Protestant and the Holy Father Catholic." Innocent was in some sort more ultramontane than Catholic; his sole excuse, not very creditable to his intelligence, is that he was the only one not to see what all Europe saw, what the Protestants were preparing, and what the Catholic powers of the League were resolved to accept, if not to aid.

The aspect of England had indeed changed since the close of 1685. The royalist movement, widespread, noisy, and superficial, that had sustained Charles II. against the Whigs, and James II. himself, at his accession, against Monmouth, had stopped at the first menaces of the King against the Protestant religion. James, in the face of the opposition of the Tories themselves, in the majority in both Houses, had prorogued Parliament. The Anglican clergy had ceased to preach passive obedience, and thundered against Papacy, which was beginning illegally to invade the pulpits and benefices. James wished to interdict controversy, and was not obeyed. He pursued his designs only the more obstinately. The parliament of Scotland, after the example of the English Parliament, having refused to abolish the Test Act (June, 1686), only consenting to tolerate private worship for Catholics, James, in his plenary authority as head of the Scottish Church, enjoined on the judges to consider as null all laws against *Papists*, and filled all the offices with Catholics, or with men without faith and morals who gave themselves out for Catholics. At the same time he strove to rouse in Ireland the national and Catholic party against the Protestant party of Cromwell's colonists. The famous Talbot of Tyrconnel was commissioned to organize the national party of Ireland strongly enough to enable the King to seek a refuge and a point of support in that island, if he should be driven from England. Tyrconnel carried his views farther, and thought to pave the way for the independence of Ireland, in case the Princess of Orange should succeed James II. by right of inheritance. He opened a correspondence with Seignelai, who promised him to prepare at

[1] Letters of Cardinal d'Estrées to the King, ap. *Œuvres de Louis XIV.*, t. VI. p. 497.

Brest means of succoring Ireland. James II. knew and approved of this design.[1]

James, although he had already dismissed many public functionaries for not being willing to become Catholics, and had begun by redoubling the violence of persecutions against the Puritans, now pretended that he had no other aim than liberty of conscience for all. He had somewhat tardily comprehended the impossibility of overthrowing Anglicanism and the dissenting sects at the same time, and desired to put Protestants in antagonism with one another. In the spring of 1687 he did in England what he had done in Scotland: he suspended the penal laws against all dissenters, and exempted from the Test whomsoever was appointed to office. Some dissenters, particularly the Quakers and their illustrious leader William Penn, were grateful for the benefit which they shared with the Catholics; but this participation disgraced liberty itself in the eyes of the Presbyterians, the most powerful of the dissenting sects; such liberty was in their eyes only a transition to a new tyranny, and they remained, with reason, in an attitude of distrust, whilst the mass of Anglicans became more and more irritated. The attributing of a public character to the Papal nuncio, his formal reception at court, the entrance of the Jesuit Petre to the privy council, the dissolution of Parliament, already prorogued two years since, exasperated the people and terrified the enlightened Catholics, who felt that their cause would be ruined (July–November, 1687). Petre was the counsellor of all the rash acts, and the ally of the French ambassador. The nuncio, on the contrary, in accordance with the ambassador of Spain, was instructed to moderate James at home and to urge him on abroad against France. The Pope, therefore, had been unwilling to make Petre either bishop or cardinal.

James, nevertheless, made a last effort to become reconciled to his eldest daughter and his formidable son-in-law. He sent Sir William Penn to the Prince and Princess of Orange, to endeavor to obtain their approval of the abrogation of the Test Act. He met with a formal refusal. The Prince and Princess only approved that liberty of conscience should be granted to the Catholics, as in Holland, with exclusion from office. The adroit William thus found the means of satisfying the Anglican Church, while declaring himself the enemy of persecutions, and thereby reassuring his Catholic allies, and the Pope himself, in regard to what the Eng-

[1] Macaulay, *History of England from the Accession of James II.* When Macaulay and Lingard do not agree upon facts, Macaulay must generally be followed.

lish Catholics had to expect from him. William was no longer left to vague hopes: a powerful party urged him to interfere with arms for the defence of British liberty and religion.

For this it was necessary that the United Provinces should furnish William with the means of action. The French government decided them to do this by a commercial quarrel which completed in Holland the annihilation of the party of the French alliance. After having prohibited the importation of herring salted with other salt than that of Brouage, the cabinet of Versailles reëstablished the tariff of 1667 on Dutch merchandise (November, 1687). This was realizing one of the last wishes of Colbert, but at a very inopportune moment. This violation of the conventions of Nimeguen, by giving a severe blow to Dutch commerce,[1] removed the obstacle that religious passions still encountered in material interests, and put all Holland at the disposition of William, none having reason longer to conciliate France. William, without authority, but without opposition on the part of the States-General, ordered the fitting out of twenty vessels and a levy of nine thousand sailors, under the pretext of protecting commerce against the Algerines, who had dared to engage in piracy at the expense of the Dutch within the Channel itself. He secretly assured himself that several German princes would send, in case of need, their troops to replace in Holland the Dutch troops that he might take to England. James II., meanwhile, recalled six English regiments that were in the pay of the United Provinces. William contested to James the right to withdraw those bodies of volunteers, and the English regiments did not depart (March, 1688).

In England, the storm increased. James, having renewed his declaration concerning the abolition of the Test Act, enjoined the bishops to have it read from the pulpit. The Archbishop of Canterbury, the Bishop of London, and six other bishops refused. The King had them brought before the court; the jury acquitted them (June–July, 1688). Meanwhile an event occurred which seemed calculated to place James firmly on his throne, but contributed more than all else to hurl him from it. The Queen of England was pregnant, and the report was spread everywhere that this late pregnancy was fictitious. June 20, before the expected period, the Queen was delivered of a boy. William seemed at first disconcerted, and even congratulated James II.; but the attitude of his partisans reanimated his audacity: he abstained from every

[1] D'Avaux maintains that Dutch commerce was reduced more than one fourth. He doubtless means to speak of the commerce of Europe. T. VI. pp. 98, 115, 198.

other act that might give rise to the belief that he admitted the legitimacy of the new Prince of Wales, and hastened his preparations. He doubled his squadron and formed a camp of twenty thousand men between Grave and Nimeguen, that might at once mislead as to his principal aim, and indirectly coöperate in it by a sudden attack on Cologne. Seven or eight millions diverted from different public services, and four millions sent by the malcontents of England, had made up for the insufficiency of regular resources.

Since spring, Louis XIV. had offered James II. fifteen or sixteen vessels to be added to the fleet that the English monarch proposed to fit out. James, much less preoccupied with his real dangers than with maintaining his neutrality between Louis and the League of Augsburg, had eluded the proposition, as he had repelled the solicitations made for the last time by the ambassador of Spain that he should enter the League.[1] It was a kind of ultimatum, after the rejection of which the Catholic powers of the League no longer scrupled to second the projects of William. Nothing could enlighten the obstinate Stuart. He sometimes flattered himself that the attack would not take place before the coming year, sometimes even that the Prince of Orange only wished to attack France. His chief counsellor, Lord Sunderland, betrayed him and undertook to deceive Louis at the same time with James, through the medium of the French ambassador Barillon, a man of intelligence, but fickle, and wholly the dupe of the designing Englishman. Louis was better served by another agent, D'Avaux, his ambassador in Holland. D'Avaux informed the King, almost daily, of all the movements, all the designs of William. Louis renewed his offers to the King of England both of ships and soldiers; James refused: the inconsistent monarch pretended to effect, without foreign arms, and with national forces,[2] a counter-revolution abhorred by his nation.

The hour of the European crisis had come; war was no longer the question: the question was no longer but to know who should begin the war and where it should begin. France had an obvious interest in anticipating her adversaries; but where should she direct her first blows? She had a double peril to fear, to wit: 1st, that the Emperor might dictate peace to the Turks, and then bring back all the forces of Germany on the Rhine; 2d, that England and Holland might unite under the sword of the Prince

[1] *Mém.* of Marshal Berwick (natural son of James II.), t. I. p. 26.

[2] At least with *British* forces, if not English; he had called to England a small army of Irish Catholics.

of Orange. The greater and more imminent of the two perils was the second: it was necessary to avert it at any cost. Louis seemed to understand this: September 2, he wrote to D'Avaux to signify to the States-General that he should consider the first act of hostilities committed by the United Provinces against his *ally* the King of England, as a declaration of war against himself. James II. hastened to disavow the declaration of the King of France, protested to the States-General that there was no *alliance* between Louis and himself, recalled Skelton, his ambassador in France, who had solicited this step on the part of Louis, and sent him to the Tower of London.

Whatever might be the extravagance of James II., it was necessary to save him despite himself. It was necessary to send the French fleet to sea, as Seignelai warmly urged the King, to march on Berg-op-Zoom or Maestricht, and to occupy Liege and Cologne with another army-corps. Holland, assailed at home as in 1672, would at that very instant have recalled all her forces for her own defence, and perhaps Germany would have hesitated directly to take the offensive. D'Avaux, with perfect knowledge of the situation, had indicated to the King, some weeks before, all that it was necessary to do: Louis did not act. September 23, D'Avaux sent word to the King that they had been anticipated at Cologne; that this great city had opened its gates to three thousand soldiers of the Elector of Brandenburg. The author of this bold stroke was the ex-Marshal de Schomberg, who at this very moment passed from the service of Brandenburg to the service of the Prince of Orange, and became the guide and general of William. The reprisals for the REVOCATION were beginning![1]

Louis had determined on a plan of campaign different from that counselled by D'Avaux. Since the end of August, as the correspondence of Louvois attests,[2] the King had resolved to attack, not Holland, but the Emperor and the Elector-Palatine. Louvois had earnestly represented to the King that the Turks, overwhelmed by their defeats and discords, on the point of losing not only their Hungarian conquests, but Belgrade also, the bulwark of their own States, were finally humbling themselves, for the first time, before the House of Austria; that they were about to submit to all the conditions that it might please the Emperor to impose on them, and thus to give him free disposition of the forces of the Empire, if haste were not made to reanimate the courage of the Divan by a

[1] *Mém.* of Count d'Avaux, t. VI. *passim.* Letters of Barillon.
[2] *Lettres militaires*, t. V. p. 1 *et seq.*

direct attack on the heart of Germany. These interests, doubtless grave, but much less pressing, much less decisive than the interests at stake on the banks of the Thames, triumphed in the mind of Louis XIV. In the early part of September, the French troops began to defile towards Lorraine and Alsace. The camp at Maintenon had been broken up August 16, and the regiments of which it was composed, after some repose necessitated by the diseases that had cruelly tormented them, were directed towards the eastern frontier. The works of Maintenon were never to be resumed; the aqueduct remained unfinished, like a gigantic Roman ruin,[1] and the river Eure did not carry to Versailles the tribute of its waters. It was the first time that Louis XIV. recoiled in the execution of one of his enterprises.

September 24, Louis XIV. hurled a manifesto against the Emperor and the Elector-Palatine. The reasons that he alleged to justify him in taking up arms, for example, the refusal of the Emperor to convert the truce of Ratisbon into a definitive peace, were unsubstantial, and he would have done better to declare simply that he attacked in order not to be attacked. The pretensions that he announced were not, moreover, exorbitant. He was about to besiege Philippsburg, he said, as the place most capable of facilitating the enemy's entrance into his States, and to occupy Kaiserslautern, as security for the rights of the Duchess of Orleans. He offered to surrender Philippsburg when he had taken and razed it, on condition that the fortifications should not be rebuilt. He would surrender Freiburg on the same condition, in order to show that he had only thought of securing his own kingdom, and not of preserving the means of enlarging it; only he would preserve the fort newly built opposite Huningue, and another fort called Fort Louis, built since the truce on an island in the Rhine, between Strasburg and Lauterburg. He would withdraw his troops from the electorate of Cologne, as soon as the Pope should confirm the appointment of Cardinal de Fürstenberg, and he would strive to procure the coadjutorship for Prince Clement of Bavaria. Finally, *Madame* would relinquish, for a sum of money, her rights to the estates of the Palatine succession. These propositions were to be accepted and peace concluded before the month of January, or the King would no longer be bound by his offers.[2]

[1] Under Louis XV., several arcades were demolished to furnish material for the enlargement of the château of Créci, the domain of Madame de Pompadour. The remains of the aqueduct still subsist in the park of the Duke de Noailles.

[2] Dumont, t. VII. 2d part, p. 170.

The next day, the Dauphin set out from Versailles to take command of the army that was to besiege Philippsburg. Louis had wished to give to his son the honor of opening hostilities. This was the signal for a war that was to be longer and more terrible than that of Holland, and which began by an immense mistake.[1]

[1] We attach little importance to the opinion of Saint-Simon (t. XIII. p. 9), who attributes the war of 1688 to a quarrel between the King and Louvois on account of a window out of proportion in the Trianon. Louvois, treated harshly by the King, thought himself undone, without a war which would divert Louis from buildings and make his services indispensable. He determined therefore to raise a general war in spite of the King and in spite of foreign powers, who wished it on neither side. The war of 1688 arose from somewhat graver causes. The truth is that Louvois entered upon it very unskilfully; the bad advice which he gave the King to attack Germany instead of Holland was probably suggested to him by his jealousy of Seignelai.

CHAPTER II.

LOUIS XIV. (CONTINUED.)

WAR OF THE LEAGUE OF AUGSBURG. Conquest of the left Bank of the Rhine. ENGLISH REVOLUTION. England and Holland united under William of Orange. Declaration of War against Holland and Spain. Devastation of the Palatinate. France loses a Part of the Rhenish Provinces. England declares War against France. War in Ireland. Retreat of Pelletier. Pontchartrain, Comptroller-General. Disorder of the Finances and Aggravation of the Public Burdens. Victory of Luxembourg at Fleurus. The Duke of Savoy declares against France. Victory of Catinat at Stafford. Talents and Activity of Seignelai. Victory of TOURVILLE at Beachy-Head over the Anglo-Batavian Fleet. Glory of the French Navy. Death of Seignelai. The Navy confided to Pontchartrain. The Battle of the Boyne. James II. abandons Ireland. Defence of Limerick. Taking of Mons. Combat of Leuse. Conquest of Nice and Savoy. Battle of Aghrim. Close of the War in Ireland. Irish Emigration to France. Death of Louvois. His Son Barbezieux succeeds him. Immense Display of Military Force. Project of invading England. Reverse of La Hogue exaggerated by Tradition. Taking of Namur. Victory of Steenkerke. Invasion of Dauphiny by the Duke of Savoy. Immense Losses of English and Dutch Commerce. La Hogue avenged. The French Privateers. Jean Bart. Duguai-Trouin. Louis XIV. misses the Chance of defeating William III. Victory of Neerwinden. Taking of Charleroi. Victory of Marseilles. Madame de Maintenon, Beauvilliers, and FÉNELON. Misery in France. Pacific Dispositions inspired in Louis XIV. Sweden and Denmark offer their Mediation. Moderate Offers of Louis XIV. rejected. Compromise between France and the Court of Rome. Louis XIV. recoils. Vain Attacks of the Anglo-Batavians against our Ports. Victory of the Ter and Conquests in Catalonia. Financial Situation of France and England. Establishment of great Economic and Financial Institutions in England. France reduced to Expedients and Empiricism. Loss of Namur and Casale. The Duke of Savoy treats with France. Savoy and Nice are returned to him, and Pignerol is ceded to him. Neutrality of Italy. Negotiations. Congress of Ryswick. Reconciliation between Louis XIV. and William III. Taking of Ath. Taking of Barcelona. Sack of Carthagena. Peace of Ryswick. France restores all her recent Conquests and all the Additions to her Territory subsequent to the Peace of Nimeguen, save Strasburg and the Domains of Alsace.

1688–1697.

THE joy manifested by the great adversary of Louis XIV., William of Orange, at the news of the siege of Philippsburg, showed the magnitude of the error into which Louvois had led his master. William saw the overthrow of the last obstacle that could

arrest his great enterprise, and no longer doubted that the Dutch, secured against the contingency of a second invasion, would sustain him to the end. Stocks rose ten per cent. in Holland, when it was known that the French were marching on Central Germany and not on the Netherlands. Louis XIV., in default of military demonstrations capable of intimidating Holland, had thought to reduce her by attacking her interests through an embargo on her vessels in our ports. This act, contrary to public faith, irritated the Dutch instead of overwhelming them; they shamed the Great King for this disloyal violation of the rights of nations by not imitating him; but they were so much the more firmly resolved to attack the system of Louis XIV. in England. The insensate James II., continuing to repel his friends and to make useless advances to his enemies, signified to the States-General, meanwhile, that he regarded the siege of Philippsburg as a violation of the truce of which he was the guarantee, and that he was quite disposed to ally himself with them and Spain against Louis XIV. in order to reëstablish the truce. The refugee English malcontents in Holland, then the Prince of Orange, then the States-General themselves, replied to James with menacing manifestoes, in which they proclaimed the necessity of thwarting the projects of the Kings of France and England against the civil and religious liberties of Protestant nations. William openly attacked the birth of the Prince of Wales, the *suppositious child*, as the English refugees called him; he declared that he was going to England to assemble "a free parliament, which should decide all things" (October 10–24). The States-General, more moderate in form, explained the motives that impelled them to aid William "with some ships and auxiliary troops, in his laudable design."[1] The Prince, they said, had declared to them that it was in no way his intention to dethrone the King of England, to make himself master of the kingdom, or to persecute the Roman Catholics, but merely to aid the English nation in reëstablishing its violated laws and in preserving its religion and liberty (October 28). William had given the same assurances to the Emperor and to the King of Spain, in order to aid them to save appearances.[2]

The tempests of autumn, however, retarded for some weeks the departure of the Prince of Orange, and the French, on the contrary, made rapid progress on the Rhine. The immediate success

[1] They had just lent him four millions over and above all the funds already employed by him.

[2] Dumont, t. VII. 2d part, pp. 179–207. *Mém. du comte d'Avaux*, t. VI. pp. 296–315. Macaulay, Vol. II. ch. 9.

seemed to justify the resolution of Louis XIV. Germany, surprised, stunned, found herself in no condition to defend the Rhenish Provinces. Whilst the Dauphin besieged Philippsburg with twenty-five or thirty thousand men, the real chief of whom was Marshal de Duras, another small army-corps, commanded by Lieutenant-General Boufflers, occupied, almost without resistance, Kaiserslautern, Neustadt, Kreutznach, Worms, Oppenheim, Bingen, Bacharach, that is to say, nearly all the cis-Rhenish possessions of the Elector-Palatine and the Elector of Mayence. The Elector of Mayence treated with Boufflers, received a French garrison into his capital, and demanded neutrality for his trans-Rhenish domains (October 17). Trans-Rhenish Germany had already been encroached upon in its turn. A detachment from the army that was besieging Philippsburg occupied Heidelberg, from which the Elector-Palatine fled, then invaded Würtemberg, penetrated into Franconia, and extended its levies beyond the Danube.[1]

Vauban, however, conducted, with his usual skill, the operations of the siege of Philippsburg, which was defended by two thousand picked soldiers, with abundant and well-served artillery. The bad weather and the difficult approaches of the place, protected by marshes and the Rhine, retarded the works and singularly excited the impatience of Louvois, who counted only the days and not the men a besieged city cost him. Vauban, bold to rashness for himself, but always careful of the blood of others, firmly opposed the arrogant minister, and did not abandon his method. Philippsburg capitulated October 29: one hundred and twenty-four cannon and a great quantity of stores were found in the place. Philippsburg reduced, the Dauphin marched on Mannheim, which held out scarcely more than a week (November 4–12); then he recrossed the Rhine to take Frankenthal (November 15–19).

All the Palatinate, on both sides of the Rhine, was thus under the yoke. The Dauphin set out, November 22, for Versailles, leaving the army to Marshal Duras; he had shown, during this short campaign, good sense, coolness, and a certain activity, meritorious in a nature sluggish in mind and body. The Great King could applaud in complete security the good conduct of his son; he had no fear of ever encountering in him a rival.

The corps of Boufflers had pursued its operations at the same

[1] Louvois recommended the leaders of this corps to "seek people in the country, capable of setting fire to houses at night," in order that places too remote to be reached by troops might nevertheless submit through fear to the levy of contribution! *Lettres militaires*, t. V. p. 168.

time with the principal army; a detachment had occupied Speyer, from which the archives and the treasure of the Imperial chamber were taken and sent to Alsace, — an offence hurled at the Germanic body without aim and without reason. Boufflers had continued to descend the Rhine; but he had not been so fortunate at Coblentz as at Mayence. The Elector of Treves had not decided to follow the example of his colleague, and had received into Coblentz troops of the League instead of French troops. Boufflers was not prepared to besiege Coblentz; he avenged himself by an act of useless barbarity: by bombarding the city and palace of the Elector (beginning of November); he then reascended the Moselle and seized Treves.

A third French column, led by Marshal d'Humières, had entered, about the same time, the territory of Liege, and possessed itself of Dinant. The Dutch believed that Liege was about to be attacked, and their disquiet indicated what should have been done; but the French did not advance on the Meuse beyond Dinant.

In the course of November, the French thus saw themselves masters of the entire left bank of the Rhine, with the exception of Coblentz and Cologne; their successes, beyond the Rhine, extended as far as Augsburg. The manifesto of Louis XIV. had been far exceeded, and an attack had been made, not only on the Imperial garrison of Philippsburg and the territory of the Elector-Palatine, but on the whole Germanic body.

William was about to respond on the Thames to the blows given by Louis on the Rhine, and the response was to be terrible. The wind, which had long blown from the west, having finally changed to the east, the Prince of Orange, after having bid a solemn adieu to the States-General, set sail from Helvoetsluis, October 30. More than five hundred transports, escorted by fifty men-of-war, bore four thousand five hundred cavalry and eleven thousand infantry, with an enormous quantity of arms and accoutrements with which to equip the English who should join the Prince. The roster of the regiments embarked was formed in great part of French *refugee* officers, led by the ex-deputy-general of the Reformed Churches, Ruvigni; there were nearly eight hundred of these. The ex-Marshal de Schomberg commanded the army under William. All the ships had hoisted the English flag. On the flag of the Prince were inscribed the words: *Pro Religione Protestante; pro libero Parlamento;* and, on the reverse, the device of the Nassaus: *Je maintiendrai.* On other flags was read: *Pro religione et libertate.* This fleet, in fact, bore the destinies of European Protes-

tantism and of English liberty. The ambassador of Spain at the Hague, the representative of the successor of Philip II., caused a high mass to be chanted for the success of the expedition that was about to wrest from Catholicism the crown of Great Britain.[1]

Heaven at first seemed to pronounce against the enterprise. The very night after anchor had been weighed, a violent storm dispersed the fleet and obliged it to rally at the starting-point; — it could not again set sail till November 10. The wind then became as favorable as it had at first been contrary; it retained in the Thames the fleet of James II., and the vessels of William cleared without obstacle the Straits of Calais. Thirty or forty French vessels, leaving the ports of Dunkirk and Havre by favor of the east wind, would have been sufficient to throw this mass of vessels, encumbered with men and baggage, into confusion, and probably to cause the failure of the expedition. Seignelai and D'Avaux had besieged Louis XIV. with their importunities; but it seemed as if the King of France, like the King of England, had been blinded by Providence. No squadron had been prepared in the ports of France. The *Protestant* fleet landed, November 15, at Torbay, on the coast of Devonshire.

Louis XIV. thought of nothing better to do than to hurl a declaration of war against the United Provinces (November 26). This was another mistake; for Holland, whilst indirectly attacking the system of the Great King, was still hesitating to enter into open contest with him; she had responded to his violence by exemplary moderation and good faith, had at first contented herself with interdicting the entrance of French merchandise till the embargo in France should be raised,[2] and had finally decided to grant letters of marque to her privateers only after reiterated aggressions by French ship-owners. As it would have been useful and decisive to attack her in the month of September or October, so it was now superfluous to declare a war against her which there was no intention of carrying upon her territory. As James II. had just proclaimed that he desired no succor but that of his subjects,[3] Louis did not give the expedition of William as a reason for his declaration, but the intervention of the Dutch in the affairs of Cologne against his protégé Fürstenberg.

[1] *Mém. de d'Avaux*, t. VI. pp. 283–309.

[2] Not only had Dutch ships been seized, but the sailors were forced to enter the service of the King and become Catholics.

[3] D'Avaux, t. VI. p. 355. In truth, James said as a private individual quite the contrary to the French ambassador Barillon, and made a tardy appeal for money and ships to Louis XIV. *Mém. de Saint-Hilaire*, IV. p. 84.

James II., finally awakened from his infatuation by the manifesto of his son-in-law and by the menacing symptoms that were breaking forth in all parts of England, had multiplied concessions for some weeks for the purpose of striving to disarm the resentment of his subjects; he had asked the advice and aid of the Anglican bishops persecuted by him; he had restored to the cities and corporations their suppressed charters, reinstalled the officers and magistrates dismissed for their attachment to the Test Act, in fine, removed from his council his evil genius, the Jesuit Petre. It was too late. The bishops excused themselves from declaring against the Prince of Orange. The army showed no more reassuring disposition than the clergy; despite its great numerical superiority, James did not dare lead it immediately to battle, as Louis XIV. had counselled him. His favorites, his generals, conspired against him: Kirke, lately the sanguinary instrument of his vengeance, Churchill, the brother of his mistress, who was to be the famous Duke of Marlborough, attempted to betray him into the hands of William. Conquered without a battle, he put the Thames between the enemy and his demoralized troops. His second daughter, Anne Stuart, and Prince George of Denmark, the consort of Anne, abandoned him and joined William. Sinister news arrived from all points of England. The most important personages rallied in a crowd to the Prince of Orange. The University of Oxford, forgetting its declaration in favor of passive obedience, took the side of William. A formidable association was formed for the attainment of the object announced in the manifesto of the Prince, and for avenging his death if he should perish in the enterprise. In fine, great popular meetings proclaimed the right of armed resistance, since "the king who puts his will in the place of law is a tyrant," and since to oppose him was to be in a state of legitimate defence. The unhappy monarch was no longer in a condition "to be a tyrant." By the advice of a council of peers assembled in haste, he announced the convocation of Parliament after a brief delay, an amnesty, and the sending of commissioners to make terms with the Prince of Orange (December 10). The conditions proposed by William to the commissioners of James were: that all papal officers and magistrates should be dismissed; that the Tower of London should be given up to the municipal officers; that Portsmouth should be put in charge of a person chosen by mutual agreement; that the army of the Prince should be maintained at the expense of the State; that, during the session of Parliament, the two armies should remain at an equal distance from the capital,

and that James and William should sojourn at London with the same number of guards (December 18).

Before receiving this answer, James had resolved on a desperate course; the apparent moderation of William only confirmed him in his resolution. He thought that his son-in-law was aiming to cause him to be deposed by the very Parliament that he had convoked. He sent away the Queen under a disguise, with the little Prince of Wales, to France; then prepared to follow them. He disbanded his army, committed the writs prepared for the convocation of Parliament to the flames, threw the Seal of State into the Thames, and quitted London by night in a bark, with a single companion. He was stopped near Sheerness by fishing-boats that were cruising in the mouth of the Thames to intercept Jesuits and fugitive Papists, and remained there several days as a prisoner. His misfortunes seemed to awaken some pity in the people. The peers present at London, who, on the news of his flight, had formed themselves into a provisional government, caused him to be set at liberty. He decided to return to London (December 26), where he was tolerably well received, and invited William to a conference; the latter refused, caused the vanguard of his Dutch troops to enter the capital, and, both in his own name and the name of the peers of England, requested the King to quit London. James obtained leave to retire to Rochester. Neither the London magistrates nor the bench of bishops had been willing to answer for the person of the King, who offered to put himself under their charge. James then returned to his project of flight. This was exactly what William desired. The Prince spared nothing to redouble the terror of his father-in-law. James again escaped; no one stopped him this time, and a fishing-boat landed him, January 4, 1689, at Ambleteuse, on the coast of Picardy. He had left, on his departure, a declaration, wherein he announced that, being unable to place any confidence in the Prince of Orange, he withdrew to return when the nation should open its eyes to the pretexts that had been used to deceive it.

James arrived, January 7, at St. Germain, where Louis XIV. awaited him, and received him with open arms. Louis installed the fugitive monarch, with his wife and son, into this royal residence; he provided for their wants with magnificence, and placed them in a condition to hold a kind of court. Louis buried in his own heart the feelings with which the terrible check of his policy and the conduct of his miserable ally had inspired him; but the courtiers and Parisians were less generous, and showed little con-

sideration for the bigoted, debauched, and cruel king, so shamefully fallen from his throne.[1] Louis had been completely deceived both as to the resources of James II. and the state of England: he had expected a prolonged civil war, which would give him time to intervene at his convenience, and he saw the King of England expelled, without striking a blow,[2] by the almost unanimous abandonment of his people rather than by material force! — a fall less tragic, but more extraordinary and of deeper significance than the execution of Charles I.!

The fall of James II. was to the genius of England the occasion of the most decisive manifestation by which it has disclosed itself in history. The revolution of 1640 had received, at least for a moment, from the enthusiastic sect of Independents, something idealistic, theoretic, and absolute, foreign to the English spirit; in the revolution of 1688, the genius of England acted indeed according to its own tendencies, and gave the stamp of its originality.

At the news of the King's flight, the peers of England, as the hereditary guardians of the national interests, invited the Prince of Orange to take charge of the government until the assembling of a national convention; — (convent,) a term borrowed from the Scotch to designate an extraordinary parliament convoked by necessity without regard to forms. The peers invited the Prince to convoke the convention. William, not deeming himself sufficiently authorized, assembled the old deputies who had sat in the Commons under Charles II., with the municipal body of London, and caused the delegation conferred on him by the peers to be confirmed by this assembly (January 5, 1689). He immediately afterwards convoked the Convention, which was opened February 1.

Three parties appeared during the election: the Whigs, the Tories, and the pure Royalists, who were subsequently called *Jacobites*. The last desired the recall of the King, with guarantees for the Protestant religion and the public liberties. The weakness of this party did not permit it to play any part in the convention, and obliged it to act with the Tories, who demanded that the exercise of sovereignty should be interdicted to James II., as having shown himself incapable of reigning; but that the title of king,

[1] "See a simpleton who has left three kingdoms for a mass," said Le Tellier, the Archbishop of Rheims, with more wit than decorum. James declared to the Jesuits of the rue Saint-Antoine that he was affiliated to their society, which did not elevate him much in the eyes of the Parisians.

[2] There were a few trifling skirmishes in the provinces, but not a musket-shot at London or in the vicinity.

inamissible, according to them, should be left to him, and that a regency should be established. The Whigs, finally, maintained that the King should be declared deposed, and the throne vacant. The Tories had the majority in the House of Lords; the Whigs in the House of Commons, where the Presbyterians abounded.[1] Among the Whigs, those who were the least disposed to encroach upon the monarchy[2] were of the opinion, that, on rejecting the King and his contested son, the crown should be transferred to the presumptive heir, the Princess of Orange; others proposed to adjudge the crown by election to William; the greatest number desired William and his wife; some, the logical Republicans, thought that James should be judicially deposed, that the English government should be declared dissolved, and that the nation should proceed to constitute a new government. William, after having given the discussion free scope, intervened by declaring to some of the party-leaders that he would neither accept the regency under the nominal royalty of his father-in-law, nor the administration of the kingdom under the royalty of his wife; that, if he were not called to reign in his own right and for life, he would return to Holland and no longer meddle with the affairs of Great Britain. The effect was decisive. The Commons, not wishing to follow the rigorous logic of the Republicans, and to bring the King to trial, declared that James II. had broken the *original contract* and *abdicated* by desertion; that consequently the throne was vacant. They laid down the principle that a Papist could not be called to reign over Protestant England. The Lords at first refused to admit that the throne was vacant; then, under pressure of the Commons and especially of public opinion, the majority gave way in the Upper House, and the declaration of vacancy passed, despite the efforts of most of the bishops; the controverted question of the legitimacy of the Prince of Wales was set aside, as if this child had not existed. These two fictions admitted, — namely, the abdication of the father and the non-existence of the son, — a middle course was adopted between those who wished to transmit the heirship to the eldest daughter and those who pretended to elect William, that is to say, between hereditary royalty and elective royalty. William and Mary were declared, jointly, King and Queen of England, the administration, however, being in William alone; after the death

[1] A fourth opinion was that of certain jurisconsults, who maintained that William should reign by *right of conquest*; it is not necessary to say that it was not seriously entertained.

[2] These were less Whigs than a petty faction detached from the Tories.

of both, if no children of their marriage should remain, the crown should pass to the younger sister of Mary, the Princess Anne. The formula of the oath of fidelity to the King, who reigned, it was said, "by virtue of *his right* and of the laws of the State," was then changed. But, for this formula of monarchical sovereignty, that of national sovereignty was not substituted; nothing more was required than to swear *fidelity to the King and Queen*, without any declaration as to whence their right to the crown proceeded. England thus seemed to found a government anew, of pure fact and from *necessity*.

Royalty reconstituted, guarantees against the abuse of royal power were thought of; — February 23, Parliament passed the famous Bill of Rights, which annulled the pretended right that royalty had arrogated to itself of arbitrarily suspending the execution of laws and of absolving individuals from conformity to the laws; interdicted the establishing of any extraordinary commission, ecclesiastical or other; declared any levy of impost not authorized by Parliament illegal; sanctioned the right of petition; authorized every English Protestant to possess arms for his defence; interdicted to the King the maintenance of an army in time of peace, without the consent of Parliament; declared the members of Parliament inviolable as to their speeches and votes; proclaimed the freedom of elections; prescribed the frequent convocation of Parliaments, etc.

The same day, the two Houses went in a body to offer the crown to William and Mary, the latter of whom had arrived the evening before at the palace whence her husband had expelled her father. The coronation took place, April 21, according to the ceremonial of the Middle Ages. William and Mary were proclaimed King and Queen of England, *France*, and Ireland, according to the formula that recalled the old pretensions buried in the tomb of the Plantagenets. The new king took the name of William the *Third*, which made him the heir of the first two Norman kings, of the two Williams. Everything, therefore, was done to preserve the forms while changing the substance, and to give this immense change the least possible appearance of a revolution. The inamissible right of kings, so much preached by the Anglican Church, in conformity with the Gallicanism of Bossuet, was abolished, but this was not openly affirmed; the right of the nation was realized, but it was not proclaimed, so that the equivocation might be indefinitely prolonged, and that the party of the past might live on this equivocation even to our days. And yet it was in fact, under all these

veils, the sovereignty of the people that had just risen against the monarchy of Louis XIV. and the divine right of Bossuet.[1]

The Convention of Scotland imitated the Convention of England, and proclaimed William and Mary (April 21).

The English revolution of 1640 had been to the Continent little else than an extraordinary spectacle, almost as foreign to the interests of the rest of Christendom as the catastrophes of the seraglio. The revolution of 1688, on the contrary, shook all Europe; but its bearing, as to the internal policy of States, although it was comprehended by a small number of speculative minds, was not what preoccupied peoples and governments; Protestant nations hailed, in this great event, the victorious resistance of their religion; the House of Austria saw in it a first defeat for its formidable enemy, and paid little attention to the blow received by the principles on which its own power rested; England, a conquest to the League of Augsburg, — this blinded to all else; the thought of the struggle against the King of France stifled every other thought among governments as well as among peoples, and, in the opinion of peoples, to struggle against Louis XIV. was to struggle against universal monarchy, — against the destruction of nationalities.[2]

All Germany was in commotion to repel the French invasion. The Emperor had responded, October 18, with extreme violence to the manifesto of Louis XIV., and the whole Empire was preparing to sustain the response. January 24, 1689, the Diet of Ratisbon declared the King of France and the Cardinal de Fürstenberg enemies of the Empire and of Christendom; it recalled, in its declaration, numerous enterprises of Louis XIV. against the faith of treaties, his acts of inhuman violence against defenceless peoples, and conjured the Emperor to make peace with the Turk, for the purpose of turning all the forces of Germany against France. Leopold, the year before, at the moment when Belgrade, the key of the Ottoman empire, fell into the hands of his generals (October 6, 1688), had lost the occasion to dictate a triumphal peace to the Divan,[3] and the Turks had raised their heads since they had

[1] Burnet's *History of his own Time*, Vol. III. Hume, *William and Mary*. La Hode, t. IV. Rapin-Thoiras, t. X. l. XXIV.; XI. l. XXV. Macaulay, ch. 9, 10.

[2] See the curious work of Gregorio Leti, *La monarchie universelle de Louis XIV.* (1689), wherein he endeavors to establish how necessary it is to overthrow the monarchy of Louis XIV., and preserve France, as necessary for European equilibrium. See also the replies of the Pope and the Emperor to the complaints of James II., in the *Mém. de Saint-Hilaire*, t. I. p. 410.

[3] The monks had predicted to Leopold that the Empress would present him with twin sons, one of whom would be Emperor of the West, the other, Emperor of the

known that the French had taken the field on the Rhine; nevertheless, Leopold could still treat with them to his advantage, and France could then hope for no other diversion in Europe. France, surrounded by enemies, had no longer a single ally; what her policy had most feared, what she had long averted, what she was unable to avert for the last time, had come: England and Holland were not only allied, but united under the same chief; England entered into the coalition with all the eagerness of passions long restrained by the inert policy of the last Stuarts. Spain had repelled the advances made to her to detach her from the League, and had called the forces of Holland and Brandenburg into Belgium. The Scandinavian States were more or less pledged to the League, and were about, despite their ancient rivalry, to unite for the first time in the same camp. France had scarcely anything to hope but the malevolent neutrality of some secondary States, and had come to regard as a diplomatic success the engagement entered into by the Swiss to remain neutral and to refuse a passage through their territory to both parties (May 7).

The forces with which Louis XIV. had begun hostilities were no longer sufficient in such a situation, which might still be aggravated by the movements of the French Protestants. From the end of November, 1688, the King had ordered, in all the general divisions, the formation of militia regiments to guard frontier and maritime towns,[1] then had called out the arrière-ban for the purpose of watching and restraining the *new converts*, the disarming of whom had been ordered in the month of October, noblemen excepted. Extensive levies were made in haste to reinforce the army. Whilst waiting for these masses of men to be collected and disciplined, Louis resolved to risk nothing, and only to maintain the war on the enemy's territory, without engaging in important enterprises on the Continent. Germany was to remain the principal theatre of war, with two diversions in Belgium and Catalonia. Finally, the offensive was to be taken against the *usurper* William, in Ireland, which among the three British kingdoms had not followed the example of the two others, and had not lowered the flag of the Stuarts.

East. The credulous monarch, henceforth, would not hear of a peace with the Turks. See *Œuvres de Louis XIV.*, t. VI. p. 18.

[1] It appears that the levy was about twenty-five thousand men. The militia was equipped and paid by the parishes; they were to be unmarried, were not required to provide uniform, and could not be required to serve more than two years. If they married in their parish after their discharge, they were exempt from the villain tax for two years (*Anciennes Lois françaises*, t. XX. p. 66). The weakest parishes furnished no militia.

The plan was good, the war with England having once become inevitable by the rupture with Holland; but the means of execution, as to Germany, sullied with an ineffaceable stain the reign of Louis the Great. It was impossible to furnish garrisons to all the places recently conquered, or, rather, invaded, without renewing, with more dangerous consequences, the mistake of 1672. The advanced posts of Würtemberg had already been abandoned somewhat precipitately (January, 1689). Louvois counselled the King utterly to destroy the cities that could not be held, that the posts from which the King's troops should retire might henceforth serve no one. Louis, after some hesitation, gave his signature to this expedient, worthy of Tartar conquerors! They began with the trans-Rhenish Palatinate. Ladenburg and Heidelberg were burned, after the inhabitants had been warned to leave with their families, their cattle and their furniture. The castle of Heidelberg, the residence of the Electors-Palatine, was sapped and blown up; its beautiful ruins are still to posterity a living testimony of Louvois's fury. The mills, the bridge, all the public buildings, were torn down; the whole city was set on fire. Tessé, the executioner of this infernal work (he was nevertheless one of the leaders of the *dragoonades!*) had not the heart to see more, or to drive the unfortunate inhabitants from among the ruins of their city. He left with his soldiers. The citizens extinguished the conflagration behind him, and called to their aid the German troops, who fortified themselves in the ruins of the castle. On the news of this, Louvois, furious that Heidelberg had not been "entirely burned and destroyed," ordered that Mannheim should not only be burned, but that one stone should not be left upon another (March, 1689).

Of the new conquests beyond the Rhine, Philippsburg alone was preserved. As to the countries on the left bank, the French contented themselves at first with dismantling the cities and blowing up the fortifications belonging to the Palatinate and the electorates of Mayence and Treves, save Mayence, which was made an important stronghold. But when the hostile forces that were increasing began to threaten Mayence, the chief of the army of the Rhine, Marshal Duras, proposed to the King and the minister a frightful resolution: namely, to destroy, not only the burghs and villages which might facilitate an attack on Mayence, but all the towns in the neighborhood of the Rhine between Mayence and Philippsburg. The fatal word given, Duras became terrified at himself and wished to recede from what he had proposed. Louvois did not allow his prey to be thus snatched from him! He caused the King

to order the Marshal to consummate the deed! Speyer, Worms, Oppenheim, Frankenthal, Bingen, were condemned to the flames. Franchises and privileges were offered to the magistrates for such as should be willing to emigrate to Lorraine, Alsace, or Franche-Comté, with means of transport for their household goods. Those who should refuse might transport their goods to fortified towns belonging to the King, but not among enemies. Thus, even the consolation of taking refuge among their countrymen was refused them. The order was monstrous; its execution was worse. It is only too easy to conceive all that the license and rapacity of the soldiers must have added to these scenes of desolation. It had been desired to spare the celebrated cathedrals of Worms and Speyer, as well as the episcopal palaces, and the effects that the inhabitants had not been able to carry away had been collected there; the fire reached these churches and burned whatever could be burned (end of May, beginning of June). This beautiful country, which the Middle Ages had adorned with so many religious and military monuments, presented only a mass of smoking ruins, as if a new Attila had passed over Gaul and Germany. One hundred thousand unfortunates, driven from their homes in flames, demanded vengeance from Germany, from all Europe, and raised against the Great King an indignation still more general than that which had been raised by the Huguenot refugees. The people of the Rhine, whom nature has attached by so many ties to France, vowed a long and implacable resentment against its government, which was to be extinguished only with the monarchy of Louis XIV., in presence of a new France.[1]

The principle of these horrors that stained our arms, so glorious in every other respect during this whole century, was not simply the cruelty of Louvois or the pride of Louis XIV., but also a false notion of the rights of war, which allowed, it was said, whatever injured the enemy. And yet this doctrine was not carried to its extreme consequences. That same prince, who believed that he had the right, *for the purpose of injuring the enemy*, to bombard inoffensive populations, to change entire provinces into deserts, would have believed himself dishonored if he had employed the dagger or poison against a single man, against a general, whose death, however, might have *injured the enemy* much more than these great exterminations![2] The rights of war, the rights

[1] *Lettres militaires*, t. V. pp. 170, 252, 308, 323; t. VI. pp. 10, 16, 46, 51.

[2] A certain Lansel having offered to kill the Prince of Orange, the King, "detesting such designs," had him arrested and "put in prison." *Lettres militaires*, t. V. p. 294.

of civilized peoples, should only authorize the destruction of what directly serves for war; it is lawful to dismantle a city, it is not lawful to burn it.

The exasperation of Germany could not be described. The Diet decreed the expulsion of French employées, tradesmen, and domestics; outside the Germanic States all commerce with France was interdicted, under penalty of being punished as high treason. Germany laid the French under the ban of the Empire; she would have gladly laid them under the ban of the universe. Leopold coldly profited by the general effervescence to tighten the bonds of the coalition and to pursue the transformation of the League of Augsburg into a compact much more formidable to France and much more advantageous to the House of Austria. May 12, before the devastation of the left bank of the Rhine had filled the measure, a defensive and offensive treaty had been signed at Vienna between the Emperor and the United Provinces for the integral reëstablishment of the treaties of Westphalia and the Pyrenees. The two parties engaged not to lay down their arms and not to separate, till France had lost all the conquests of Louis XIV. By a separate article, the Dutch, for the purpose of repelling the dangerous pretensions of the Dauphin of France to the succession of Spain and the crown of the Romans, promised to aid the Emperor or his heirs to put themselves in possession of the succession of Spain, and to favor with their influence the election of the King of Hungary as King of the Romans. To unite the Empire and Spain would have been a singular manner of reëstablishing European equilibrium; but the Dutch were carried away by passion. The new King of England and the King of Spain successively gave their adherence to the new treaty, which was called *the Great Alliance* (December 30, 1689–June 6, 1690).[1]

The German armies had formed somewhat slowly, as always, but powerfully; they were in a condition to act with vigor at once on the Rhine and on the Danube. Whilst Prince Louis of Baden took the command in Servia against the Turks, more than eighty thousand men advanced in three corps into the Rhenish provinces, under the orders of the Duke of Lorraine and the electors of Bavaria and Brandenburg.[2] The Prince of Waldeck commanded moreover, in Belgium, a Hispano-Batavian army composed in great part of German auxiliaries, called into Holland to take the place

[1] Dumont, t. VII. 2d part, p. 229.

[2] The Great Elector had died in May, 1688, and had been succeeded by his son Frederick III.

of the small army that had gone to dethrone James II. The French, nearly equal to their adversaries on the Belgian frontier, were very inferior on the Rhine, and the capacity of their generals did not compensate for this disadvantage. France had no longer but a single general of great renown, Luxembourg; but, on bad terms with the minister, whose despotism his pride could not support, he had been in disgrace for ten years,[1] and Louvois had dissuaded the King from employing him. The army of the Rhine remained in the hands of Duras; the army of the Netherlands was confided to Marshal d'Humières.

These selections were not fortunate. Duras failed to devise means to obstruct the operations of the Duke of Lorraine and the Elector of Bavaria, who, after having projected an attack on Strasburg, were prevailed on by the clamor of the German populations to undertake the siege of Mayence. The Duke of Lorraine debouched on the left bank of the river by way of Coblentz, and was rejoined before Mayence by the Elector, whilst Duras effected no other diversion than the devastation of Swabia and the burning of Ba-

[1] The cause of Luxembourg's disgrace was connected with a strange affair, which had long and violently agitated Paris and the court, the *poisoning affair*. The prosecution of the famous Marchioness de Brinvilliers, burned in 1676 for having poisoned her father, her two brothers, and her sister, had left a vivid impression on minds. Mysterious incidents had given rise to the idea that the crimes of Brinvilliers and her lover St. Croix were not isolated crimes; that there existed at Paris a sort of school of poisoning founded by an Italian named Exili: it was said that sinister revelations reached the magistrates through the medium of confessors; that the *powder of inheritance* was in the hands of many impatient heirs; the terror was general. In 1680, the King's council judged it necessary to establish at the Arsenal an extraordinary commission, which the people called the *burning court*, because the crimes which it had to prosecute were punishable by fire. Several women, la Voisin, la Vigoureux, a priest named Lesage, etc., were tried for having dealt in poison. A multitude of great personages found themselves compromised as having had relations with these wretches. Two nieces of Mazarin, the Duchess de Bouillon and the Countess de Soissons, were summoned before the court of the Arsenal. Madame de Bouillon, on being interrogated, treated the affair very cavalierly, and extricated herself without difficulty; but her sister, the Countess de Soissons, the love of the King in his youth, preferred quitting France to appearing in court. The Duke de Vendôme, the great-grandson of Henri IV., was interrogated. The Marshal de Luxembourg, charged, by the depositions of the accused, with improbable crimes, went of his own accord and delivered himself up at the Bastile, without claiming the privileges of his peerage. He remained there fourteen months, during the whole time of the trial of la Voisin and her accomplices, who finally shared the fate of Brinvilliers. The ill-will of Louvois, it was said, had contributed much to prolong the captivity of the Marshal, who had been guilty of nothing worse than intimacies unworthy of him, and an unorthodox curiosity. La Voisin and her accomplices were not only poisoners, but also go-betweens, sorcerers, diviners, casters of horoscopes, who exhibited the Devil and told the fortunes of the curious. There was in this vast procedure, by the side of some secret crimes, much levity and folly. (See the *Letters* of Madame de Sévigné, January–March, 1680. *Mém. de La Fare*, p. 291.)

den and some other small cities of no military importance. Mayence, blockaded since the beginning of June, and besieged in form in the course of July, was garrisoned with a small army, ten thousand men, commanded by Lieutenant-General d'Huxelles. These ten thousand valiantly and skilfully defended themselves against almost sixty thousand of the enemy. At the beginning of September, after six or seven weeks spent in the opening of trenches, they repelled, with frightful carnage, several assaults made on the new works that protected the place, the body of which was ill fortified. It is maintained that the assault of September 6 cost the enemy five thousand men. The besiegers began to fear that they would not be able to overcome this heroic defence, and the Duke of Lorraine was greatly surprised and very happy to receive, the next day but one, an offer of capitulation: he granted all the conditions desired by the governor. The exhaustion of ammunition had compelled D'Huxelles to surrender Mayence; the same cause had already made us lose Philippsburg, during the war with Holland. The foresight of Louvois was found in default.[1]

In the mean time, the Elector of Brandenburg, at the head of more than twenty-five thousand men, had been laboring to drive the French from the Electorate of Cologne. Letters of appeal from the Emperor, and the declaration of the Diet, had produced an effect in the Electorate: the Cardinal de Fürstenberg had been abandoned by his German troops, and their desertion had caused the loss of several places. A check suffered, in the month of March, by the French commandant Sourdis, had also compelled the evacuation of Neuss; Rheinberg and Kaiserswert fell next into the hands of the enemy (May–June); then the Elector of Brandenburg marched against Bonn, the chief place of the Electorate and the residence of the archbishop-electors. Bonn, overwhelmed with bombs and hot-shot, crumbled in the flames. A strange manner of delivering the Rhenish cities, to treat them precisely as their oppressors had done! The French, before the bombardment, had sent away all the non-combatants. The garrison obstinately defended the remains of the city, and the Elector of Brandenburg, weakened by the succor that the Duke of Lorraine and the Prince of Waldeck demanded from him, was obliged to convert the siege into a blockade. Mayence taken, the Duke of Lorraine came in

[1] St. Hilaire (t. I. p. 416) accuses Louvois and D'Huxelles of a mutual understanding to surrender the place at the moment when Duras was about to succor it. Louvois, he says, needed a reverse in order to make himself indispensable to the King, who disliked him. There exist against Louvois grievances enough without also charging him with so improbable a treason, shared with one of the bravest officers of the army.

his turn to reinforce Brandenburg with the bulk of his army; the place still held out an entire month, and did not surrender till October 12, after all the outworks had been carried by an assault, in which the brave Governor d'Asfeld received a mortal wound.

The season was too far advanced, and the German troops had suffered too much in the sieges of Mayence and Bonn, for their generals to think of undertaking anything during the remainder of the year; they took up their winter-quarters in the Palatinate, wholly ruined as it was. Thus the end that had been sought by such barbarous expedients had not even been reached: they had not succeeded in making the Palatinate uninhabitable; man had indeed been able to destroy the work of man, but not to render sterile, in a few days, the fertile soil of these countries. The French army wintered in Alsace and Lorraine, guarding, by its advance posts, a part of the Palatinate and of the Electorate of Treves.

Louvois was not yet satiated with devastation. After the loss of Mayence, he would have gladly inflicted the fate of Worms and Speyer on a much greater and more illustrious city. He proposed to the King to burn Treves. Louis, when the question had arisen of annihilating the towns on the Rhine, was at first fascinated by the kind of terrible grandeur that such a power of destruction manifests; but remorse was not slow to awaken in his soul: he recoiled before this new outrage. Louvois, warmly repulsed, returned to the charge. Some days afterwards he audaciously declared to Louis that he had taken the responsibility on himself and had sent the order. The King, transported with rage, raised his hand against the minister. Madame de Maintenon threw herself between the two; Louis commanded Louvois to hasten to countermand the order; his head should answer for a single house burned. The order had not gone; Louvois had thought to compel the assent of the King by announcing the thing to him as done. This scene, after many others, left a deep resentment in the heart of the King.[1]

The campaign of the Netherlands had no result. Neither side had displayed a large force there. Louis XIV. had declared war on Spain, April 15, and sent his troops into Belgium in the middle of May. Two slight checks experienced by Marshal d'Humières, in assailing the positions of the Prince of Waldeck, did not prevent the French from remaining on Spanish territory till autumn; but the enemy, on his side, laid French Flanders under contribution.

[1] Saint-Simon, t. XIII. p. 82.

In Catalonia, the Duke de Noailles, who had received there employment more honorable and more worthy of his talents than the leadership of dragoonades, was not in a position to undertake anything of importance. He only maintained himself during the whole season on the Spanish side of the Pyrenees.

The maritime war was much more interesting. For the first time the French navy found itself in face of two great navies united: a terrible trial, when it is considered that to cope with one of the two alone, the Dutch navy, had been regarded, a few years before, as a high ambition. A treaty was signed, May 9, between England and Holland, for the junction of the fleets, England agreeing to equip fifty vessels and Holland thirty. But the offensive operations of the French against William III. had begun in the month of March. Nearly all Ireland, with its Lord-Lieutenant Tyrconnel, had declared for James II., and Viscount Dundee had raised in favor of the same cause a party of Highlanders. James II. resolved to put himself in person at the head of the Irish Catholics; he concluded with Louis XIV. a treaty by which he promised to France a succor of seven thousand Irish in exchange for seven thousand French soldiers, who should carry to Ireland the example of their discipline and tactics. February 28, he set out from Saint-Germain for Brest, where a French squadron awaited him. "I hope never to see you again!" said Louis to him in parting. James, while waiting for the seven thousand soldiers, took with him four hundred French officers and artillerymen, with a great quantity of arms, accoutrements, and munitions. Louis had given him his own cuirass, as a token of royal fraternity. James disembarked without hindrance at Kinsale, March 22. The English fleet had not been ready in time to dispute his passage. All the Irish of the Celtic race, and the old Anglo-Irish colonists that had remained Catholics, received him with enthusiasm. The Protestants were not in a state to offer serious resistance except in the northern province of Ulster, where the colonists, English as well as Scotch Presbyterians, were numerous and very energetic. The Protestants of Ulster were driven back on two points, Londonderry and Enniskillen, where they concentrated their defence.

William III., who encountered great difficulties in the government of England, was not yet in a position to take any considerable amount of forces to Ireland; he began by sending a squadron to the Irish coast for the purpose of intercepting communications with France; then, on the initiative taken by the House of Commons, he hurled, May 17, a declaration of war against "the King of the

French." Among the grievances given as the cause of war, besides the efforts made for several years by Louis XIV. to overturn the government (constitution) of England, besides the invasion of Ireland, William enounced the recent pretensions of the French against the sovereignty of the crown of England to the island of Newfoundland, the invasion of the English possessions of New York and Hudson's Bay, the commissions given to French ship-owners to seize English ships,[1] the exclusion of the greater part of English merchandise, the persecution of English subjects in France, constrained to change their religion or sent to the galleys, under pretext of having given asylum on their vessels to French Protestants; finally, the contesting of the "right of flag" attached to the crown of England, "which violates," he said, "the sovereignty we have over *the British seas*."[2]

At the moment when William was vindicating the pretended supremacy of the English flag, this supremacy had just been contested by victorious arguments. In the beginning of May, Lieutenant-General Château-Renaud had set sail from Brest with twenty-four men-of-war, escorting a convoy that was carrying to Ireland munitions and money. May 10, as the disembarkation was beginning at Bantry Bay, on the southwest coast of Munster, the English admiral Herbert appeared with twenty-two vessels, heavier-timbered and better sailers than the French ships. Château-Renaud advanced to meet the enemy, and baffled the manœuvres of Herbert, who wished to gain the windward and break the French line. After several hours of cannonading, the English admiral, seeing half his vessels disabled by the superior fire of the French, stood out to sea and left the disembarkation to be completed without further opposition. Château-Renaud returned to Brest, May 18, having captured on his way a rich Dutch convoy.[3]

Brest had been indicated as a general rendezvous for our maritime forces. Château-Renaud was there joined by sixteen or eighteen vessels from Rochefort, Havre, and Dunkirk. The squadron from Toulon was also expected. Admiral Herbert, on his side, was reinforced, and the junction of the Anglo-Batavian fleets was effected. More than seventy hostile ships cruised before Brest, to prevent the junction of the squadron from Toulon. Fortunately, this squadron, consisting of twenty ships, was commanded

[1] The vessels of the *partisans of the usurper*, as the letters of Louis XIV. said.

[2] Dumont, t. VII. 2d part, p. 280.

[3] L. Guérin, *Hist. maritime de la France*, t. II. p. 5. Sainte-Croix, *Hist. de la puissance navale de l'Angleterre*, t. II. pp. 18, 879.

by a man who was the first seaman of France, since Duquesne no longer existed. Tourville availed himself of a squall that scattered the combined fleet, and entered the road of Brest safe and sound (July 30). He soon set sail again at the head of all the French forces, with Seignelai on board. The impetuous minister of the marine dreamed of nothing but a great naval battle. The two admirals having each sent forward a vessel to reconnoitre, both ships engaged: the English ship was taken. The allies retired into the channel, occupying themselves only with securing the return of their merchant-fleet from Smyrna, and the King, by the advice of Louvois, prudent through jealousy, forbade Seignelai to follow them and to run such a terrible risk without necessity. It was already a great glory to have seen the two combined navies avoid the contest.[1]

Whilst the fleets were facing each other, French frigates, detached in the seas of Holland and Ireland, had engaged in brilliant combats and taken or destroyed several vessels of war; the famous privateers Jean Bart and Forbin, less fortunate than their companions, were captured after a heroic struggle maintained with forty guns against a hundred; taken to England, they escaped and reached the coast of Brittany in an open boat. They were not slow in taking ample vengeance for their mishap. The French privateers made such ravages that English commerce raised despairing clamors, and the popularity of William III. was greatly shaken.

The war in Ireland, unfortunately, did not succeed so well as the war by sea. James II. was no longer but the shadow of what he had been in his youth; the warrior in him had sunk to the level of the politician. Had James known how to turn the resources and ardor of the Irish Catholics to account, the Protestants of Ulster, despite the moral superiority of that energetic population, would have succumbed before numbers; but Londonderry was very unskilfully attacked and exceedingly well defended. The besieged, abandoned by their military chief, had found in a churchman, the Rector Walker, a hero whose example provoked on their part prodigies of valor and constancy. After more than a hundred days of blockade and siege, they were dying with hunger without being willing to surrender, when vessels loaded with provisions finally succeeded in forcing a stockade that barricaded the river Foyle (July 28). The siege was raised. The Catholics had been no more fortunate against another Protestant corps that had

[1] *Mém. de Villette* (commodore under Tourville), p. 96. L. Guérin, t. II. p. 11.

intrenched itself at Enniskillen, on an island of Lough-Erne. August 23, ex-Marshal de Schomberg landed on the coast of Ulster with a small army. He rallied all the Protestants, expelled the Jacobites from the whole province, and maintained himself on the confines of Ulster and Leinster, in presence of the superior forces of King James, who dared not attack him, and despite the maladies that devastated his camp. The cause of James, meanwhile, had been entirely lost in Scotland by the death of Viscount Dundee, killed in battle at the head of his mountaineers. In Ireland, the political acts of James injured him still more than his military inertia; his government was only a mixture of anarchy and tyranny, subsisting on spoliations,[1] monopolies, and spurious money.

The war had extended this year over all Europe, from the Irish Sea to the Black Sea. The Imperialists, seconded by a triple diversion of Venetians in Greece, of Poles in Podolia, and of Russians in New Tartary, had invaded Servia and Bulgaria. Prince Louis of Baden had twice defeated the Turks and taken Widin. England, Holland, and the Germanic Diet again pressed the Emperor to grant peace to the Sultan; but Leopold, more ambitious at heart, under his cold and dull exterior, than Louis XIV. in the midst of his splendors, — the obscure and mediocre Leopold pretended at once to push his victorious arms to Constantinople and to secure to himself the succession of Spain through his allies; that is to say, he also dreamed of the empire of Europe. He offered unacceptable conditions to the Ottomans, and the war continued, opportunely for France. The allies of Leopold had been less fortunate than he: the Poles, destitute of good artillery, had not been able to retake Kamieniec, and the Russians had been beaten by the Tartars on the side of Perekop.

The hope conceived by the allies of involving the Scandinavian States was not fully realized. In truth Denmark, which the Elector of Brandenburg had, in 1688, reconciled to Holland, consented in the interest of the Protestant cause to furnish seven thousand soldiers to William III. (August 15); but she was unwilling to break directly with France. Sweden, although a signer of the League of Augsburg, did the same; she only put, by a special treaty, some regiments at the disposal of Holland. These two States had seen what enormous advantages their commerce would derive from their

[1] We cannot be astonished that James should resume or allow to be resumed by the heirs of the Irish despoiled by Cromwell the property given to the English conquerors; outlawry is not admissible when a whole people is involved; but it was not just, after forty years and more, to seize this property again without indemnity to those who had acquired it in good faith, or pay for improvements.

neutrality during the contest between the three great maritime powers. England and Holland undertook to deprive them of this benefit by agreeing to interdict to neutrals all maritime commerce with France, and declared every ship destined for a French port to be a lawful prize (August 22); but this strange maritime law could not be fully applied: England and Holland were obliged to renounce the interdiction of direct commerce from Scandinavian ports to French ports.[1]

France had just been rid of an implacable enemy: Pope Innocent XI. had died August 12. He was regretted by the Protestants and the Jansenists. He had refused every species of pecuniary succor to James II. to aid him in recovering his throne, and had responded quite as harshly as the Emperor to the appeal addressed by the fallen monarch to the sovereigns against the *usurper* of England. French diplomacy took an active part in the election of a new pontiff, and it is affirmed that Louis XIV. spent three millions to assure the success of the aged Cardinal Ottoboni, who took the name of Alexander VIII. (October 6). France regarded this election as a victory; the King restored Avignon to the Holy See, and, granting to a *friend* what he had refused to an enemy, he relinquished the too famous *franchises*. Alexander VIII. appeared grateful for this, and addressed a very friendly brief to Madame de Maintenon, a proceeding of which Louis XIV. must have been sensible; but when the point in question was to lay the foundation for a reconciliation between the Holy See and France, it was perceived that they were far from a mutual understanding.

Alexander VIII., like his predecessor, maintained the pretended right of Prince Clement of Bavaria to the Electorate of Cologne, and refused bulls to the bishops elected among the subscribers to the Declaration of 1682, unless they should retract, or at least make some reparation to the Holy See. After some months of debate, he quashed and annulled, by a *constitution* of August 4, 1690, "*the deliberations and resolutions of the assembly of* 1682."[2] He had in truth shunned, in this document, all imputation of heresy, of schism, or even of error, which might render the rupture irreparable; the question remained pending.

As was to be expected, the general war had excited a lively fermentation among the French Protestants. Since the Revocation, extraordinary phenomena had appeared among the mountain populations of Cévennes, Vivarais, and Dauphiny. In default of the

[1] See Dumont, t. VII. 2d part, p. 292.
[2] *Œuvres de d'Aguesseau*, t. XIII. p. 418.

pastors, who were absent or proscribed, shepherds, artisans, children, had taken to preaching the word of God to nocturnal meetings in the wilderness; soon, *ecstatics* and *seers* had succeeded *simple preachers*. A book launched by Jurieu from the midst of his exile, in 1686, had penetrated into the south, and had begotten a crowd of *prophets*. It was a commentary on the Apocalypse, announcing *the near deliverance of the Church* and the ruin of the Papal Babylon. April, 1689, was the period fixed for *the fulfilment of prophecies*. The fall of James II. seemed the beginning of the great work. Six thousand mountaineers rose in Vivarais; others armed themselves in Cévennes; some priests who had taken an active part in the persecutions were massacred; but the insurgents were soon sabred or dispersed after a somewhat vigorous resistance. The gibbet and the galleys completed the work of the sword, and the movement was stifled for a time, owing to the administration, as intelligent as pitiless, of the intendant Basville, who opened through Cévennes and Vivarais more than a hundred wagon-roads twelve feet wide, raised in Languedoc eight Catholic regiments to be paid by the province, built forts at Nîmes, at Alais, at Saint-Hippolyte, and established posts in the châteaux of the mountains. The King having called the eight regiments to the army, Basville replaced them by organizing the whole of the *old Catholic* population into fifty-two regiments of militia. The revolt, externally suppressed, survived and rankled in hearts.[1]

A sad recourse to employ one part of France to watch the other, the dagger at the throat! and that in the midst of universal war. Such expedients had not been needed in other wars! A man as great in heart as in intellect, Vauban, caused the voice of France to be heard by the ruling power, not the voice of France for a moment gone astray through prejudices and the spirit of system, but the voice of the eternal genius of the country. He spoke as Hospital would have spoken. He demanded of the most formidable agent of the evil to repair it. He presented to Louvois a memorial in which he set forth the fatal political and moral consequences of the Revocation, and boldly proposed the retraction of all that had been done since 1680, the reëstablishment of Protestant churches, the recall of ministers, the liberty of choice for Protestants who had abjured through constraint, with a general amnesty for fugitives; in fine, the rehabilitation of all condemned on account of religion.[2]

[1] Noailles, *Histoire de Maintenon*, t. II. p. 559.

[2] Rulhière, *Éclaircissements sur les causes de la Révocation*, &c., p. 257.

Vauban was not heard favorably, and could not be. It would have required a superhuman force thus to make Louis XIV. confess his error before the world and voluntarily descend from the pedestal on which the *destroyer of heresy* had been raised. "How," wrote Madame de Maintenon, "how quit an enterprise for which he has allowed so much praise to be given him?" The *enterprise* was not abandoned, but a grave concession was made, *to the conjunctures* of which Vauban spoke. An ordinance of March 12, 1689, had already permitted the fugitives who should serve the King of Denmark or should retire to Hamburg, to receive one half of their revenues, the object of which was to keep them from the service of the enemy. A much more important edict, of December 7, enjoined the restoration of the property of fugitives to their heirs, on condition that it should not be disposed of within five years. No condition of religion being imposed on the heirs, the Protestant relatives remaining in France immediately appeared and claimed their rights. In the single districts of La Rochelle and Marennes, property yielding an income of 2,500,000 francs was restored. The government then became disquieted on account of this kind of Calvinistic restoration: the intendants pretended to restrict the bearing of the edict to Catholic heirs, and sustained the revenue-farmers who had leased the confiscated property, and who, entitling themselves "appointed for the sequestration of the property of fugitive Reformers and of those who do not do their duty to the Catholic religion," that is to say, the bad converts, transformed themselves from tax-gatherers into inquisitors. The parliaments, through a tardy spirit of justice, and perhaps a little through rivalry with the intendants, protected the Calvinist heirs. The King's council for a long time oscillated between the two tendencies. The state of persons and property continued to be a veritable chaos.[1]

The ulcer of the Revocation, therefore, did not close: the refugees did not bring back to France their industry, their capital, or their courage, and the diminution of resources coincided with the necessity of the most powerful efforts that had ever been imposed on the nation. Everything announced the greatest war that France had yet had to sustain: the Coalition, already much stronger than during the war with Holland, was still laboring to increase itself. How meet such necessities with finances already heavy and burdened? In 1672, the position had been much better, yet it had been requisite at once to resort to expedients. From the death

[1] *Anciennes Lois françaises*, t. XX. pp. 72, 96; Rulhière, pp. 850, 865.

of Colbert to the end of 1688 the annual debt had increased 3,700,000 francs, and the expenditure seven millions. The expenditure, reduced to ninety-two millions in 1687, had increased in 1688 to nearly one hundred and six millions, without counting fifteen millions for the *rentes* constituted and the interest on advances made to the treasury; it exceeded the receipts from six to seven millions. The interest, which was five per cent. in 1688, had just risen to five and a quarter per cent. in an issue of 500,000 francs of *rentes* made in July 1689.

The comptroller-general, Le Pelletier, felt his heart fail before the terrible exigencies that he foresaw: as Le Tellier had said, he was not *hard enough* for such painful duties. After some months of opposition on the part of the King, who valued his modesty and probity, he constrained Louis, so to say, to accept his resignation, and remained in the council as minister of state without a portfolio. On his recommendation the King appointed Phelippeaux de Pontchartrain, formerly first president of the Parliament of Brittany, then intendant of finances, as his successor (September 20, 1689). It was difficult to meet two minds more opposite than the timorous Le Pelletier and the brilliant, bold, and presumptuous Pontchartrain. Unfortunately, Pontchartrain no more resembled Colbert than Le Pelletier. Like many men of the time, honest as to his private interests, he was unscrupulous as to "the interests of the King." He did not turn aside from his end, which was money, and considered neither the morality of the means, nor their influence on the well-being of the people. He plunged into financial empiricism with a careless audacity that the court mistook for genius. Scarcely installed, he showered on the public a multitude of bursal edicts, creations of offices, sales of increase of salaries, which produced the King more than fifty millions, and cost the acquirers much more on account of remissions made by the King to the revenue-farmers, who leased the product of these edicts; these remissions usually amounted to twenty-five per cent., and, moreover, the farmers immediately enjoyed the revenues and salaries, and made payments to the King only at stated times. The reign of partisans began again. 1,200,000 livres of *rentes* at five and a quarter per cent. on aids and salt-taxes, 1,400,000 livres of contingent annuities in *tontine*,[1] and some other expedients, furnished at

[1] *Anciennes Lois françaises*, t. XX. p. 87. The first *tontine* or association of *rentiers* inheriting from one another till the death of the last member of the association, had been created under Mazarin by the Italian Tonti. It had not subsequently been revived.

least forty-five millions more. This made more than ninety-five millions of extraordinary resources assured to the treasury by Pontchartrain before the close of 1689, — assured, we say, but not realized, almost half of these resources being destined to produce their effect only in the course of the following years.[1]

An operation of another nature closed the year in an unfortunate manner, and stamped the administration of Pontchartrain with a characteristic sign. This was the general recoining of specie with arbitrary change of its nominal value, raised more than ten per cent.,[2] so that the individual who took a mark's weight of old specie to the mint for recoining received only nine-tenths of a mark in the new specie, the King appropriating to himself the other tenth. Individuals, in their turn, defrauded their creditors ten per cent. by paying them in the new coin. On comparing this monetary operation with that made by Colbert in 1669, the financial administration seems to have receded three centuries, and France to have returned to the extortionary governments of the Middle Ages, to the *false-money* princes.[3]

A measure less dishonest, but impolitic and much to be regretted for the sake of the arts, had been decreed at the same time as the recoinage (December 14): this was the order given to all private individuals to send ornaments and utensils of solid silver to the mint, and even plate of more than three or four marks' weight. The King himself set the example, and caused the articles and vases of silver chiselled by Ballin after the designs of Lebrun, which were among the chief ornaments of Versailles, to be melted up. The art, in these magnificent works, was much superior to the material, and less than three millions of coined money was obtained from what had cost ten. If the King had not spent extravagant sums for diamonds, the most useless of all vanities,[4] he would not so soon have been reduced to the necessity of destroying those objects of a more serious and nobler sumptuousness, and of thus revealing to his enemies the scarcity of specie in France after one year of war. The greater part of the silver of the churches shared the fate of the plate of private individuals.

Bursal edicts continued to be issued like torrents during the years

[1] Besides very considerable gratuities which they granted, the state districts each raised and maintained a regiment.

[2] The silver mark was carried from 26*l.* 15*s.* to 29*l.* 14*s.*

[3] Forbonnais, *Recherches sur les finances de France*, t. II. p. 46. *Comptes de Mallet*, p. 258. P. Clément, t. II. p. 337.

[4] During several years Louis had expended as much as two millions per annum for diamonds. See *Mém. de Choisi*, p. 598.

that followed. Pontchartrain renewed a vast number of offices which had overwhelmed France under Mazarin,—offices, some ridiculous (offices of royal barber-periwigmaker, royal oyster-vender, &c.), others injurious to the public service,[1] all useless and consequently prejudicial to the people, who had to pay the salaries of all these parasitical functionaries.[2] Not one of these offices, however, failed of a purchaser. The mania for distinctions, privileges, and public functions never failed to insure success to this unceasing appeal to bourgeois vanity. Pontchartrain explained his financial method with cynical carelessness. "Every time," he said to the King, "Your Majesty creates an office, God creates a fool to purchase it." He did not limit himself to devising new functions; he made it his duty to transform the few remaining elective posts in society into vendible posts; he dealt a terrible blow to the industrial organization of Colbert, by creating hereditary masters and wardens of merchants' guilds, and hereditary juries in the trades-corporations, in the place of elective wardens and juries; this was annihilating the guaranties that the system of corporations afforded, by increasing the inconveniences tenfold, and surcharging manufactures with a new burden (March, 1691).[3] The remains of municipal liberties were attacked soon afterwards: *maires* and assessors of *maires* with title of office were created in all the cities (August, 1692); *échevins*, consuls, etc. were allowed to remain, but the electors were enjoined to choose at least one half of them from among the assessors of the *maire*. From 1689 to 1694 the vendibility of judicial offices was introduced into the conquered provinces Franche-Comté, Artois, Alsace, and Flanders, where the judicial bodies had hitherto preserved the right of presenting candidates to the King. The number of magistrates was increased in these countries, save in Alsace, where the province

[1] Hereditary commissaries of war, for example. Hereditability in an employment that demands special activity and aptitude!

[2] One of these creations, that of register-conserver of the rolls of baptisms, marriages, and burials, excited disturbances in Périgord and Querci. The peasants set about baptizing their own children and marrying themselves without formalities, in order to avoid the payment of fees. They resisted the farmers and clerks, and constrained several noblemen to march at their head and to enter Cahors by main force. The King's council shut its eyes and let the edict fall into disuse. Bailli, t. II. p. 101.

[3] The juries and wardens of corporations once having become hereditary, their number was multiplied frightfully: more than 40,000 offices of this sort were created from 1691 to 1709. See Renouard, *Traité des brevets d'invention. Anciennes Lois françaises*, t. XX. p. 121. In December, 1691, hereditary syndics were imposed on such merchants and artisans as were not organized into masterships and wardenships.

purchased the suppression of new offices at the price of 600,000 livres.[1] Simultaneously with the creation of so many new posts, considerable increase of salaries was sold to the old office-holders.

Whilst offices increased, and the future was pledged to a frightful extent, the admirable order of accountability founded by Colbert was disorganized day by day: the registers were no longer regularly kept; the receivers, while pursuing the unfortunate taxpayers to the utmost, made the difficulty of collection an excuse for tardiness in their payments to the treasury, charged heavy interest for the money that they pretended not to have received, and finally obtained large remissions to clear themselves from arrearage.[2]

Manufactures had been attacked by destroying the elective principle of trades-corporations; the financial administration was allowed to go to ruin; agriculture in its turn was reached. A tax of control over notarial deeds was established, with the obligation to register the deeds within a fortnight (March, 1693). The basis of this tax was not just, not being proportional to the importance of the deeds;[3] but that was not the great evil. In order that the deeds, and the taxes produced by the deeds, might be frequently renewed, leases were prohibited for a longer period than nine years, that is, as Forbonnais so well says, "the farmers were prohibited from attaching themselves to their land and from continuing improvements of which it was susceptible." Whilst in France leases of more than nine years were prohibited, in England leases were for fourteen, twenty-one, and twenty-eight years; this was one of the causes of the progress of England and of our agricultural decline.[4] This absurd measure encroached upon the future, another affected the present. Le Pelletier had favored the exportation of grain: in time of war, more restrictions were, doubtless, necessary, but regular restrictions which should be the same for all. Pontchartrain, on the contrary, decided that grain could be exported only with especial permission; that is, he monopolized exportation.

Each day swept away a relic of the France of Colbert.

Among the innumerable expedients springing from the too fertile brain of Pontchartrain, scarcely any were in conformity with true financial principles but the tax of four and a half millions on

[1] *État de la France*, extract from the *Mémoires des intendants*, &c., by the Count de Boulainvilliers, t. III. pp. 280, 371, 480.

[2] Forbonnais, t. II. p. 59.

[3] Notaries at Paris and elsewhere purchased exemption for a small sum in ready money.

[4] Forbonnais, t. II. p. 68.

the forests of the clergy,[1] the general affranchisement from taxes on quit-rent manors and ground-rent demesnes, in consideration of a fixed price, which in great part effaced the traces of the feudal régime in the domain of the crown, and the issue of *rentes* on the State, which, while increasing the annual expenditure, did not at least give place to the innumerable abuses of the creation of offices. From 1690 to 1693, 3,200,000 francs of *rentes* at five and a quarter per cent. were created, and six hundred thousand francs of contingent annuities; moreover, it was ordered to employ in *rentes* on the State all sums given or bequeathed to churches or religious communities (August 14, 1691). Coffee, tea, chocolate, and sherbets were monopolized, farmed out and rated in the same manner as tobacco (January, 1692).

Although France had been plunged, from the outset of the war, into a ruinous financial empiricism, her rivals, despite the enormous mass of their united forces, had also grave embarrassments. The Emperor had but little money, and the war on the Danube cost him dear. The German princes had been accustomed to receive and not to give. It was necessary that the commercial nations, England and Holland, should pay, if they wished to make the Germans move; but in England and Holland the government did not dispose, as in France, without control and without discussion, of all the resources of the country, and the deliberations of the states and cities in the United Provinces and of Parliament in England complicated and retarded the movements of the real leader of the League, William III. William had no longer any serious opposition to fear on the part of the States-General; but his authority was much less at London than at the Hague, which caused contemporaries to say that he was "King of Holland and stadtholder of England." The English Parliament raised many difficulties for him. He found himself there between the Whigs, partisans of his person, but adversaries of the royal authority, and the Tories, partisans of royalty, but repugnant to the person of the new King, who had been enthroned by a violation of the monarchical principle. Such was also the case with respect to the religious question; William stood between the Anglicans, who pretended to maintain their exclusive domination, and the dissenters, who aspired to the abolition of Anglican principles. At heart, William would have liked political despotism[2] and religious liberty, and he had to do with a

[1] The clergy gave in addition, as a gratuity, nine millions and a half, payable in three years (1690).

[2] Or at least an authority strong and dominant, but not for the purpose of using

nation that desired quite the contrary: sincere in the sentiments that he had expressed, before his expedition, against religious persecutions, and moreover discontented with the bishops, several of whom had refused to swear allegiance to him, he would have liked to change the form of the Test Act, in order to make offices accessible to dissenters, and to unite all Protestants by a sort of *syncretism*. These views were too advanced for the moral state of England; the bills presented to Parliament did not pass,[1] and William could only cause the adoption of a bill of tolerance, which exempted the dissenters from penal laws on certain conditions. The Catholics, although they were not comprised in the bill, profited by it in reality. As to the religious question, William had found support only among a part of the Whigs; as to the political question, the Tories, on the contrary, sided with him in the hope of obtaining a share of the offices and of being protected against their adversaries: they surmounted their repugnance to aid in defending the royal prerogative against the restrictions and *limitations* of the Whigs.

These discussions had contributed to cause the war to languish in Ireland. The Whigs saw that the cause of the revolution was in danger, and the Commons voted two millions sterling for the war both in Ireland and on the Continent (November, 1689). William resolved to pass into Ireland; there was to him the main question, which it was necessary to settle at any price. He hoped to expel his rival and to complete the reduction of the three kingdoms under his sceptre, whilst his allies should first encroach upon France on the frontiers of the north and southwest. An army was collected in Belgium, under the Prince of Waldeck, and was to be reinforced by the Elector of Brandenburg, in order to penetrate into Picardy or Champagne. On the side of the Alps, the Coalition hoped to find a new ally, the Duke of Savoy, who was negotiating with it in secret, and the aid of whom would doubtless enable it to penetrate into Dauphiny. The Emperor had obtained, January 24, 1690, a success that Louis XIV. was no longer able to contest with him: he had caused his son Joseph to be elected King of the Romans without opposition.

France was in a condition to maintain her ground everywhere, although with armies inferior in number. In Germany, the Dauphin resumed nominal command under the direction of Marshal de

it with violence; he showed himself moderate towards persons, and his moderation even contributed to make him unpopular with the Whigs, whom he prevented from avenging themselves on their vanquished enemies. See Macaulay, *William III.*

[1] In Scotland, on the contrary, where Episcopacy sustained itself only by the support of royalty, Presbyterianism held full sway and became tyrannical in its turn.

Lorges, called to take the place of his brother Duras, with whom the government had not been satisfied the preceding year. The Duke de Noailles kept command of the little army in Catalonia. On the side of Belgium, the command was confided to Luxembourg; the King had the good sense to impose silence on the rancor of Louvois.[1] It had been judged necessary to have an army-corps on the side of the Alps, to succor in case of need Casale against the Spaniards and restrain the Duke of Savoy; there, as in Belgium, the choice of a general was excellent and fell upon the most distinguished of all the lieutenants-general, who had lately greatly signalized himself in the siege of Philippsburg; this was Catinat, the worthy friend of Vauban, his rival in enlightenment and civic virtues. This modest and grave warrior, a stranger by his birth as by his manners to the military nobility and the court,[2] had risen slowly by the sole force of his merit; by the nature of his talents, he was to Luxembourg what Turenne had been to Condé.

On the Rhine the French were ready before the Germans; but they did not profit by it and did not attempt to prevent the junction of the electors of Bavaria and Saxony. The Duke Charles V. of Lorraine had died April 17, 1690, greatly regretted by his allies and esteemed by his enemies, leaving his claims to his children. The Elector of Bavaria had succeeded him in the chief command. The campaign was very inactive. The two armies left the Rhine between them till the middle of August. The Dauphin and Lorges finally decided to cross the river; forty thousand Frenchmen and fifty thousand Germans found themselves face to face, from September 10 to September 12, in the environs of Offenburg, on the scene of Turenne's last campaign. Both sides hesitated to attack, and the French took up their winter-quarters in the beginning of October, while guarding some advance posts in Ortnau and Brisgau. The Imperialists, relieved from inquietude on the Rhine by this inopportune retreat, were able to send reinforcements to the countries of the Danube, where fortune had changed face. The Turks, exalted by the danger of their empire, had made vigorous efforts, whilst the Emperor, believing them to be exhausted, had not put himself in a condition to maintain his advantages. Tekeli had reappeared on the scene with brilliancy; Michael Apaffi being dead,

[1] It is untrue, however, that Luxembourg had obtained the privilege of corresponding directly with the King and dispensing with the medium of the minister; we have all his correspondence with Louvois, during this campaign and the following, in Vols. VI. VII. VIII. of the *Lettres pour servir à l'Histoire militaire de Louis XIV.*

[2] He belonged to a parliamentary family of Paris.

Tekeli had caused himself to be appointed Prince of Transylvania by the Sultan, then had invaded this province at the head of Hungarian refugees, sustained by the Turks. The Imperialists had been driven from almost the whole of Transylvania, and the Turkish army had retaken Nissa, Widin, and Belgrade (September–October). The reinforcements sent from the banks of the Rhine could only arrest the progress of the Turks.

The war on the Pyrenees had had nearly the same character as on the Rhine. The French had had the advantage of subsisting for a part of the season on the lands of the enemy, without doing anything of note.

It was not the same in Belgium; but Luxembourg was there in command!

Luxembourg had only a little over thirty thousand men united in Flanders under his direct command; but a corps of fifteen or sixteen thousand soldiers, posted between the Moselle and the Meuse, was in a position to succor him. The enemy would be much superior in numbers when the general of the Dutch, the Prince of Waldeck, should be joined by the Governor of Belgium and the Elector of Brandenburg; their project was to attack by the valley of the Meuse; they had not time to do this, and Luxembourg did not permit them to effect their junction. Luxembourg had begun to lay waste or to levy contributions on Spanish Flanders in the middle of May. The Dutch army, which had wintered in Belgium, did not assemble near Nivelle till the first fortnight in June. As soon as Luxembourg knew that it was in motion, he left twelve thousand men with Marshal d'Humières to hold the governor of the Spanish Netherlands in check in the direction of Bruges and Ghent, then moved rapidly between the Sambre and the Meuse, and was there reinforced, without the knowledge of the enemy, by the greater part of the corps of the Moselle (June 28), which compensated for the heavy detachment left with D'Humières. Waldeck, however, was approaching the Sambre. Luxembourg, by a flank movement executed with great celerity, fell upon the Sambre, near Froidmont, and forced its passage (June 29). June 30, near the close of the day, the two vanguards met on the plain of Fleurus, a name destined to a double glory, and Luxembourg routed the enemy's cavalry in person.

The next morning, Luxembourg, leaving his baggage on the other side of the Sambre, marched directly on the enemy. Waldeck had taken position behind Fleurus, concealing and supporting his left by the forest of Eppenies, and covering his right by the

château of Saint-Amand; his front was protected by a brook with steep banks that ran down from the burgh of Fleurus. An attack in front could not be thought of; Luxembourg took an incredibly audacious resolution; he resolved to surround an army at least equal to his own by embracing in his manœuvres a field of enormous extent in proportion to his forces. He deployed the infantry of his left before the brook of Fleurus and made it his centre; he pushed the cavalry of his left in the form of a T on the enemy's right flank as far as Eppenies, protected by a ridge that concealed the march of his squadrons. In the mean time, with the other half of his army, he crossed the brook of Fleurus beyond the reach of the enemy, at Ligny, — another name well known in our military annals, — made a long detour on the right, covering himself with hedges and rising ground, and finally debouched into the plain on the left flank and rear of the enemy. Had Waldeck divined this manœuvre in time, and thrown the main body of his forces on the angle formed by the French left, he would have pierced this long and feeble line, cut in twain the French army, and made retreat impossible to Luxembourg, by separating him from his pontoons and baggage! but he did not perceive the operation till it was accomplished, and at the instant when the two halves of the French army closed on him like pincers. It was then too late. The French left, nevertheless, suffered much at the first shock; Lieutenant-General Gournai, who commanded it, was killed, and the cavalry was thrown on the infantry; but at the same moment, Luxembourg charged in serried masses on the enemy's left, broke it at a single onset, and reëstablished his communications with his centre, which crossed the brook of Fleurus. Waldeck strove to re-form in the rear, but it was impossible for him to rally his cavalry. The Dutch and German infantry defended itself with heroic fury; several battalions, surrounded, mowed down with grape-shot, sabred by the French infantry, artillery, and cavalry, rushed upon the edge of the sword rather than surrender. Waldeck, with a dozen battalions and some squadrons that had not suffered themselves to be broken, succeeded, under fire and terrible charges, in gaining the forest of Eppenies, where the pursuit ceased. This was all that remained together of the hostile army. Five or six thousand dead, besides the wounded, eight or nine thousand prisoners,[1] fifty-five field-pieces, and more than a hundred flags, which, sent to Paris,

[1] Among the prisoners were found a great number of French refugees. The King caused them to be sent to the galleys. Lémontey, *Articles inédits des Mémoires de Dangeau*, p. 61.

gave Luxembourg the name of the *Upholsterer of Notre-Dame*, were the trophies of the conqueror. The French had had three thousand men killed or disabled.[1]

This victory, the most complete that had yet been gained in the wars of Louis XIV., remained sterile. Luxembourg wished to besiege Namur or Charleroi: Louvois did not permit him. Louvois persuaded the King that it was necessary to send a part of the victorious army to the Moselle, in order to be within reach to sustain the army of *Monseigneur* (the Dauphin), somewhat weaker than the Germans. *Monseigneur*, as we have seen above, did nothing, and was a pretext to prevent anything from being done. Luxembourg thus saw himself paralyzed; the enemy was reformed by reinforcements drawn from all sides and by the redemption of its prisoners, which could not be refused in consideration of a ransom, according to terms of a previous agreement; the Elector of Brandenburg rejoined Waldeck,[2] and manœuvring continued till the end of the season, without other result for the French than having subsisted on the enemy's territory and reëstablished numerical equality by destroying, through a great and sudden blow, the excess of numbers possessed by the allies. There had been but one battle, there had been no campaign.

On the side of the Alps the events were more complex and the results more positive. The Duke of Savoy, Victor Amadeus, had for some time been suspected by Louis XIV., not without reason, although he was in appearance faithful to his engagements, and had at this moment several regiments in the King's service in Flanders. In 1687, Duke Victor Amadeus and the Elector of Bavaria had met at Venice, under pretext of the carnival, and Victor Amadeus had secretly promised his aid to the League of Augsburg. This young prince, restless and courageous, found himself with anxiety shut in between Pignerol and Casale as in a vice, and feared that Louis might wish to make another Lorraine of Piedmont. The allies had not great difficulty in gaining him, by promising to deliver him from this subjection, which the insolence of Louvois made still more painful to him. The Duke complained that the French minister treated him "like a page." During the winter of 1689–90, Louvois was advised that the allies were projecting to take the offensive against Dauphiny, by uniting the Spanish

[1] *Lettres militaires*, t. VI. Quinci, t. II. pp. 240–272. Saint-Hilaire, t. I. p. 426.

[2] By treaty of September 6, the Elector of Brandenburg engaged to keep twenty thousand soldiers continually on the left bank of the Moselle, and not to treat with France without his allies.

troops of Milanais with the forces of the Duke of Savoy and the French and Piedmontese refugees in Switzerland and Swabia. He knew that the Emperor had promised the Duke to treat his ambassadors on the same footing as those of crowned heads, — a great object of ambition with the House of Savoy, — on condition that the Duke would furnish pay for a German corps that should be sent to his aid. The truth of this information was confirmed by the conduct of the Duke towards the *barbets*,[1] or insurgent Vaudois of the Alps. The Vaudois had not all perished or emigrated to distant countries. As soon as the French troops had evacuated the upland valleys, after the massacres of 1686, these poor people had begun to reappear in the best sheltered places of their mountains, and the Duke, once in relation with the enemies of the persecuting King, had closed his eyes to the return of the exiles. The great war having commenced, a numerous band of Vaudois had returned from Switzerland and Geneva by forcing the passage of the little Mont Cenis; they occupied the valley of Saint-Martin, and waged partisan warfare against the garrisons of Pignerol and the neighboring forts. The officers of the Duke seconded the French with little vigor. Towards the end of April, Catinat came to take command of a small army-corps which was assembling in Dauphiny. The King notified the Duke that these troops, designed to operate against Milanais, would have to pass through his territories; before they were wholly assembled, he asked him to aid Catinat in driving the *barbets* from the mountains; the Duke commissioned one of his generals to concert with Catinat the assault of Quatre-Dents, an almost inaccessible post where the *barbets* had intrenched themselves, at the bottom of the valley of Saint-Martin. On the day agreed upon, the French made the attack; the Piedmontese did not appear; the snow and the difficulties of the ground necessitated the abandonment of the assault (May 3).

On again entering Pignerol, Catinat received two successive couriers from the King to the Duke. Louis demanded that Victor Amadeus should join all his troops to the army of Catinat, and that he should receive French garrisons at Vercelli and Verrua and in the citadel of Turin, till the general peace. The army of Catinat supported these imperious despatches by descending from the mountains on Carignano, in the valley of the Po (May 9). The Duke, terrified, strove to gain time, hastening, on the one hand, the aid promised by the League, and, on the other, undertaking to

[1] So called from their long beards, or *barbes*. — Tr.

soften the King. He was not yet irrevocably pledged to the League, and if the King, as he demanded, had consented to treat him as a sovereign prince and had at least renounced the occupation of his capital, he probably would have recoiled before the chances of a contest with France. Louvois prevented all concession and spared nothing, either in substance or form, that could push the Duke to the last extremity. An odious calculation has been sought in this conduct of the minister, who never thought, it has been said, that France had enemies enough, and only hoped to maintain himself by multiplying perils around his master. He was indeed capable of such a calculation; nevertheless, his natural arrogance and brutality suffice to explain his conduct. The Duke, summoned to yield before May 24, wrote, the 20th, to the King that he submitted, but that he besought him to content himself with another place in exchange for Turin. During these parleys, a reserve corps left by Catinat in the mountains, and composed, for the most part, of militia, carried, in a second attack, the post of Quatre-Dents: most of the *barbets* escaped, favored by a thick fog (May 23).[1]

Some days afterwards, Catinat received from the King an order to occupy Turin, Vercelli, and Verrua, in conformity with the promise of Victor Amadeus. The French general made known his instructions to the Duke. The latter responded in such a manner that Catinat judged a rupture inevitable. Meanwhile, the wind had changed at Versailles: the King had repented of his hardness, and had resolved to be contented if Carmagnola, Susa, and Montmeillan were remitted as a pledge to a neutral, the Republic of Venice, which should hold them as security for Victor Amadeus's conduct, on condition that the Emperor and Spain should subscribe to the complete neutrality of Italy.[2]

It was too late: a double treaty had been signed, June 3 and 4, by the Duke of Savoy with Spain and the Emperor, who promised him considerable aid, Pignerol, when it should be taken, and a share in the conquests that might be made on the other side of the Alps.[3] Victor Amadeus immediately set at liberty all of the Vaudois that remained in prison, ordered the arrest of the ambassador of Louis XIV., and of all the French at Turin, and began hostilities. Louis, by his conduct towards Genoa, had set an example of such violations of the law of nations.

[1] On the conduct of Louvois towards the Duke, see Gourville, p. 482. La Fare, p. 207.

[2] Dumont, *Corps diplomatique*, t. VII. part 2, p. 244.

[3] Dumont, ibid. p. 265.

Catinat advanced on Turin with twelve thousand men; but he was not in a condition to undertake the siege of this great city, and could not hinder Victor Amadeus from uniting five or six thousand soldiers that he had in readiness to ten thousand Hispano-Lombards that had arrived by forced marches from Milanais (the middle of June). The two small armies held each other in check a long time near Carignano, and were reinforced each on its side. Catinat wholly laid waste, behind him, the valleys of Luzerne and Angrogna, in order to deprive the *barbets* of all means of subsisting and of establishing themselves on his line of communication. The war was waged, after the instructions of Louvois, with a rigor that recalled, on a smaller scale, the cruel devastations of the Rhine, and offered a mournful contrast to the private character of the French general.[1] Catinat, menaced in his camp by the dispositions of the enemy, retired to the mountains and took post at Caours. The enemy attempted to cut off his communications with a reserve corps that occupied the valley of Luzerne, and was repulsed with loss. Some days afterwards (August 17), Catinat resumed the offensive and directed his course towards Saluzzo by a flank-march in presence of the enemy, in order to tempt him to battle. The allies did not appear till towards evening, the commandant of the Spanish auxiliaries having long argued with the Duke for the purpose of inducing him to wait for German reinforcements that were on the march. Victor Amadeus was determined to open the engagement. The French, who had commenced an attack on Saluzzo, faced about. The Duke awaited them in a favorable position, but he had not known how to avail himself of all its advantages: his two wings were covered by marshes, and, before the marshes, *cascines* (country houses) filled with infantry presented a first obstacle to the assailants. The French opened the attack the next morning. Nothing arrested their impetuosity. The *cascines* were carried after a vigorous resistance; the marsh on the right was crossed by the infantry, which, supporting itself by an old dike of the Po, which the Duke of Savoy had neglected to occupy, took the enemy's line

[1] The Piedmontese peasants, a rude and valorous race, had commenced a petty warfare, after the example of the Vaudois. Following the old and barbarous right of war that might be supposed to have fallen into disuse, Catinat ordered the two syndics of a village to be hung, "for having allowed their community to take up arms against an entire army." All the peasants that were found with arms, balls, or powder, were arrested, sent to the provost, and hung. As too great a number were taken, and the provost was not sufficient for their execution, Catinat allowed his soldiers to kill them. All villages and country houses that refused to pay the war-levy were pitilessly burned. See *Mém. de Catinat*, t. I. p. 72 *et seq.*

in flank. On the left, the enemy, protected by his situation, obstinately defended himself; but the French cavalry finally succeeded in crossing the second marsh. The Hispano-Piedmontese army, despite its superiority in numbers, then found itself overwhelmed and taken between two fires; it broke, and precipitated itself in disorder into the woods and thickets that extended behind its position. A young officer prevented this retreat from being changed into a complete rout, — Prince Eugene of Savoy Soissons, who had brought to his cousin Victor Amadeus the aid of a sword already proved in Hungary and on the Rhine. The enemy had lost from four to five thousand men and eleven cannon. The French had had a thousand men killed or wounded. Several regiments of militia had participated, with the troops of the line, in this brilliant action, which was called the Battle of Staffarde, from the name of an abbey in the vicinity.[1]

The hostile army, beaten, but not destroyed, rallied at Poncalieri and at Carignano, covering Turin. The immediate price of the victory was only the occupation of Saluzzo and some other small cities, and the possession of the plain that extends from the Alps to the Tanaro. In the course of October, Catinat sent back his sick and wounded, and most of his trains, into Dauphiny, as if he were on the point of going into winter-quarters; then, instead of recrossing the Upper Alps, he marched rapidly towards Susa, by the extremely difficult passes that connect the valley of the Clusone with that of the Petit-Dora. The famous pass of Susa was evacuated by the enemy, and the citadel surrendered in presence of the Hispano-Piedmontese army, which went to succor it, reinforced by five or six thousand Germans and three or four thousand Spaniards (November 8–14). The French were thus masters of the two principal passes from Dauphiny to Piedmont, — Susa and Pignerol.

During these operations in Piedmont ten thousand men of the militia and the arrière-ban had occupied, without much resistance, all of Savoy, except Montmeillan. The identity of language and customs, with habits of friendly proximity, prevented the Savoy mountaineers from feeling the same repugnance that the Piedmontese experienced to the French invasion.

The first reverses experienced by the Duke of Savoy had obliged him to draw more closely his ties with the allies: October 20, his agent at the Hague had concluded with England and Holland a treaty by which those two powers promised him subsidies, and he, on his side, engaged in the Great Alliance for the reëstablishment

[1] *Mém. de Catinat*, t. I. p. 85 *et seq.* *Mém. de Feuquières.*

of the treaties of Westphalia and the Pyrenees. By a secret article, he granted abolition of his edicts against the Vaudois, and religious liberty for them and for French refugees who should settle in their valleys. Part of the subsidy was to be employed in paying the Vaudois and the refugees.[1]

The Continental war, viewed as a whole, had therefore thus far turned to the advantage of France, although, through the fault of the French government, its enemies had increased in number, and its successes had not produced their full fruits. The allies, on their side, were not sufficiently enlightened by the recollections of the war of Holland; and the rivalries, the quarrels, the pretensions, and the personal calculations of the German princes had infused into their movements a tardiness and difficulties that had contributed much to paralyze the League on the Rhine, and to bring disaster on it in Belgium.

Events still more striking, and of the greatest consequence, took place in the mean time on the coasts of England and Ireland. In the month of March, the squadron of Brest, thirty-six men-of-war strong, transported from Brest to Ireland six or seven thousand French soldiers, with a considerable quantity of arms and munitions. A few weeks afterwards it carried back to France the Irish troops that James II. had promised to Louis XIV. by way of exchange. The voyage of the squadron was effected both ways without difficulty. The English and Dutch marines had recently suffered by a tempest which had been equivalent to them to the loss of a battle. The English had had eight men-of-war and more than a hundred and fifty merchant-vessels wrecked, and were not in a condition to dispute the passage to the French.

The expedition to Ireland was only the beginning of the campaign. Greater projects were on foot. Brest, after the return of its powerful squadron, saw the successive arrival in her port of the squadron of Toulon, led by Château-Renaud, who had passed the Straits of Gibraltar in presence of an allied squadron superior in force, then all the disposable ships of the ports of the West, and finally fifteen galleys constructed in three months at Rochefort by order of Seignelai, who wished to attempt the utilization on the ocean of this kind of vessel which is not arrested by a calm. The minister of the marine displayed an activity of which fabulous examples are quoted.[2]

[1] Dumont, t. VII. 2d part, p. 272.

[2] It is pretended that he caused a forty-gun frigate to be built, careened, masted, rigged, and put under sail in nine hours at Toulon; that at Marseilles he had the keel of a galley laid on the stocks at exactly four o'clock, and that before noon

June 23, the French fleet, fully complete, sailed out of the road of Brest, under the command of Tourville, appointed Vice-Admiral of the Levant at the close of 1689; it numbered seventy-eight men-of-war, sixty-three of which carried above fifty guns.[1] The coasts of France had never witnessed anything so terrible or magnificent: Seignelai, forgetful of the maxims of his father, who desired on board of our ships of war a manly simplicity, had overloaded them with a ruinous sumptuousness: *The Royal Sun*, the flag-ship, was adorned with flags fifty feet long, and streamers a hundred and thirty and a hundred and forty feet long, of embroidered damask.[2] Happily, this sumptuousness did not render our sailors effeminate; proof of this was soon had! The fleet, checked some days by adverse winds, entered the Channel, June 29.

June 24, the day after Tourville had left Brest, William III. had landed in Ireland. Hitherto retained by the grave political debates of England, the elections, and the first discussions of a new parliament, William had successively sent to Schomberg all the forces at his disposal, and went at last to place himself at the head of his army, to bring matters to a close with James II. by a decisive blow.

This collision Louis XIV. had advised James to avoid. The Great King had proposed an excellent plan to his ally, namely, to refuse to accept battle and to protract the war; French frigates, detached from the fleet, were to go to seize, on the coast of Ireland, the transports that had carried William, and to cut off his communications with England; in the mean time, the French fleet was to attack the enemy's fleet in the Channel, and to endeavor to bring about in England that royalist uprising promised by the partisans of James II. The French fleet duly set about fulfilling the part assigned to it in this plan. July 2, it was in sight of the enemy, in the waters of the Isle of Wight. The English and Dutch united were inferior to the French, if not in the number of guns, at least in that of ships: they had only from fifty-five to sixty ships of the line, for the most part, it is true, of very great strength. The two great maritime powers had not thought it necessary to display all their force, and Admiral Herbert, who commanded the combined fleet, had received orders to engage without waiting for a reinforcement prepared in Holland.

he left the port on this galley rigged and armed. We are reluctant to cite such strange facts, although we find them in a serious historian, M. L. Guérin, *Histoire maritime de France*, t. II. p. 17.

[1] We follow the statement given by Quinci, t. II. p. 819; that of M. E. Sue mentions only sixty-four vessels.

[2] E. Sue, t. IV. p. 99.

This presumption was to cost the allies dear. After some days of evolutions, the Anglo-Batavian fleet, favored by the wind, took the offensive (July 10). Tourville, although to the windward of the enemy, accepted the attack, and the battle began in sight of Beachy-Head, called by us Cape Bévesiers, on the coast of Sussex. The twenty ships of the Dutch squadron that formed the vanguard of the enemy, under Admiral Evertsen, bore down under full sail with more ardor than prudence, and without lengthening their line sufficiently to present a front equal to that of the French vanguard. Château-Renaud, commandant of the French vanguard, profited by this fault, turned the head of his squadron on the Dutch, which gained the windward of them, and put them between his fire and the fire of the centre directed by Tourville. It would be impossible to express the violence and obstinacy of this frightful cannonade, which lasted, without interruption, for eight hours. The centre of the enemy, commanded by the English admiral Herbert, made but feeble attempts to disengage the Dutch, borne down by the French artillery: most of this squadron did not approach nearer than within long range. The English rear-guard, led by Lord Russel, much more vigorously attacked the French rear-guard, under the command of Victor-Marie d'Estrées, son of the aged Marshal d'Estrées, but without gaining any advantage over it. At noon the fortune of the battle was no longer doubtful. A Dutch ship of sixty-eight guns had been taken and burned. The Dutch squadron seemed utterly lost, and the fire of the English slackened before the superior fire of the French. The calm that followed hindered the French from following up their advantage, and made them greatly regret the absence of the galleys which the heavy weather had prevented from following the fleet. A little before evening both fleets cast anchor. About ten o'clock, the wind having sprung up, the enemy weighed anchor for flight. Tourville followed his example and pursued him with his squadron. Unfortunately his signal was not seen by his two vice-admirals, who remained at anchor, and, the next morning, he lost time in waiting for them. The English profited by this to effect their retreat towards the Straits of Calais and the Thames. Most of the Dutch ships, mutilated, dismasted, razeed, could not follow their allies, and voluntarily ran aground on the coast. The French assailed them there, and burned them or forced the Dutch to burn them themselves. From the 10th to the 15th of July, fifteen vessels of the line were blown up or sunk on the shores of England. Among the fifteen, there were, it appears, but two English ships. The Dutch paid dear for the honor

of having made a king of England. In order to appreciate the material importance of such a victory, it must be remembered that, in the great action of Fleurus, fifty guns had been taken from the enemy, and that the fifteen ships destroyed probably carried a thousand! Colbert would have been happy in witnessing such a spectacle!

At this glorious news, Seignelai, in despair at having been retained at Versailles by a fever which wasted his strength but not his moral energy, dreamed only of an invasion of the Thames, and a descent on England. The consternation was extreme around Queen Mary, regent of the kingdom in the absence of William. The Jacobites became restless, and a counter-revolution seemed probable. Admiral Herbert saved England from extreme peril by removing all the buoys and beacons from the coast and the Thames. Tourville, destitute of pilots who might supply, to a certain extent, the absence of those indispensable indices, was unwilling to expose his fleet to shipwreck in the shoals of the Thames: beholding no more enemies in possession of the sea before him, he sent a few vessels to Ireland, fell back on the southern coast of England, and burned the little maritime town of Tynemouth in Devonshire, with four frigates and a number of merchant-ships; but the dismay that he inspired only served to show to what extent the cause of James II. was unpopular: the southern provinces rose in a body against the expected invasion.[1]

Whilst Tourville was covering himself with glory, without power to realize all the wishes of the impetuous Seignelai, James II. lost everything in Ireland. The day after the battle of Beachy-Head, another battle was fought on land, with very different success (July 11). James II. had paid no attention to the advice of Louis XIV. When William III., having landed in Ulster, marched directly against him with an army superior in numbers and condition, James II. refused to retire on the Shannon, in the heart of Celtic Ireland, pretended to cover Dublin, and awaited the enemy near Drogheda, on the banks of the Boyne. William had thirty-five or forty thousand excellent soldiers,—English, Dutch, Danish, Ultonians, (Protestants of Ulster,) French refugees; James had

[1] L. Guérin, t. II. pp. 17–28. E. Sue, t. IV. pp. 98–125. Sainte-Croix, *Hist. de la puissance navale de l'Angleterre*, t. II. pp. 17, 884. *Relation de Jacques II.*, in the *Mémoires de Berwick*, t. I. p. 455. *Mém. de Villette*, p. 96. *Mém. de Forbin*, p. 519. Quinci, t. II. p. 314. See in E. Sue, the narrative of Petit-Renau. A ball passed between his legs while he was drawing up the order of battle. Macaulay reduces too much the importance of the battle of Beachy-Head, and is unjust towards Tourville.

thirty thousand men, Irish and French, and the Irish infantry was but a mass of filching peasants, whom he had not taken the pains to discipline. The French thus found themselves face to face, some under the aged Schomberg, others under Count de Lauzun, an old favorite of Louis XIV., a long time disgraced by his master, and celebrated for his romantic adventures and his secret marriage with the Great Mademoiselle,[1] a somewhat superannuated heroine of the Fronde. William extended his right wing several miles up the river, with orders to force a passage at the Bridge of Slane and turn the left of the Catholics. A regiment of Irish dragoons that defended this passage was routed. Lauzun hastened to stop the assailants with the French infantry and a part of the Irish cavalry. William then advanced towards the river with his left wing, whilst Schomberg marched at the head of the centre, preceded by Ruvigni de Caillemotte, son of the last deputy-general of the Reformed Churches in France and commandant of the Huguenot refugees. The infantry of James II. gave way at the mere sight of their assailants; but the Irish cavalry charged valiantly into the bed of the river. Ruvigni fell mortally wounded, crying to his Huguenots, "To glory! to glory!" as if to offer them in glory a compensation for their lost country.

The refugees faltered; the aged Schomberg urged his horse into the waters of the Boyne: "On, men, on; here are your persecutors!" He crossed the stream and fell in his turn with three mortal wounds. But the Protestant army forced the passage on all sides, and William reached the other bank and threw himself into the thickest of the fight. The brave Irish cavalry allowed itself to be cut to pieces, while the infantry continued its flight. The French retired in good order. As to James, who had kept himself at a distance, in shameful contrast to his rival, he fled, almost without stopping, till he reached the haven of Kinsale: he found there ten of the twenty-five frigates designed to clear St. George's Channel and to cut off William from England, an operation that a squadron of the line had received orders to support. He employed them to take him back to Brest, whence he returned to Versailles[2] to entreat Louis XIV. to give him another army to land in England, under the protection of the victorious Tourville! Louis, indignant at his

[1] *Mém. de mademoiselle de Montpensier; Lettres de madame de Sévigné*, etc.

[2] At the moment of James's return, France was scarcely disabused with respect to the pretended death of William. A ball having grazed the shoulder of this prince the evening before the battle, the report of his death had flown to Paris, and the Parisians had made rejoicings at it that must have flattered him more than all panegyrics.

inconceivable desertion, would not even discuss such a project, declared that there was nothing more to be done, and recalled Tourville to Brest, with orders to send a squadron to Ireland sufficient to bring back the French troops.

Louis was certainly very excusable, yet this abandonment of Ireland was a fault. Ireland, ignominiously forsaken by her King, did not yet abandon herself: she showed that she had deserved a different chief. The Irish army was re-formed on the Shannon. William marched on Limerick, the principal centre of resistance. Lauzun, a court general, without firmness, without military capacity, thought everything lost, and dreamed only of returning to France; he took his troops to Galway, to await there the French squadron. A simple captain in the French Guards, Boisselot, did what his general should have done: he remained in Limerick, and, in concert with the brave and active Irishman, Sarsfield, directed, with as much intelligence as energy, the inexperienced courage of the Gaels. These same foot-soldiers, that a panic had broken so easily on the Boyne, showed themselves heroes when they had worthy chiefs at their head. The siege artillery, on its way to the camp of William, was surprised and destroyed by the Irish cavalry; the garrison repulsed an assault of the English with great slaughter. William raised the siege of Limerick (the end of August). Meanwhile, the French vessels arrived and Lauzun embarked, in spite of this happy turn of fortune, which made it his duty to remain. Scarcely had he gone, when the English, led by Marlborough, took Cork and Kinsale, and thus accomplished the occupation of the eastern coast of Ireland.[1]

The disaster of James II. more than compensated William for the great check of the English navy, but it did not console English pride. The English, driven from the Channel,[2] attempted to avenge themselves on the French colonies of America. A squadron of thirty-four sail entered the St. Lawrence and attacked Quebec by land and water. The brave governor of Canada, Frontenac, at the head of the Canadian colonists, as robust and agile as skilful marksmen, defeated the disembarked troops and compelled them to retreat (October 18–20). The English obtained success only at St. Christopher, where they expelled the French from the half of the island that belonged to them (December).

[1] *Relation de Jacques II.* in *les Mém. de Berwick*, t. I. p. 482. Gordon, *Hist. d'Irlande*, t. II. ch. XXXIII. Macaulay, *William III.*, Vol. II. ch. 2.

[2] They had again been worsted in several partial engagements; thus, a French vessel of fifty guns took and burned an English vessel of eighty guns, after a furious combat in which both captains were mortally wounded. L. Guérin, t. II. p. 128.

This year, the most glorious that the French navy had ever witnessed, ended sadly for it: Seignelai expired November 3, before completing his thirty-ninth year; his fiery organization had been rapidly consumed by simultaneous excesses of work and pleasure; his personal character, without being cruel like that of Louvois, was domineering and haughty; his impatient genius would not brook obstacles, and he held men responsible for the resistance of the elements; in his vast and sudden creations he perhaps sacrificed the resources of the future too much to the present.[1] The King, who endured with more and more difficulty the presence of spontaneous characters and strong wills, felt himself, as it were, relieved at being rid of this feverish activity. Whatever might have been the faults of Seignelai, his loss was irreparable; he left no heir to the secret of that immense and admirable machinery of war, that maritime administration, created by his father, enlarged by himself. The King united the marine to the finances in the hands of Pontchartrain, who wished at first to be excused from "what he knew nothing about," and who proved but too well that he had spoken the truth.[2]

Seignelai had not only been a man of impulse and action, he had completed the legislative work of his father by a monumental ordinance, the celebrated naval code, which coördinated, moulded, and completed the edicts and regulations of the great Colbert. The ordinance of April 15, 1689, is still the principal basis of our present legislation.[3]

[1] He was far, however, from neglecting economic interests. Thus, despite the war, he authorized French ships to continue to export grain to Spain, in order to prevent the English from depriving us of the benefits of this transportation. He carefully maintained the commercial privileges enjoyed by our flag in Brazil. L. Guérin, p. 597.

[2] Lémontey, *Articles inédits des Mém. de Dangeau*, p. 68.

[3] The ordinance contained twenty-three sections. We will only cite a few characteristic provisions. The captain of a vessel could not, under penalty of dismissal, receive any compensation from merchant-ships escorted by him. In case of boarding, he was not to quit his own vessel to throw himself on that of the enemy. The relative rank of army and naval officers was regulated as follows: a lieutenant-general of the navy ranked with a lieutenant-general of the army; a chief of squadron with a field-marshal; the captain of a vessel or galley with a colonel; the captain of a galliot or frigate with a lieutenant-colonel; the lieutenant of a vessel with a captain of infantry; the ensign of a vessel with a lieutenant of infantry (lieutenant-general and chief of squadron, corresponded with our vice-admiral and rear-admiral; vice-admirals of that time with our admirals). The intolerant spirit of the Revocation made itself felt in the maritime penalty that inflicted the rope's end on sailors that missed being present at mass. The sailors that deserted were punished with the galleys for life; officers, with death. An officer that abandoned merchant-vessels that he was charged with escorting, was punished with death; by way of compensation, the captain of a merchant-vessel that separated himself from the

The general result of the campaign of 1690 was, therefore, that France maintained the preponderance on the Continent, and had gained it on the sea, but that William of Nassau had firmly established himself on his new throne.

William labored vigorously to strengthen the bands of the Coalition and to repair the reverses of Holland and England. On his return from Ireland he succeeded in inducing the English parliament to vote a levy of seventy thousand soldiers and the enormous sum of four and a half million pounds sterling, — almost equivalent to the sixty million francs that had appalled Colbert so much at the commencement of the war with Holland. Parliament did not engage to renew this effort every year, but was destined to be constrained to do it by the force of circumstances! William, regarding himself so well established that his presence was no longer necessary at London or in Ireland, set out at the close of January, 1691, for Holland, where he was received less as a governor than a king of the United Provinces. He went to the Hague to preside over a congress of princes, ministers, and generals, for the purpose of concerting military operations. It was agreed to put more than two hundred and twenty thousand soldiers simultaneously in the field against France.

Whilst the allies deliberated, France acted. The King and Louvois had resolved to repair the inaction imposed on Luxembourg after Fleurus, and had prepared during the winter an expedition which was to recall the memory of the famous sieges of Valenciennes and Ghent. March 15, two French corps, one of them moving from the places of the Scheldt, the other from the places of the Sambre, invested Mons. The King arrived in camp the 21st, with Luxembourg. Nearly seventy thousand soldiers, twenty-six or twenty-seven thousand of them horsemen, constituted and covered the siege. Twenty-two thousand pioneers, sent from Flanders, Artois, and Picardy, traced, under the direction of Vauban, the vast circumvallation of Mons, and turned the Trouille, one of two rivers between which Mons is situated, from its bed. The

escort unnecessarily, was punished with the galleys. Whoever should conceal himself during battle, or should speak of surrender, was punished with death; every commander of a man-of-war who should surrender his vessel, with a council of war, and death, if there was no excuse. Half-pay was granted to invalid seamen. (Seignelai had desired to establish a general marine hospital; he was stopped by the expense.) The proprietors of forests situated within fifteen leagues of the sea, or within six leagues of navigable rivers, could not make use of them without the King's permission. (This was an extension of the reservation established by the Ordinance of Waters and Forests in 1669.) See *Histoire générale de la marine, par Boismêlé*, t. III.

trenches were opened, March 24, towards the gate of Bertamont; the 26th, sixty-six cannon and twenty-four mortars began simultaneously to batter down the fortifications and to overwhelm the city.

At the news of the siege of Mons, William had hurried to Brussels and hastily collected the forces that the allies had between the Meuse and the sea: in a fortnight, he only succeeded in assembling thirty-five or forty thousand men, and perceived the impossibility of aiding Mons. The horn-work that covered the gate of Bertamont having been carried, April 2, after two bloody assaults, the inhabitants, terrified by the bombardment, took measures to compel the governor to surrender. The governor, hoping for no assistance from without, and seeing imminent revolt within, capitulated, April 8, and marched out on the 10th, with four thousand eight hundred men that remained to him. The King returned, April 12, to Versailles, and the troops entered winter-quarters again for repose, after having taken, in three weeks, the powerful capital of Hainault. Ath was the only fortified town that remained to the Spaniards in this province.

William, on his side, was recalled to Great Britain, after this new check, by the agitations of his stormy kingdoms; when he returned into Belgium, at the end of some weeks, the French had already again taken the field. At the close of May, Lieutenant-General Boufflers had marched on Liege with fifteen thousand men, and had bombarded this great city in order to punish the prince-bishop and citizens for having joined the League of Augsburg and for having received allied troops within their city. Boufflers was not in a condition to besiege Liege, and retired on the report that an army-corps was on the way to aid it (June 1–6). Luxembourg, meanwhile, with the main body of the army, took Hal, and menaced Brussels. William had arrived in time to cover the capital of the Catholic Netherlands. He soon found himself superior in numbers by the junction of powerful reinforcements. The allies had, this year, more than eighty thousand soldiers between the Moselle and the sea. This great force remained useless: Luxembourg kept it at bay till the middle of September, by reducing it to the defensive. The allies, disheartened, thought, at the beginning of autumn, of going into winter-quarters. William quitted the camp and left to the Prince of Waldeck the care of dispersing the army. The allies were near Leuse; the French were in the region of Tournay, and also appeared disposed for winter-quarters; the allies were not guarding themselves very care-

fully. Suddenly, September 19, four thousand horsemen fell like a thunderbolt on their rear-guard; it was Luxembourg in person, with the troops of the royal household and some other picked corps. More than ten thousand of the enemy's cavalry hastily formed themselves in three lines: they were broken, sabred, driven upon each other, pursued till within reach of the fire of the infantry which advanced to take advantage of their rout; the French then retired proudly, carrying off forty standards and leaving the earth strewn with fifteen hundred enemies. Twenty-seven or twenty-eight squadrons [1] had beaten from seventy-two to seventy-five. This splendid feat of arms brilliantly terminated the campaign in the Netherlands.

The campaign in Germany was still more fruitless than in the preceding year. The French seemed to propose to themselves no other advantage than that of subsisting on the enemy's country and of hindering the Germans from penetrating into France, as they had done during the war with Holland. This end was attained in this campaign as in the following ones.

The allies had projected a considerable effort on the side of the Alps, but there again they had been anticipated. In the beginning of March, the main body of Catinat's troops, that had been sent into winter-quarters in Dauphiny and Provence, crossed the Var, invested Nice, and besieged Villafranca. A small squadron coöperated with the land-forces. The castle of Villafranca capitulated in a few days; the forts on the mountain and on the shore, between Villafranca and Nice, followed this example. March 24, all the troops united before Nice. The city was without defence; the consuls hastened to treat with Catinat without consulting the governor of the castle. The governor wished to oppose it; the citizens fired on the Piedmontese soldiers and brought in the French. The castle, situated on a steep rock that commands the city and the sea, seemed likely to make a protracted resistance, but, the French bombs having blown up the two powder-magazines, with a part of the donjon and four or five hundred soldiers, the rest of the garrison surrendered the place, April 5. Provence was thus sheltered from all invasion by the occupation of the Maritime Alps, its natural frontier.

After having so rapidly conquered this celebrated place, of which the French had never been able to possess themselves during the

[1] And out of this number six or seven squadrons of dragoons were employed in harassing the enemy's infantry. The King, this time, less harsh than after Fleurus, treated the Protestant refugees like the other prisoners of war. *Lettres militaires*, t. VII. pp. 436–458.

wars of the sixteenth century, Catinat reëntered Piedmont, again put himself in motion before the close of May, and took Avigliana and Carmagnola (May 30–June 9). His lieutenants, less fortunate and less skilful, failed before Coni (June 22–28). The Duke of Savoy was joined, soon afterwards, by the Elector of Bavaria, at the head of a numerous body of the old bands of Hungary: Schomberg, son of the marshal killed on the Boyne, had also arrived with several regiments of Huguenot refugees; Catinat disputed the ground against thirty thousand men with twenty thousand during the rest of the season. He could not hinder the enemy from retaking Carmagnola in the month of October, and was forced to evacuate Saluzzo and the plains of Piedmont; but he avenged himself by returning to the other side of the mountain, to take the much more important place of Montmeillan, which put the French in complete possession of Savoy (November–December).

On the Alps as in the Netherlands, the allies had, therefore, not only failed in their designs, they had lost important positions. The Duke of Savoy, reduced to the defence of his Italian possessions, had no longer an inch of territory on the French side of the Alps.

On the frontier of Spain, the Duke de Noailles, with a small army of ten thousand men, took Urgel and made incursions on the confines of Catalonia and Aragon. At the other extremity of the Pyrenees, towards the Bidassoa, the war was not felt: a local truce had been agreed upon for the Basque country and Navarre. The maritime cities of Spain, after the fortified towns of the Netherlands and the Rhine, had to undergo the cruel system of bombardment. Victor-Marie d'Estrées, with the galleys of Toulon and some vessels and galliots, was dispatched to throw eight hundred bombs into Barcelona and two thousand into Alicante (July), these two cities having been unwilling to purchase exemption. It was imagined that Barcelona would be brought to revolt by bombarding it; the only effect was to efface what remained of its ancient sympathy for France.

The allies succeeded nowhere but in Ireland. Louis XIV., however, seeing that the Irish continued to defend themselves after being deserted by their King, had begun again to aid them. Our squadrons, at different times, had carried them many officers, engineers, artillerists, with cannon, munitions, arms, and even horses, and finally a general to direct the use of all these resources. Louis was not fortunate in the generals that he sent to Ireland. Lauzun had succeeded very ill the preceding year. The new chief that was sent, Saint-Ruth, reckoned as his principal military title that he

had been one of the most implacable executioners of the dragoonades. He had scarcely entered upon a campaign at the head of the Irish army, when he allowed the English to carry the strong position of Athlone by assault, almost under his own eyes (July 10). The Dutch General Ginkell, who commanded in Ireland for King William, crossed the Shannon and invaded Connaught, the refuge of the insurrection. Saint-Ruth, instead of harassing the enemy and disquieting him by diversions, as the Irish chiefs advised him, accepted battle near Aghrim. Ginkell opened the attack without hesitation; he had but twenty thousand men against twenty-five thousand; but the Protestant troops were much better disciplined and more accustomed to service than their adversaries. The Irish were defending themselves valiantly in a good position, when a ball struck Saint Ruth. Sarsfield, commandant of the reserve, receiving no orders, and ignorant of his chief's death, did not charge in time on a column of the enemy that was turning the Irish army. The position was carried, and the Irish broken with a loss incomparably greater than at the Boyne (July 22). Galway, the most important town of Connaught, surrendered without much resistance. William created the French refugee Ruvigni, to whom belonged the leading part in the victory of Aghrim, Earl of Galway; he was the elder brother of Ruvigni de Caillemotte, killed at the Boyne. The son of Schomberg had already been created Duke of Leinster.

Ginkell marched on Limerick, whither the remnants of the Irish forces had retired. The besieged were still nearly equal in number to the besiegers; but their constancy was shaken by ill-fortune, and Limerick was not so energetically defended as in the preceding year. At the end of a month's siege, the Irish entered into negotiation with Ginkell, and the parleys ended in a general capitulation for the whole force. General Ginkell and the two lord-judges of Ireland, on the part of King William, guaranteed to the Irish Catholics the liberties which they had enjoyed in the time of Charles II. All the Irish of the Jacobite party, who had not been condemned by name, were to recover their property and their privileges, on condition of acknowledging William and Mary; the lord-judges were to endeavor to obtain the abrogation of condemnations already pronounced. Such of the defenders of Limerick and other posts still occupied by the Jacobites, as were unwilling to submit to these conditions, were to be transported, with arms, baggage, and horses, on English ships, to whatever foreign country it might suit them to retire (October 13).

Scarcely had the capitulation been signed when a French squadron appeared at the mouth of the Shannon. Its arrival some hours sooner would perhaps have changed the face of events. The squadron could only witness the execution of the treaty, and escort as far as Brest the ships that bore to France such of the Irish as were more attached to their party than their native soil. A whole army went into exile amidst the most heart-rending scenes.[1] Ten or twelve thousand Irishmen went to enter the pay of the King of France, by the side of five or six thousand of their countrymen who were already in the service of Louis XIV. The Irish Catholic emigration thus filled the void in our armies made by Protestant emigrants, — sad vicissitudes of persecution and conquest! From this epoch dates the establishment between France and Ireland of ties analogous to, but more extensive than those formerly existing between Ireland and Spain.

The reverses of Ireland were not compensated for, as the year before, by brilliant maritime successes; yet the naval campaign was again advantageous to the French. The allies had profited by the terrible lesson of Beachy-Head: they had exerted themselves to be superior at any cost, and had collected nearly ninety men-of-war under command of Admiral Russel, Herbert having been disgraced for his double defeat at Bantry Bay and Beachy-Head. Tourville had only sixty-nine ships: he had orders to avoid an engagement and to cruise at the entrance of the Channel to intercept the rich Anglo-Batavian merchant-fleet on its return from Smyrna. Admiral Russel succeeded in saving the Smyrna fleet; but Tourville took an English mercantile flotilla on its way to the West Indies under the escort of two men-of-war, and, after fifty days' cruise on the ocean, he returned successfully to Brest, whilst Russel encountered a tempest that destroyed two of his ships and seriously damaged many others.[2]

The French privateers had continued their daring exploits. Jean Bart, who, presented to the King, astonished the court by his rude simplicity as much as he had astonished France by his heroism, reached the summit of his renown: blockaded in the harbor

[1] General Sarsfield had promised to take the wives and children of the soldiers. So great a number presented themselves that the promise could not be kept, and most of the families were left on the shore. Women were seen seizing hold of the ropes of the ships that bore away their husbands, and allowing themselves to be dragged into the sea. A terrible and savage shriek rung from the whole shore, and shook the nerves of the most implacable of the Puritan conquerors. See Macaulay, *William III.*, Vol. II. c. 8.

[2] *Mém. de Villette*, p. 105. E. Sue, t. IV. p. 144.

of Dunkirk, with seven frigates and a fire-ship, by thirty-five or forty vessels of the enemy, he ran the blockade, traversed all the northern seas, and took three men-of-war and a great number of English and Dutch merchant-vessels. A new hero began to promise a rival to Jean Bart: a young man, twenty years old, Duguai-Trouin, of Saint-Malo, who already showed not only a valor equal to every emergency, but a true maritime genius.

There was nothing decisive in all this. Both Louis XIV. and the Coalition made immense preparations in the winter of 1691–1692. These were no longer directed, in France, by the formidable man who had so long been the soul of the military administration. The two ministers, in whom the double war on land and sea had been personified, had disappeared a few months apart!

The influence of Louvois had rapidly declined of late. Everything had contributed to this; the atrocious severities, the crimes, it must be said, into which he had drawn Louis XIV., and which weighed on the conscience of the monarch, the outbursts of passion that he could no longer restrain in the presence of Louis, and which sometimes went to the extent of insolence, the deplorable war with Piedmont brought on by unheard-of proceedings, which, it is said, had gone so far as to suppress the letters of the Duke of Savoy to the King; finally, perhaps more than all the rest, the enmity of Madame de Maintenon and the obstinacy of the minister in not bending before this modestly encroaching authority. During the summer of 1691, an outbreak had become imminent. We are assured that the King entertained the thought of treating Louvois like Fouquet. The minister, by certain indications, felt that his ruin was approaching, and did not conceal from his familiar friends the agonies that tormented him. July 16, while at work with the King in the apartment of Madame de Maintenon, he felt himself seized with a sudden illness; the King sent him home. Scarcely had he entered when the oppression increased; he caused himself to be bled, but too late; a few moments after, he expired!

An accusation of poisoning did not fail to be raised, as in the case of all sudden deaths of great personages. The Duke of Savoy was suspected of having caused Louvois to be poisoned, as Louvois himself had been suspected of having caused the poisoning of Seignelai. There was no other poison than apoplexy, a malady quite in harmony with the sanguine and muscular temperament of the Le Telliers, which carried off most of the members of that family.[1] Louis did not sufficiently conceal his satisfaction at being

[1] *Journal de Dangeau*, t. I. p. 373. St. Simon, t. XIII. p. 54. St. Simon's taste

freed from him, and suffered a too characteristic saying to escape him! "This year," he said, "has been a fortunate one for me: it has rid me of three men whom I could no longer endure, — Louvois, Seignelai, and La Feuillade!" La Feuillade had wearied him by the excess of his flatteries, as the two others by the greatness of their services. His pride, increased by all that the other passions of his youth had lost, persuaded him that no one could be necessary to him.[1] All about him did not think the same; although no one loved Louvois, many were terrified to see that powerful administrator disappear in the midst of such a war, and foresaw the impossibility of replacing him!

Louvois, in fact, would have been a perfect minister, had the King known how to prevent his being anything else than minister of war. As great an administrator as detestable a statesman, in the spirit of order, organization, economy, in the art of combining movements of masses with mathematical precision, and assuring the means of their action and subsistence, he has never been equalled. We have seen, in the course of this history, the immense evil that he did by going out of his sphere. In the circle of his duties, in addition to the customary administrative action, he had realized fundamental reforms that coincided with the institutions of Colbert, and were only the application of what was soundest in the personal views of the King.[2] He had introduced into the army unity and equality in the presence of a common rule: it is only necessary to cite, for all eulogy, the bitter complaints of the feudal Saint-Simon. The King and Louvois, said Saint-Simon, had arranged matters so well that every man of quality, old enough to serve, dared not defer to enter the service. "This was an adroit means to accustom the nobles to equality, and to mingle pell-mell with everybody. They were thus broken of the habit of thinking that there were people born to command others." All the people of quality, "without other exception than that of princes of the blood, were required to begin as cadets in the life-guards (a school subsequently changed into that of musketeers): they were there compelled to be confounded with all sorts of people and all classes, and this was what the King expected from this novitiate." Up to the grade of colonel, advancement had no fixed rule;[3] beyond this grade, Louvois had established what was called

for tragic mysteries cannot be too much mistrusted. Louvois was born January 18, 1641, and died at the age of fifty.

[1] *Mém. de Choisi*, p. 624. *Mém. de Saint-Simon*, t. XIII. p. 45.

[2] See Vol. I. ch. III. § 1.

[3] The inferior grades had, since 1661, for the most part, depended on the colo-

the order of the roll (l'ordre du tableau), that is to say, advancement, except for very extraordinary deeds, was according to age, which took away all privilege from favor or birth. "All the nobles are in the crowd of officers of all kinds; hence, by degrees, that forgetfulness, of all and in all, of all personal difference and origin, to exist no longer but in that state of military service become *popular*. Great and small are forced to enter and to persevere in the service, *to be there a low people in full equality*." [1]

There is no need of insisting on the bearing of such a system: only it must be acknowledged that it went beyond its aim. To establish unity and equality in the service and in advancement at the expense of aristocracy and favoritism, was excellent; but to take all spontaneity from generals-in-chief, in order to annihilate their influence over the army and to insure their absolute dependence on the minister, was excessive and dangerous: Louvois went so far as to apply the principle of *the order of the roll* to subaltern commands in time of war; the general-in-chief had no longer the liberty to choose the general and superior officers to whom he intrusted detachments and expeditions: each officer had the right to march in his turn.[2] This was suppressing emulation and discouraging talent; it was slighting natural or acquired superiority after having destroyed artificial superiority. Pains was taken to reduce the military organization to a purely mechanical order; this has been, in general, the great and formidable peril of the modern unity that has replaced the unregulated and diffuse life of the Middle Ages.

The King filled the place of Louvois with his second son, the Marquis de Barbezieux, a young man of twenty-four, or rather he made himself minister of war, for he enjoined the generals to address their dispatches henceforth directly to him. By a singular inconsistency, Louis XIV. reëstablished, for the interest of his secretaries of state, that hereditability of office which he had proscribed in military governments. The system had succeeded twice,

nels, who proposed the officers to the minister: the establishment of military inspectors took away this authority from the colonels, and put the regiments more immediately under the hand of the minister and his bureaus.

[1] *Saint-Simon*, t. XIII. p. 67.

[2] These commands, according to the order of names on the roll, had already been in use, and Turenne caused them to be replaced by the free choice of the general-in-chief. See *Éloge de M. de Turenne*, by Saint-Évremont. Saint-Simon is right on this point and also against the picked corps of the King's household, and the companies of soldier-officers, — a nursery of general officers who did not understand their business, since they never had performed the duties of any but inferior officers. Let us not forget, before leaving Louvois, that he founded the *depôt of war* in 1688.

with the sons of Le Tellier and Colbert, with Louvois and Seignelai, and had suffered no exception except in the case of the son of Lionne, rejected for his notorious incapacity. The eldest son of Louvois was also rejected for the same reason, but in behalf of his younger brother, an energetic and active young man, but as presumptuous as insufficient for so great a charge. Louis liked young ministers, because he believed that he *formed* them. He pretended to create everything about him, men as well as things. He thought that he had made Louvois and Seignelai, and regretted, so to say, having succeeded too well! After Louvois, he had no longer a superior minister and was no longer governed by any minister; but the double influence, at first allied, then rival, of Maintenon and the confessor, was proportionally augmented.

The peoples that looked upon Louvois as the genius of devastation, conceived some hope of peace at the report of his death. It was known that Sweden, in the autumn of 1690, had offered her mediation to the Emperor and to Holland. Pope Alexander VIII. had already terminated his ephemeral pontificate (February 1, 1691), in conformity with the hopes of those who had elected him on account of his advanced age, and he had been succeeded, July 12, by Cardinal Pignatelli, who took the name of Innocent XII.; although the name of Innocent was of bad augury for France, the new Pope showed a lively desire for general peace, and addressed, at the close of the year, two briefs in this sense to the Emperor and to the King of Spain. The two chiefs of the House of Austria responded by recriminations, sharply accusing the King of France, and revendicating the treaties of Westphalia and the Pyrenees. A great victory gained, August 19, at Salankement, by Prince Louis of Baden over the Turks, made Leopold more obstinate than ever, although this dearly purchased victory had had no important results.

Whilst the Pope was taking this useless step, Louis XIV., on his side, had secretly offered to the Duke of Savoy virtually to restore all the territory he had taken from him, by giving up, till a general peace, Nice and Villafranca to the keeping of the Swiss, Montmeillan, Susa, and even Casale to the keeping of the Pope or of Venice, Italy resuming neutrality (December, 1691). This surprising moderation indicated a change of system.[1] Nevertheless, however advantageous these propositions might be, by which Louis repaired the offences of Louvois and renounced such useful conquests, the Duke of Savoy refused to abandon the offensive policy

[1] *Mém. de Catinat*, t. II. p. 66.

of his allies. The House of Austria persisted in its desire to attack France on the southeast, and moreover saw in the war of the Alps a chance to rule and levy contributions on the Italian States.

Louis on one side, and his enemies on the other, thought no longer but of efforts to make the campaign that was about to open decisive. Gigantic levies had exhausted all our provinces. The French armies counted, or were reckoned to count, at the commencement of 1692, nearly four hundred and fifty thousand men, and the navy one hundred thousand.[1] The marine, royal, merchant, and privateer, had fourteen thousand six hundred and seventy guns; the army had six hundred and thirty in the field and ten thousand either in reserve or employed in the armament of fortified places. The like had never been seen; all France, so to say, was turned into an army.

The allies had made proportional efforts. A general impressment of sailors had been ordered in England. William, who had again obtained from Parliament nearly three and a half millions sterling, wished to attack in his turn the north of France by land and sea, whilst the Duke of Savoy, powerfully reinforced, should attack Dauphiny and finally determine the still hoped-for uprising of the Protestants of the South. Louis had a plan not less energetic: he had resolved, at least at the outset, to stand on the defensive in Germany, Piedmont, and Catalonia, and to direct the whole weight of his forces against the Catholic Netherlands by land, and by sea against Great Britain. The diversion in Ireland having failed, Louis wished to make an effort to attack England without and within. James II., who had turned to so little advantage the first aid granted by the King of France, saw therefore in preparation a much more powerful assistance, and obtained what had been refused him after the days of the Boyne and Beachy-Head, — an army to invade England. News received from that country explained this change in the conduct of Louis. The opinion of James at Versailles was no better than in the past; but England was believed to be on the eve of counter-revolution, which it would be sufficient to aid with a vigorous and sudden blow. One of those changes in public opinion, more demonstrative than serious, which always follow the material sufferings caused by revolutions, was manifesting itself among the English; William

[1] About 10,000 in the crews of galleys therein comprised. The active army numbered 807,000 men; the reserve, in fortified places, about 140,000. The cavalry reached the number of 100,000 horses. See the table inserted in t. I. of the *Mém. de Catinat*, p. 401.

himself, discontented with the exactions of the Whigs, and unwilling to sink to the rôle of a party-leader, which they endeavored to impose on him, had dissolved the House of Commons, made overtures to the Tories, and aided them to obtain a majority in the new Parliament that he convoked in 1690; the Jacobites hoped that the Tories would return to them by the force of a common principle, the Jacobites being only Tories faithful to logic; the Whigs, on their side, irritated by what they called the ingratitude of William, clamored against his system of vibration and corruption, and complained that they had gained nothing important by a change of king. Many eminent personages, among the Whigs as well as among the Tories, among others the Duke of Marlborough (Churchill), had opened a secret correspondence with the royal exile at Saint-Germain. James had secret adherents in the English fleet which he had so long commanded before reigning, and believed himself able to count on Rear-Admiral Carter and even on Admiral Russel. Louis gave himself up to excessive confidence in the result of these plots, and arranged his plan of naval operations accordingly. An army of thirty thousand men, with five hundred transports, was assembled on the coast of Normandy, the greater part at La Hogue and Cherbourg, the rest at Havre: this was composed of all the Irish troops, a number of Anglo-Scotch refugees, and a corps of French troops. Marshal de Bellefonds commanded under King James. Tourville was to set out from Brest in the middle of April with fifty ships of the line, enter the Channel, attack the English fleet before it could be reinforced by the Dutch, and thus secure the invasion. Express orders were sent to him to engage the enemy "whatever might be his numbers." It was believed that half of the English fleet would go over to the side of the allies of its king. The landing effected, Tourville was to return to Brest, to rally there the squadron of Toulon, sixteen vessels strong, and the rest of our large ships, then to hold the Channel during the whole campaign.

They had reckoned without the elements, which, hitherto hostile to the enemies of France, this time turned against her. Tourville was retained nearly a month by adverse winds in the waters of Brest, and even failed to see himself reinforced by the squadrons of Toulon and Rochefort. Victor-Marie d'Estrées, who was in charge of the squadron of Toulon, did not quit that port till the beginning of May; on the 18th, in the Straits of Gibraltar, he encountered a tempest that wrecked two vessels and injured the rest, and did not appear on our western coasts till after the fortune

of the campaign was decided. As to the squadron of Rochefort, its armament, still incomplete through the negligence of the administration, retarded it quite as much as the winds: Tourville, judging that the same winds that arrested the French must have facilitated the junction of the allies, asked the minister to change his plans and to leave him at Brest till the fleet should be complete. "It is not for you," answered Pontchartrain, "to discuss the orders of the King; it is for you to execute them and to enter the Channel; send me word whether you are willing to do it; if not, the King will put some one in your place more obedient and less circumspect than you." The bureau of the marine exceeded the minister: Tourville having complained that the powder was bad and would not carry the ball, a clerk replied to the admiral, "that, if he found that the powder did not carry far enough, he had only to approach nearer to the enemy."[1] The clerk doubtless thought himself a hero after this brilliant sally. Unfortunately a board of admiralty had not been organized among us. The great ministers having once disappeared, the reign of bureaus remained; obscure handlers of dusty papers, under the orders of a secretary of state as ignorant as they, dictated the law to the most illustrious captains. The evil did not appear so quickly in the war on land, because there the King was not ignorant, if the minister was; the King had the special knowledge of a good chief of staff; but in matters pertaining to the sea, Louis knew no more than Pontchartrain;[2] yet he left to the new secretary of state the same authority over the admirals that the two Colberts had had.

Tourville obeyed. The wind having abated without changing direction, he set sail with only thirty-seven ships out of the seventy-eight that, according to the estimates,[3] were to be sent to sea. The wind rose afresh and arrested him again nearly a fortnight between the Cape of Cotentin and that of Devonshire. During this time, Louis XIV. received advice that the Jacobite plot had been discovered, that Marlborough and other important personages had been arrested, and that the English and Dutch fleets had effected their junction. He sent to Marshal de Bellefonds to dispatch corvettes without delay in all directions

[1] Valincourt, *Mémoire sur la marine*, prefixed to the *Mém. de Villette*, p. LVII. Sainte-Croix, *Puissance navale de l'Angleterre*, t. II. p. 40.

[2] See the singular anecdote related by Valincourt, p. LVIII., as little creditable to the understanding of the Duke de Beauvilliers as to the nautical knowledge of Louis XIV.

[3] *Mém. de Catinat*, t. I. p. 401.

to notify Tourville to fall back on Ushant and await the other squadrons.

It was too late. The corvettes did not meet Tourville, who at this moment was advancing on the Cape of Barfleur (or of Gatteville). May 29, at daybreak, between the Capes of La Hogue and Barfleur, Tourville found himself in presence of the allied fleet, the most powerful that had ever appeared on the sea. He had been joined by seven ships from the squadron of Rochefort, and numbered forty-four vessels against ninety-nine, seventy-eight of which carried over fifty guns, and, for the most part, were much larger than a majority of the French.[1] The English had sixty-three ships and four thousand guns; the Dutch, thirty-six ships and two thousand six hundred and fourteen guns; in all, seven thousand one hundred and fifty-four guns; the French counted only three thousand one hundred and fourteen. The allied fleet numbered nearly forty-two thousand men; the French fleet less than twenty thousand.

Tourville assembled a council of war on board his ship. All the general officers were of the opinion that a battle should be avoided. Tourville exhibited the King's order. Each was silent, and a few moments afterwards the French fleet bore down under full sail on the immense mass of the enemy, which seemed ready to swallow it up at the first shock. The allies could not believe their eyes.

The two fleets were, according to custom, divided into three squadrons. Each of the squadrons of the Anglo-Batavian fleet would now pass for a great fleet! Each squadron was subdivided into three divisions. Tourville, with his main body, pushed directly for Admiral Russel, who commanded the centre of the allies. The two admirals remained some time in presence of each other within musket-shot without firing, in solemn silence; then a vessel of the Dutch squadron, which formed the enemy's vanguard, having opened the cannonade, the two entire lines, in an instant, followed. The contest was terrible, especially in the centre. The English, who had thirty-one vessels there against sixteen, furiously turned on the flag of the French admiral, and Tourville had to sustain the fire of five or six vessels at once. In the mean time, the English

[1] Tourville, subsequent to 1690, in accordance with a decision suggested by Petit-Renau to the board of naval constructions, no longer used in the line ships of less than fifty guns, which were reserved for convoys and cruising. The English did the same after 1692. See Sainte-Croix, *Histoire de la puissance navale de l'Angleterre*, t. II. p. 408. It appears that only eighty-eight vessels of the enemy, out of ninety-nine, took part in the action; the others did not join the fleet till the next day.

rear-guard, commanded by Vice-Admiral Ashby, broke through the division of Pannetier, which held the extremity of the French rear-guard, and turned the rest of this rear-guard. The French fleet seemed lost. Fortunately, the major part of Ashby's squadron persisted in pursuing four or five ships of Pannetier, instead of turning *en masse* upon the main body of the French; the commander of the French rear-guard, Gabaret, held his ground against the rest of Ashby's squadron, and the third division of the rear-guard went, without command, to the aid of Tourville. This was led by Coëtlogon, who had been for twenty years the brother in arms, the faithful mate,[1] of Tourville. Coëtlogon wished to save his chief or die with him. His vigorous attack not only disengaged Tourville, but helped him to force the squadron of Russel to give way, superior as it was in number. A large English vessel was burned. The rising of a thick fog caused the fire to be for some time suspended or relaxed. Gabaret, with the division of the rear-guard that was left him, profited by it to fall back in the rear of Tourville's squadron. The French fleet cast anchor. The squadron of Lord Russel not having done so, drifted some distance. The main body of Ashby's squadron abandoning, meanwhile, the pursuit of Pannetier, who had fallen back on the French vanguard, returned and cast anchor in the rear of Tourville and Gabaret, and the fire was resumed sharply at this point; fortunately, the squadron of Russel could not immediately approach for the purpose of crushing the French between it and Ashby. As to the Dutch squadron, with thirty-six vessels against fourteen, it had, from the beginning of the battle, been held in check by the French vanguard, thanks to the skill with which Lieutenant-General d'Amfreville had kept the windward. Perhaps, too, the Dutch fought somewhat faintly, still feeling rancor on account of having been sacrificed, as they said, at Beachy-Head. Night approached; Ashby was uneasy at seeing himself separated from the rest of the fleet; he resolved to rejoin Russel, and to open a passage among the French ships. He succeeded in this, but lost a vessel, eight fire-ships, and his rear-admiral, Carter, who had promised James II. to abandon William, and at the same time betrayed to William the secret of the plot. The English relinquished by this manœuvre the immense advantage of holding their adversaries between two fires.

This great day thus terminated without any disadvantage to those who had fought almost one against two. The enemy had lost two vessels; the French not a single one. In the night the

[1] Ships that fight side by side are called each other's (*matelots*) mates.

French fleet set sail. May 30, at break of day, Tourville rallied around him thirty-five vessels. The other nine had strayed, five towards La Hogue, four towards the English coast, whence they regained Brest. If there had been a naval port at La Hogue or at Cherbourg, as Colbert and Vauban had desired, the French fleet would have preserved its laurels!

There was no place of retreat on all that coast. The fleet of the enemy advanced in full force. It was impossible to renew the prodigious effort of the day before. Tourville and his lieutenants decided to pass through the Race of Alderney in order to gain sea-room on the enemy and return to Brest. They therefore entered this Race or channel between the coast of Cotentin and the isles of Alderney and Guernsey. June 31, in the morning, twenty-two vessels left the Race without hindrance, and went to seek an asylum at St. Malo. The last thirteen, retarded by the injuries they had received, were too late for the tide. They attempted to cast anchor; the bottom was bad; the anchors broke; the currents bore them to the lee of the enemy. Three of them ran aground at Cherbourg; one of the three was the magnificent flag-ship, *The Royal Sun*, of one hundred and six guns, which Tourville had abandoned the day before, transferring his flag to a less injured ship. The remaining ten, among which was the new flag-ship, doubled Cape Barfleur and anchored in the night at La Hogue. They were there joined by two of the fire-ships that had arrived the day before in these roads. The other three of these five, not having been injured, sailed north to make the circuit of the British isles for the purpose of returning to Brest. Tourville judged that he could not follow them, without delivering his unrigged and anchorless ships to the enemy, who was already in sight. He had wished to throw the guns overboard, to run the ships aground, to evacuate them and defend them with coast-batteries and stockades, under the protection of the forts constructed by Vauban at La Hogue. King James and Marshal de Bellefonds, who were on the coast with troops and transports, opposed it, and Bellefonds promised a hundred well-armed shallops to aid in defending the ships. He did not keep his word: the King and the Marshal lost thirty-six hours without making any use of the vast resources in their possession. June 2, it was learned that the three vessels run aground at Cherbourg, assailed by seventeen English vessels and eight English fire-ships, had been burned after a heroic resistance, and that two of the three had blown up with a part of their crews. Bellefonds finally consented to the evacuation of

twelve vessels; but it was too late to bring them near land; most of the crews were saved; Tourville made, with fifteen shallops, a desperate attempt to save the vessels; but what could he do against a hundred and fifty shallops and a force of fire-ships, sustained by the whole fleet of the enemy? The English burned, on the evening of June 2, six ships run aground near the isle of Tatihon, and the next morning the other six, under the fort of La Hogue. The three hundred transports, destined for the embarkation of the *Jacobite* army, which the ebb-tide left on the strand, were for the most part preserved, as the ships would probably have been if Tourville had been able to follow his inspiration. James II. had reason to say that *his unlucky star* everywhere shed a malign influence around him;[1] but this influence was only that of his blindness and incapacity.

Such was that disaster of La Hogue, which has left among us such a fatal renown, and the name of which resounds in our history like another Agincourt or Cressy. Historians have gone so far as to ascribe to this the destruction of the French navy. The facts that will be exhibited in the course of our work will do justice to this assertion. La Hogue was only a reprisal for Beachy-Head. The French did not lose in it a vessel more than the allies had lost two years before, and the fifteen vessels destroyed were soon replaced. The loss of the French was not more than eighteen hundred men killed or disabled; the English lost more, without counting the Dutch. The exaggerated notions that were formed of this catastrophe pertained to two causes: first, to the effect produced on the imagination of a people so accustomed to conquer, that a defeat seemed to them a monstrous phenomenon, and, later, to the maritime decline which was brought about by administrative, and in no way by military causes.[2]

The admiration expressed by the sailors of the enemy for the sailors of France[3] was already a moral compensation for our reverses. The war on the Continent offered a more positive compensation. William III. was not so fortunate as his admirals.

William, having arrived at the Hague from England in the month of March, had begun with an important political measure. Spain,

[1] *Lettre à Louis XIV.*, ap. E. Sue, t. IV. p. 227.

[2] L. Guérin, t. II. pp. 48–63. *Mém. de Villette*, p. III. E. Sue, t. IV. p. 197. Sainte-Croix, t. II. p. 44. Quinci, t. II. pp. 577–590. Foucault, *à la suite des Mém. de Sourches*, t. II. p. 377. Macaulay (*William III.*, Vol. II. ch. 8) is not very accurate as far as Tourville is concerned; so complete in regard to the affairs of England, he is much less well informed as to the affairs of France.

[3] See the letter of Lord Russel to Tourville, in Sainte-Croix, t. II. p. 59.

seeing that the Catholic Netherlands were beginning again to fall to pieces, offered them to whomsoever might be able to defend them; she had offered the government of them to William himself. The heir of Philip II. offered Belgium to the descendant of William the Taciturn! William refused; the administration of a Catholic country would have cost him great embarrassment; he caused the design concerted, in 1685, between the two branches of the House of Austria to be resumed, and Belgium to be confided to the Elector of Bavaria; Germany was thus established in Belgium against France. William and the Elector of Bavaria set about collecting a great army in Brabant. The allies were once more anticipated, and the French were again first in motion, although much later than in the preceding year; the loss of Louvois began to make itself felt, and Madame de Maintenon, who would have rather that the King had never interrupted the habits of their common life and had renounced the life of camps, had at least induced him to take *the ladies*, — a rear-guard very cumbersome in warfare. In the night of May 24–25, several corps of French troops invested Namur. The 26th, the King arrived in camp, leaving the ladies at Dinant. Louis took command of the siege with over fifty thousand men, about twenty-three thousand of whom were horsemen. Luxembourg, posted on the Mehaigne, covered the siege with an army stronger by ten thousand men than that of the King, and numbering more than thirty thousand horsemen. Never had been seen, in our modern armies, such enormous masses of cavalry. Namur and its two fortresses were defended by more than nine thousand soldiers. From the 29th to the 30th of May, the trenches were opened before the city; June 5, the city capitulated; it was commanded by the hills on both banks of the Meuse and was not well fortified; it had not been bombarded. All the energy of the resistance was concentrated in the two fortresses situated on the rocks between the Sambre and the Meuse, and separated from the city by the Sambre. One of these forts, that on the west, called the New Fort or Fort William, had been built only the previous year by the celebrated Dutch engineer Cohorn, who defended it in person against Vauban. It was one of the brilliant spectacles of military history to see the two first engineers of Europe pitted against each other.

William III. advanced meanwhile, for the purpose of attempting to succor the fortresses. Although he had not yet received a part of his German auxiliaries, his forces were about seventy thousand men; but Luxembourg, reinforced by a heavy detachment from

the army of the King, barred his passage with eighty thousand soldiers, one half of whom were cavalry. It would have been necessary for him at the outset to cross the small river Mehaigne in presence of Luxembourg, then to cross the Sambre, between the army of Luxembourg and that of the King; this would have been hastening to certain destruction. He felt it and attempted nothing serious. During this time the army of the King, despite torrents of rain, energetically pressed the New Fort, which was compelled to surrender June 21; the heavy artillery directed by Vauban was irresistible. Cohorn marched out of his fort wounded, with sixteen hundred men that remained to him, and the honors of war. The external works of the Old Castle, situated between the New Fort and the city, were carried by assault some days afterwards, and the Old Castle capitulated June 30. Two thousand five hundred men marched out; the rest of the garrison had perished.[1]

The conquest of Namur assured to France that great angle, the point of which was formed by the Sambre and the Meuse, coming together at Namur, which plays so important a part in the wars of the Netherlands. By Namur, Brussels, Liege, and Maestricht were at once menaced.

It seems as if Louis XIV. ought not to have contented himself with this success; Namur and its forts occupied, Louis remained at the head of a hundred thousand men; he was able to march against William and to force him either to accept battle or to fall back on Brussels, abandoning Charleroi to the French. This conquest would have completed that of Namur; but the army had suffered much from the bad weather and the lack of forage. Louis was more repugnant than ever "to commit himself to a great event";[2] he moreover judged it necessary to detach troops to the coast to prevent enterprises by the conquerors of La Hogue, and desired to reinforce his army in Germany in order to put it in a condition to act on the other side of the Rhine; he feared that the Turks would make peace if France did not effect an important diversion in Germany. He therefore returned to Versailles, leaving to Luxembourg the army of the Netherlands reduced to seventy thousand men.

William was reinforced whilst the French were weakened: he was joined by seven or eight thousand soldiers of the Duke of Hanover, who, after having hesitated much to enter the Great Alliance, had decided to send all his troops against France and the

[1] *Relation de Louis XIV.*, in his *Œuvres*, t. IV. p. 341. This relation seems to have been written in the first intoxication of pride inspired by success. Saint-Hilaire, t. II. pp. 478–528. Quinci, t. II.

[2] *Mém. de la Fare*, p. 297.

Turks, in consideration of the promise obtained from the Emperor by William to erect his duchy into an electorate. William undertook to avenge his discomfiture at Namur; he made a feint of menacing Namur; Luxembourg, who was in the north of Hainault, threw in the direction of Namur twenty thousand men under command of Lieutenant-General Boufflers; then, undeceived by the movements of William, he recalled Boufflers; but, before the latter could rejoin the army, Luxembourg was surprised and attacked by his royal adversary under circumstances that recalled the combat of Saint-Denis-sous-Mons.[1] Luxembourg was off his guard, persuaded by the false report of a spy that William had quite another design than taking the offensive that day (August 3). William knew that the broken and confined ground occupied by the French, between Enghien and Steenkerke, did not allow them to deploy their formidable cavalry, and he counted on every advantage in an engagement of infantry wherein he would have a very great superiority of numbers. In fact, a brigade of infantry that formed the extreme right of the French camp gave way at the outset under an overwhelming fire and lost its position; fortunately William was retarded by obstacles that he had not foreseen, by ditches and fences. This brief respite sufficed for Luxembourg, enfeebled as he was at this moment by fever, to reorganize his battalions. The dragoons dismounted and supported the infantry. A furious battle raged along a front of half a league, over ground intersected by ravines and hedges, and confined between heavy forests and the small river Sennes. The French centre grew weak under the violence of the fire, the enemy emerged from the woods and seized a few pieces of cannon: the moment was critical; the Duke de Bourbon, grandson of the great Condé, the Prince de Conti, the Duke de Vendôme,[2] the young Duke de Chartres, nephew of the King (who was to be one day the Regent), dismounted, marched at the head of the French and Swiss guards, drove the enemy at the point of the sword and the pike, retook the lost artillery, wrested several cannons from the allies, and cut in pieces the brave Scotch infantry of William. On the right as on the centre, the French regained the advantage at the cost of rivers of blood; on the left, fortune was still very uncertain, when Boufflers began to debouch on the field of battle with his detached corps, and hurled his dragoons to the aid of the French left. The enemy finally yielded at all points and hastened his retreat through the defiles and forests;

[1] See Vol. I. p. 468.

[2] Son of the Duke de Vendôme-Mercœur and nephew of Beaufort, the hero of the Fronde.

night and fatigue prevented the French army from pursuing him. The loss was very great on both sides: fifteen or sixteen thousand dead or wounded, of which nearly seven thousand were Frenchmen, strewed the theatre of carnage; twelve or fifteen hundred prisoners remained in the hands of the conquerors.

The battle of Steenkerke had a very popular renown; for some time all the fashions were *à la Steinkerque*. It had shown that, in the French army, the infantry was equal to the cavalry; the infantry had had its turn in the action of Leuse. From this action dates the suppression of the clumsy match-lock, which was generally replaced by the flint-lock musket. These two weapons had for some time been used indiscriminately among the French infantry, and the allies had set us the example of almost entirely abandoning the match-lock.[1]

William succeeded but little better in profiting by the victory of La Hogue than in avenging the loss of Namur. The allies, after having caused the failure of the projected descent on England, had pretended, in their turn, to effect a descent on France, and to raise the Protestants of the West. The Duke of Leinster (Schomberg) and the Earl of Galway (Ruvigni) had embarked with an army-corps composed in part of refugees, and with very considerable resources in arms, equipments, and tools; but the wind, which had favored the allies at the beginning of the campaign, now kept them back. The summer was advanced; a council of war acknowledged the impossibility of attacking the coast with any chance of success, and the allied fleet, finally leaving the Channel, went to Ostend to land ten thousand soldiers, who, reinforced by a detachment from the army of William, succeeded in taking possession of Furnes. This was the whole result of this great effort. On the other side, scarcely had the allied fleet left the Channel, when the French began to take the sea, and ships and frigates, leaving Brest and Saint Malo, resumed cruising for fleets of merchantmen between

[1] (*Lettres militaires*, t. VIII. p. 181. Quinci, t. II. pp. 523–549. Saint-Hilaire, t. II. p. 41. La Hode, t. IV. p. 584. Berwick, t. I. p. 118.) Macaulay, *William III.*, Vol. III. ch. 1. Meanwhile a plot against the life of William concocted, by a Frenchman named Grandval, in Belgium, was discovered. Grandval, dragged before a court-martial, declared that it was the minister Barbezieux that had bribed him; that the deed had been premeditated in the lifetime of Louvois, and that he had had an audience with King James at Saint-Germain before setting out. He was hung, drawn, and quartered. The allies gave great publicity to this affair. The court of France kept silence. The allies thence concluded that Louis XIV. now tolerated a species of crime that he had lately repelled with indignation. He had not known it in advance; but he did not punish it afterwards. Barbezieux, whether guilty or not, kept his place. *Ibid.*

the coast of Spain and the British Islands. Five Dutch men-of-war were taken or sunk while defending the merchantmen that they were escorting. The privateers of Saint Malo deprived English commerce of many vessels. The English had moreover lost two men-of-war in a combat in the West Indies. The cry was raised throughout England: What is the use of gaining naval battles and ruining ourselves with naval armaments, if the French cannot be prevented from infesting the seas as if they had been the conquerors at La Hogue? [1]

It was because, in cruising warfare, the chances were not equal. The French, having, in comparison with their enemies, thanks to the vast development of their navy, little maritime commerce, but many sailors, gave the two commercial nations ten blows for one.

The war had continued to be of little importance in Germany. Marshal de Lorges, a general of little resolution and activity, knew not how to fulfil the intentions of the King, although the disunion and incapacity of the German princes that were opposed to him offered him many admirable opportunities. The Elector of Saxony having died at the close of the preceding campaign, his son, whose minister had been bought over, it is said, by Louis XIV., had contented himself with sending a feeble contingent to the army of the Rhine, instead of going in person with all his troops, as the Emperor expected. By this kind of defection, the Germans found themselves scarcely equal in number to the French (over thirty thousand men on each side), and inferior in quality of troops. Nevertheless, the war continued on the left bank of the Rhine, in the Palatinate, around the ruins of Speyer and Worms, till September. Towards the middle of this month, however, Lorges crossed the Rhine at Philippsburg, and marched to attack and disperse, near Pforzheim, a flying camp of six thousand horse, commanded by the prince-*administrator* (regent) of Würtemberg, who was taken. This success was not followed up.

Nothing worthy of remembrance took place on the side of the Pyrenees.

The Alps were the only point of the Continent where the allies obtained a temporary success. The defensive imposed on Catinat, with insufficient resources in equipage and materiel, had disastrous consequences. There is cause for astonishment at hearing insufficiency mentioned, after such enormous levies of men and horses; but Louvois's iron hand was no longer present to assure all the services with his mathematical precision. The financial distress

[1] Quinci, t. II. pp. 590–608. Macaulay.

also reacted on the armies, principally on that distant army which was sacrificed to the army of the Netherlands. Catinat, who, according to the estimates, was to have fifty thousand men, had not, at most, over thirty-eight thousand, ill provisioned and ill paid. He had received orders to limit his operations to covering Pignerol and Susa. The Duke of Savoy, who had from fifty-five to sixty thousand men, left a corps of observation before those two places and before Casale, and took thirty thousand men into Dauphiny by the passes of Var, Miraboue, and Argentière. The *barbets*, eager for vengeance, served him as guides through those dangerous passes of the Alps. The Duke, at the head of the principal corps, descended by the pass of the Var into the valley of Queiras, which opens on the Durance between Briançon and Embrun; he began the siege of Embrun, August 5. Three or four thousand men, regulars and militia, had been thrown into this small mountain city, and defended it with great energy. The place, although commanded by a neighboring mountain, only surrendered, August 19, for want of munitions. The vanguard of the allies the next day entered Gap, which it found evacuated by the inhabitants, and burned it. All the environs had been abandoned by order of the King, and were ravaged and burned in retaliation for the devastation of Piedmont and the Palatinate. Here, the progress of the allies was arrested. The Duke of Savoy was retained at Embrun by the small-pox; Catinat, who had proceeded to Grenoble, went to Pallons, on the Durance, above Embrun, to take an excellent position from which he at once covered Briançon and Grenoble and menaced the enemy's rear. The *new converts*, restrained by the militia, did not stir, although the Duke of Leinster (Schomberg) had accompanied the Duke of Savoy with four thousand refugees and Vaudois, and had issued in the name of William III. a proclamation, in which he called on the people to revolt. He assured them that William and his allies only wished to restore to the French nobility its ancient splendor; to the parliaments their primitive authority; to the people their just rights.[1] The popula-

[1] Hume, *William III. and Mary*, l. III. This was the language of the celebrated pamphlets entitled, *Soupirs de la France esclave qui aspire après sa liberté*, attributed to Levassor, an ex-oratorian, who had become Arminian and Anglican, and published in Holland, from 1688 to 1689, by Jurieu, who found any weapon good, provided it touched Louis XIV. These pamphlets, a singular mixture of free aspirations and retrograde tendencies towards an ill-known past, are especially characterized by that hatred of modern political and administrative unity which the Boulainvilliers and the Saint-Simons were soon to express with so much energy. To read them somewhat attentively suffices to show that they cannot be by Jurieu, except perhaps the last three or four of the fifteen. Jurieu would never have expressed

tion of Dauphiny rose, on the contrary, to repel the invasion, and harassed the aggressors by a partisan warfare directed by a young heroine whose name deserves to be preserved by history, Mademoiselle de La Tour-du-Pin.[1] The Duke of Savoy felt that he would be lost if he awaited the winter on this side of the Alps: he set out from Embrun on his return, still suffering greatly, September 16, after having dismantled this city, and reëntered Piedmont by the pass of Argentière, less difficult than those of the valley of Queiras. He only left a few troops in the valley of Barcelonnette, to keep possession of the pass of Argentière.[2]

The incursion of the allies on this side of the Alps had therefore no other material result than the devastation of a part of Upper Dauphiny; but it was to them a success of public opinion to have been able to penetrate into France; the defensive position to which the French had been reduced had finally put Italy at the discretion of the allies. The Emperor demanded that the princes and States of Upper Italy, Venice excepted, should furnish contributions and winter-quarters to the troops that he furnished to the army of the Duke of Savoy: these States would have gladly been exempted; and Genoa, despite her recent and terrible grievances against Louis XIV., had promised the French diplomatists to show an example of refusal. A Spanish squadron that suddenly entered the port of Genoa obliged the Genoese to revoke their resolution. Vice-Admiral d'Estrées returned too late from Brest, with the squadron of Toulon, to oppose the Spaniards.

In Hungary, the Imperialists had taken Great Warasdin; but, despite the efforts of English diplomacy, the Emperor had not been willing to propose reasonable conditions of peace, nor the Turks to accept the requirements of Leopold.

The important results of the campaign of 1692 may be summed up in a few words. Louis XIV. had made a new and profound encroachment on Belgium, but he had again lost the recently acquired maritime ascendency, with the hope of wresting the throne of England from his rival.

himself concerning the Roman Church as the author does in these pages that are still almost catholic, and the political and rationalistic spirit of these writings has nothing of his mystical and apocalyptical audacity. See, on this question, the *Dictionnaire des Anonymes*, by Barbier, art. JURIEU.

[1] The King gave her a pension as to a military chief, and, on her death, in 1708, had her portrait and coat-of-arms placed by the side of those of Jeanne Darc, at Saint-Denis. Nyons, her native place, has recently erected a monument to her (in 1844).

[2] *Mém. de Catinat*, t. II. p. 408. Saint-Hilaire, t. II. p. 72. Quinci, t. II. pp. 567–576.

France put herself in a condition to repair her naval losses, to push her advantages in the Netherlands, and to take the offensive in Germany and Catalonia: the allies prepared to defend the rest of Belgium, to menace the coasts of France, and to endeavor to close Italy to the French. Louis, in the autumn of 1692, created thirteen new regiments of infantry, several regiments of Alsacian militia, some independent companies, a regiment of hussars, an arm imported from Hungary, and raised new auxiliary troops in Switzerland. He had vessels enough constructed or repaired to make his fleet more powerful than before La Hogue, and, among others, caused four vessels to be built, the smallest of which was equal to *the Royal Sun*.[1] The Danes, despite their accession to the League of Augsburg, furnished him with materials, and even constructed ships for him. Financial distress urging the government to the deplorable expedient of selling regiments and companies, the King desired to compensate in some sort for this injustice towards capable and poor officers by a system of honorary rewards, and instituted the military order of Saint-Louis, by an edict of May 10, 1693. The order was composed of the King as grand master, the heir to the throne, the marshal, the admiral, the general of the galleys, eight grand crosses, twenty-four commanders, and an unlimited number of knights chosen from among officers having served ten years at least on land or sea, the latter to be in the proportion of at least one to eight. A dotation of three hundred thousand livres was effected to the order. Merit and services were the only conditions required. There was no question of birth. The order of Saint Louis was, therefore, a democratic creation in comparison with that of the Saint Esprit.[2]

The English Parliament, despite its discords, granted King William the largest subsidies that had ever been voted in England. The whole amount reached five million pounds sterling, more than two millions of which were for the army and artillery, and nearly two millions for the navy. Fifty-four thousand soldiers, thirty-four thousand of them for the war abroad, and thirty-three thousand sailors were to be maintained; moreover, Parliament consented to prorogue the agreement according to which England fur-

[1] *Mém. de Villette*, p. 144.

[2] *Anciennes Lois françaises*, t. XX. p. 181. Medals, moreover, were distributed, with ceremony, to simple marines and sailors who made themselves conspicuous for courage, and great crosses in copper, shaped like the crosses of St. Louis, were suspended from the masts of ships that had acquitted themselves well in battle, — a happy thought that made a profound impression on seamen, and personified the crew in the ship.

nished two thirds and Holland only one third of the pay of German troops in the Netherlands and of French refugees. This year marks an important date in the financial history of England: on one hand it was required that a great part of the resources (two million pounds sterling, or twenty-five millions of our livres) should be defrayed by a real-estate tax of twenty per cent. levied on the revenue of all estates without exception, according to the example that had been given by the republic under Cromwell; on the other hand, a loan was contracted of a million pounds sterling, which was the starting-point of the gigantic English debt.[1]

The French did not wait for spring to act. During the autumn of 1692, the greater part of the English troops that had taken Furnes had been cantoned in that city and Dixmude, and it was feared that the allies might make advance-posts of these two places against Dunkirk. December 28, Boufflers suddenly invested Furnes. The trenches were opened January 5, 1693; the next day, the Anglo-Batavian garrison, four thousand men strong, capitulated in order to avoid being made prisoners of war. Dixmude was evacuated without waiting for an attack. An enterprise undertaken about the same time against Rheinfels, by a corps of the army of Germany, was less fortunate; it was unable to carry this post, which would have cut off communications between Mayence and Coblentz.

These operations in mid-winter seemed to announce for 1693 a prompt and active campaign; nevertheless the great French army, the army of the Netherlands, did not assemble till the second fortnight in May. The King had resolved to besiege Liege. He was, as before Mons and Namur, to conduct the siege in person, while Luxembourg covered it. The two army-corps that were to serve under the King and under Luxembourg found themselves massed, May 27, in the environs of Mons. Louis had arrived at Quesnoy on the 25th, bringing with him *the ladies;* but there he was arrested for a week by a cold, and kept the army motionless, as if the investment of Liege could not take place without him. William III., who had formed his army in Brabant, profited by this delay: he threw fifteen or twenty thousand men into Liege and into the trenches that the allies had made on the heights commanding this great city; he then retired with the rest of his forces into an in-

[1] Macaulay, *William III.*, Vol. III. ch. 1. It is important to observe that the principle of equality in regard to taxation was not new in England, and that the *subsidies* voted by the old Parliament always had this basis. This was the true superiority of English parliaments over our States-General.

trenched camp, at the Abbey of Parck, near Louvain, from which he covered Brussels. The attack on Liege had become very difficult; but the position of William was perilous to the last degree. A party of German troops being still between the Rhine and the Meuse, he had at most but fifty thousand men in the camp of Parck, and Louis could march directly against him with a hundred and ten thousand. William could not have resisted a French army more than double his own and animated by the King's presence. The defeat of William would have delivered to the conqueror not only Liege, but Brussels and all the rest of the Catholic Netherlands. It was one of those occasions that fortune offers but once. The whole French army felt it, and trembled with impatience. Rejoined by Louis, June 3, it arrived, on the 7th, at Gembloux, almost equidistant from Mons, Liege, and Louvain, and only waited for the signal to march on the enemy, when, suddenly, the report was spread that the King was setting out on his return to Versailles, and was dividing the army for the purpose of sending a part of it to the Dauphin in Germany.

This incredible report was only too true: Luxembourg had, it is said, thrown himself at the feet of the King, beseeching him not to refuse the victory that was extending its arms to him; it was in vain: Louis's pretext was, as the year before after the taking of Namur, the necessity of reinforcing himself in Germany in order to encourage the Turks and to follow up beyond the Rhine the successes that Marshal Lorges was beginning to obtain. Strange calculation: he held in his hands the soul of the League and the fate of the war, and he let them go in order to seek afar doubtful and secondary successes. It was the third time, after 1676 and 1692, that Louis had shrunk from a decisive encounter with his rival, and this time without the least excuse. His military reputation was thus irrevocably and justly lost. Brave and persevering in siege-warfare, which leaves scarcely anything to the unforeseen, he was troubled and ceased to act as soon as he saw the chances of war in the field presented before him. His enemies thenceforth believed themselves authorized to represent him as a theatrical king, without talent and courage; the affection and respect of his own army were shaken; the railleries of foreigners concerning the *great King and his old mistress* were circulated through France, and libels against Louis and Madame de Maintenon soon came to be repressed by atrocious penalties.[1] The

[1] In 1694, a printer and a binder were hung, by the sentence of the lieutenant of police, La Reinie, for having printed, bound, and sold libels concerning the marriage

public voice had not been unjust in the affair of Louvain; it was indeed Madame de Maintenon who had prevailed against Luxembourg; the timid counsels that came from Namur, whither Louis had sent the ladies, had determined the deplorable resolution of the King. Louis, probably little satisfied with himself in his heart, appeared no more in the armies.[1]

If William, joined by the troops of Brandenburg and Jülich, had united all the forces that the allies possessed between the Meuse and the sea, he would in his turn have been superior by some thousands of men to the French; but he did not dare to withdraw the garrison from Liege, nor to leave Brussels unprotected. Luxembourg, who had kept more than eighty thousand soldiers, seemed to him still too formidable. Luxembourg, on his side, did not think himself able to attack William in his camp at Parck, and strove to draw him out by skilful manœuvres. Want of provisions crippled his operations for some time; the commissariat was no longer managed as in the times of Louvois. Luxembourg posted himself at Meldert, between Tillemont and Louvain, and from this point disquieted his adversary concerning Liege. William wished to divert the French from Liege, and dispatched towards French Flanders about fifteen thousand men, who forced the defensive lines drawn from the Scheldt to the Lys, between Espierre and Menin, which put the level country from Courtrai to the gates of Arras under contribution. Luxembourg, during this time, invested Huy with a strong detachment. The city and the two forts were taken in five days (July 19–24). Huy was the halting-place between Namur and Liege. Huy carried, Luxembourg marched on Liege with the whole of his army. William broke up his camp, advanced on the territory of Liege, and sent five thousand foot-soldiers to reinforce the corps that guarded the city; he then reëntered Brabant, for the purpose of regaining his camp at Parck.

Luxembourg did not give him time for this. He deceived William by feigning to send a part of his army to the aid of French

of the King and Madame de Maintenon. One of these libels was entitled, *L'Ombre de M. Scarron.* An engraving parodied the monument of the Place des Victoires. The King, instead of having four chained statues beneath his feet, was chained himself by four women, La Vallière, Fontanges, Montespan, and Maintenon. Several persons, for the same affair, were put to the question, or died in the Bastile. See *Bulletin bibliographique* of Techener, October, 1836; art. of M. J.-C. Brunet on the MS. journal of the Advocate Bruneau. About the same time a libellist, author of a pamphlet against the Archbishop of Rheims, Le Tellier, entitled, *Le Cochon mitré,* was shut up in an iron cage on Mount Saint-Michel.

[1] La Fare, p. 300. Feuquières, t. II. p. 200. *Œuvres de Louis XIV.*, t. IV. p. 401. Saint-Simon, t. I. p. 95. Racine, *Œuvres,* t. VI. p. 355. Quinci, t. II. p. 612.

Flanders, and, by a march as rapid as skilfully planned, he reached the enemy on the evening of July 28, at Neerwinden, between Saint-Tron and Tillemont. Out of eighty-five or ninety thousand men numbered by the allied army in the Netherlands, William, owing to his bad management, had scarcely more than fifty thousand at hand. There remained a chance to avoid a contest that had become unequal through his fault. He might, during the night, have retired behind the small river Gette. He would not do it, and used this delay of a few hours to intrench himself in the strongest manner possible.

His position, it is true, was very advantageous to defend. The allied army rested its right wing on the village of Neerwinden and the Gette, over which it had thrown bridges, and its left on the village of Neerlanden and the brook of Landen. The centre was covered by a long hillock that extended from one village to the other, along which the allies had cut a ditched intrenchment with surprising celerity. Behind this intrenchment the allies were almost sheltered from the cannon. The two villages bristled with abattis of trees; hedges, ditches, chance mounds of earth defended the approaches. Neerlanden was regarded as almost inaccessible: Luxembourg, on the morning of July 29, made a feigned attack on this side and directed all his energy against Neerwinden. The French cavalry took position in the centre, before the intrenchment of the enemy and between the two columns of infantry that attacked the villages. It was the most terrible contest of the whole war, even more terrible than Steenkerke. Neerwinden was twice taken and retaken with frightful carnage. The infantry on both sides struggled obstinately and furiously, whilst the French cavalry, motionless for four hours, received the fire of eighty pieces of cannon, plunging from the hill into the little plain, where its squadrons were in battle-array. It is said that William, astonished that the cavalry did not waver, ran to his batteries, complaining of the inaccuracy of his gunners' fire. When he saw the effect of his cannon, and the squadrons stirring only "to close up the ranks as fast as the files were cut down," he gave utterance to the exclamation of admiration and wrath: "Oh! the insolent nation!" [1]

Neerwinden remained in the enemy's power: the cavalry, finally let loose, had twice charged against the intrenchment on the hill without being able to carry it. Most of the generals counselled retreat; Luxembourg refused and threw the reserve on Neerwinden. The French and Swiss guards, and the rest of the infantry

[1] Saint-Simon, t. I. p. 111.

that had not been engaged, assaulted at once the village and the extremity of the intrenchment that terminated in it. During an hour and a half, success was still doubtful; when the French guards had exhausted their ammunition, they fixed their bayonets on the end of their guns and fought the enemy with steel alone. This is the first bayonet-charge remembered in our history.[1] Neerwinden, strewn with dead, finally remained in the hands of the French. The French guards then levelled the extremity of the enemy's intrenchment, on the right of Neerwinden, to open a passage for the cavalry; the household troops penetrated through this opening; they were at first repulsed by the enemy's cavalry, which was led by William in person and supported by the terrible fire of the infantry; but Luxembourg rallied them in a moment. Another corps of French cavalry passed between Neerwinden and the Gette, across hedges and ravines that William had believed impenetrable to horses, and took the allies in the rear. A corps that had remained at Huy arrived at this moment on the field of battle and supported the movement on the left of Neerwinden. The enemy's cavalry, charged in front and flank, broke; the whole right wing of the enemy was sabred, put to flight, or precipitated into the Gette. The remains of this wing reached Tillemont and Louvain. The wrecks of the left wing, evacuating Neerlanden, retired in tolerably good order, but not without cruel losses, on Leeuwen and Diest. The most moderate accounts put the loss of the enemy at ten or twelve thousand left on the battlefield, without reckoning all those that were drowned in the Gette; two thousand prisoners, seventy-six cannon, eight mortars or howitzers, more than eighty flags or standards, remained in the power of the conqueror. The chief of the refugees, Ruvigni, was found a moment among the prisoners: he was instantly released, and those who took him "pretended not to know him." The destroyers of the Edict of Nantes were thus spared a great embarrassment or an odious act the more.[2]

The French had probably lost almost as many as the enemy; however dear the victory of Neerwinden had cost, it was so great that the victorious general seemed able to undertake anything. Brussels,

[1] This was not yet, however, the modern bayonet. It was only a cutlass (*baynete*) which was pushed into the barrel of the gun after it was discharged: Vauban had not yet invented the adaptation of this blade to the barrel without obstructing the firing, that is to say, the union of the bayonet and the gun, and the mingling in a single arm of the pointed weapon and the firearm. Macaulay reports that the Scotch General Mackay had the same idea in 1689.

[2] Saint-Simon, t. I. p. 101. Saint-Hilaire, t. II. p. 96. Berwick, t. I. p. 119. Quinci, t. II. pp. 616–644. Macaulay, *William III.*, Vol. III. ch. 2.

dismayed, expected the French. William, on collecting the mutilated remains of his army, had scarcely thirty thousand men. It seemed as if Luxembourg had only to march on the capital of Belgium. He did not do it. He left William time to reorganize in Brussels, to receive succor there from Holland, and to recall the corps sent against French Flanders. The conduct of Luxembourg is not sufficiently explained. The army, it is said, lacked provisions; but, in the rich country of Brabant, this obstacle, doubtless, would not have proved insurmountable. Some contemporaneous memoirs charge Luxembourg with having wished to prolong the war: we hesitate to attach any importance to this commonplace imputation, successively repeated against so many celebrated generals: the glory of dictating peace at Brussels to the European Coalition would certainly have counterbalanced with Luxembourg the prolongation of his command. However this may be, during the whole month that followed the battle, the victorious army did nothing more than lay the fields and small towns of the territory of Liege, and Spanish and Dutch Brabant, under contribution; it was not till the 9th of September that the French invested, not Liege or Brussels, (there was no longer time for that,) but Charleroi. This city, fortified by Vauban while it was in possession of Louis XIV., was better defended than any other place of the allies had been; the garrison did not surrender till October 11, when it found itself reduced from four thousand five hundred men to twelve hundred.

This was not a sufficient result of the victory of Neerwinden, nor especially of the vast display of force exhibited by Louis XIV. at the beginning of the campaign. It seems as if the results diminished in proportion to the increase of the armies. The time was far distant when Turenne obtained such prodigious successes with twenty or thirty thousand men! Charleroi, however, was not a conquest to be despised; it secured the other conquests by completely freeing the country of the Sambre and the Meuse, and by connecting Mons and Namur. All the Walloon part of the Spanish Netherlands, except the single city of Ath, was in the hands of the French.

It was, as has been said, with the hope of enabling his son to make a decisive campaign in Germany, that Louis XIV. had suffered the entire conquest of Belgium to escape from his hands. The campaign in Germany was as fruitless as usual. Marshal de Lorges had begun his operations on the right bank of the Rhine with a fine army of forty-five thousand men, one half of them cavalry. He had taken Heidelberg by assault, May 22: the unfortunate city, still

charred from the flames of 1689, was given up to pillage and conflagration a second time. The whole population was expelled without provisions and almost without clothing. The castle, or rather its remains, surrendered almost without striking a blow, and the French added ruin to ruin by destroying everything in the shape of fortifications that the allies had reëstablished. The rapacity of the soldiers added new horrors to these scenes of destruction: the tombs of the Electors-Palatine were ransacked in search of treasures, and their remains cast to the winds. Lorges then abandoned this pile of ruins. The King supposed that he would make use of his superiority to take Heilbronn, and attack or drive to a distance Prince Louis of Baden, without leaving time to Prince Louis to receive numerous reinforcements that were on the march.[1] Lorges found difficulties in everything and did nothing, till the junction with the Dauphin, who brought twenty thousand men from Flanders. There was no greater activity after the junction: the Neckar was crossed; the camp was threatened where the Prince of Baden had collected, near Heilbronn, all his forces, very inferior to those of the French; the position not being susceptible of attack in front, no attempt was made to turn it, and the only feat accomplished was the ravaging of Würtemberg. In the beginning of September some troops returned to the Netherlands; others were sent to Piedmont, and the Dauphin returned to join the King at Versailles: the campaign had not been more brilliant for the son than for the father.[2]

Although the year 1693 was disadvantageous to the personal glory of Louis XIV., who had lost a chance of terminating the war by a great triumph, it was far, however, from weakening the ascendency of French arms. France might have gained all; she gained something and took some steps in advance.

As in the preceding year, the enemy had taken the offensive on the side of the Alps. In the course of June, a Spanish corps, coming from Milanais, had begun to blockade Casale; in the latter part of July, the main body of the allied army, under the direction of the Duke of Savoy, marched on Pignerol. The Duke at first had designed to reënter Dauphiny by the valley of Barcelonnette, but the French had anticipated him: a corps detached by Catinat had just driven the Piedmontese from this valley, thus closing the

[1] The Elector of Saxony, shaken by French diplomacy, had been gained over anew by the Emperor, and had promised twelve thousand soldiers, in consideration of 400,000 rix-dollars, paid in part by England and Holland.

[2] *Lettres milit.*, t. VIII. pp. 198, 292, 317. Saint-Hilaire, t. II. p. 107. Quinci, t. II. pp. 646–662. Larrei, t. II. p. 185.

French frontier to foreigners. Catinat, recently made marshal of France,[1] protected Pignerol with an army very inferior to the enemy, and harassed by the *barbets*. The Duke attempted to turn him for the purpose of penetrating into Dauphiny or Savoy. Catinat retired on Fenestrelles, covering the frontier, but uncovering Pignerol. The Duke laid siege to Pignerol. Catinat confided in the good-will of the place and the courage of the garrison; the event justified him. Two long months passed away; Pignerol did not surrender; Catinat, motionless in his camp at Fenestrelles, was gradually reinforced there. September 27, he crossed the steep passes that separate the valley of the Clusone from that of the Petit-Dora, and moved from Fenestrelles to Bussolino, below Susa. The 29th, he entered Avigliana. The gendarmery (heavy picked cavalry), detached from the army of Germany, joined him October 1, and he descended into the plain of Piedmont with nearly forty thousand men, of whom at least fifteen thousand were cavalry. French partisans went to sack the *Finage* (a suburb) of Turin, and, by the express order of the King, to burn the beautiful *villa* of the Duke of Savoy, the Vénerie, to avenge the devastation of Upper Dauphiny, which had itself been only a revenge for the devastation of Piedmont.

The Duke of Savoy raised the siege of Pignerol too late to be able to regain Turin. The French were already between his army and his capital. He could neither avoid a combat nor choose his field of battle. October 3, the two armies were in presence of each other, near Marsaglia, between the two small rivers Cisola and Sangone. The Duke of Savoy might have strongly established his left by seizing the heights of Piosasco; he did not do it, knew no better how to support his right on the Sangone, and simply covered himself with a piece of woods that was not even impenetrable to cavalry. Catinat profited by this double fault and put himself in a position to overwhelm the enemy at once on both flanks. The next morning, October 4, the French opened the attack along the whole line. The centre of the enemy was protected by a long hedge and ditch: this obstacle was crossed by Catinat in person, whilst the right wing of the French turned the enemy's left, which was formed of Spanish troops. The infantry attacked squadrons and battalions with the bayonet, and without firing. It

[1] The King had made, March 27, seven marshals, among whom were Catinat and Tourville. Vice-admirals being superior to lieutenant-generals, without being equal to marshals of France, there was wanting in the navy a grade equivalent to the marshalship.

was the first time that infantry was known to charge cavalry instead of awaiting its shock. The glory of the French bayonet, which began at Neerwinden, was consummated at Marsaglia, even before the bayonet had received the final improvement that was to make the musket the best arm in the service.

On the left the victory was more disputed. The Duke of Savoy, at the head of his Piedmontese and a party of Imperialists, at first forced the French line to give way; but the gendarmery, which formed the second line, broke the allied cavalry with terrible charges, and took the infantry of the enemy's right and centre in flank, whilst the French infantry attacked it in front. Germans, Vaudois, Huguenot refugees, were routed and cut to pieces after a courageous resistance. Schomberg, the Duke of Leinster, remained mortally wounded on the battlefield, which was covered with eight or nine thousand of the enemy and two thousand French. Two thousand prisoners, thirty cannon, and more than one hundred flags or standards fell into the hands of the French.

This great victory, like that of Neerwinden, had little result; but Catinat could not be reproached for this: he had neither money nor siege-trains, and could attack neither Turin nor Coni; he was forced to content himself with laying Piedmont under contribution. At the news of this battle, the enemy had raised the blockade of Casale, abandoning his materiel and munitions. In the month of December, the greater part of the victorious army returned to winter in Dauphiny and Provence.[1]

In Catalonia, Marshal de Noailles had obtained a success of some importance by the conquest of Rosas (May 27–June 9). An order to send reinforcements to Catinat prevented Noailles from following up his advantages.

Vice-Admiral Victor-Marie d'Estrées, who, with the squadron of the Mediterranean, had coöperated in the taking of Rosas, then set sail to rejoin Tourville and the fleet of Brest on the coast of Portugal: he did not rejoin him in time to participate in the important maritime events that were taking place at this very moment.

Petit-Renau, the Vauban of our navy, had suggested to the King's council an excellent plan for striking the enemy in his tenderest point, his maritime commerce. The Anglo-Batavian fleet had assembled early at Spithead, for the purpose of protecting the departure of a great merchant-fleet, composed of all the English, Dutch, Hamburg, and Flemish ships, bound to the Mediterranean

[1] *Mém. de Catinat*, t. II. pp. 151–282. *Id. de Saint-Hilaire*, t. II. pp. 116–119. Quinci, t. II. pp. 662–699.

and Levant. The great French fleet, on its side, was assembled at Brest: it numbered seventy-one ships of the line, which made ninety-three ships at sea, comprising the twenty-two ships of the squadron of Toulon, which had in addition thirty galleys. This was the navy which some historians picture to us as annihilated after La Hogue! Never had France displayed such a naval force. Tourville sailed from Brest, May 26, without the knowledge of the enemy, and set sail for the coast of Algarve, where D'Estrées was to join him, and both were to await the enemy's merchant-fleet. Three weeks afterwards, the Smyrna fleet, as it was called, escorted by twenty-three ships in command of Vice-Admiral Rooke, one of the commanders of an English squadron at La Hogue, set out from the coast of England for the Straits of Gibraltar. Scarcely had it separated from the Anglo-Batavian fleet which had convoyed it as far as the Bay of Biscay, when the latter was informed of the departure of Tourville. Dispatch-boats were sent in haste to recall Admiral Rooke; but the merchant-fleet, propelled by a fair wind, had already advanced too far, and it was impossible to overtake it; it sailed straight into the terrible hands that awaited it. Tourville since the beginning of June had been lying to in the roads of Lagos, behind Cape St. Vincent, barring the passage of the Straits.

June 26, Tourville, informed of the approach of a numerous fleet, put to sea in order to fight only when he liked, and to his advantage. This movement made him lose the windward, and, the next day, when he was assured that he had nothing to encounter but the Smyrna fleet, he was obliged to beat about in order to regain it. The enemy profited by this delay to advance towards the Straits. Nevertheless, on the evening of June 27, the best sailors of the French fleet came up with the enemy's rear-guard. Two Dutch men-of-war were taken after a courageous defence; an English man-of-war was burned. During the night the French vanguard turned the enemy's rear-guard and confined it between itself and the land. Admiral Rooke, feeling resistance impossible, fled to the open sea with the greater part of the escort and a small number of merchant-ships, abandoning to its fate the rest of the unfortunate fleet. The merchant-vessels which were in advance took refuge in the ports of the Spanish coast. The day of June 28 offered a frightful spectacle: the numerous ships of the enemy's rear-guard, enclosed in a semicircle of fire continually narrowing, blew up or hauled down their flags one after the other. The whole sea seemed to be on fire! The next day, Tourville

sailed for Cadiz, where thirty of the enemies' ships had taken refuge; two ships, that had not had time to reach the port, were burned under the guns of the city. The French fleet rallied before Cadiz, and completed there its terrible work of destruction. It had destroyed forty-five ships, and had taken twenty-seven. Jean Bart, the king of privateers, had taken or burned six for his part. Many of these merchant-ships were armed with thirty, forty, even more than fifty guns. Tourville was not yet satisfied. He crossed the Straits, took or burned fifteen fugitive ships under Gibraltar itself, and went in person to force the port of Malaga and destroy there, too, some relics of the allied fleet. The total loss of the allies was nearly a hundred ships and more than thirty millions. La Hogue was avenged!

A year after La Hogue, the government of Louis XIV. could, without boasting, dedicate a medal to the maritime splendor of France (*splendor rei navalis*), exhibiting France, trident in hand, seated on the car of Neptune.

Nothing could exceed the anger of the English, wounded in their two leading passions, interest and pride. The House of Commons proposed to bring all the admirals to trial! The English admiralty attempted to satisfy public opinion by a signal vengeance. Saint-Malo and Dunkirk, those two formidable nests of privateers, were, to the merchants and seamen of England, the double object of a hatred that reached delirium: the inhabitants of Saint-Malo alone, since the beginning of the war, had perhaps deprived the allies of two thousand sail! The admiralty secretly constructed, in the form of a ship, a frightful infernal machine, designed for the annihilation of Saint-Malo. November 26, a squadron of twenty-five English ships appeared in sight of Saint-Malo. The governor of Brittany, the nobility, the seamen, the militia of the suburbs, hastily assembled for the purpose of repelling the expected attack. The English seized some unimportant posts, threw a few bombs, then, suddenly, in the evening of November 30, launched their machine. No one suspected the danger with which he was menaced. Already the infernal vessel was within pistol-shot of the walls, when, fortunately, it struck on a rock and split; the engineer who had constructed it set fire to it at random, and the machine belched forth, not upon the city, but upon the open country, the frightful mass of iron and fire concealed within its sides. The concussion broke all the glass in the city and shook down a part of the roofs and walls; but there were no other victims than the author himself of the machine and his sailors, who were blown to pieces. This en-

gineer was a Huguenot refugee. The next day the English squadron left without attempting anything else.

Nothing had succeeded with the English this year. In the preceding campaign, they had made an unsuccessful attempt against Guadeloupe. In the month of April, an English squadron landed four thousand soldiers upon the island of Martinique, at the foot of Cananville, near Saint Pierre: the governor-general of the French West Indies, Blenac, defeated the enemy and obliged him to reëmbark. The same squadron had no better success, in the month of August, against Plaisance in Newfoundland.[1]

The Dutch had been more fortunate in India; they had succeeded in taking from us Pondicherry, a remote possession which, by reason of their colonial power, they were in a better condition to attack than we to defend (October 5).

The year 1693, upon the whole, was therefore for France another year of victory; Louis XIV. had desired to profit by it only to compel his enemies to peace. The advances he had fruitlessly made to the Duke of Savoy had already indicated the great change effected in his disposition. Different causes simultaneously acted on his mind and his conscience. Louvois was no longer by his side perpetually to excite his passions and to preach to him inflexibility in the name of his glory: the opposite influence, that of Madame de Maintenon, henceforth weighed upon him without counterpoise and without relaxation. Alone, Madame de Maintenon would have acted with somewhat less force; her timid prudence was too afraid of chafing the King; but Madame de Maintenon was impelled, urged on by her friends, some of whom, moreover, acted personally on the King: the Duke de Beauvilliers especially,[2] was in great esteem with Louis, who had made him, while still young, chief of the council of finances and governor of the Duke of Burgundy, the eldest son of the Dauphin. We have already spoken of that kind of *League of the Public Good* which had been formed around Madame de Maintenon: this party of moderation and of *good people (gens de bien)*, animated by the most humane and Christian sentiments, carried to excess the tendencies opposed to war and conquests; it was, to a certain extent, the tradition of Colbert, sustained by his two sons-in-law, Beauvilliers and Chevreuse, against the policy of Louvois, but the tradition of Colbert modified, altered by a bigoted spirit,

[1] L. Guérin, t. II. pp. 78–84. Sainte-Croix, t. II. pp. 66–70. Quinci, t. II. pp. 705–724. Hume, *William III. and Mary*, ch. 4.

[2] Of the House of Saint-Aignan.

by timidity of views, by an insufficient understanding of the interests of State and of the part of France in Europe. Community of sympathy for popular suffering attached to these men of a somewhat narrow virtue two great citizens, two philosophic soldiers, as well intentioned as they, and far superior in enlightenment, Catinat and Vauban; but it was not from Catinat and Vauban that Beauvilliers, Chevreuse, and Madame de Maintenon herself received their impulse, but from a genius much more brilliant and vast, but less sure, who suggested, through systematic views, the maxims that his friends adopted through the scruples of a timid conscience. Fénelon, preceptor of the Duke of Burgundy since 1689, was the soul of this circle, which became a political party which, as Fénelon frankly said in his correspondence with Madame de Maintenon, *besieged* the King in order to *govern* him, "since he would be governed." A wholly new order of ideas was developed under the very shadow of the throne. The moment has not yet come to give an exposition of these ideas as a whole, or of the so diverse characteristics of Fénelon's genius. We need mention here only those of these ideas which concerned the war and the external policy. These ideas were boldly innovating in one respect and retrogressive in another; thus the great maxim of Fénelon, "I love my family better than myself, my country better than my family, the human race better than my country," if it remained insufficiently explained or defined, might lead to sacrificing the rights of country to a vague philanthropy. On the other hand, Fénelon, seeking to base upon right the relations between States, had in view no other right than that which the formulas of diplomatic protocols still furnished, but which none longer practised or respected: according to Fénelon, a prince who took a province from another prince, took *the property of others*. Fenelon, not rising above the old hereditary and feudal right, considered provinces and their inhabitants as the patrimonial property of sovereign houses, and had not even a suspicion of the final causes of national existence or of the natural rights that result from these final causes; that is to say, the new right of nations that was to spring from the principle of nationalities, and that is still struggling to make itself understood. He therefore judged the policy of Louis XIV. with that severity which a new generation always shows towards the generation that it is about to replace, and against which it reacts, and he was severe at once in a philosophic and progressive, and a retrogressive point of view.

Discontented with the circumspection that Madame de Mainte-

non and even the Duke de Beauvilliers preserved, Fénelon employed indirect and violent means to endeavor strongly to affect the King and to *convert* in Louis the statesman, as Madame de Maintenon had *converted* the private man.

In the course of 1693, Louis received an anonymous letter, which, in the opinion of the writer, was to be to the Great King *Mene-Tekel-Upharsin* of Belshazzar's feast, and which at least rang in the ears of Louis like a terrible dissonance among the perpetual hymns of Versailles.[1] The imposing style and religious dignity which stamped this letter did not permit it to be confounded with the pamphlets inspired by hate. The writer began with protestations of attachment to the King's person, in terms too simple and too noble not to be sincere; he then displayed, with inflexible spirit, before Louis a gloomy picture of his reign. "You were born, sire, with a just and equitable heart; but those who educated you gave you as a science of government only distrust, jealousy, avoidance of virtue, fear of all conspicuous merit, . . . haughtiness and attention to your own interest alone." He then reproached him with reversing the ancient rules of State for the advantage of his good pleasure, and especially with the despotism of his ministers; all France was impoverished in order to introduce monstrous luxury into the court, the ministers crushing everything, without as well as within, till the name of the King and of France had become odious to all neighboring peoples, and all ancient allies had been lost, whom it had been wished to turn into slaves. The war with Holland, he continued, was unjust, and consequently all the acquisitions made on account of that war were unjust. It was the same with annexations effected since the peace of Nimeguen, — works of usurpation and violence. "Hence, the continuance of the League formed against you." The allies preferred to wage war with loss, to concluding a peace which, in their opinion, would be no better observed than the others. And yet the people were dying of hunger: the cultivation of the soil was almost abandoned; all commerce was annihilated. "All France is no longer but a great hospital desolated and without provisions; the people, who have loved you so much, begin to lose love, confidence, and even respect. The *popular disturbances*, that were so long unknown,[2] are becoming frequent. Even Paris is not exempt

[1] Allusion is made, in this letter, to misfortunes that could be nothing else than the battle of La Hogue and the invasion of Dauphiny; and, in another place, the famine of which the letter speaks, can only be that of 1693. See *Œuvres de Fénelon, édit. Lefèvre et Pourrat*, 1838, t. V. p. 182.

[2] This is not quite accurate: remember the troubles of the war with Holland!

from them. The magistrates are constrained to tolerate the insolence of mutineers and secretly to distribute money to appease them. You are reduced to the deplorable extremity of either leaving sedition unpunished, or of massacring the people that you reduce to despair, . . . and who are perishing daily, with maladies caused by famine. While they lack bread, you yourself lack money, and you are unwilling to see the extremity to which you are reduced. You flatter yourself on account of daily successes, and you do not take a general survey of affairs, which are insensibly declining beyond recovery. . . . God holds his arm raised above you; but he is slow to strike, because he takes pity on a prince who has all his life been surrounded by flatterers, and because, moreover, *your enemies are also his* (the Protestants). But he will know well how to separate his just cause from yours which is not just, and to humble you in order to convert you; for you will be a Christian only in humiliation. You do not love God; you do not even fear him but with a slavish fear: it is hell, and not God, that you fear. Your religion consists only in superstitions, in petty superficial observances. You refer everything to yourself, as if you were the God of earth. . . . ."

The anonymous writer deplores the feebleness of the council, which does not know how to draw the King "from this devious road," and the timidity of Madame de Maintenon and the Duke de Beauvilliers, who *dishonor* themselves by not daring to speak frankly. "This," he finally exclaims, "is what they should say to you, and what they do not say to you: It is necessary to ask peace, and to expiate by this shame all the glory which you have made your idol; it is necessary to surrender forthwith to your enemies, to save the State, the conquests that you cannot retain without injustice!"

The author of the letter therefore wished that France should eliminate the members that she had acquired since the war with Holland; logically, he should perhaps have gone back, like the Coalition, to the treaty of the Pyrenees, the conquests effected by the *War of the Queen's Rights* being very contestable in the light of feudal law! He wished that France should restore to Spain the provinces, French in language, origin, and territory, which the strange accidents of hereditability had given to the House of Austria; he condemned everything in the policy of Louis the Great, except the most fatal and the most culpable act of his reign,—the Revocation, which he shrouds in silence.

This letter, a veritable manifesto of a new political school, had

gone beyond its aim: the exaggerations which were mingled with too well-merited reproaches were of a nature "to irritate or discourage the King rather than to reform him," as Madame de Maintenon[1] wrote, some time afterwards. The less violent, but continued impressions given to Louis by those whose weakness Fénelon accused, were more efficacious. Nevertheless, a part of the letter was unfortunately incontestable; the King saw it but too well: it was what concerned the distress of the people, the emptiness of the treasury. As Voltaire forcibly says, "They perished of want to the sound of *Te Deums*." Everything concurred to swell the wretchedness to fearful proportions: the aggravation of imposts and charges of every kind; the decline of commerce and industry, caused by the war and bad economic measures; the suppression of measures protecting agriculture (the prohibition to seize stock, maintained till the death of Colbert, had not been since renewed);[2] the want of laborers that the war took by the hundred thousand from the labors of the field. To these evils, the work of man, were joined the scourges of nature. The harvest of 1692 had been spoiled by rains; that of 1693 had been no better, and, as usual, the general panic and the avidity of traffickers raised the price far above what it should have been from the scarcity; the government itself moreover was, from necessity, the *great monopolist* on account of the vast magazines that the subsistence of armies required. The King began by taxing grain, which led only to emptying the markets; the King then prescribed a general census of grain belonging either to communities or to individuals, and enjoined each one to send to market, at the rate of a certain quantity per week, and there to sell at the price current one half of the corn that he possessed, the other half remaining at the free disposition of the possessor.[3] He prohibited the exportation of grain, under penalty of the galleys; at the same time he sent ships to purchase corn in Africa in order to offer it for sale at a moderate price in the markets. The efforts of the government afforded but a feeble and tardy remedy for the scarcity, which engendered terrible epidemics, the ordinary sequence of popular distress. It is pretended (the number is doubtless exaggerated) that ninety-six thousand persons died at Paris this year.[4]

[1] *Lettre au cardinal de Noailles;* 1695, ap. Rulhière, p. 397.

[2] Forbonnais, t. I. p. 321.

[3] Those who had enough corn only for their own consumption for six months were authorized to keep it. *Anciennes Lois françaises*, t. XX. p. 198; September 5, 1693.

[4] La Hode, t. IV. p. 89.

A motive of a very different nature also powerfully contributed to dispose the King to peace, — a motive, not of renunciation and humility, as Fénelon desired, but, on the contrary, of ambition itself. The King of Spain, Carlos II., after having, contrary to all expectation, survived his childhood and youth, decrepit at thirty, could not greatly prolong his premature old age; the wife that Louis XIV. had given him, the unfortunate Marie Louise of Orleans, had died in 1689, poisoned, as was believed, in France, by the Austrian party, who had soon afterwards remarried Carlos to the daughter of the Elector-Palatine, one of the bitterest enemies of Louis XIV. If Carlos II. were to die during the war, whilst Europe was united against France, the succession of Spain would certainly escape the House of Bourbon; it was therefore necessary that peace should be made to dissolve the Coalition, and permit Louis to make allies for himself again in Europe and even a party in Spain.

At the opening of the campaign, Louis had therefore begun to disclose his pacific disposition in a manifesto circulated in Germany; his circulars to the bishops, giving them orders to thank God for his victories, expressed the same sentiments. In the month of July he had communicated to Sweden and Denmark, as mediating powers, propositions for peace with the Empire. Those two states, even while furnishing at the outset some auxiliary troops to the Coalition, had refused to break with France, and had even entered into a recent treaty among themselves to cause their maritime neutrality to be respected (March 17, 1693). Louis fell far short of the manifesto by which he had opened the war in September, 1688: he offered to raze Mont-Royal and Trarbach, which was equivalent to the evacuation of the Electorate of Treves; to raze the works constructed opposite Fort Louis and Huningue, on the right bank of the Rhine; to surrender Freiburg and Philippsburg fortified; to renounce, in behalf of his sister-in-law, all claims on the Palatinate; to give to the young Duke of Lorraine (Leopold I., eldest son of the late Duke Charles V.) an equivalent to the revenue of his duchy; finally, to leave the question of the annexations to the arbitration of Venice, only insisting on the preservation of Strasburg with its forts. He promised to make reasonable terms with the other allied princes and states.[1]

This was the first retrograde step that France had taken since the accession of Richelieu. The diplomacy of Louis XIV. became as moderate as his arms were violent, and presented a strange con-

[1] *Actes et Mémoires de la paix de Ryswick*, t. I. p. 83.

trast to that savage war, the cruelties of which had not ceased with the death of Louvois.

Before the end of the year, Louis offered to restore to Spain his recent conquests in the Netherlands and Catalonia, only razing the fortifications of Charleroi; to restore Huy to the Bishop of Liege; to reëstablish commerce with the United Provinces on the footing of the treaty of Nimeguen; finally, he consented that, in case of the death of the King of Spain, the Elector of Bavaria should have the Catholic Netherlands: the conqueror, he offered what might have been demanded from him if he had been conquered. By this enormous concession made to Holland and England, Louis went beyond the combination which he had so energetically repelled in 1685, and abandoned the great design of completing France, in order to preserve the chances of his dynasty abroad. The envoy of Denmark in England communicated these conditions to William III. and announced to him that, as England was not comprised therein, "the King his master had already undertaken to induce the Most Christian King not to stay thereby the general peace (December 21)."[1] The recognition of the *usurper* as King of England was, in fact, the greatest blow to the pride and the monarchical convictions of the Great King.[2]

New negotiations had been privately resumed with the Duke of Savoy, since his defeat at Marsaglia; Louis showed himself disposed to restore all his conquests, and the Duke seemed earnestly to desire the neutrality of Italy, which the Emperor vehemently rejected; but these secret parleys were prolonged without positive result.

The two crowns of the North, on the one side, the Pope, on the other, were zealously employed in paving the way for the European pacification. Innocent XII. had always shown himself well disposed towards peace, and, moreover, Louis XIV. had purchased his friendship by a compromise that terminated the long difference between France and the Holy See. There, as with the Coalition, the concessions came from the side of the Great King. After years of negotiation, it was agreed that the ecclesiastics who had taken part in the assembly of 1682, and had been afterwards appointed by the King to bishoprics, should write to the Holy Father, each

[1] *Paix de Ryswick*, t. I. p. 39.

[2] It seems that Louis XIV. conceived the idea of a compromise, by which the little Prince of Wales, son of James II., should succeed William III.; but James vehemently rejected this bargain. The compromise, moreover, would not have been practicable except on condition that the Prince of Wales should be brought up in England and in the Protestant religion. See Macaulay, Vol. III. ch. 8.

for himself, a letter in the following terms: "Prostrated at the feet of Your Beatitude, we profess and declare that we deplore, from the bottom of our heart and beyond all expression, the things done in the said assembly (of 1682), which have sovereignly displeased Your Holiness and your predecessors; for this reason we declare, that, whatever may have been regarded as decreed in this same assembly, touching ecclesiastical power and pontifical authority, we do not hold and should not be held as decreed. Moreover, we hold as not resolved what may have been regarded as resolved to the prejudice of the rights of Churches (the regale)." The letters of the bishops were accompanied with a letter from the King, who informed His Holiness that he had "given the necessary orders that the things contained in his edict of March 22, 1682, touching the declaration made by the clergy of France, to which the past conjunctures had compelled him, should not be observed," — that is to say, that it should no longer be obligatory to teach in the schools of the kingdom anything but the doctrine of the Four Articles, and that these questions might be abandoned to discussion as not touching the faith (September 14, 1693).

At this price the Pope granted the bulls to the appointed bishops, and the Church of France resumed its normal position.[1] Rome had obtained the price of its patient obstinacy, — not the abandonment of the Gallican doctrine, nor the retraction of the assembly of the clergy, which it had not even dared to demand, but at least the individual retraction, in ambiguous terms,[2] of a part of the members of that assembly, and the retraction of the edict that imposed the Four Articles on all French theologians. It was certainly a check on Bossuet[3] and a backward step on the part of the Great King.

The advances of Louis XIV. were not so successful with the Coalition as with the Pope. Louis had given the allies till the 15th of March to accept his offers. Holland, the Elector of Bavaria, and the Duke of Savoy, whose pretensions Louis satisfied, would have willingly treated, but the Emperor threatened the Duke of Savoy; William III. caused a secret negotiation, commenced be-

[1] Bausset, *Hist. de Bossuet*, t. II. p. 206. D'Agnesseau, *Œuvres*, t. XIII. p. 418. *Mém. Chronolog. et Dogmat.*, t. III. p. 406.

[2] The prelates say, in effect, that they deplore the things that have displeased the Pope, and that they do not hold them as decreed; but they do not say that they are false.

[3] Nevertheless, it is just to remark that the *Exposition de la foi catholique*, of Bossuet, logically leads to put aside among the questions handed over to the disputes of the schools what concerns the authority of the Pope.

tween the cabinet of Versailles and the States-General, to miscarry, and rejected the interposition offered by the Elector of Bavaria. William and Leopold were encouraged by the too well-known distress of France, although the peoples whom they governed were suffering little less. William once more succeeded in obtaining from England and Holland an effort, the greatest that they had yet made, which, according to him, was to be the last: it was always the same promise, which the event each year belied. The Tories being too favorable to peace, he went over again to the Whigs, to whom he gave all the important offices; he succeeded in calming the irritation caused by the disasters to the merchant-shipping, and procured from Parliament a vote of five and a half million pounds sterling for the year 1694; it was agreed to maintain forty thousand sailors and eighty-three thousand English soldiers, and to increase the subsidies paid to the allies. This enormous expenditure was covered by an increase of excise on beer, by different new duties, by a capitation-tax, by a lottery, by a renewal of the twenty per cent. land-tax; finally, by a loan, the subscribers to which were constituted into a financial corporation under the title of the *Company of the Bank of England.*[1]

If the Emperor and Spain had kept their engagements as faithfully as England and Holland, the allies would have been able, in 1694, to operate everywhere with colossal forces; but Leopold was obstinate in pursuing against the Turks a costly and indecisive struggle, and only succeeded, by dividing his forces, in waging war unsuccessfully at once on the Danube and on the Rhine; as to Spain, her disorder and exhaustion did not permit her to do anything completely or to the point.

The allies were prepared to take the offensive in Flanders, in Piedmont, and on the coasts of France. Louis XIV., compelled to reduce his expenses, had changed his plans, and decided to hold himself everywhere on the defensive, except in Catalonia, where he resolved to deal vigorous blows in order to compel Spain to desire peace.

The Catholic Netherlands seemed destined this year to be the theatre of great events. The allies had collected there the most powerful army that they had yet put on foot, and William III. had, between the Meuse and the sea, more than a hundred and twenty thousand men at his disposal. The Dauphin and Marshal de Luxembourg had only a little more than eighty thousand to oppose him. Public expectation was deceived; there was no battle. Lux-

[1] Hume, *William III. and Mary*, ch. 8. Macaulay, *William III.*, Vol. III. ch. 2.

embourg, by his skilful manœuvres, deprived the allies of the benefit of their superiority during a great part of the campaign, and for a long time compelled William to protect Liege and Louvain against him. In the latter part of August, William, finally, stealing two marches on his adversary, directed his course against French Flanders, in order to force the lines or fortifications drawn between the Scheldt and the Lys, and probably to attempt some enterprise against the maritime towns, in concert with the Anglo-Batavian fleet. At the first rumor of this movement, the French army set out with such celerity that it marched forty-four leagues and crossed five rivers in five days: the vanguard of the French passed the vanguard of the enemy at Espierre on the Scheldt, and covered the lines of Flanders. William repaired this want of success, and in some sort drew advantage from his discomfiture: he held the French in check on the Scheldt, and sent to the troops that he had left at Liege, and whom he reinforced, orders to invest Huy. This place, ill fortified, but of some importance on account of its position between Liege and Namur, was obliged to surrender after ten days' siege (September 28).

The war in Germany did not belie its ordinary insignificance. Marshal de Lorges showed himself as mediocre as usual: Prince Louis of Baden, a skilful manœuvrer, maintained himself, as in the preceding year, in the strong position of Heilbronn, although he was the weaker, then attempted a dash on Alsace, but without endeavoring to maintain himself in that region or in the cis-Rhenish Palatinate. Everything was limited to marches and countermarches, with no other result than the devastation of the unfortunate provinces of the Rhine.

The war in the Alps was still less interesting. The Duke of Savoy, very superior to Catinat, derived no profit from his superiority. The Duke had been sensible of the moderation shown by Louis XIV. after the action of Marsaglia, and earnestly desired to recover through peace his invaded provinces, and to escape from alliances that had brought him nothing but reverse upon reverse. He did not, however, yet decide to break with his allies, but, as he had secretly announced to the King, he avoided any serious engagement and rendered the campaign entirely fruitless.

The naval campaign, on the contrary, presented, in default of great conflicts, varied and interesting incidents: our coasts on the Channel and the ocean, menaced by the allies, had been put in a strong state of defence; but the French fleet did not dispute these seas with the Anglo-Batavians. France, this year, fitted out fleets

much inferior to those of the preceding years. In the beginning of May, Château-Renaud set out from the roadstead of Bertheaume (near Brest) with thirty-five ships of the line, and sailed for the Mediterranean, with orders to menace the coasts of Spain and join Tourville, who, at the head of from twenty to twenty-five ships and some Provençal galleys, seconded the operations of Marshal de Noailles against Catalonia. The year had begun ill on the sea for the allies: their Smyrna merchant-fleet had undertaken to effect the passage of the Straits in winter, in order to shun a catastrophe similar to that of the past year: instead of the French, it encountered a tempest at Gibraltar; the Anglo-Batavian squadron of the Mediterranean, which was acting as an escort, suffered as much as by a lost battle: four English ships of the line, among them the flag-ship, perished entirely, with twenty other men-of-war and merchant-vessels (February 28–March 4). The loss, it is said, was eighteen millions.

The allies attempted to avenge themselves at the expense of France. Their great fleet, ninety ships of the line strong, had left the roadstead of St. Helen's (Isle of Wight) some days after Château-Renaud had sailed from Brest; it did not join him, but burned or sunk in the roadstead of Bertheaume twenty-five French merchant-vessels loaded with grain, wine, and brandy. Admiral Russel then set out with fifty ships for the Mediterranean, where Spain was calling loudly to the Anglo-Batavians for succor, threatening to make peace if she were not aided to save Catalonia. The rest of the fleet, commanded by Lord Berkeley, sailed to embark troops collected at Portsmouth, and returned to Brest. They awaited the enemy there. The project of a descent had been divulged to James II. by a man who had contributed as much as any one to dethrone this unhappy monarch, but was now conspiring against William III., not for the benefit of James, but for that of William's sister-in-law, Anne Stuart, princess of Denmark. This man, who exhibits in history one of the contrasts most repugnant to the human conscience, the association of immorality and genius, was Churchill, Duke of Marlborough.[1] On the receipt of this information, Louis XIV. had dispatched Vauban to Brest, to direct the employment of the formidable means of defence accumulated in that great arsenal. Vauban distributed in the forts, on the rocks, and on flat-boats, around the inner road of Brest and the outer road of Bertheaume, three hundred guns and ninety mor-

[1] The letter in which Marlborough reveals the expedition to James II. has been published in the *Stuart Papers*.

tars. Fourteen hundred gunners, three thousand gentlemen of the arrière-ban, five thousand soldiers, and several thousand militia, defended all points susceptible of attack. Admiral Berkeley nevertheless attempted to disembark in the little bay of Camaret, at the southwest of the narrows of Brest (June 18). Scarcely had a thousand of the English set foot on shore under the fire of the coast-batteries, when the marines pounced upon them, routed them, and drove them into the sea. General Talmash, commander of the disembarking troops, was mortally wounded. The fleet retired: part of the English sloops and a Dutch frigate remained aground and were obliged to surrender. Two English ships, one of them the rear-admiral's, and several transports, were sunk by French bombs. The allied fleet mournfully returned to the coast of England.

It set out again, July 16, and directed its course towards Upper Normandy. July 22 and 23, it threw into Dieppe a thousand bombs and fire-shells. This was easier and less perilous than to renew the descent: the success was better. The birthplace of Ango and Duquesne, the Dieppe of the Middle Ages and of the Renaissance, with all the houses of sculptured wood that were crowded along its narrow streets, was swallowed up in the flames. The enemy sailed thence for Havre; but the less easy approach, the unfavorable wind, the nature of the buildings, — Havre being a city of stone and not of wood like Dieppe, — finally, the precautions skilfully taken to prevent the conflagration from spreading, and to mislead the enemy in firing during the night, almost wholly preserved Havre (July 25–31). The allies retired again to the road of Wight, then, September 22, went to reconnoitre Dunkirk, and, judging it impossible to bombard the city without first destroying the two forts of the double mole that extends so far into the roadstead, they launched against the forts two infernal machines similar to that which had nearly destroyed Saint-Malo. Both, missing their way, and pierced by the guns of the forts, exploded in the roadstead without damage. The enemy then went to throw a few bombs into Calais, then, the sea becoming rough, left definitively, after having failed everywhere, except at Dieppe.

At the moment when the Anglo-Batavians were vainly threatening Dunkirk after Saint-Malo, the two heroes to whom these two cities had given birth were signalizing themselves by new exploits. Jean Bart, with six vessels and two armed store-ships, had gone to meet a Danish and Swedish merchant-fleet which was bringing corn from the Baltic to France, where the scarcity still continued.

When he encountered the fleet, between the Meuse and the Texel, it had just fallen into the hands of eight Dutch vessels superior in force to the vessels of the French squadron. Jean Bart instantly ordered a general boarding, took three of the enemy's vessels, put the others to flight, and brought without loss into our ports the hundred ships loaded with grain (July 29). Duguai-Trouin, still more precocious than Tourville had been, equalled, at twenty-one, the first of those French seamen whose names had become as terrible to the imagination of peoples as the names of the old *Sea-Kings*. With a frigate of thirty guns he had taken two English ships of equal force; he was surrounded by six English ships of the line; wounded and taken after a prodigious struggle, he escaped in a bark, as Jean Bart and Forbin had formerly done, returned to take command of a ship of forty-eight guns, attacked two English ships of fifty and thirty-eight guns at the same time, and captured both. Petit-Renau, whose arm equalled his head, had, on his side, taken an English ship that was bringing from India an immense value in diamonds (500,000 pounds sterling, it is said), by boarding. The English were not more fortunate in distant waters. The French colonists of the West Indies effected a devastating descent on Jamaica, in order to avenge the invasion of the French territory in St. Domingo by the Anglo-Spaniards; Senegal and Goree were reconquered from the English, who had surprised these factories the year before.[1]

Whilst the allies were attacking the coasts of France with so little success, the French were making progress on the coast of Spain, — a progress that would have been much more important if the army had been better provisioned and better supported by the minister of war. Marshal de Noailles, with twenty thousand men, had, May 27, forced the passage of the Ter at the ford of Torella, carried the intrenchments thrown up by the Spaniards on the other bank of the river, and routed their army, more numerous than his own. Master of the campaign, he besieged Palamos. Tourville seconded the operations by sea. Château-Renaud had just joined him with his fleet, after having compelled the Anglo-Batavian squadron of the Mediterranean, and the Spanish squadron, to conceal themselves in the ports of Spain and to burn in the Alfaques (lagunes near the mouths of the Ebro) four Spanish ships of war. The city of Palamos was carried by assault, June 6; the citadel surrendered on the 9th. The King had desired that the

[1] L. Guérin, t. II. pp. 84–95. Quinci, t. II. pp. 71–99. Hume, *William III. and Mary*, ch. 4.

army should march on Barcelona; Louis hoped that the Barcelonese would rise in favor of France. The recent bombardment of their city was not calculated to revive their old French sympathies, and Noailles judged it imprudent to attempt so great a siege, far from his base of operations, with an army not numerous, ill paid, and poorly supplied with provisions. The evil was owing not only to the too real penury of the government, but also to the ignorance, presumption, and ill-will of the minister Barbezieux, who had the vices without the great qualities of his father Louvois, and who did not like Noailles, because this experienced general, counting on the friendship of Madame de Maintenon, did not think himself obliged to bend to a young coxcomb, and put himself as much as possible in direct correspondence with the King. Noailles, with the King's consent, fell back on Gerona, which commands the course of the Ter and the whole of El Ampurdan. This important place was defended by more than five thousand soldiers and four thousand militia. Invested, June 17, it capitulated on the 29th. Noailles, arrested a fortnight by want of supplies, then advanced against Hostalrich, on the road from Gerona to Barcelona (July 18). The inhabitants delivered the city to the French; the garrison took refuge in the citadel, protected by seven intrenchments, descending in stories from the top to the bottom of a steep hill. This formidable amphitheatre seemed inaccessible. Two French grenadiers advanced without orders to the foot of the first intrenchment. "I wager," said one of them to his comrade, "that you dare not climb there." The other leaped upon his shoulders, hoisted himself on the parapet, and called the regiment, which followed him in a body. The enemy was terrified; the grenadiers scaled the seven intrenchments, one after another, and entered the citadel pell-mell with the fugitives (July 19).

Master of almost the whole of northern Catalonia, Noailles might then have attacked Barcelona; but Admiral Russel had entered the Mediterranean and joined the squadrons of the enemy remaining in the Spanish ports; he found himself much superior to Tourville; the latter had received orders to avoid a contest, and had retired to Toulon. Noailles was obliged to content himself with taking Castle Follit, the only place that the Spaniards retained north of the Ter (September 4–8); the troops were put into winter-quarters.[1]

The campaign of 1694 had been neither brilliant nor decisive, and the results had been in an inverse ratio to the greatness of the

[1] *Mém. de Noailles*, ap. Collect. Michaud, 3d series, t. X. pp. 48–61. Quinci, t. II. pp. 54–71.

force displayed; but the little that had been effected was still favorable to the French. The leaders of the Coalition did not show themselves much more pacific on this account: there had been some attempt at secret negotiation with the Emperor, at a moment when the Imperial army on the Danube seemed in especial danger before the Turks; but this had been without effect. Louis had nôt, hitherto, been able to determine to make advances *to the Prince of Orange;* nevertheless, in the beginning of 1695, on the refusal of the allies to negotiate separately, Louis declared that he would not pretend to take advantage of any private agreements, "till the Prince of Orange should be satisfied regarding his person and the crown of England." This was an important step in advance; England and Holland, on their side, had shifted the debate outside the ground of the Great Alliance, by no longer claiming the treaties of Westphalia and the Pyrenees, which would have made peace impossible, but the treaties of Westphalia and Nimeguen; only, they desired that return pure and simple to these treaties should be previously accepted by France, and that Louis should thus tie his hands, whilst the allies should preserve the power to demand new guaranties (May 1695). They were still far from an understanding, Louis claiming to keep Strasburg and Luxemburg.[1]

A great loss that France had just sustained encouraged the obstinacy of the allies. Marshal de Luxembourg had ceased to live. This illustrious warrior had always preserved the licentious habits of the heroes of the Fronde, the morals of the youth of the great Condé; he led, at sixty-seven, a kind of life which his face and his deformity, still more than his age, rendered at least strange: his ruined health could not resist the attack of an inflammatory malady that carried him off, January 4, 1695. In him France lost the most dreaded general that remained to her, and the always successful adversary of King William. He was one of the greatest winners of battles who have left their mark in history: no modern general before him had handled such great masses of soldiers with so much ease and precision. His irregular habits, incompatible with patient designs, or with incessant vigilance and far-reaching combinations, alone hindered him from being a perfect captain. This death, which removed from the path of William an invincible obstacle, would have caused the chief of the Coalition more joy if at this moment he had not been struck with a great domestic affliction. Queen Mary, who had been to William a passionately devoted wife and a useful political instrument, succumbed, January 7, to the small-pox: she had given her husband no children. Her

[1] *Paix de Ryswick*, t. I. p. 199.

death, although reviving the hopes of the Jacobites, caused no troubles in England: William, who reigned with Mary, reigned alone in virtue of the act that had called both jointly to the throne.

Before the death of the Queen, he had already induced Parliament to make new sacrifices, but he paid for them by important concessions to the party of liberty. He had consented that the parliaments should henceforth be triennial, that is to say, that the House of Commons should be renewed at least every three years; the establishment of the liberty of the press, by the abolition of the censorship, completed and characterized the triumph of the Whigs, and made the return of absolutism impossible. The year 1694 merits scarcely less place in the history of England, and in the history of European institutions, than the year 1688 itself: it had been signalized, not only by the great political innovations that we have just indicated, but by an economic establishment of the highest importance — the creation of a national bank, similar to those of Amsterdam and Genoa: forty merchants subscribed for a million pounds sterling of notes guaranteed by 500,000 pounds sterling of effective capital; the government collected the specie, used the notes as money, and paid interest on the whole at the rate of eight per cent. to the lenders, who were constituted into a company for the transaction of banking business. The real capital and the circulating capital were soon augmented. This was the starting-point of that great organization of British credit which finally merged into the bank the administration of public finances, and linked together the national wealth and private fortunes for the greater stability of the state.

The French government also attempted to restore its disorganized finances. The multiplied issues of *rentes* and the distrust of individuals had caused the last issues to fall to seven and one ninth per cent., and still they were reluctantly taken. Disastrous operations on specie had everywhere introduced disturbance. By reducing the silver mark from twenty-six livres fifteen sous to twenty-nine livres fourteen sous, forty millions had been gained, by the general recoinage, from 1689 to 1693,[1] which indicated that about four hundred millions had passed into the mints. It was supposed that a hundred millions had been buried or recoined in foreign countries by speculators.[2] In order to deprive foreign recoiners of this profit,

[1] This profit was in part illusory; for the government could not impose its debased coin on foreigners, and, in all its expenditures abroad for its armies and its fleets, it was obliged to pay the difference.

[2] In these one hundred millions must we reckon the sixty millions carried away by refugees? There would then have been in France five hundred millions in coin

and, doubtless, for a less honest reason, that is to say, in order to receive in heavy coin after having paid in light coin, the government raised the coin again, in 1692 and 1693, from twenty-nine livres fourteen sous to twenty-seven livres eighteen sous the silver mark; then, in September, 1693, a new general recoinage was ordered, and the coin was again debased from twenty-seven livres eighteen sous to thirty-two livres six sous the mark. The participation of the Duke de Beauvilliers in such acts cannot be explained, except by excusing his probity at the expense of his intelligence, and by affirming that he had no comprehension of Pontchartrain's operations.[1] The new recoinage produced less profit than had been hoped; it gave only about fifty-five millions, from 1694 to 1697, a great part of the specie having been hoarded or sent abroad; this deplorable profit was dearly purchased! By a contrast grievous for France, a new English chancellor of the exchequer (minister of finances) was executing at this very moment a wholly contrary transaction: the chancellor of the exchequer, Montague, the promoter of the bank, counselled by two men who were to be the highest glory of England, and who applied to politics the methods of science, Locke and Newton, induced Parliament to adopt a measure for the recoining of English specie, not to diminish its value, but to change its wretched fabrication, which had facilitated the fatal trade of clippers, and to reëstablish its weight at the expense of the treasury; this intelligent sacrifice reëstablished order in business and restored public confidence.[2]

In France, despite the expedients, or rather on account of the expedients employed by Pontchartrain, the distress of the State increased; the burdens increased and the net revenue decreased from year to year. The net revenue was, in 1693, from one hundred and seven to one hundred and eight millions; in 1694, from one hundred and two to one hundred and three millions; and it must not be forgotten, that, owing to the debasement of the currency, one hundred and two millions of 1694 did not represent much more than eighty-five millions in 1689. Pontchartrain had continued his ruinous creation of offices, among which we remark, in 1694, new officers of villain taxes and salt-taxes, *tasters* of beer in

(less than a thousand millions of our coin). Such was the destitution of statistical information that Louvois and the Comptroller-General Le Pelletier himself, some time before, doubted whether there were, not five hundred millions, but two hundred millions! Gourville, p. 582.

[1] The president of the council of finances had little else than an honorary title, but he should not have covered these acts with his name.

[2] Forbonnais, t. II. p. 97. Hume, *William III.*, ch. 5. Macaulay, *Id.*, Vol. III. ch. 8.

Flanders, hereditary quartinier-colonels and captains, in the place of elective quartiniers, etc. Having exhausted all objectionable resources, the French government finally found itself forced to have recourse to good and just ones, although incompletely. A man, in other respects fatal to France, but endowed with a true administrative genius, the intendant of Languedoc, Basville, caused the establishment of a capitation-tax on all the subjects of the King, by hearths and families, whatever might be their condition, to be proposed by the States of Languedoc, as a testimony of zeal for the public good. Languedoc had already set the example of this kind of impost in the Middle Ages, at the time of King John's captivity. There was much opposition: Pontchartrain, who had not hesitated to overthrow transactions by changes in the currency, and to let loose on France, like a cloud of locusts, thousands of parasitical functionaries, hesitated much in regard to a measure that disturbed powerful interests and prejudices. He finally decided. The whole population of the kingdom was divided into twenty-two classes, from the Dauphin to peasants and artisans. The princes of the blood, the ministers and *great revenue-farmers* (farmers general) paid two thousand francs; the rest in decreasing proportion (January 18, 1695). Valets alone were exempt. The domestics of Paris, humiliated by being in some sort excluded from the number of Frenchmen, claimed the right to be included in the capitation-tax, whilst the nobles, the privileged, murmured against the obligation to pay. The privileged yielded only upon the promise to suppress the new impost three months after peace.[1]

The capitation-tax, applied with timid reserve, produced little more than twenty-one millions per annum, and did not prevent the renewal of the creation of offices, the alienation of domains, the issue of *rentes* at seven and one ninth per cent. All this increased the net revenue only ten millions. The villain taxes were diminished three millions, — a scarcely perceptible relief to the country districts, in the midst of so many new burdens.

Louis XIV., not having been able to impose peace, had resolved, for this year, to keep on the defensive everywhere. He collected heavy forces on the side of Belgium, less, however, than those of William, who had made immense preparations. An army-corps, assembled near Mons, under Marshal de Boufflers, was charged with protecting Namur. A flying camp covered Furnes and Dunkirk. The principal army was to cover Ypres, Lille, and Tournay.

[1] *Anciennes Lois françaises*, t. XX. p. 255. Saint-Simon, t. I. p. 250. Dangeau, t. II. pp. 4–6.

From the downs of Furnes to Ypres, the French frontier was protected by canals; from Ypres to Espierre, on the Scheldt, lines intrenched and furnished with redoubts defended the entrance to the territory; from Espierre to Condé, the Scheldt served as a fosse. The Haine and the Sambre completed this long line as far as Namur. The General charged with the whole defence, the successor of Luxembourg, had the public voice been consulted, would have been Catinat; the King chose Villeroi, son of his governor and the companion of his youth, very brave and a tolerable officer as long as he had only to execute the orders of others, but more expert in the manœuvres of the court than in those of the battle-field. This was the first of those fatal errors into which the Great King henceforth too often fell in the choice of his generals.

William showed only too well, in his first movements, that he was perfectly aware that he no longer had Luxembourg opposed to him. He encamped with fifty thousand men a league from Ypres, detached fifteen thousand of them against Fort Knocke, which was the key to the canals between Ypres and the sea, and gave orders to the Elector of Bavaria to advance with a second army of thirty thousand men by Audenarde, between the Lys and the Scheldt; whilst a third army, at least equal to that of the Elector, was formed towards the Sambre and the Meuse, and threatened Namur. These operations were bold even to temerity. Villeroi had massed nearly sixty thousand men between Ypres and Comines; Boufflers, after having dispatched a part of his infantry to Namur, had gone as far as Courtrai with his cavalry, his dragoons and his artillery, and it was in his power to precipitate himself upon the rear of William with ten thousand horse; the Elector of Bavaria had still at his disposal, between the Scheldt and the Lys, only the smaller part of his troops, and could not have arrived in time to succor William. Villeroi, it is said, sent a courier to Versailles to ask permission to open the attack; the King refused; the two armies remained in presence of each other about ten days; William had full leisure to complete his preparations; suddenly, he concentrated his forces and moved rapidly in the direction of the Meuse, leaving behind him on the Lys the Prince de Vaudemont with twenty-five or thirty thousand men to amuse Villeroi. He rejoined before Namur his army of the Meuse, which was already besieging that place (July 1). Boufflers had followed the movement of the enemy and threw himself into Namur with his dragoons before the investment was complete. Namur and its outer works, greatly increased within three years by Vauban, were thus defended by a marshal

of France at the head of thirteen or fourteen thousand soldiers. The besiegers had over eighty thousand men.

It was natural to expect a long and powerful resistance. The rôle of Villeroi was all marked out: it was to crush Vaudemont, then to starve out the besiegers by cutting off their communications with Brussels and Liege. July 13, at the close of the day, Villeroi, by a well-planned march, reached Vaudemont near Deynse, on the left bank of the Lys. Vaudemont, during the night, intrenched himself as well as he could. The position was not strong, and the numerical inequality was such that the army-corps of the enemy should have been annihilated. The French army awaited the signal of attack at daybreak; this signal was not given; almost the entire day passed in complete inaction, Villeroi every moment expecting that Vaudemont would put himself in motion, in order to charge him in his retreat. The enemy finally profited by this unhoped-for respite to begin the withdrawal of his right wing. The French left, commanded by the Duke du Maine, the eldest of the King's natural sons, then entered the evacuated intrenchment, but allowed the enemy to retire undisturbed; the Duke gave as a pretext that Villeroi had forbidden him to open the attack. Evening arrived; the enemy withdrew in his turn; Villeroi, with the French right, finally moved, but so late that he could only kill or take some hundreds of men in Vaudemont's rear-guard. This day should have sufficed to determine the capacity of Villeroi and Du Maine, the general and his lieutenant.[1]

After having failed to take the army of Vaudemont, Villeroi failed to secure the city of Nieuwpoort, into which Vaudemont had time to throw important aid. Villeroi fell back upon Dixmude and Deynse, wretched places occupied by seven thousand English and other soldiers, who surrendered themselves prisoners almost without resistance. William III. was thereby irritated to such a degree that he ordered the commander of Dixmude to be decapitated, and the commander of Deynse to be degraded. This check of the English, however, could in no way effect the siege of Namur. The great engineer, Cohorn, pressed this siege with an ardor that was

[1] *Mém. de Saint-Hilaire*, t. II. pp. 149–158. *Mém. de Berwick*, t. I. p. 135. *Mém. de Feuquières*, t. IV. p. 251. *Mém. de Saint-Simon*, t. I. p. 299. Saint-Simon gives a very dramatic, but very false account of this affair, as we can assure ourselves by comparing him with Saint-Hilaire and Berwick, ocular witnesses. His rage against the *bastards* caused him to justify Villeroi completely at the expense of the Duke du Maine. The more deeply we study Saint-Simon, the more we learn to distrust all his anecdotes so well told, but so thoroughly transformed by a restless, hating, and credulous imagination.

redoubled by his rivalry with Vauban: he would have gladly, at any cost, repaid Vauban the affront he had received from him in 1692. Unfortunately, Vauban was not in the place, and Namur was defended with more energy than skill by Boufflers. The trenches were opened in the night of July 9–10; in the night of the 17th, a corps of troops, that Boufflers had believed that he could leave in camp outside of the ramparts, was assailed and almost destroyed by the allies; a large breach was opened in a wall that they had neglected to terrace; the enemy forded the Meuse, which was very low, and penetrated into the city. He was repelled the first time; but the place was no longer tenable: Boufflers surrendered the city, August 4, and withdrew his troops to the citadel and other fortresses, which William battered with one hundred and fifty heavy guns and fifty-five mortars. Villeroi essayed a diversion: he forced Vaudemont as far as Brussels, and, from the 13th to the 15th of August, showered bombs and hot shot on this great city. Brussels experienced the fate of Genoa: nearly four thousand houses were burned; there was, it is said, more than twenty millions' damage. This cruel retaliation for the bombardment of Dieppe did not save Namur. Villeroi did not attack Vaudemont, who had covered himself with the river Senne, and had been joined by a part of William's army; he marched towards the camp of the allies after having received heavy reinforcements drawn from the army of Germany and the garrisons of the North. Two masses, of a hundred thousand soldiers each, thus found themselves in each other's presence; but Villeroi, after having gained a knowledge of the positions occupied by William on the bank of the Mehaigne, deemed it best to run no risk. William, on the contrary, without waiting for his trenches to be carried up to the base of the citadel of Namur, ordered an assault as soon as a breach was made. The counterscarp of the citadel, Fort Cassotte, newly constructed by Vauban, and another work, were attacked at once, openly, and in the daytime (August 31). The assailants' loss was enormous; but the two forts and the counterscarp were carried, and the garrison of the citadel could drive the enemy from the breach only by a great effort. Boufflers capitulated the next day, on condition of marching out September 6, if he were not succored in the interval. Villeroi remained motionless, and Boufflers surrendered the citadel and Fort Orange on the day agreed upon. The garrison was reduced from thirteen thousand men to less than five thousand; the enemy had lost from eighteen to twenty thousand soldiers in this terrible siege.

This was the first important success that William had obtained on the Continent since the beginning of the war, and this success was enhanced to him by the personal humiliation of the Great King, to whom the taking of Namur had once brought so many praises in verse and prose. Louis had hitherto more than once restored his personal conquests, but he had not yet lost one by force. The effect of the retaking of Namur was great in Europe.[1]

It is scarcely necessary to say that we did not indemnify ourselves for this loss on the side of Germany. Marshal de Lorges still had, at the opening of the campaign, forty-five thousand men, more than half of them cavalry, against less than twenty-five thousand. The Imperial army was formed only with difficulty. Dissension reigned among the German princes, in consequence of a very grave act on the part of the Emperor. Leopold, in order to gain the Duke of Hanover, who had long vacillated between Austria and France, had promised to create a new electorate in favor of this Prince, with the secret condition that the Brunswick-Hanover branch should always vote for the eldest son of the House of Austria as King of the Romans (March 23, 1692). Leopold had kept his word (December 29, 1692), but three of the Electors, Treves, Cologne, and the Palatine, had protested; the college of the Princes of the Empire, among whom was the Duke of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, chief of the eldest branch of Brunswick, had followed this example, and had engaged, by an *act of union*, not to admit the new electorate (February 11, 1693). This act was renewed and strengthened by new adhesions, March 24, 1695, although Leopold had receded and declared that he would suspend the effect of the investiture till he should obtain the consent of the Diet. In gaining the Brunswick-Hanovers, Leopold had nearly alienated other sovereign houses! The French generals profited by this state of affairs only to lay bare the level country between the Neckar and the Main. The numerical inferiority of the Imperialists soon ceased by a great effort of the Emperor and his allies. Marshal de Lorges fell ill and was replaced by Marshal de Joyeuse, who did no more than he. It would have been much better to proclaim the neutrality of the Rhine than uselessly to ravage, every year, both banks of this river.

The campaign of Italy was, this year, more diplomatic than military. Secret negotiations had recommenced, in the month of March, with the Duke of Savoy. Casale was blockaded; the Em-

[1] Quinci, t. II. pp. 100–156. Saint-Hilaire, t. II. pp. 148, 161–163. Feuquières, t. II. pp. 244–249; III. p. 336; IV. pp. 28–341.

peror and Spain unceasingly pressed Victor Amadeus seriously to attack this important place; but this Prince feared as much to see Casale in the hands of the Imperialists as in those of the French. He informed Louis XIV. that he could not avoid undertaking the siege, and entreated the King to send the governor orders to capitulate, when somewhat closely pressed, on condition that the fortifications should be demolished without the power of being reëstablished during the course of the war, and that the garrison should remain till the demolition was complete. This was the blotting out of Casale. Louis XIV. consented; Catinat was ordered to remain on the defensive around Pignerol and Susa. Casale was attacked at the end of June; the governor, on the 8th or 9th of July, asked to capitulate; the generals of the Emperor and of Spain were in nowise satisfied with the conditions offered; the Duke of Savoy constrained them to accept, and caused the demolition of the fortifications to be prolonged till the middle of September, in such a way as to make any other enterprise impossible during the rest of the season. Nevertheless, in order to dissipate the suspicions of the allies, he renewed, September 21, his adhesion to the Great Alliance, — the act of which was renewed, this year, between the Emperor, Holland, the Bishop of Münster, the Duke of Hanover, the Electors of Bavaria and Brandenburg, then Spain and England, as if to protest against any idea of negotiation with Louis XIV. (August–November, 1695).[1]

The affairs of Catalonia, brilliant enough the year before, had greatly deteriorated during the winter. The troops, ill paid and ill fed, having committed all kinds of excesses and pillaged even the churches, the Catalonians, at first favorably disposed towards the French, had risen against them with fury. Armed peasants, more formidable to the conquerors than the regular troops of Spain, had defeated the detachments, seized the convoys, blockaded the towns. Marshal de Noailles, who felt the situation becoming more and more difficult, and who was weary of struggling against the ill-will of the minister of war, asked for his recall under the pretext of sickness. The King sent the Duke de Vendôme. This great-grandson of Henri IV. and Gabrielle, licentious, witty, and brave, had greatly distinguished himself wherever he had borne arms, but had not yet commanded in chief. This choice was happier than that of Villeroi. Vendôme had great faults, but still greater good qualities. By his good qualities as well as by his faults, he closely resembled Luxembourg, whom he replaced, as Luxembourg had replaced the great

[1] *Mém. de Catinat*, t. II. p. 879.

Condé, without wholly equalling him. Our history presents a decreasing double series of captains who seem to engender each other and who represent the genius of war under its two aspects: these are Condé and Turenne, Luxembourg and Catinat, Vendôme and Berwick.[1] Vendôme, in the existing state of affairs, could not make a brilliant beginning. He was forced to dismantle Hostalrich, Castle Follit, Palamos, and some other posts which he could not guard in the midst of a seditious country, and, of the conquests of the preceding year, he only preserved Gerona.

In 1695, as in 1694, France had no fleet on the western seas. The Anglo-Batavians recommenced their attacks against our maritime cities. July 14, admirals Berkeley and Allemunde presented themselves anew before Saint-Malo, and bombarded at once the city and Fort Conchée, built on a rock in the sea to defend the approach to the town. They ruined or damaged a number of houses, but were not even able to burn the fort, which was then only of wood, and which was soon afterwards replaced by a more formidable citadel. Several of their bomb-ketches were sunk or burned by the fire from the town and fort. From this place they set sail towards the coasts of Normandy, bombarded Granville in passing, then a small town without defenders, and unimportant, then directed their course towards Dunkirk, after having renewed their instruments of destruction. Armed sloops prevented the galliots from approaching Dunkirk, and heroically went to grapple and turn aside the infernal machines hurled against the forts of the two moles. Not a single bomb reached the city (August 11). The allies lost in their retreat a frigate run aground and burned. They were not much more successful against Calais; they did some injury to the place with their bombs, but were not able to burn the wooden fort that protected Calais on the side of the sea. The great preparations and terrible threats of the English thus ended, as was wittily said in France, *in breaking windows with guineas:* they had spent incomparably more than the houses which they burned were worth.

Whilst the Anglo-Batavians were employing their principal naval forces in protecting the coasts of Spain and in threatening the coasts of France, the French privateers continued to lay waste their commerce. Dunkirk and Saint-Malo braved the impotent wrath of the allies and fattened on their spoils. The rich vessels of the English East India Company were seized on their return, with many ships of the West Indies; the loss was a million sterling. The English and the Spaniards failed in an attack on the French

[1] Villars may also be reckoned in the *school* of Condé.

part of St. Domingo; the French, on the contrary, took and destroyed the English fort at Gambia at the beginning of the following year.

The sea was unfavorable to the allies; yet, for the first time, the general result of the campaign was advantageous to them. France had lost two first-class places. One of these places, in truth, was to be of no more use to any one, and the defection of the Duke of Savoy was about to deprive the allies of much more than the annihilation of Casale gave them.

The allies were still unwilling to open their eyes to this imminent defection, and were intoxicated with a success indeed new to them. William and Leopold thought that they finally saw the colossus of the French monarchy shaken, and obstinately redoubled their efforts to overthrow it. Leopold, however, had met with grave checks in another direction. A new Sultan, young and brave, Mustapha II., had taken command of the Ottoman army in person, reconquered several places in Hungary, and defeated the Imperialists. The real force of the Turks had long been exaggerated; subsequently, their weakness had been overrated; but, at the moment when they were supposed to be overthrown, they rose again as if moved by an unexpected impulse, and showed themselves still formidable. It was long to be the case with this people.

William convoked a new Parliament for December 2, 1695. The debates of the last session had revealed the dishonorable means by which William secured a majority; venality had been as great in this Parliament as in the times of Charles II., with this important difference, however, that it was no longer foreign gold that purchased votes.[1] The Whigs, who were predominant in the new Parliament, endeavored to put a stop to the corruption that reigned in the administration, but at the same time granted the King more considerable subsidies than ever, in order to follow up the advantages gained over France. They voted five million two hundred and forty thousand pounds sterling for the war, without counting five hundred thousand pounds sterling to replenish the civil list encumbered with debts. Louis XIV., however, at the beginning of 1696, declared to the King of Sweden, as mediator, that he accepted the judgment of Sweden as to the modifications to be made in the treaties of Westphalia and Nimeguen, and Charles XI.

[1] Macaulay, in his *William III.*, gives interesting explanations concerning the causes and true nature of parliamentary corruption in England, and seeks excuses in favor of William.

declared, on his side, that Sweden would accept no change that would alter the tenor of the two treaties. These conciliating manifestations, which seemed to indicate that Louis might give up Strasburg and Luxemburg, did not stop military preparations.

Louis made a vigorous effort to efface the impression produced by the loss of Namur. He had returned to the idea of attacking William in England itself. At Versailles, as at Saint-Germain, it was believed that William was less firmly seated on the throne since the death of his wife, who had given him, whilst she lived, a kind of *quasi* legitimacy. The agitation was great in England: a part of the yeomanry still clung to the *ancient right;* commerce angrily clamored at being abandoned to French privateers, whilst the British fleets were employed in cruising about the Mediterranean or in threatening the ports that derided their attempts; English commerce reckoned its losses at the enormous figure of four thousand two hundred vessels and thirty million pounds sterling! Money was wanting. The recoining of the currency, an excellent operation in itself, momentarily increased the trouble by diminishing circulation. The Jacobites made use of these causes of discontent to excite a revolt, and had announced to the cabinet of Versailles that a great rising of armed men would take place as soon as an auxiliary French corps should descend on the British coast with King James. Considerable armaments were prepared in the French ports; sixteen thousand picked soldiers were assembled at Calais, Dunkirk, and Gravelins; and James II., in the course of February, put himself at the head of these troops, which Jean Bart and other famous sailors were to escort.

In the mean time the plot miscarried in England. The conspirators were not content with preparations to take up arms and to enroll the malcontents; the most determined had planned to kill the *usurper*. Two or three of their accomplices, through fear or remorse, denounced them; several of the leaders were arrested and avowed everything. William hastened to send to sea all the ships at his disposal. Admiral Russel, who was on his return with a part of the Mediterranean fleet, was in a few days at the head of fifty ships and frigates, and sailed to cruise before the downs of France, where he was reinforced by a Dutch squadron. The fleet of Toulon, sent by the King, had not arrived; the squadrons united on the coasts of Flanders and Picardy were not in a condition to force the passage. King James returned mournfully to Saint-Germain.

This enterprise, although its execution had not even been com-

menced, and although it had evoked, in England and Scotland, noisy expressions of attachment to William's person, seemed to produce a deep impression on that prince. The feeling of the dangers he had run made him thenceforth less opposed to peace. Besides, he was not in a position to undertake anything of importance in the Netherlands. He collected heavy forces there, but the French opposed to him forces nearly equal, and the lack of money hampered his movements. It was easier for Parliament to vote heavy imposts than to secure their cheerful and prompt payment. William did not believe it possible to undertake a great siege in the presence of a powerful enemy and with ill-paid and ill-provisioned troops. The French, who were in a scarcely better condition, did no more. Four armies held each other in check all summer: on the side of the Sambre and the Meuse, Boufflers remained on the defensive before William; on the side of the Scheldt and the Lys, Vaudemont preserved the same attitude before Villeroi; two hundred and fifty thousand men thus remained confronting each other several months without any result, except that the French succeeded in maintaining themselves on the enemy's territory.

In Germany, as usual, nothing of importance took place; only, this time, it was a victory for France to have made the campaign ineffectual. Although the war in Hungary had become again more active and more unfavorable to the Emperor, Leopold, who no more desired peace on the Rhine than on the Danube, had found the means to give to Prince Louis of Baden fifty thousand men against thirty-five thousand that Marshal de Choiseul had at his disposal. Choiseul, an old general hitherto without distinction, chose an excellent position on the Speyerbach (a brook of Speyer), at once covered Landau, Philippsburg, and Alsace, and hindered Prince Louis from penetrating our territory and besieging our towns. It was a splendid success with so good a general as Prince Louis for an opponent.

The operations in Catalonia were not of much interest. The great Anglo-Batavian fleet had left the Mediterranean, and the Spaniards were not in a condition to keep the offensive. The Duke de Vendôme defeated their cavalry near Hostalrich, but he was not strong enough to attack Barcelona, with the people in a state of insurrection in his rear.

Diplomacy continued to act more than arms in Piedmont. The secret negotiations with the Duke of Savoy had been followed up during the winter. Victor Amadeus, availing himself of the too manifest desire of Louis XIV. for peace, was no longer content

with recovering his invaded domains; after having succeeded in destroying Casale, he now demanded that France should cede to him Pignerol dismantled. A few years earlier, Louis XIV. would have smiled with pity at such a proposition: he refused it at first; then consented to discuss it. In the spring, pending the conclusion, Catinat, powerfully reinforced, descended into the plain of Piedmont with more than fifty thousand men, for the purpose of at once influencing the Duke and furnishing him a pretext for accepting the King's conditions. A few days afterwards, a treaty was signed between the secret agents of Louis and Victor Amadeus (May 30). The Duke, it is said in this treaty, engaged in a league offensive and defensive with the King till a general peace. Louis, on the establishment of peace, was to cede to Victor Amadeus Pignerol dismantled, with its dependencies, as far as the foot of Mont Ginevra, on condition that the fortifications should never be reëstablished. The King was to restore Savoy, Susa, and the county of Nice, as soon as the Imperialists and other foreigners should quit Italy, and the Spaniards should return to Milanais. The King was not to treat, without the Duke, with the cabinets of Vienna and Madrid. The marriage of the Princess Maria Adelaide, the eldest daughter of the Duke, was agreed upon with the Duke of Burgundy, the eldest of the King's grandsons. The King granted the Duke proper time honorably to disengage himself from the League (that is to say, till the end of August). The ambassadors of Savoy were thenceforth to be treated in France like those of crowned heads. The Duke was not thereafter to permit French refugees to establish themselves in the Vaudois valleys of Luzerne, the King in no other way interfering with the manner in which the Duke was to treat the Vaudois. The Duke pledged himself, if neutrality were reëstablished in Italy, to reduce his forces to seven thousand five hundred foot and fifteen hundred horse. If neutrality were not accepted by September 1, he was to join his troops to those of the King and to command the combined army. The conquests that might be made in Milanais were to belong to him. The King, during the war, was to pay to him a subsidy of one hundred thousand crowns per month.[1]

The Duke of Savoy thus gained by his defeats what he could not have hoped to gain by a prosperous war. Louis XIV., through having allowed Louvois to drive this feeble neighbor to extremity, lost not only Casale, his own conquest, but the key of Italy, the old conquest of Richelieu, that Pignerol which France had held

[1] *Mém. du maréchal de Tessé*, t. I. p. 68; 1806.

for three quarters of a century, and should have preserved as long as any other foreign power kept a foot of land in the peninsula. And yet this treaty was regarded as a victory!

Some difficulties retarded the ratification till June 29. The secret compact ratified, Catinat, as it had been agreed, ostensibly proposed to the Duke, on the part of the King, what had already been concluded. Victor Amadeus communicated the *propositions* to the generals of the Emperor and of Spain, his auxiliaries, and declared to them that he could no longer allow his States to be laid waste, or refuse Pignerol, but protested, with well-feigned indignation, against the idea of joining France for the purpose of attacking his allies. A truce of one month was agreed upon, July 12, then continued to the middle of September. The Emperor employed this delay in endeavoring to regain Victor Amadeus by magnificent offers: he went so far as to offer him the Duchy of Milan after the death of the King of Spain, and the immediate government of Milanais as a guaranty. The Duke was too deeply pledged, and the French were in too great force at the gates of Turin. The cabinets of Vienna and Madrid, exasperated by the *treason* of the Duke, resisted the solicitations of the Pope, of Venice, of all Italy, and refused neutrality to the peninsula. September 15, peace was published at Turin between Louis XIV. and Victor Amadeus. The public treaty made no mention of the alliance offensive and defensive; but Victor Amadeus had in his pocket the commission of generalissimo of the combined army. The Austro-Spanish troops were withdrawn to Milanais. As soon as the truce expired, the French marched along the Po as far as Valenza, the best place for protecting Milanais. September 17, Victor Amadeus joined Catinat. From the 18th to the 19th Valenza was invested on both banks of the Po by the Franco-Piedmontese. Victor Amadeus operated unscrupulously and relentlessly against his allies of the day before, an action against which he had recently protested so strongly at the moment when he had just promised its accomplishment. The trenches were opened September 24: the allied generals were not in a condition to aid Valenza and arrest the invasion of Milanais: they resigned themselves to use the powers that had been conferred on them to be employed only in the last extremity. They accepted the neutrality of the peninsula, and engaged to remove the Imperial and auxiliary troops immediately from Italy, on condition that the Italian States, the Pope and Venice excepted, should pay to the Emperor 300,000 pistoles. France conceded the relinquishment of Pignerol, not only at the

general peace, but at the same time that she restored Savoy and Nice (October 7).[1]

The natural frontier of the southeast, a moment conquered, was thus abandoned.

Louis XIV., the expedition to England having failed, had decided not to maintain great fleets on the sea. After Château-Renaud had brought his squadron from Toulon to Brest (the middle of May), without having been stopped in the Straits of Gibraltar by the Anglo-Batavians, most of the vessels were disarmed, and only small squadrons were kept at sea. The allies, on the contrary, sent to sea, in the spring, a numerous fleet, and recommenced their attempts on our coasts, without more success than in the past: they threw bombs into Calais, May 18; at the close of July, they reappeared in sight of Brest, which they uselessly threatened: a part of their fleet bombarded Saint-Martin-de-Ré and the Sables d'Olonne, then ravaged some islets on the coast of Brittany, without even being able to effect a landing elsewhere than at Belle-Isle, or to carry the towers of Houat and Hedic, each defended by fifteen soldiers. All the exploits of the English were limited to hamstringing horses, killing cattle, and burning cottages. Maritime bombardments, which had only too well succeeded with the French against such places as Genoa, ill prepared to defend themselves against this kind of warfare, seemed definitively condemned by experience where well-fortified places somewhat difficult of approach were concerned: it required the application of steam to navigation to give any chance of success to this cruel procedure.

The allies had striven, this year, to defend their commerce somewhat better. The English succeeded in this to some extent, but the Dutch were worse treated than ever. The allies had succeeded no better in blockading the port of Dunkirk than in burning the city; in the course of June, fourteen Anglo-Batavian ships had not been able to prevent Jean Bart from quitting the port with one ship and six large frigates. June 18, Bart met at the north of Texel the Dutch merchant-fleet of the Baltic, escorted by six frigates. Five frigates and thirty or forty merchant-ships fell into his hands. Thirteen of the enemy's men-of-war arrived under full sail; Bart burned his prizes, without allowing a single one to be retaken, and retired slowly, the enemy's squadron not daring to attack him. He did still more injury perhaps to Holland by disturbing the herring-fishery, which occupied four or five hundred

[1] Dumont, *Corps diplomatique*, t. VII. part 2, p. 368. *Mém. de Tessé*, t. I. pp. 71–77. *Paix de Ryswick*, t. I. p. 180.

vessels, and which he almost wholly obstructed, despite the protection of a strong squadron. He terminated his brilliant campaign by passing through thirty-three Anglo-Batavian ships that were endeavoring to prevent him from regaining the ports of France. The grade of rear-admiral recompensed the illustrious privateer, who had long since taken rank in the royal navy. Duguai-Trouin promised soon to equal Jean Bart. This year, with five frigates or vessels of inferior rank, he attacked and captured three Dutch men-of-war and twelve rich merchant-vessels which they were escorting. The Rear-Admiral Nesmond took prizes to the amount of ten millions from the Dutch by a single blow. This cruising warfare, so advantageous, had just been rendered more honorable by an ordinance that took from it every trace of piracy. This ordinance, which honors the government of Louis XIV., required French vessels to hoist the national flag before firing the first gun (March 17, 1696). Other nations successively accepted this rule as a part of the law of nations.[1]

The Imperialists had been again successful in Hungary during this campaign. The new Elector of Saxony, Frederick Augustus, who had been put at the head of the Imperial army, had been defeated by the Sultan Mustapha and obliged to raise the siege of Temesvar (August 26). The Sultan had not succeeded, however, in penetrating into Transylvania, and, as a compensation for the check at Temesvar, the Emperor had obtained from the Russians a closer alliance and a more efficient diversion. The young Czar, Peter Alexiovitch, who had been reigning several years conjointly with his brother Ivan, found himself the sole possessor of supreme power by the death of Ivan, which occurred in January, 1696. His first act was to wrest from the Tartars, vassals of the Turks, the city of Azof, which gave to the Russians the mouth of the Don and the Sea of Azof, and paved the way to them for the opening of the Black Sea. John Sobieski died in the mean time (June 17). Peter the Great rose at the moment when Sobieski disappeared, — a sombre presage for Poland and Europe!

With the exception of these remote events, the campaign of 1696 had been very nearly fruitless in its military, but important in its diplomatic results. The defection of the Duke of Savoy, dearly purchased, it is true, had covered one of the frontiers of France and released one of the armies. Louis XIV., while he became stronger, showed himself more and more pacific, and, in the course

[1] *Anciennes Lois françaises*, t. XX. p. 260. L. Guérin, t. II. pp. 98–105. Quinci, t. II. pp. 268–288.

of the summer, he had signified to the allies, through an agent whom he had had for some time at the Hague, "that he was ready to replace everything as it was," according to the treaties of Westphalia and Nimeguen, the allies preserving moreover the right to advocate their claims and pretensions. This was what William III. had demanded in the first parleys of 1694. Louis made no reservations except for Luxemburg and the ten cities and seigniories of Alsace; he consented to restore Strasburg or an equivalent at the choice of the Emperor, — an equivalent which could only be Freiburg and Breisach. This was adroitly calculated to divide the Emperor and the Empire, the King hoping that the Emperor would prefer to see Freiburg and Breisach return to the domain of his family to seeing Strasburg again become a free and Imperial city.[1] Holland, so cruelly injured by the war in her vital point, her maritime commerce, eagerly received the new propositions of France. William no longer obstructed this movement of public opinion; the great enemy of Louis XIV. agreed that the time had arrived to accept the Swedish mediation and to open a congress. The Emperor on the contrary persisted in putting off the opening of general negotiations till Louis had promised to satisfy all the demands of the Empire concerning Alsace and of Spain concerning the Netherlands. In reality, Leopold repelled peace for the same reason that Louis desired it, — on account of the approaching succession of Spain.

The language held by William in Parliament, after his return from Flanders (October 30, 1696), indicated the change that had been wrought in his mind: he spoke of overtures made for peace; nevertheless, he strongly insisted on the necessity of treating only with the sword in hand, and of remaining strongly armed. Parliament, animated by the hope of conquering an honorable peace, surpassed itself in liberality, and voted more than six million pounds sterling, to assure the services of 1697, as well as to fill up the deficit caused by the insufficiency of collections. By the side of the tax on the revenue of lands, taxes were established on all sorts of revenues without exception. The six million pounds sterling, however, could not at once provide for the current services and fill up the deficit, which was alone more than five million pounds sterling: the state of finances was deplorable; money was scarce; interest from nine to ten per cent. to merchants; maritime insurance, thirty per cent.; the Navigation Act was virtually suspended, and the English marine reduced to the necessity of sailing under the Swedish

[1] *Paix de Ryswick*, t. I. p. 197 *et seq.*

and Danish flags; bonds on the State were discredited; bank-notes were at twenty per cent. discount; a territorial bank, emitting bills on mortgage of real estate, had been attempted without success. The chancellor of the exchequer, Montague, attacked the evil face to face with the boldness of superior genius; he procured the passage of a law by Parliament that all the new taxes, save the land-tax, should be set apart to fill up the deficit, and should continue to be collected till the deficiency should be extinguished; that, in case of necessity, even a new impost should be created in order to put an end to it. At the same time he caused the exchequer to be authorized to borrow one million pounds sterling at eight per cent., by issuing a double number of notes, and to begin to levy, from the closing month of 1696, the impost voted for 1697; the treasury had orders to receive exchequer notes in payment of the different taxes, except the land-tax. A company was organized to put the notes in circulation; these notes at first paid a discount of ten per cent., then of four, then they reached par, and the company became useless. The bank, on the other hand, was strengthened by different favors of Parliament, and especially by permission to issue eight hundred thousand pounds sterling worth of bonds, bearing eight per cent. interest: the notes of the bank rose to par, and its new bonds were soon preferred to money. The machinery of credit was thus put in motion again with unwonted energy, and England, equally prepared for peace or war, entered on a course of progress and development which was no more to be arrested.[1]

If England had Locke and Newton to counsel her ministers, France also might have found distinguished citizens to guide hers; but she had no Montague to understand them, she had only Pontchartrain. The comptroller-general only knew how to renew in profusion the bursal edicts, among which we remark an increase of duty on salt-water fish, injurious to the marine, the sale of five hundred letters of nobility at two thousand crowns each, the levy of duties on coats-of-arms to the amount of seven millions,[2] the reëstablishment, for pay, of titular governors in the close cities of the interior, etc. The creations of *rentes* were still the least evil

[1] Hume, *William III. and Mary*, ch. 5. Sainte-Croix, t. II. p. 85. Macaulay, *William III.*, Vol. III. ch. 4. All the resources employed by Montague were not equally good; he had established a great lottery.

[2] All the noblemen and all the communities of the kingdom were constrained to pay these duties; all ecclesiastics, officers, citizens of free cities, were authorized to assume coats-of-arms by paying the duties. They were almost constrained to do it. See Larrei, t. II. p. 288.

expedient; from 1695 to 1697, six million eight hundred thousand livres' worth were created at seven and one ninth per cent. and one million's worth at eight and one third per cent., besides a *tontine* of one million two hundred thousand livres on a capital of twelve millions. The gross receipts, from ordinary revenue as well as from extraordinary transactions, were, in 1697, one hundred and fifty-eight millions; the charges to be deducted approached forty-eight millions. Each year had deepened the chasm.[1]

The progress of negotiations, it is true, began to afford a forecast of the end of sacrifices. French diplomacy was no longer conducted by Colbert de Croissi; that minister had just died, July 28, 1696,[2] and his office, conformably to the system of ministerial hereditability in vogue, had passed to his son, the Marquis de Torci. This time, the public service did not suffer; Torci, although not possessing a mind of the first order, had estimable and solid qualities: learned, laborious, upright, and sensible, he was a mature man more by his character than by his age (he was thirty-one years old), and Louis, moreover, gave him as an associate and guide in the ministry the ex-minister of foreign affairs, Arnaud de Pomponne, who had been replaced by his father Croissi. Disgraced in 1680, for a trifling neglect of duty, and especially for too much moderation in his conduct towards foreign nations, Pomponne had been recalled to the council, as minister of state without a portfolio, after the death of Louvois, and his return had been one of the indications of a modification in the policy of Louis XIV. Pomponne, of a religious spirit, inclined to Jansenism, which was to him a family religion, had become reconciled in Christianity to the Colberts, and had married his daughter to Torci. He had, till his death, in 1699, the chief authority in the ministry, Torci having the title and the execution under him, without mistrust or jealousy, which was to the credit of both.[3]

Germany had been greatly agitated during the winter; she feared an invasion in the spring by the French armies of the Rhine and of Italy united, and the six Circles of the Upper and the Lower Rhine, Franconia, Bavaria, Swabia, and Westphalia, excited by the Emperor, had associated themselves to put on foot a defensive army of sixty thousand men, and had loudly demanded assistance from Holland and England. Their warlike clamors increased with the pacific remonstrances of these two states to the Emperor (January 3–8, 1697). England and Holland pressed Leopold no longer

[1] Forbonnais, t. II. pp. 82–95.

[2] It was Croissi who founded the *Dépôt des Affaires Etrangères*.

[3] Dangeau, t. II. p. 45.

to raise preliminary difficulties, and to accept the Swedish mediation and the opening of conferences. There were between France, England, and Holland no more preliminary discussions except concerning the form in which Louis should recognize the royalty of William and the restitution of Luxemburg; but the Anglo-Batavian envoys declared to the Emperor that they were persuaded that these two difficulties would be removed. The Emperor did not dare to offend his powerful allies, and, February 4, all the ministers of the allied powers, Spain excepted, accepted the mediation of Sweden. The 10th, the French ambassador Caillères renewed the offers made by his master, adding thereto the restitution of Luxemburg or an equivalent, and the promise to recognize King William without restriction or reserve, when the treaty should be signed. The allies reserved the indemnities which they pretended to claim and demanded, beyond the treaty of Nimeguen, the restitution of the duchies of Lorraine and Bouillon. France refused to exceed her preliminaries; she had already made enough and too many concessions!

These preliminary discussions took place at the Hague. It was decided that the congress should be held at Neuburg-Hausen, a château belonging to William III., near the village of Ryswick, between Delft and the Hague. The congress did not open till May 9; Harlai de Bonneuil, councillor of state, and Verjus de Créci had been joined as plenipotentiaries to the first French negotiator Caillères. The plenipotentiaries of the allies claimed not to remit their demands to the mediator till after the French plenipotentiaries had presented theirs. "We have nothing to demand," proudly replied the French; "your masters have never conquered anything from ours."[1] The Emperor, the Empire, and Spain, who had finally decided to accept the mediation, then set forth a host of different pretensions: the most legitimate were those of the princes and states of the Rhine, who demanded damages for their countries so cruelly and unjustly laid waste; but, as they were feeble, they had little chance of being heard. England and Holland did not support the claims of their allies; William III., who summed up these two nations in his person, had very nearly made his peace; Louis XIV. had secretly pledged him his word to retain nothing of what he might take from Spain in the campaign that was opening, and William, who now desired peace as strongly as he had desired war, and knew that Austrian obstinacy would yield only to absolute necessity, had given Louis to understand that he

[1] Limiers, *Hist. de Louis XIV.*, t. V. p. 132. This was true only in Europe.

would not seriously oppose the operations of the French. Louis was therefore prepared to press Spain with the utmost vigor; at the same time he opposed an absolute refusal to the pretension manifested by the Emperor to regulate beforehand the Spanish succession in the congress of Ryswick; that is, Louis succeeded in breaking the Great Alliance, with the consent of William III. England and Holland, the ardor of their anti-French passion once cooled, had understood that they were playing, in this compact, the part of dupes for the interest of Austria. This must have been truly disheartening to Leopold, who had counted on introducing into European law an agreement that should guarantee the Spanish inheritance to his house. The rupture of the Great Alliance was the price paid by William to Louis for his vast territorial restitutions. Louis, resuming his old custom, signified his ultimatum, July 20, to the Emperor, the Empire, and Spain, giving them till the end of August to accept.[1]

Military operations had kept pace with the negotiations. France had put formidable armies on foot. The fears of Germany had not been justified; the storm did not break upon her, and Marshal de Choiseul, who commanded on the Rhine, somewhat inferior in force to the Imperialists of the Prince of Baden, could only hold them in check in the countries of Baden and Ortnau. The great masses of French troops were concentrated in Belgium; a hundred and fifty thousand soldiers were there formed, in the month of April, into three army-corps under the command of Villeroi, Boufflers, and Catinat; this last name was of good augury and compensated for the first. May 15, Catinat invested the city of Ath, the last place that covered Brussels. Villeroi and Boufflers protected the siege, the works of which Vauban directed; he had fortified Ath, whilst that city belonged to France; he well knew how to undo his own work. With this siege a new system was begun. Hitherto it had been customary to advance the batteries as the works advanced; henceforth cannon were employed only when the works were so near the place that the batteries did not require to be changed. William III. had about ninety thousand men to put in line; he did not risk them to save Ath, which capitulated June 7, but contented himself with protecting Brussels. The three marshals did not attack him; the armies remained confronting each other peaceably in the heart of Brabant, and the last difficulties that remained between William and Louis were removed in the mysterious conferences brought about by William and held from

[1] *Paix de Ryswick*, t. I. pp. 211–232, 289–412; t. II. pp. 1–233.

the end of June to the beginning of August, not between the official plenipotentiaries at Ryswick, but at Hall, between Marshal de Boufflers and Bentinck, Earl of Portland, the most intimate confidant of William. It was generally believed that the eventualities of the Spanish succession had been discussed in these interviews; this was a mistake; the correspondence of the two Kings and of their ministers shows that they referred only to what concerned Louis, James, and William.[1] William demanded that James II. should leave Saint-Germain, which was too near England; Louis refused. Louis demanded an armistice, with restitution of property, for the Jacobite refugees; William would not agree to this. Louis desired that William, on recovering his principality of Orange, should engage not to give asylum to French Protestants; William consented, after some resistance. Louis formally promised henceforth to encourage in no manner, direct or indirect, any attempt against the existing order of things in England. William was unwilling to promise the payment of the dowry of the Queen, wife of James II., unless she would retire with her husband to Avignon or Italy. There was no question, as has often been repeated, of a compromise that would have made the son of James II. the successor of William. James, in a manifesto addressed to the congress of Ryswick, had protested, the March preceding, against any combination of this kind and against any abandonment of his rights.[2]

The conferences of Boufflers and Portland, besides their direct object, had been certainly calculated to influence the congress of Ryswick, where the agents of the Emperor continued to embarrass the negotiations. The events in Spain exercised a pressure much stronger still. With forces infinitely less than in Belgium, the French arms had obtained on that side a success incomparably greater. Before operations began again in the Spanish peninsula, the campaign had commenced very unfavorably to Spain in her American possessions. A privateer squadron, that is to say, a squadron formed of the King's vessels, equipped at the expense of ship-owners, had arrived from Brest in the waters of the West Indies at the close of winter: the rear-admiral, Pointis, who had under his command eight ships and heavy frigates, a bomb-ketch, and some small vessels, had been reinforced by seven small priva-

[1] See the correspondence of Louis XIV. with Boufflers and that of William III. with Portland, &c., published in English by Grimblot, under the following title,—*Letters of William III. and Louis XIV. and of their Ministers, etc.*, London, 1848, 2 vols. 8vo. Macaulay, *William III.*, Vol. III. ch. 8. *Mém. de Torci. Mém. de Berwick. Stuart's Papers.*

[2] *Actes de la paix de Ryswick*, t. I. pp. 460, 490.

teering frigates, commanded by Ducasse, governor of St. Domingo. The expedition set sail for Carthagena, the rich entrepôt between Peru and Spain, and landed on the strand three thousand five hundred soldiers and privateers, who took by assault or capitulation the three forts of the roadstead and the city, then the city itself, despite a courageous defence which was rarely met with in the Spanish-Americans (April 15–30). The inhabitants were allowed to carry away their effects; but all the gold, silver, and precious stones were the prey of the conqueror. Pointis set out on his return, after having blown up the fortifications; he avoided an English squadron much stronger than his own, fought another on his way, and reëntered Brest safe and sound, bringing back to his ship-owners more than ten millions. The officers of the squadron and the privateers had well provided for themselves besides, and the Spaniards had probably lost more than twenty millions.[1]

This, however, was but a remote episode of the war: Spain was struck nearer by and on her own soil. The war in Catalonia had assumed a wholly new aspect. The Duke de Vendôme, with thirty thousand men, had presented himself, June 6, before Barcelona, whilst Vice-Admiral d'Estrées closed the port with ten ships and frigates, thirty galleys, and two bomb-ketches, and disembarked siege artillery and provisions for the army. The besiegers could not supply themselves by land on account of the Miquelets who intercepted all routes; the siege would have been impossible had not the French been masters of the sea. They were so. The Anglo-Batavians, summoned by the Spaniards, did not appear. The enterprise, however, was still very difficult: it required, to insure it any degree of success, all the audacity of Vendôme, all the spirit that he knew how to infuse into an army; twelve thousand soldiers, reinforced by four thousand militia selected from among the Barcelonese, as most attached to the Spanish cause, defended the place: twelve thousand men occupied two camps a short distance from the city; one, composed of cavalry, on the banks of the Llobregat, the other, of infantry, and Miquelets, on the mountains; they communicated freely with Barcelona by the citadel of Mont Juich, which Vendôme had not been able to invest at the same time with the city, through lack of sufficient forces. Nothing discouraged the besiegers: the trenches were opened, June 15, before the Old Town:[2] from the 4th to the 6th of July, the covered way was carried after

[1] Quinci, t. II. pp. 354–388. Commodore Nesmond took, during this time, six millions in prizes from the English.

[2] Barcelona is divided into the Old Town, New Town, and Mont Juich.

two bloody assaults, the bomb-ketches seconded the army by hurling bombs on the city; July 14, two strong detachments of French unexpectedly assailed the two Spanish camps, carried them, and drove back the two corps of the enemy, the one beyond the Llobregat, the other to the top of the mountain (July 14). A part of the defeated cavalry succeeded in reaching Barcelona; but the French nevertheless took two bastions by assault, July 22. They had nothing longer before them but the old but strong walls of the Middle Ages that closed the gorge of the bastions. These were attacked by sapping and mining. August 5, the mines being ready to spring, Vendôme summoned the place to surrender. The governor had received orders from Madrid not to await the last extremity before capitulating; the capitulation was signed on the 10th for the city and Mont Juich. Seven thousand soldiers, the remains of the garrison, marched out with thirty-six guns and mortars; the city preserved its privileges and institutions, save the Inquisition, which Vendôme was unwilling to engage to maintain. The army of the destroyer of the Edict of Nantes had as leader one of those men who were beginning to oppose systematic skepticism and indifference to the spirit of persecution, and compensated in some sort, by sincere sentiments of humanity, for the scandal of their epicurean habits.[1]

The conquest of Barcelona had cost eight or nine thousand men; but it was decisive. The Spanish monarchy was tottering: Aragon was ready to rise; Castile loudly demanded peace. The party that did not wish to sacrifice Spain to Austrian interests, long repressed by the Queen and the agents of the Emperor, had gained the ascendency in the cabinet of Madrid even before Barcelona had fallen, and had preferred to surrender this great city to suffering it to be carried by assault. The ministers, despite the Queen, demanded a truce; pacific instructions had already been sent to the Spanish plenipotentiary at Ryswick. The term fixed by France for the acceptance of the ultimatum expired meanwhile; September 1, France signified to the allies that she was not desirous of profiting by her advantages or of receding from her offers; that, nevertheless, she modified them on one point, to wit, she no longer offered to the Emperor and the Empire the choice between Strasburg and an equivalent, but she would relinquish Freiburg and Breisach, and would keep Strasburg, razing

[1] All had not this license of manners, as we shall see in the case of Bayle, the most illustrious among them. We shall recur to Vendôme and the society of the Temple. On the Siege of Barcelona, see Quinci, t. II. pp. 329–350.

Kehl and the forts of the islands in the Rhine, in such a manner that the channel of the river should become free again; all the bridges on the Rhine should be destroyed, save part of the bridge of Fort Louis between the left bank and the fort. France was to keep Fort Louis; the tête-de-pont of Philippsburg on the left bank was to be destroyed. The frontier of the Rhine, which had been crossed by France, would thus be reëstablished from Huningue to Landau. If France had declared herself concerning Luxemburg as concerning Strasburg, and had signified a resolution to keep Luxemburg in consideration of ceding the four Belgian cities that she had proposed as an equivalent, it is probable that Spain would have yielded. Contemporaries accuse the first plenipotentiary, Harlai, of having lost this great point by his weakness.

September 20 was fixed as the limit for accepting the ultimatum as modified. In the interval, the Protestant allies interceded with Louis XIV. for the reëstablishment of the French Protestants in their rights, privileges, and liberty of conscience. A very touching anonymous request had at the same time been addressed to Louis on the part of his "faithful subjects of the religion styled by the edicts the pretended Reformed religion." The French plenipotentiaries disregarded it. The allies had attempted this intervention only through propriety, and without hope of success.[1]

September 20, at midnight, the Dutch were the first to sign the peace. They restored Pondicherry to the French East India Company. With the treaty of peace was joined, as at Nimeguen, a treaty of commerce concluded for twenty-five years. The conditions of Nimeguen were renewed and still greatly ameliorated with respect to Holland. Equality of treatment, as to commerce, between the subjects of the two states, was interpreted by the suppression of all anchorage duties on Dutch ships, by the authorization of Dutch ships to traffic from the Levant to Marseilles and other ports, and to import herring freely. The tariff of 1664 was expressly reëstablished. When one of the two states should be at war, the subjects of the other were authorized to carry on by sea, with the enemies of the party at war, not only direct commerce, but commerce from one hostile port to another (this the Danes and Swedes had been unable, quite recently, to obtain from England and Holland). The duty of fifty sous per ton was abolished on Dutch ships unless they should take their freight from one French port to another. This was a very disadvantageous treaty to our marine,

[1] *Paix de Ryswick*, t. II. p. 512; III. pp. 47–101. Saint-Simon, t. II. p. 40. *Mém. du comte de Harrach* (ambassador of Austria at Madrid), t. I. p. 74 *et seq.*

given up, without any protection, to an overwhelming competition.

The English signed immediately afterwards. Their treaty obliged Louis XIV. not to assist either directly or indirectly any of the enemies of the King of Great Britain, and not in any way to favor the cabals, secret plots and rebellions that might arise in England. Commerce between the two nations was reëstablished with the anterior conditions. What had been taken in America was reciprocally restored.[1] France recovered one half of the island of St. Christopher; the English were enabled to revive their settlements in Newfoundland.

A third treaty was signed the same night between France and Spain. France made, without compensation, immense restitutions: these were, half of Catalonia, the city and duchy of Luxemburg and county of Chiny, Charleroi, Mons, Ath, Courtrai, with their dependencies, and the dependencies of Namur; finally Dinant; this last place was restored to the bishopric of Liege.[2]

To the three treaties was annexed a separate article whereby France granted to the Emperor and the Empire a new delay till November 1, to accept the ultimatum. A suspension of arms was at the same time agreed upon. The Emperor felt the uselessness of prolonging the struggle, since Spain had yielded, and the question of the Spanish succession was thrown out. To allow the last delay to expire was to cause Freiburg and Breisach at least to be withdrawn. After having disputed the ground without much success till the end of the truce, October 30, the plenipotentiaries of the Emperor and of the Empire declared themselves ready to sign. The French then presented a new clause to the purport that, in all the places that should be restored to the Empire, the religion should remain in the state in which it was then found; that is, that the exercise of the Catholic worship should be maintained where the French had established it. The Protestant Germans, supported by the Swedish mediator, declared that this was a violation of the

[1] The treaty stipulated the restoration of Fort Bourbon or Nelson and other places on Hudson's Bay taken by the English from the French: this article was useless; at the moment when the treaty was signed, the brave Canadian d'Ibreville had just retaken Fort Bourbon, after having fought in the bay one of the most admirable battles recorded in our maritime annals. With a single ship of fifty guns, he had sunk an English ship of fifty-two guns, taken a frigate of thirty-two guns, and put to flight another frigate of equal force (September, 1697). He had, the preceding year, in concert with Brouillan, commandant of the French posts of Newfoundland, destroyed the burg and fort of St. John's, the principal settlement of the English in this great island.

[2] *Actes de la paix de Ryswick*, t. III. pp. 162-281.

treaty of Westphalia, and refused to sign. The plenipotentiaries of the Emperor and the Catholic princes signed; the representatives of some Protestant princes and cities in the neighborhood of the Rhine yielded, through fear of French arms, and followed this example. Six weeks were granted to the other Protestants to give their signature.

By the treaty of October 30, France restored all the places situated beyond Alsace which had been occupied by her armies during the present war or formerly by way of annexation and re-annexation, the King revoking all the orders, decrees, and declarations made and published on this subject by the chambers of Metz and Besançon, and by the council of Breisach. The restitutions and cessions comprised Treves, Germersheim, Deux-Ponts, Veldentz, Montbéliard, Kehl, Freiburg, Breisach,[1] Philippsburg, the Emperor and the Empire ceding in exchange Strasburg to the King of France in complete sovereignty. France obligated herself to demolish all the fortifications that she had built on the right bank of the Rhine, and to restore the lands to their former possessors; moreover, to raze the fortifications that she had made at Trarbach and Mont-Royal, on the Moselle, and at Kirnburg, on the Nahe, the Empire razing, on its side, the tête-de-pont of Philippsburg and the fortifications constructed by the French at Ebernburg, on the Nahe. Louis XIV. had consented somewhat to relax the rigor of the treaty of Nimeguen towards the heir of the Duchy of Lorraine, nephew of the Emperor by his mother; he restored to the young Duke Leopold his inheritance in the condition in which Charles IV. had possessed it before the French conquest of 1670; that is to say, he restored Nancy, allowing only the ramparts of the Old Town to remain, and razing all the rest of the fortifications without the power of restoring them; he kept Marsal, an interior place calculated to hold Lorraine in check, and also Sarre-Louis, a frontier-place which separated Lorraine from the Germanic provinces; he restored Bitche and Homburg dismantled, without power to reëstablish them, and kept Longwy in exchange for a domain of similar value in one of the Trois-Evêchés; finally, he no longer demanded, as at Nimeguen, four great strategic routes through Lorraine, and consented that the passage should always be open to his troops. The House of Lorraine was thus reëstablished in its estates after twenty-seven years of exile.

[1] Louis XIV. even engaged, in ceding Breisach, to have the new city or Neuf-Breisach demolished, which was built on the left bank of the Rhine opposite to Old Breisach, with the fort on the island in the Rhine, between the two cities. France only kept, on the left bank, the fort called Mortier.

The Emperor, on his side, restored to the Cardinal de Fürstenberg, bishop of Strasburg, and to his relatives and friends, all their rights, estates, and honors, Prince Clement of Bavaria remaining in possession of the Electorate of Cologne. The Elector-Palatine obligated himself to pay to the Duchess of Orleans two hundred thousand francs per annum for her hereditary rights, while waiting for the Pope to pronounce as arbiter concerning the main point at issue.

The Protestant princes and states, being unable to contend alone against France, finally resigned themselves to the reëstablishment of the Catholic worship in the restored places, but long retained rancor for it against the Emperor.[1]

Thus terminated this vast war, in which the two parties had displayed, on land and sea, forces incomparably greater than modern Europe had ever seen before in motion: the armies acquired frightful proportions; France, in order to maintain herself against the Coalition, had nearly doubled her military status since the war with Holland.[2] The result of these gigantic efforts had been to her a barren honor: alone against almost all Europe, she had continued to conquer; but she had conquered without increasing her power. For the first time, on the contrary, since the accession of Richelieu, she had lost ground and receded in the work of her territorial completion. She found herself, in 1697, much within the limits of 1684, and returned to the limits of 1678, except that she had acquired a great defensive position, Strasburg, in exchange for offensive positions, which was advantageous to a true policy.

France had exhausted herself to conquer. It had been, however, still less the weariness and wretchedness of her people, or the tenacity of her enemies (they suffered little less than she), than the after-thoughts of her King that had led her to yield. The direct and territorial interest of France had been sacrificed to the plans of an ambitious dynasty which was connected, however, indirectly to the greatness of France, more or less perfectly understood. All the rest of the great reign will be nothing more than the development and application of these plans destined to cost our ancestors so dear.

[1] *Paix de Ryswick*, t. IV. pp. 15–121.

[2] In the war of Holland, France had armed two hundred and forty thousand soldiers, eighty thousand of them cavalry or dragoons, and fifty ships, besides galleys. In the war of the League of Augsburg, she had numbered nearly four hundred and fifty thousand combatants and more than a hundred and sixty ships and large frigates of more than forty guns.

CHAPTER III.

LOUIS XIV. (CONTINUED.)

INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL PROGRESS.—LETTERS, SCIENCES, AND ARTS at the Close of the Seventeenth and Opening of the Eighteenth Centuries. STATE OF BELIEFS AND IDEAS. Puget. La Bruyère. RACINE at Saint-Cyr. *Esther* and *Athalie*. End of great Classic Poetry. Lesage. *Quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns*. Fontenelle and Perrault. Society of the *Temple*. *Free-Thinkers*. Erudition. Law. The Abbé Fleuri. Montfaucon. Laurière. DOMAT. Exact and Natural Sciences. Delisle. Tournefort. Reaction of great Foreign Geniuses on France. Newton. Leibnitz. Progress of Cartesianism. MALEBRANCHE. Spinoza; Locke. Last Days of BOSSUET. His Combats against Innovators and Protestants. Jurieu. Richard Simon. FÉNELON AND THE EDUCATION OF THE DUKE OF BURGUNDY. *Télémaque*. Madame Guyon. *Quietism*. Contest between Bossuet and Fénelon. Disgrace of Fénelon. BAYLE. Invasion of *Skepticism*. Death of Bossuet.

1683–1715.

THE treaty of Ryswick, greeted by the exhausted nations as the promise of a long repose, was to be but a truce between two immense wars. This brief interval suspended the march of events. We will profit by it to cast our eyes on another phase of history, and thus to keep pace in the history of ideas with the history of facts.

We have seen the birth and growth of the intellectual France of the seventeenth century; we have then contemplated it in its full bloom; we are about to witness its decline and decomposition, still retarded by glorious efforts, and to behold the dawn of another age and a new society. The distinctive characteristic of the preceding period was the identification of the great age with the Great King. The royal sun was the centre of attraction of all this planetary system in which so many brilliant stars revolved. It was to be so no longer. The sun of Louis XIV. was declining; the stars which made his train were vanishing one after another; the new stars which rose belonged no longer to his influence, and some were like the precursors of a hostile world.

Let us glance at the different domains of thought, science, and art, and examine the condition of the heart and mind of France.

The fine arts had been struck first, in the person of the head of a school that had so rigorously disciplined them. Lebrun had died in 1690. Louis XIV. could not replace him. No one had longer his inexhaustible fertility or his power of dominion; although there remained an artist superior to Lebrun as a painter, that Jouvenet who in some sort reminds us of Veronese by the extent of his compositions, a grave and sage artist, endowed with a sort of majesty, who was to Poussin and to Lesueur what the Caracci and Domenichino were to Leonardo and Raphael. The first of our masters of the second class, Jouvenet was the medium, not by years but by style, between Poussin and Lebrun; if he had lost the nobleness and amplitude of movement which signalized the first, he was truer, simpler, and more profound than the second. Often feeble in execution, he did not render all that he felt, but he had great conceptions.[1]

When the domain of Lebrun was dismembered after his death, it was not Jouvenet, but the octogenarian Mignard, the elegant portrait-painter of the court-ladies, who received from the King the official direction of painting, as it was not the aged Puget, but Girardon, the docile second of Lebrun, who was appointed inspector of works of sculpture. Too proud and too great to bow before Lebrun, Puget had passed his life far from court, sometimes in Provence, his native land, sometimes in Genoa, his adopted country. Louis XIV. nevertheless knew well — to use the haughty saying of the artist himself — that "there were not many Pugets in France." Colbert had caused Puget to be recalled from Genoa to Toulon, in 1669, to give him the direction of the decoration of the royal ships; in 1683, his famous Milo of Crotona was purchased of him for Versailles; the Andromeda was sent from Marseilles in 1685; the King gave a fit welcome to the son of the artist, who brought this beautiful group. "Sir," said he, "your father is great and illustrious; there is no one in Europe that can equal him." Louis nevertheless left the great sculptor in straitened circumstances at Marseilles. Puget did not appear at Paris and the court until 1688, and returned to die at Marseilles, while finishing his great bas-relief, "The Plague of Milan" (1694).

The aged Mignard disappeared soon after, and was succeeded in the direction of the works of painting by a man who, like himself,

[1] Born in 1647, at Rouen; died in 1717. His principal works are, "The Descent from the Cross," "Magdalen at the House of the Pharisee," "The Money-Changers of the Temple," "The Miraculous Draught of Fishes," and "The Resurrection of Lazarus."

excelled especially in female portraits, Largillière (1695). Mignard and Largillière had had for a rival an artist of less delicate and more vigorous talent, Rigaud, who rendered himself illustrious by bequeathing to posterity the living images of several of the great men of the age.

Neither did Louis suffer sculpture, nor high mural and decorative painting to lack object and employment. He had greatly reduced, but not interrupted the expenditure for buildings during the height of the war; the war over, he had made it his duty to finish Versailles and the Invalides by the construction of the chapel and the dome; he modified and increased Marly, despite the somewhat timid remonstrances of Madame de Maintenon;[1] he received from the city of Paris the sumptuous tribute of an equestrian colossus in bronze on the new Place Vendôme (1699):[2] Jouvenet, Coypel, La Fosse, the Boullongnes, covered the chapel of Versailles and the Church of the Invalides with vast compositions; Coisevox, the two Coustous, Lepautre, Van Clève, peopled with statues the groves of Marly. Remarkable talent still sustained therefore the honor of the French school; nevertheless, the taste was deteriorating by degrees. Portraiture, a difficult and profound style, but preserved by the positiveness of its object from the alterations to which the ideal of art was exposed, acquired a tolerably great relative superiority, although Largillière and Rigaud were far from attaining the height of the Titians and the Rembrandts. Form became softened and overwrought among the majority of the painters and sculptors; the amplitude and gravity which had signalized the age of Louis XIV. tended to degenerate into that affected grace which announces the decline of the arts, and which had already appeared for a moment among us at the close of the sixteenth century: ornamentation was distorted and tortured into petty conceptions; sculpture strayed into abuse of details, and lost the beautiful simplicity of lines and adjustment. The spirit of the seventeenth century became extinct in the arts before the Great King descended to the tomb.

Poetry and letters had also seen glorious days since the splendid epoch, the sketch of which we have endeavored to trace.[3] We

[1] "Another main building is being made here.... Marly will soon be a second Versailles. I have given displeasure in a conversation on buildings. I am sorry to have offended without profit. There is nothing to do but to pray and suffer; but what will become of the people?" *Letter from Madame de Maintenon*, July 19, 1698. See *Revue rètrospective*, t. II. p. 337.

[2] This statue, cast by Keller from the model of Girardon, was destroyed in the Revolution.

[3] See the preceding volume, Chap. III. p. 160.

paused at the moment when Molière had just disappeared, when Racine attained the perfection of his art with *Phèdre*, when La Fontaine and Boileau had produced their most precious fruits. A few years then elapsed without bringing forth any important book, the literary impulse being however kept up by the publication of a multitude of works which reproduced, in a less degree, the essential characteristics of the reigning literature, — order, clearness, judgment, and that beautiful language by which the writings of this generation may be recognized from the first page.

Comedy had been for some time abandoned to inferior talent: at the end of a score of years, something of the genius of Molière reappeared therein, at least on the surface; men fancied that they heard in it at times the sparkling dialogue of the master. It was from that Regnard, whose romantic adventures remind us of those of the author of Don Quixote, and who, after passing his youth in wandering from Atlas to the Arctic Ocean, returned to devote his mature age to the French stage. Regnard was, although a long way off, the direct and apparent heir of Molière; nevertheless a prose-writer, a stranger to the stage, had perhaps a more effective share in the inheritance. We speak of the author of the *Caractères*,[1] the imitator and superior of Theophrastus. If Regnard resembles Molière in form, La Bruyère resembles him in substance; if the *Gambler* (1696) reminds us of the comic vigor and the exquisite naturalness of Molière, the *Director*[2] seems a type escaped from the author of *Tartufe*. The peculiarity of La Bruyère is the philosophic observation of a sagacious thinker and admirable writer, who collects and inscribes on his tablets, in ineffaceable characters, the scattered features of moral life, but without thinking of assembling them to compose a creation of art. The peculiarity of Regnard is the free and brilliant wit of an artist who feels and paints more than he thinks, and who, provided he sports freely on the surface of things and animates at will the facile creations of his dramatic vein, cares little about sounding the depths of the human soul. It would have been necessary to melt the two men into one to give Molière, not a rival, but a successor.

La Bruyère springs at once from Molière, La Rochefoucauld, and Nicole. Although often rigorous towards mankind, he has not the prejudices of La Rochefoucauld: he is, consequently, juster and truer. A model of style, he furnishes the most excellent and

[1] *Les Caractères de Théophraste, traduits du grec, avec les Caractères ou les Mœurs de ce siècle*, appeared in 1688; the following editions were considerably augmented.

[2] *Les Caractères, etc.*, 8th edition, 1694, p. 140.

most original type of the purely French style, freed from all remnant of Latinism, but he carries somewhat too far this excessive correctness, this purism which goes so far as to condemn the liberties of the ample versification of Molière. In philosophy, he pauses half-way between the independence of Molière and the charitable and submissive unction of Nicole. In political and social questions, sometimes retrogressive, he also makes some bold sallies: when he praises the King, it is without emphasis and with dignity, and he makes reservations with respect to absolute power, for which great credit should be given him.[1] He wittily combats those who pretend to forbid to women mental culture. In short, as well as La Rochefoucauld, and by a better title, he has had the signal glory of immortalizing himself by one small volume.

Whilst Regnard sustained high comedy, a comedian author, Dancourt, displayed in farce a wit and originality which do not permit him to be forgotten in the history of letters. Comedy thus preserved a certain lustre, although fallen from the height to which Molière had raised it and to which none would again attain. Tragedy had done more. It had, for a moment, returned to the immortal days of *Polyeucte* and *Phèdre*.

Tragedy was Racine, and Racine had been for twelve years lost to the stage. Since *Phèdre*, (1677,) his muse had preserved an obstinate silence. Was it the fear of being no longer able to equal himself, of declining, like his predecessor, the great Corneille, that had snatched him from his career, at thirty-seven, in the full bloom of his genius? Was it, as has been pretended, spite at unjust critics, fully compensated for by the favor of the public and by that of the King? The biography of Racine and his correspondence attest that he was prompted by sentiments of quite a different nature. The remembrance of the severe masters who had reared him in infancy often disturbed him in the midst of his worldly triumphs: tender and religious, external life, the society of men, were not sufficient for him; he could not dispense with God; now, religion and art appeared to him an irreconcilable antithesis; he saw religion only under the form of inflexible Jansenism. He decided: he

[1] "To say, . . . that the prince is absolute master of all the property of his subjects, without distinction, accountability, or discussion, is the language of flattery; it is the opinion of a favorite who will retract if put to the test." *Caractères*, 8th ed. p. 398. He did not know that Louis XIV. had written with his own hand the maxim which he opposed so freely. And elsewhere, "Pomp and luxury in a sovereign is a shepherd dressed in gold and precious stones, with a golden crook in his hand, and a golden collar on his dog's neck? What is the use of so much gold to his flock, or against the wolves?" P. 399. "The people lack wit; the great lack heart; decidedly, I rank myself with the people."

broke with his glory, and, in the first violence of the reaction against his past life, he wished to bury himself in a cloister to expiate what he called his *crimes*, more pitiless than Antoine Arnaud himself, who had approved *Phèdre*. Saved from his own rigor by a sensible confessor, he remained in the world and united himself to a woman virtuous but incapable of understanding this genius, the fruits of which he denied. Louis XIV. prevented him from entirely abandoning letters by appointing him his historiographer, in conjunction with Boileau;[1] but he abandoned forever the outlines of pieces which had been destined to succeed *Phèdre*, embryos of masterpieces which were never to see the light! We have not even the trifling compensation of a historical work: the manuscript works of Racine and Boileau on the history of Louis XIV. perished in a conflagration.

All hope seemed lost: this great suicide seemed consummated, when an inspiration forever to be blessed reopened the stage to Racine in the name of religion itself. It is to Madame de Maintenon that gratitude is due; this may win her pardon for many things! Several years before, a kind feeling had led Madame de Maintenon to obtain of the King the foundation of an institution for which great celebrity was in store. The recollection of her youth, so long poor, dependent, exposed, had made her wish to preserve others from perils which she had surmounted with such great difficulty. She assembled at Noisy, under the direction of Augustinian nuns, several daughters of poor gentlemen who had died, or worn out in the military service, to educate them there from seven to twelve years of age to twenty, and caused the rich abbatical living of Saint-Denis to be placed *in commendam*, in order to appropriate its revenues to the new institution, which was soon transferred to Saint-Cyr, near Versailles (1686). The number of inmates was increased to two hundred and fifty. Madame de Maintenon, who had in the highest degree the taste and faculty for instruction, direction, and discipline, and whose zeal in meddling in conventual affairs caused her to be accused of wishing to erect herself into the *mother of the Church*, became, at least in fact, the veritable superior of Saint-Cyr, made this house her most cherished pleasure, and devoted to it every moment that she could steal from the King.[2] After the

[1] Instead of Pellisson, transferred to the direction of the stewardships; that is, the fund for conversions. Pellisson had carried the history of Louis XIV. to the peace of Nimeguen.

[2] See *L'Histoire de la Maison de Saint-Cyr*, by Th. Lavallée. We have spoken elsewhere of the imperfection of the different editions of the "Letters of Madame de Maintenon"; M. Lavallée has given recently, in two volumes, as correct and as

example of the Jesuit colleges, she introduced scenic exercises in the plan of education of her young girls, and took a fancy, one day, that they should play *Andromaque*, while the author of *Andromaque* was disavowing his work as a mortal sin. The contrast was piquant, but the choice somewhat strange; Madame de Maintenon found that the young girls played this passionate drama too well; and, seeking a means of reconciling her tardy scruples with the diversions which she was unwilling to renounce, she requested Racine to give a dramatic form to a purely religious subject, which should appear on no other stage than the pious house of Saint-Cyr.

From this incident were born two imperishable creations. Racine was enabled to reconcile his genius and his faith.

In the beginning of 1689, with *Esther* a form of tragedy appeared at Saint-Cyr at once new to the seventeenth century, and inspired by antiquity. Racine, while quitting Greek subjects for subjects from the Bible, had approached the forms and spirit of the Athenian drama infinitely closer than he yet had done. The choruses, those great voices of the people and of humanity, which sway individual passions in antique tragedy, reappear in *Esther*, less preponderant, but more essentially allied to action, and with them, lyric poetry and its forgotten treasures;[1] the simplicity of action, the brevity of proportions, offer another analogy to the ancients; devotion dictated to Racine a severity which Art had formerly demanded of him in vain; the romantic taste, the necessary love, — the scourge of our stage, — radically disappeared; dramatic art was purified. Behold the true lyric tragedy of which Quinault had shown but the shadow! It was not the sublime passion, the startling flight of Biblical poetry, but its profound simplicity and religious emotion; it was its most touching and harmonious beauty; it was Christian Hellenism.

The King, then the princes, then the whole court, by turns, came to admire *Esther;* to see *Esther* was not less a favor than to be admitted at Marly;[2] the King presided in person over the admis-

well restored as possible, the "Historical and Edifying Letters" of this celebrated woman; he has also published the "Counsels to Young Ladies" and the "Conversations on the Education of Girls," which form a whole which may be entitled, "The Works of Madame de Maintenon."

[1] The stanzas of the *Cid* and of *Polyeucte*, much superior, it must be confessed, to the choruses of *Esther*, attest the desire of Corneille to make room for the lyric element on the stage.

[2] A special invitation was necessary to follow the King into his retreat at Marly, where the etiquette of Versailles was greatly relaxed, and where a sort of relative intimacy and liberty reigned. For the representations of *Esther*, the King made out a list as for the journeys to Marly. He entered first and placed himself at the door, holding the paper in one hand and raising his cane with the other, as if to form a

sion of the elect. The prodigious success of *Esther* at the court was disputed in the city, when the piece appeared printed; the city had jealously seen itself excluded from this rare spectacle, and the spirit of opposition was, moreover, awakened. To this spirit must be attributed the allusions to Louvois, the Revocation, etc., which were not in the mind of Racine.

The drama, in *Esther*, had perhaps lost something of what had been gained by poetry and lyricism, although a pretended lack of interest in this beautiful work has been greatly exaggerated. Racine prepared another poem which was not destined to incur the same imputation, — another religious drama, much vaster, more skilfully arranged, more powerfully inspired. In 1691, *Athalie* succeeded *Esther*. Voltaire has proclaimed this the masterpiece of art; the most distant posterity will not contradict Voltaire. Never has there been a scenic composition so perfect in all its parts; never have the conditions of the regular drama, the most difficult and most scholarly of the forms of the art, been so perfectly fulfilled. The constant grandeur of situations, ideas, and images which transports and maintains the spectator in so lofty a region during the whole of the piece, — this sustained sublimity is worthy to be compared with the sublime flashes which break forth in Corneille: a finer subject of study cannot be met in the annals of art than to contrast *Athalie* with *Polyeucte*.

Athalie, notwithstanding, was not so successful as *Esther*. The brilliant success of *Esther* had been more glorious to dramatic art than profitable to the discipline of Saint-Cyr: the rigorists, and, at their head, the confessor of Madame de Maintenon, the bishop of Chartres, Godet-Desmarais, had protested, not without some show of reason, against the impropriety of thus giving the virgins of Saint-Cyr as a spectacle to the whole court. Madame de Maintenon dared not continue. *Athalie* was played but twice, without costumes or decorations, before the King and a few select persons. Racine counted at least on its publication; but *Athalie* encountered only unfavorable prejudices; it was little read; this work, destined to be one of the glories of the human mind, fell noiselessly on the court as on the city; it did not begin to rise in public estimation until after the death of the author, who went down to the grave doubting his work. The entire rehabilitation was not to come until

barrier. He remained there until all on the list had entered. The third representation was designed for Father Lachaise, a number of prelates and Jesuits, and the celebrated Madame de Miramion with her nuns. "To-day," said Madame de Maintenon, "we will play only for saints." *Œuvres of J. Racine, with Commentaries by Geoffroi*, t. V., *Commentator's Preface*, p. 8.

thirty years after, in a wholly different generation, which, although a stranger to the exalted piety of Racine, judged impartially from a literary point of view, *Athalie*, at last transferred to the Theatre-Français.

Such a welcome given to such a work announced clearly enough that the seventeenth century was expiring, and that strange innovations were in the course of preparation. It was Biblical tragedy, the devotional piece protected by Madame de Maintenon, which was rejected by the indifference of some, the hostility of others. Devotion reigned in facts; it had already ceased to reign in public opinion.

Scarcely more than half a century elapsed between the *Cid* and *Athalie;* the era of French tragedy is comprised between these two bounds. *Athalie* was like a vast jet of flame which illuminated the whole heavens, after which all relapsed into a darkness traversed here and there by a few doubtful gleams. Racine did not even leave, like Molière, a Regnard behind him; mediocrities whose name does not merit the honors of history occupied the tragic stage; at the end of fifteen years there appeared a dramaturgist of strong and gloomy imagination, Crébillon; but he can scarcely be called either writer or poet.[1]

Not only tragedy, but high poetry, ended with Racine. Racine died in 1699; La Fontaine had preceded him to the grave (1695); Boileau survived his friends several years (until 1711), but he survived himself; he had given almost all the happy fruits of his vein before 1677, the year of *Phèdre*. From 1692 to 1693, had disappeared Mesdames de La Sablière and de La Fayette, Pellisson and Bussi-Rabutin; the two last-mentioned were among those who had best handled French prose; La Bruyère and Madame de Sévigné died in 1696: this generation, forever illustrious, was disappearing star by star.

A skilful versifier, who had retained the garb but not the soul of poetry, mounted to heaven like Elisha in the fiery chariot, and an excellent prose-writer, who brought down romance from the imaginary world into the real world, and who also transported upon the stage his strong feeling of reality, mark the last period of letters under Louis XIV.; these were Jean-Baptiste Rousseau and Lesage. Jean-Baptiste had received all the external gifts of the poet,—purity of language, numbers, skilful and harmonious rhythm;

[1] *Atrée et Thyeste* was written in 1707. *Rhadamiste et Zénobie*, the most powerfully conceived of Crébillon's pieces, is of the date of 1711. Another work of merit, the *Manlius* of La Fosse, is somewhat anterior; but neither is this merit that of poetry.

he lacked only what can be neither defined nor replaced, — life, true enthusiasm; when he paraphrases the Psalms, the Biblical thought fills the broad mould of his verse and may delude us, although we do not feel in it the afflatus which inspires the choruses of *Esther* and *Athalie;* but when he attempts to sing his own thoughts in original odes, he knows how to evoke no other muses than cold allegories, rhetorical abstractions, in a sonorous and hollow voice; he sings in empty space. Whatever those may say who have surnamed him the Great Rousseau, great classic poetry was really extinct.

Lesage, on the contrary, completely attained his literary aim: after beginning by a romance of manners which shows a rare spirit of observation,[1] he rendered himself illustrious by a comedy of real life which was at once an excellent work and a deed of courage and disinterestedness. *Turcaret* (1709) was superior to the works of Regnard both in character and in aim; it was no longer art for the sake of art; Lesage, disdainful of his private interests, valiantly attacked the farmers of the revenues, escaped from the hands of Colbert and become more powerful than ever. He was recompensed by the rare honor of creating a type. Lesage, unhappily, could not persevere in this quasi Aristophanesque course: a new piece, which touched more directly on circumstances, *La Tontine*, was not played; that was not tolerated from a mind that went to the bottom of things which had been permitted to Dancourt, who thought only of diverting the pit at the expense of the incidents of the day. Lesage fell back on another form of literature, and again took care to dress his characters in Spanish to give himself full liberty with respect to them. *Turcaret* therefore was succeeded by *Gil Blas*,[2] — after one of the best comedies of the modern drama, the first of French novels.

Gil Blas is doubtless inferior to *Don Quixote*, because it does not rest, like the work of Cervantes, on a profound and ideal conception, and because its idea is only a frame, but what a frame! This *Gil Blas, undulating and varying*, neither good nor bad, who journeys through so many different conditions, and who passes in review all society, from the thief to the King, represents in some sort the average of human life. This frame contains a universal mirror on which an almost infinite series of living portraits appears depicted in turn. But all this reality lacks an ideal; Lesage does

[1] *Le Diable boiteux* (1707).

[2] The first two volumes were published in 1715; the third and fourth did not appear until much later, in 1784 and 1785.

not substitute a true one for the conventional one of the ancient romance. *Gil Blas* is a work which cannot inspire enthusiasm, but which will be read again and again as long as men of sense and taste exist. It is the epopee adapted to a prosaic epoch, such as the first half of the eighteenth century.

Even before the decline of the Great Reign had become apparent, numerous symptoms announced the transition from one period to another wholly different. A literary contest which agitated the closing years of the seventeenth century was one of the most interesting signs of this. *The Quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns* was both a more or less legitimate insurrection against the opinions of the times and a logical development of the spirit of the times; it was in the name of the seventeenth century and for its glory that the banner was unfurled against the ancients.[1] The affranchisement of reason from traditional authority, — such was the revolution wrought by the seventeenth century in metaphysics and physics: it was designed to do the same in the belles-lettres and the arts; the superiority of the ancients in the province of the imagination was denied; it was sought henceforth to be as independent of Homer as of Aristotle: the question however was more complex; the seventeenth century had not accepted the supremacy of the ancients through tradition, but through reason and after examination. Two remarkable minds carried the discussion to a great theoretic height. One was Charles Perrault, who had given proof of literary talent but once, in those charming Fairy Tales, in which he gave an ingenuous and imperishable form to the Gallic traditions which lulled our ancestors in their cradles; he was, ordinarily, one of those agitators of ideas who are lacking in form, for the want, apparently, of a sufficiently complete possession of the idea, and who bow beneath a load of thoughts, knowledge, and aspirations too heavy for their genius, — men incomplete but original, and sometimes profound. The other was the nephew of the great Corneille, Fontenelle, a mind that contrasted singularly with the somewhat heavy and diffuse gravity of Perrault; a clear, lively and dashing writer, philosophic and generalizing at the bottom, at least as much so as Perrault, but subtle and finical in style to affectation, manipulating and refining the noble and serious language of the seventeenth century by a change like that which was beginning to be produced in the lines of statuary, imparting in fine to science the language of the boudoir, but introducing among the men of the world, under this frivolous guise, the sublimest dis-

[1] *Le Siècle de Louis le Grand*, a poem by Ch. Perrault, 1687.

coveries of modern genius, the knowledge of the system of the universe and the infinity of the heavens, the hypothesis or rather the moral certainty of the plurality of inhabited worlds.[1] Perrault and Fontenelle both attached themselves to the literary generation of the time of Richelieu, in opposition to the school of Racine and Boileau, too pure in form and too circumspect for them; but Fontenelle, destined to the longest career as a writer ever seen in the world of letters, belonged at the same time to the past and the future; the posthumous child of the era of Richelieu, he was destined as it were to pass over the age of Louis XIV. to extend his hand to the age of Voltaire.

A great idea struck them both; one jotted it down rapidly in his brief and witty *Digression on the Ancients and Moderns;* the other diluted it in the four volumes of his *Parallel between the Ancients and Moderns* (1692–1696). Neither the one nor the other doubtless was cognizant of the unpublished passage of Pascal on the progress of the sciences, in which he compares the human race to "the same man always subsisting and continually learning." This idea recurred to them under a more complex form and with a more general character. They first laid down the principle that nature is always identical to herself in her productions; that she necessarily brings forth as many geniuses now as formerly; that the moderns, having progressed farther than the ancients in the arts and sciences "which are a constantly increasing hoard of rules and precepts," must be superior, through equality of genius. Progress, according to them, is continuous, save in violent interruptions of great wars and barbarian invasions. When these crises break forth, the arts and sciences are like "rivers which encounter a gulf where they are suddenly swallowed up, but which, after flowing underground, . . . find at last an opening through which they are seen to issue with the same abundance with which they entered."[2] The human race is like a man who has passed through infancy and youth and has attained manhood, but who will never grow old or decline. Our fathers were the children; it is we who are the ancients.[3] Imagination ruled first alone, then the development of man was completed; but man

[1] *Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes* (1686).

[2] Ch. Perrault, *Parallèle des anciens*, etc., t. I.

[3] *Œuvres de Fontenelle*, t. IV. p. 191. This thought had been already expressed by Bacon. In the first part of the seventeenth century, a few Italian and English writers had already contested the literary supremacy of the ancients, but without much noise or success. See *Hallam's History of European Literature*, Vol. IV. ch. 9, § 4.

has not lost anything that he ever possessed: he does now what he could not have done formerly; but what he did formerly he can always do again.

Indeed, it is impossible not to be struck by the greatness of this theory, indisputable as far as the progress of human acquirements is concerned, applicable to the development of societies as to the development of sciences, and to the development of nature itself in its successive ages as to the development of societies. This was the new dogma of modern times which was beginning to reveal itself. Perrault and Fontenelle were far from having measured the full scope of their idea. Unhappily, they had approached this great theory of continued progress on precisely the most contestable side: they had judged the arts as scholars and not as artists; exaggerating the value of *rules* and *precepts* in matters of imagination, and well appreciating the more real advantage which the development of sentiments and relations gives to modern writers, they had not understood, Perrault especially, what a vast compensation the ancients had found in the buoyancy of infant poetry, in the morning freshness of the dawn of literature, when all feelings, all essential and eternal ideas were for the first time expressed by the voice of the poet, when all that has become *commonplace* was revelation and creation. We know not what the future has in store for the human race; but, however high the moderns may soar, it is certain that experience does not permit us as yet to give judgment against the ancients in poetry and the fine arts.

We shall not set forth here the phases of the literary quarrel.[1] Fontenelle, in default of pure taste, had too much adroitness not to preserve some moderation in his attacks; Perrault, bolder and less skilful, showed himself wholly devoid of literary judgment and sentiment of art, blasphemed all the great names of Hellas, Plato, as well as Homer[2] and Pindar, and opposed to the ancients, not only Corneille and Molière, but also, but above all, Chapelain, Scudéri, and Quinault, "the greatest lyrical and dramatic poet that France ever had." In short, he raised against himself and his ally a fearful tempest. It was a piquant yet natural fact, that, among the

[1] See the interesting work lately published by M. Rigaut, *Querelle des anciens et des modernes*.

[2] He was the first to express doubts of the very existence of Homer, and to advance the idea that the Iliad and the Odyssey might be "only a collection of several small poems by different authors." This was, he said, the opinion of excellent critics; the Abbé d'Aubignac had memoirs already prepared on the subject. *Parallèle*, etc., t. III. p. 82. Voss has only taken up and commented upon this idea. This was the beginning of that formidable modern criticism which attacked at the same time, as we shall see directly, objects still more perilous.

living authors, the only ones worthy to rival the ancients were those that sided with them: Racine, La Fontaine, La Bruyère, then Boileau, who sustained in the end the whole brunt of the contest. If the assailants understood absolutely nothing of primitive poetry, the defenders did not comprehend it very clearly themselves. Boileau indeed felt the beauty of the language and images of Homer, but as to the sentiments and the social condition of the Homeric times, he took them little more into consideration than Perrault himself. Only, where the latter accuses Homer of grossness and triviality, Boileau strives to prove that the terms employed by Homer were *very noble in Greek* although ignoble in French, and does not suspect that these distinctions produced by the refinement of languages and societies might have been unknown in the simplicity of the heroic ages.[1] The seventeenth century, too original to appreciate fully the originality of others, had not the comprehension of the past which we possess to-day: this is the indemnity of generations which no longer create.

The great poets of Louis XIV. had been right in defending the ancients; for the war was not long in turning against poetry itself. It was at first claimed to surpass the ancients in poetry; the next step, through a new excess of the scientific spirit, was to deny poetry in its necessary form. Already Fontenelle saw in the rules of verse nought but arbitrary difficulties; soon after, a new champion, La Motte-Houdart, a distinguished mind, an ingenious thinker, but who, a very good prose-writer, had been guilty of the mistake of making himself a poet *in spite of Apollo*, systematically attacked versification as an idle fetter and parasitical ornament of thought. The innovators had in this respect an auxiliary far more formidable than La Motte, a man of genius who preached the example by writing a poem in prose, the author of *Télémaque*.

Whatever may have been the literary heresies of Perrault and his friends, the importance of their part in the history of French thought must not be slighted. Perrault, less brilliant than Fontenelle, has obtained less justice; nevertheless, the man who had undertaken in his *Parallel* to examine "all the sciences and all the arts, in order to see to what degree of perfection they attained in antiquity, and what the experience of the human race has since added, — this man, although he may not have fulfilled this vast programme, was not assuredly a common mind. If his name is connected with the decline of poetry, it is connected, by way of compensation, with the progress of philosophy, and he should be given

[1] See the *Œuvres de Boileau*, edit. Lefèvre, 1834; t. III. pp. 195, 262, 273.

credit for having been in France one of the apostles of the dogma of perfectibility, at the very moment that Leibnitz, in Germany, bringing back to philosophy the principle of succession and development, that is, of life itself, by the side of the *absolute* of Descartes, gave from this same dogma such magnificent formulas,[1] not by denying the ancients, but on the contrary by connecting them with the moderns in the continued chain of human thought.[2]

The literary quarrel was not the most threatening signal of the revolution which was beginning to be wrought in minds. The little group of *free-thinkers*, the origin of which we have pointed out,[3] long sheltered in obscurity and silence from the intolerant splendors of the Great Age, revived, emerged from its retreat, and rapidly spread. The Temple was the headquarters; Messieurs de Vendôme were the leaders and hosts[4] of this society where reigned letters and pleasures, witty license and incredulity. The young Duke de Chartres, the nephew of the King, destined to hold too great a place in history! the Prince de Conti, so popular for his wit and bravery, were connected with it, if not in person, at least by their sentiments. Chaulieu, La Fare, Saint-Aulaire, Vergier, Madame Deshoulières charmed the suppers of the Temple by the blaze of their wit and by piquant and facile verses, in which light poetry at times already assumed that turn and form which Voltaire was to carry to perfection. La Fontaine took great delight in them. Fontenelle, having then but little of the somewhat selfish circumspection which characterized his prolonged old age, was leagued with this circle by his unidealistic tendencies, and obtained its suffrages by his *Dialogues of the Dead*, in which he jested at all worldly greatness with skeptical levity, by his *History of the Oracles*, in which his denial of prodigies imputed to the devil may lead to the dispute of other miracles, and by his allegory of *Mero and Enegu*,[5] a satire on the Roman Church which he had printed in Holland. The aged Ninon, and old Saint-Evremont who had retired to London, were the patriarchs of this little epicurean world. The progress of *libertine* and skeptical opinions was already notable enough some years before the close of the seventeenth century for

[1] "Lasting contentment consists in continually journeying towards greater perfection. *Videtur homo ad perfectionem venire posse.* The present, engendered by the past, is big with the future."

[2] See his letter, *De Aristotele recentioribus reconciliabili*, in the sequel to his edition of Nizolius.

[3] See Vol. XII., Martin's *Histoire de France*, p. 8 *et seq.*

[4] The brother of the Duke de Vendôme resided in the Temple as grand prior of the order of Malta.

[5] An anagram on Rome and Geneva.

La Bruyère, in his capacity of Christian philosopher, to deem it incumbent on him warmly to attack the *free-thinkers*, to compensate for his attacks on false devotees and confessors of women.

All the *free-thinkers* must not however be classed as pure skeptics or materialists: celebrated verses by the Abbé de Chaulieu, who sometimes singularly elevated the tone of his Anacreontic lyre, attest that Deism had a loud voice in the Temple, — Deism, it is true, little theological, little metaphysical, yet very indulgent to human weaknesses, and quite similar to that which was to reign later at Ferney.

A few of these free-thinkers were *converted* towards the end of their career. The charming and learned Madame de la Sablière, who, towards the close of her too brief life, wrote a little volume of religious ethics (*Maximes Chrétiennes*), had set the example to her friend La Fontaine, less systematically skeptical than careless, and the enemy of all constraint; La Fontaine had seriously negative opinions only on a few points of theology and politics in which he rejected the official doctrines, either by reason or feeling.[1] La Fontaine died very piously, as naïve moreover in his penitence as he had been in his errors. Madame Deshoulières made a similar end: this female poet, who styled herself unceremoniously the *tenth Muse*, (there have been many of these *tenth Muses!*) had at intervals placed her agreeable, easy, at times rather weak and prosaic talent at the service of somewhat audacious ideas, willingly opposing nature to society, and imitating *Tartufe* in her way in her piece addressed to Father La Chaise, daring, despite the compliments which won forgiveness for the bold sayings. These conversions on the brink of the tomb did not arrest the progress of the fraternity, we will not say of the incredulous *school:* despite the flashes of Chaulieu, despite the circulation of atomistic ideas revived from Epicurus and Lucretius through Gassendi, and turned by some to pure materialism, — ideas which a diplomatic prelate, the Abbé, afterwards Cardinal de Polignac, refuted meanwhile in fine Latin verses (*l'Anti-Lucrèce*), — there was not yet in this a constituted doctrine, a philosophic school; it was scarcely more than a protest, an unostentatious anti-religious Fronde, which the ruling power scarcely heeded, absorbed as it was by the consequences of the Protestant persecution and the renewed stir of Jansenism. It had given itself too much to do in persecuting heterodox Christians

[1] His disputes with Racine concerning absolute monarchy will be remembered. The dogma of eternal punishment inspired him with the same repugnance as Madame de Sévigné.

to have leisure to think of men who did not believe in Jesus Christ, or even in God. Louis XIV. did not take this in earnest; he was greatly in the wrong!

Orthodox science and letters still produced works of superior merit, which might reassure those whose glance did not penetrate deeply into the future. Religion did not seem near lacking defenders. The year 1691 had witnessed the foundation of a great historical and religious monument, the Ecclesiastical History of the Abbé Fleuri, who had undertaken to write the entire annals of the Church from the Gallican standpoint of Bossuet; Fleuri carried his immense work to the sixteenth century. There is perhaps no book so useful to the general history of Europe. Except Tillemont, from whom he borrowed the first idea of his work and much information, Fleuri has no rival in the seventeenth century in historical criticism; he is, in knowledge of the early part of our history, that is, the transition from the Roman world to the Middle Ages, far above his epoch. If he is somewhat too deeply involved, perhaps, in the reaction of the Renaissance and Gallicanism against the Middle Ages, he has, at the bottom, a laudable aversion to superstition and the persecuting spirit which guides it: there are, in his Preliminary Discourses, so firm and substantial, bold things for so orthodox a writer; for instance, the manner in which he expresses himself concerning certain recent acts of devotion, and concerning the countries of the Inquisition, which are also, he says, the countries of the most immoral casuists.[1]

By the side of history, of which Fleuri gives so estimable a model, erudition, which furnishes the materials of history, continued its vast labors, especially by the indefatigable hands of the Benedictines of the congregation of Saint-Maur. Ducange no longer existed; Mabillon was finishing his career, supported by a worthy co-worker, Edmond Martenne, the author of useful and learned publications on the ancient rites of the Church;[2] but the true successor of the Ducanges and Mabillons, in amplitude of science and activity of mind, was to be Father Montfaucon. Montfaucon preluded, by important publications on the Greek origins of

[1] T. XX., edit. in 12; Marriette; Introduction, p. 42.

[2] His valuable collection, entitled, *Thesaurus anecdotorum*, did not appear until after the death of Louis XIV. The principal works of Mabillon, subsequent to his *Diplomacy*, are: *The Gallican Liturgy* (1685); the treatise, *Monastic Studies*, against the Abbé de Rancé, who interdicted letters and sciences to the monks (1691); the letter, *The Worship of False Saints*, against false relics (1698). He died in 1707, while laboring on the *Annals of the Order of St. Benedict*, which was completed by Martenne.

Christianity, the Greek Fathers, Origen and Philo, his magnificent work, *Antiquity Explained.* Still other Benedictines — Ruinart, the editor of Grégoire de Tours; Denis de Saint-Marthe, the last of that family of Saint-Marthe so fruitful in scholars, and the author of the great edition of *Gallia Christiana* — deserve the gratitude of posterity.

Ecclesiastical history, with all the light which it casts on other parts of history, was not the only, but the principal object of Benedictine erudition; a lay scholar, a jurisconsult, Eusèbe de Laurière, rendered, meanwhile, most important services in another direction. He took for his aim the study of laws and customs in France and in Europe, and applied to this great object a science and sagacity worthy of Ducange. New editions annotated, improved, elucidated, of the *Coutume de Paris* and its commentators, of the *Institutes coutumières* of Loisel, of the *Glossaire du droit français* of Ragueau and other feudists, several original treatises, — vast plans which could not be executed without the assistance of the State, — signalized the zeal of this eminent man (1692–1715). He had formed the plan of a new *Coutumier général* of France, in which he would have collected all the customs, usages, statutes, writs, charters, styles, police laws, etc., explained and commented upon. This gigantic project was not executed; but the minister Pontchartrain, who became Chancellor of France in 1699, having resolved, at the instigation of the elder D'Aguesseau, to unite in one work the ordinances of the kings of the third race,[1] charged Laurière and two other jurists with the task. Laurière and his colleagues published, in 1706, as a specimen, the *Table chronologique des Ordonnances;* but war and financial distress caused the suspension soon after of this vast enterprise, which was resumed after the death of Louis XIV., and which has been continued by several generations of scholars to our days.

Judicial science was rendered illustrious, meanwhile, by a work much more brilliant than the most excellent labors of erudition could be. The philosophy of law was founded in France by a Christian philosopher, a disciple at once, like Arnaud and Nicole, of Descartes and Port-Royal. Leibnitz, at twenty-two, had opened the way, with that genius for universal synthesis which seized at a glance all the analogies which connect law to history, philology, and general philosophy: he had proposed a new method to arrange matters of civil law in a rational order. A firm and lucid mind accomplished what this genius had indicated: a modest provincial

[1] Baluze had published, under Colbert, the Capitularies of the first two races.

magistrate, grown old in an inferior office,[1] was the author of the finest work on jurisprudence that exists in our language. The fellow-countryman and friend of Pascal and the Arnauds, Domat made one of that powerful group given by Auvergne to the France of the seventeenth century: enlisted early under the banners of Port-Royal, he ranged himself, in dogmatic questions, on the most rigid and unbending side — the side of Pascal, whom he loved with the tenderest friendship, and who died in his arms. But, in all else, he was thoroughly imbued with the Cartesian spirit, the spirit of the Method. After applying himself, in his youth, to physics and mathematics, he had confined himself to the science of law. Like Leibnitz, he was at once inspired with profound respect for the great Roman jurisconsults, who seemed to him the interpreters of natural equity, and shocked at the total absence of philosophic order in the compilations of Justinian, where the rules and maxims of these great men are found heaped up in confusion. He resolved to establish order in the study of civil law. This idea carried him far and high. In order not to substitute for confusion an arbitrary classification, he comprehended that it was not enough to arrange the rules of law without going back to the first principles of these rules. — What are these first principles? — To discover them, it is necessary to lay down two primary truths or primordial definitions: 1st. Laws for man are only rules for his conduct. 2d. This conduct is nothing else than the progress of man towards his end. — The end of man is God; that is, the possession of God, which is the sovereign good. — The first law of man is therefore that which prescribes to him the love of and search after this sovereign good. This first law comprises a second, which obliges men to associate with and to love each other, to seek together their common good in the supreme unity. It is to bind men in this society that God has rendered it essential to their nature. As we see in the nature of man his destination to the sovereign good, we also see therein his destination to society. The bonds which bind him to these first two laws are the origin of all laws. The real state of society differs strangely from what ought to be his normal state; but the first laws are not less binding on him, although they may have been transgressed, and, to comprehend what is, it is necessary first to see what should be.

On the foundation of the first two laws, Domat erects therefore an ideal plan of society. He shows the law of labor derived from the first two laws and constituting the social bond. After the gen-

[1] Attorney of the King in the presidial court of Clermont.

eral bond which unites all mankind, appear particular bonds of two kinds: 1st, those formed in consequence of the union of the husband and wife, that is, the family; 2d, engagements and relations of all kinds, at the head of which, after the example of the sages of Greece, he places friendship, the first of free engagements. All the disturbances of society arise from disobedience of the first law, the love of man for God, which entails the violation of the second, the love of man for man. Self-love is substituted for mutual love; but God has permitted this principle of division to become a bond by personal interest itself, and thus to repair, at least from the point of view of society, a part of the ills which it has caused. Self-love, moreover, cannot stifle the enlightenment of natural equity.

Domat then distinguishes between immutable or natural laws and arbitrary laws; that is, where the legislator has been obliged to fix approximate and uncertain bases, (for instance, the age of majority). The arbitrary laws which we observe, he says, are comprised in four classes: the Roman law, the Canonical law, ordinances, and customs; as to the immutable and natural laws, their rules have been collected only in the Roman law. Next he gives, concerning the great divisions of law, the law of nations, or international law, public law, private or civil law, clearer and more logical definitions than the ancients had done. He concludes by the necessity of reëstablishing in the study of the Roman law a natural order, that is, deducted logically from first principles. He refers all matters of civil law to two classes: engagements, which preserve the order of society in all places, and successions, which preserve it in all times.

The theoretical treatise on *Laws*, the principles of which we have just indicated, serves as a preface to the chief work of Domat, *Civil Laws in their Natural Order*. The *Civil Laws* appeared in 1694 under the auspices of the King, who, on the recommendation of the elder D'Aguesseau and other important men, had called the author to Paris and pensioned him to give him means to execute his project. During eleven years' sojourn in Paris, Domat did not lose a day, despite his sufferings from asthma and stone. When he was urged to take some repose, "Let us work," said he; "we shall rest in Paradise." It was a variation of the celebrated saying of his friend Arnaud. Almost a septuagenarian in 1694, he survived but a little while the brilliant appearance of his work, which caused Boileau to say that reason had at last just entered the province of jurisprudence. The *Public Law*, published in 1697, after the death of Domat, adds little, in the sight of posterity, to the renown of

the author of the *Civil Laws;* except those general maxims of ethics which are found therein, as everywhere, as in the Politics of the Holy Scriptures itself, Domat does little, in his *Public Law*, but systematize the facts of contemporaneous political society. He confounds, like Bodin, like Grotius, like Bossuet, right and fact, sovereignty and the exercise of power, divine permission and divine institution; he denies at once individual right and the collective right of nations to transform their institutions. In a word, the notion of progress is lacking to this noble mind, that has so well conceived the distinction between the ideal and the real, the perfect and the imperfect, but that does not see how the ideal and the real can be reunited, or rather renounces it, like Pascal, for this fallen world. He may also be reproached with an important gap in the definition of social ties; he does not define the tie of country, in the place where it should be, between the tie of humanity and that of the family.

Despite these reservations, Domat will remain, next to Cujas, the greatest name in French jurisprudence. Cujas had disentangled, and, as it were, created anew the matter of law; Domat gave it a soul. A singular and touching saying attests at once his humility and the opinion which he entertained of his work. "I am surprised," said he, "that God should have made use of an insignificant man, a cipher like me, to make so fine a work!" This work was to be the basis both of the judicial labors of practical jurisprudence in the eighteenth century and the great codification in the nineteenth century.[1]

Domat, protected by the King, although a Jansenist, is, at least by the date of his renown, not only the last glory of Port-Royal,

[1] See the edition in fol. of 1785, and, concerning the life and labors of Domat, the *Unpublished Documents on Domat*, published by M. Cousin, 1843. Some thoughts and maxims of Domat are cited, the sentiment and even the expression of which remind us strongly of Pascal.

"Is there no company in which good sense is examined as well as law? The superfluity of the rich ought to serve the necessities of the poor; but, on the contrary, the necessities of the poor serve the superfluity of the rich. Shall I never have the consolation of seeing a Christian pope in the chair of St. Peter?" External devotions, scapularies, etc., are to him, in the New Law, what the superstitious traditions of the Pharisees were in the Old. "We do not act," says he, "by reason, but by love." This seems plagiarized from the *Discourse on the Passion of Love.*

We must not forget one of the merits of Domat, namely, that of having been the first to put the Roman laws into the French language, because this language, says he, "has now attained a perfection which equals and even surpasses in many things the ancient tongues; because, for this reason, it has become common to all nations, and because it possesses, in a singular degree, the clearness, accuracy, exactness, and dignity, which are the characteristics essential to the expression of laws." *Preface to the "Civil Laws."*

but the last of the great thinkers who represent the peculiar genius of the age of Louis XIV. The eminent minds that we shall see henceforth appear will belong more or less completely to another order of ideas.

Whilst in France the genius of the seventeenth century became exhausted, foreign nations began to dispute to us supremacy, not in belles-lettres, the arts, or social culture, — a thing which Europe, which copied us servilely, seemed to judge impossible, — but in philosophy and the sciences. Already the great scientific inventors belonged no longer to France, but to Germany and England.

France, nevertheless, neglected nothing to maintain her position, and to continue her scientific conquests. In 1699, the Academy of Sciences was strongly reorganized by a regulation approved by the King, and took its place among the official bodies. Its new regulation made a law to it of that fruitful activity which was never more to be interrupted, and erected it into a tribunal charged to pronounce on the applications of science to industry, and to recommend them to the sanction of the State. The experiments and researches made at the King's expense by the academicians had been a boon; the boon became a right. The Academy was divided thenceforth, no longer into five, but into six sections, the section of mathematics being subdivided into geometry or pure mathematics and mechanics or applied mathematics. It is to be regretted that metaphysics did not find a place by the side of the exact and natural sciences; this was the point of divergence between general science and the particular sciences, of a disruption of human knowledge, which was destined in time to threaten to abase the human mind. The distrust with which Descartes inspired the Great King doubtless contributed to this.[1]

At the epoch of its reorganization, the Academy had already, for two years, elected Fontenelle as its perpetual secretary; it could not have chosen better for its own glory, for the glory of the elect and for the interest of science. Fontenelle was preëminently a popularizer. He brought to the service of science literary talent endowed with all the qualities adapted to this end, devoid of all the qualities that could be injurious to it. The lack of imagination and passion, which made him an indifferent poet, became almost a virtue in the scientific writer. For fifty years he was the faithful interpreter of the Academy to the European public. The *Annual History of the Academy*, and the *Eulogies of the Academicians*, which

[1] The Academy of Inscriptions was regulated in its turn in July, 1701. See the two regulations in the *Anciennes Lois françaises*, t. XX. pp. 326, 886.

formed the summary of the march of the sciences during half a century, were the real and imperishable honor of this mind, unmetaphysical, but eminently scientific, and thus the true initiator of the eighteenth century. The preface to the *Eulogies* is a masterpiece of wit and good sense: the unity of science, as the unity of Nature, the object of science, is admirably comprised in this, and Fontenelle well deserves here the name of philosopher.

Mathematics continued to be cultivated with brilliant success in France; but it was not, however, among us that the great discovery was formulated which opened a new world to the exact sciences. Newton in England, Leibnitz in Germany, had formulated, each on his side, the first under the name of *the calculus of fluxions*, the second under that of *the differential calculus* and with forms at once more general and more convenient than those of Newton, a new geometry which had for its object, no longer known and mensurable quantities, but quantities unappreciable by their infinite littleness.[1] This was in some sort the inverse of that new astronomy which saw the unfathomable depths of the sky escape its calculations by the incommensurable greatness of quantities. Our Fermat[2] had laid down the principle, of which Newton and Leibnitz drew the conclusions; another French geometrician, the Marquis de l'Hôpital, improved, and above all spread the new method; he published, in 1697, the *Analysis of Infinitely Small Quantities*, and thus unveiled the mysteries of the *geometrical infinite* and the *infinite of the infinite*, "in a word, of all those different orders of infinites which rise one above the other and form the most astonishing and boldest edifice that the human mind has ever dared imagine."[3]

In applied mathematics and the natural sciences, French scholars sustained the national glory: Lahire showed himself the worthy rival of Cassini; Sauveur improved acoustics; the mechanician Varignon discovered the causes of equilibrium.[4] Hitherto, geography had been only an empirical science, groping in the dark by the narratives of travellers: Delisle made it an exact science, by substituting mathematical precision for conjectural approximations, thanks to the determination of longitudes, due to the observations

[1] Leibnitz published the rules, but not the demonstrations of the differential calculus, in 1684. Newton appears to have been the possessor of his *Calculus of Fluxions* in 1666, but he had published nothing of it.

[2] See Vol. XII., Martin's *Histoire de France*, p. 30.

[3] Fontenelle, *Éloges des Académiciens*, t. I. p. 85; edit. of 1766.

[4] About 1690, another mechanician, Amontons, gave the theory of the telegraph, and a few successful experiments were made on a small scale. The Great King, however, was destined to leave the honor of its application to the National Convention. See Fontenelle, *Éloges*, t. I. p. 114.

of Cassini on Jupiter's satellites (1699). The importance of this revolution may be judged by a single fact: before Delisle, the geographers gave the Mediterranean three hundred leagues too much, from east to west! Botany became, like geography, a French science, through the admirable labors of Tournefort. A few English and German botanists had attempted imperfect systems of classification; Tournefort first attained, by taking the flower as the fundamental basis, the flower and fruit together as the secondary basis, a truly general classification (1694), which his travels in the Levant, undertaken at the expense of the King, enriched with thousands of undescribed plants (1700).

The renown of these modest and useful labors, which transformed various branches of science, was stifled as it were in the learned world by the discussions raised by a colossal system, which claimed to explain by a single law, by a single cause, the relations of the celestial spheres and the whole order of nature. The geometry of the infinite had gone beyond Descartes, without contradicting him. The *Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy*[1] attacked Cartesianism openly and opposed another conception of the world to the *vortexes* of Descartes. This is not the place to set forth in detail the history of the Newtonian theory, the antipodes of the Cartesian theory. Descartes had taken for his starting-point primitive philosophy, transcendent metaphysics, in order to descend, by deduction, to general physics: Newton set out from experimental physics, the observation of phenomena, to go back from effects to causes, to this same general physics.[2] Both handled with the same power the mathematical instrument, which one had applied more especially to the abstract laws of the mind, which the other applied above all to the investigation of the laws of the visible world. The three laws of Kepler, which Descartes had too much neglected, and which could not be successfully reconciled on certain points with the system of vortexes, the law of gravity given by Galileo and disputed by Descartes,[3] lastly, the idea of the *centrifugal* and *centripetal* forces, indicated by Kepler and formulated by Descartes as two great mechanical facts, preoccupied

[1] Published in 1686–1687.

[2] It is this method *d posteriori* which Newton styles Natural Philosophy, or the Philosophy of Nature. It is important to remark that Descartes by no means claimed to deduce *à priori* entire physics, but only the most general effects of first principles. The admirable experimental analysis of Newton is in perfect conformity with the precepts of the Discourse on Method.

[3] Descartes had believed gravity caused by the motion of *subtle matter*, a motion which he deemed too variable to be subjected to a fixed law.

minds most advanced in the science of nature: Newton was not alone in seeking the reduction of these various data to a more general law, not offered by Cartesianism. Since 1645, Bouillaud had established, that, if attraction exists, it must diminish in proportion to the square of the distance; in 1666, the Italian Borelli had maintained that by extending to the relations of the celestial bodies among themselves, the law of gravity or the law which causes bodies to tend towards a centre, and the inverse law which makes them diverge from the centre, the *vortexes* would become useless in explaining the movements of the stars.[1] But this was only a bold hypothesis, which appears to have been common to Borelli, Bouillaud, Newton, and Hooke;[2] the glory of Newton was to apply to it the effort of a sublime system of mathematics and to verify the perfect agreement of this hypothesis with the relations of the moon and the earth; the measure of a terrestrial degree, executed meanwhile in France, by Picard, Cassini, and Lahire, furnished him certain notions without which he would have striven in vain to attain an adequate result; he applied to all the celestial bodies, by legitimate induction, the law which was demonstrated with respect to the moon, and was enabled to affirm that everything takes place in the universe as if the celestial bodies *attracted* in a direct ratio to their weights and in an inverse ratio to the squares of their distances, the weaker being carried along in the movement of the more powerful. Newton dared not yet contest the identity of matter and extension, much less affirm the existence of a gravity inherent to matter, of an *attraction* which was a *property* of bodies. He did not deny that *attraction* might be a mere mechanical impulse; he did more, he sought its explanation in the motion of a prodigiously elastic ethereal medium, and appeared to admit that everything was mechanical in nature, except the first cause, that is, God.

Despite these reservations of a mind that still hesitated on the mysterious cause of the great law which it had discovered, French science rose against Newton; the Academy of Sciences fancied that it saw the revival, with *attraction*, of the *occult qualities*, the animic superstitions of ancient physics; it felt indeed that the principle of the mechanical world of Descartes was attacked; our scholars intrenched themselves in the fortress of Cartesianism, and Newton was repulsed from our soil: he was to return one day a conqueror, with the glorious truths and the errors mixed with

[1] This is not to say that, in this case, there might not be vortexes, but the vortexes would be the effect and not the cause of the movement of the celestial bodies.

[2] The admirable experiments of Hooke appear to have put Newton on the way.

truths in his hypotheses. We shall meet him again in the eighteenth century.

Our scholars were right, however, in rejecting attraction, while considering nature only from the point of view of extension; they could not admit that extended substance might conceal a mystic virtue foreign to the essential attributes under which the mind conceives of extension. But is there nothing in nature but extension? Is it true that the world is inert and dead, having need of a movement immediately, solely, and perpetually communicated by the divine hand? Is not the active principle always and everywhere associated with the passive principle, — force with extension, — nay, is extension really a substance, and is there a different reality, a different substance from forces — from powers of activity associated with powers of passivity, with principles of inertia, of resistance, of impenetrability? Is extension anything else than a necessary point of view, resulting from the reciprocal action of these existences impenetrable one to another? This conception, the germ of which had been growing obscurely since the fifteenth century, and which Newton justified,[1] a more comprehensive genius, a profounder metaphysician, Leibnitz, stripped of its covering, and, without openly formulating it in all its boldness, made it the soul of a new theory of the universe which he substituted for that of Descartes: he replaced the Cartesian principle of the always equal quantity of motion in the world by the principle of the preservation of living forces;[2] he proclaimed all substance active, and thus restored life to that sublime organism of the creation which Descartes had transformed into an indifferent and inert machine. Did he in turn exceed the end by implicitly denying the reality of matter, — of what is visible and ponderable, — and in conceiving real beings only as atoms *of substance and not of weight*, spiritual units (*monads*), organized bodies being nothing else than groups of inferior monads centralized around a superior monad, a soul, either rational or instinctive?[3] What can be verified is that he himself believed, right or wrong, that he perceived that simple units, such as he defines his monads,[4] cannot naturally act upon

[1] We do not discuss it; we make an exposition of it.

[2] Descartes had given as the measure of motion the product of the weight by the velocity. Leibnitz gives as the measure of force the product of the weight by the height to which this force can raise a gravitating body, — a height which is as the square of the velocity. Fontenelle, *Éloges des Académiciens*, t. I. p. 470.

[3] The soul of beasts thus revives, according to Leibnitz; animals again become living beings, animated by an indestructible principle, and no longer machines.

[4] Simple in the sense that they are without parts, for he distinguishes in them the two principles of activity and passivity.

each other.[1] To explain the relations of beings, he found himself obliged therefore to replace the hypothesis of Descartes on motion perpetually imparted from God, by another transcendent hypothesis, — the celebrated *preëstablished harmony* of God first between beings, then, in beings, between thoughts and motions, between the monads that think and the monads that act, between souls and bodies; so that to every volition of the soul may correspond a movement of the body, although there may be no real communication between the two.

The theory of forces, less in its metaphysical depths, inexplicit and little understood, than in its practical applications to phenomena, experienced at first in France the fate of the Newtonian attraction; it was classed among the *entelechies* of Aristotle, the *substantial forms* of the schoolmen.[2] Like attraction, it was to have its day; it was to return triumphant and to rule over all the sciences of nature.

In rapidly glancing over the sphere of the sciences, we come from physics to general philosophy, in the steps of the two great geniuses of England and Germany. In metaphysics, France had still, as we shall see directly, a mind of the first order to oppose to rival nations.[3] The state of philosophy presented a singular contrast in France: Cartesianism, reigning almost undisputedly over intellects, played towards all without the part of an established power defending its authority against foreign invasion; meanwhile it was still persecuted within by the political and religious powers. The University and the Jesuits, those ancient adversaries, had combined against it; in 1671, the University had requested the Parliament to cause its teaching to be forbidden in the colleges. Antoine Arnaud intervened by rational discussion, Boileau by satire, and all know the *burlesque decree* which contributed so much to prevent a serious decree. Boileau, by taking sides so warmly for Descartes against Aristotle, proved that his adoration of the

[1] Giordano Bruno had formerly sought to resolve this difficulty by joining material atoms to the monads or immaterial units that he also had conceived.

[2] See in the *Éloges* of Fontenelle the articles LEIBNITZ and NEWTON. Leibnitz had set the seal of his genius on the discovery of Newton; on the mere rumor of this discovery, he recreated the whole theory by the differential calculus without having read Newton's work (1689). On attraction and forces, see Bordas-Demoulin; *Cartésianisme*; Renouvier, *Manuel de philosophie moderne*, and *Encyclopédie nouvelle*, art. FORCE. Biot, *Biographie univ.*, art. LEIBNITZ and NEWTON. A. Jacques, *Préface aux Œuvres de Leibniz*. F. Morin, *Philosophie des sciences*, ap. *Revue de Paris*, July 15, 1856.

[3] And, again, we do not speak of the men of whom metaphysics was not the principal object, but who were great metaphysicians, upon occasion, when they wished, such as Bossuet and Fénelon.

ancients was nothing except a blind fetichism. Cartesian teaching had but a short respite. The enemies of Descartes, obtaining nothing from the Parliament, addressed themselves to the King; a decree in council forbade the Oratorians to teach the new philosophy (1675). The Oratorians protested. The Parliament, by a remarkable exception to its traditional and stereotyped spirit, accepted the protest. The King rescinded the decree of the Parliament. The Oratory was forced to submit, and to pledge itself to teach conformably to ancient scholastic Peripateticism, that extension is not the pure essence of bodies, that thought is not essential to soul, that vacuum exists, etc. The Jesuits were not contented with having caused the reality of vacuum to be proclaimed by the King: while Calvinistic fanaticism persecuted Cartesianism in Holland, a Jesuit denounced the Cartesian philosophy to the assembly of the clergy of France, as favoring the *errors of Calvin* concerning the question of the essence and properties of bodies. The doctrine that denies that accidents or modes exist outside the matter which they modify, was incompatible, it was said, with the mystery of transubstantiation, which requires the accidents to subsist after the matter has disappeared. Bossuet stifled this formidable discussion; but the conferences of Régis, who had propagated Cartesianism by his eloquent discourses in the learned cities of Toulouse, Aix, and Montpelier, were interdicted at Paris by the Archbishop Harlai (1680). A few years after, the Sorbonne launched a decree against the new philosophy (1693).[1] Oral instruction might indeed be interdicted, but the prohibition did not go so far as to proscribe books. Cartesianism had everywhere too powerful supporters, and Louis XIV. would have feared to tarnish *his glory*. The orders in council, the decrees of the Sorbonne, effected as little as the polemic of skeptics through bigotry, such as the learned Bishop Huet and the Jesuit-historian Daniel, who were offended that reason should pretend to any certainty outside of faith. These attacks only increased the success of Régis, that devoted popularizer, become as it were the leader of a numerous and active sect, that spread and commented upon Descartes everywhere, without adding anything, without correcting anything, without applying the method of the master to continue the work of the master, and sometimes even showing the greatest preference to his most defective parts. History need not occupy itself with that which added nothing to science.[2] The true heirs of Descartes were not the slaves of the let-

[1] See Cousin, *Fragments philosophiques*, t. II.; *De la Persécution du cartésianisme.*

[2] We must not however be unjust to Régis, who has often shown real merit in his commentaries.

ter of Cartesianism, but rather its great independent disciples who developed and transformed the creation of the master and bequeathed worlds of thoughts in turn to posterity.[1]

Three great metaphysicians, sprung from Descartes, rose almost simultaneously in France, Holland, and Germany. One was Malebranche; another, Spinoza; the third, we have already seen appear many times, for he invaded with the same power all branches of human knowledge — Leibnitz.

In the order of ideas, if not in that of time, Malebranche presents himself first. This contemplator of the divine ideal, who seems to have sprung up from the depth of a Thebaid, was, the painter of heaven, like Lesueur, a child of Paris, that city bustling and active above all others. The congregation of the Oratory, that learned and austere ally of Port-Royal and Descartes, had the honor of producing the last great thinker that sprang from the religious orders. Malebranche was to the Oratory what St. Thomas had been to the Dominicans, and St. Bonaventure to the Franciscans; but he did not mingle, like those two monastic philosophers, the affairs of the Church with external things. His history is wholly in his books, or rather in a single book, which it was the sole work of his life to develop, the *Search for Truth*.[2] He was less a man than a thought. With a mind exclusively idealistic, filled with a proud disdain of facts, of appearances, of everything that comes to us through the senses, through imagination or through human tradition, at the same time pious and attached by a profound sentiment to his faith, he impressed on his work this double character: he undertook to develop the theory of the understanding and the ideas, to demonstrate that our soul is much more closely united to God than to our body, and at the same time to connect together

[1] With the prohibition of Cartesian instruction coincided illiberal measures concerning instruction in general. In 1679, an edict forbade all persons other than Professors by title to lecture publicly on canonical and civil law, under penalty of 3000 livres' fine, and deprivation of all the degrees which they might have obtained, etc. This prohibition, in 1682, was extended to all the faculties and was applied to Fellows as well as to all other doctors; they could no longer either teach in public or assemble pupils at their houses. Hitherto, all Fellows had had the right to teach freely within the jurisdiction of their faculties. The monopoly of titular Professors, and the destruction of what remained of the scholastic liberties of the Middle Ages, were therefore the work of the government of Louis XIV. Despotism was rendered complete in every direction.

[2] The first volume appeared in 1674; the rest followed close after. Malebranche, born in 1638, died in 1715. His other works are *Christian Conversations; Treatise on Nature and Grace; Treatise on Ethics; Christian and Metaphysical Meditations; Answers to Objections*, etc.

philosophy and religion, which Descartes had separated to affranchise philosophy.

He took therefore for his starting-point, in the *Search for Truth*, the distinction between the soul and the body as propounded by Descartes and the geometrical method singularly associated with the dogma of original sin. All evil being to him in the flesh, he necessarily adopted the method which sweeps away Peripatetic sensualism. The reason of his contempt for sensible experience and phenomenal notions is metaphysical, inasmuch as the senses "do not teach us what things are in themselves, but only the relation which they bear to our body"; but he is also and above all theological, inasmuch as our body is what turns us from God: original sin, according to him, has corrupted the senses, or, more exactly, has corrupted the mind by relaxing its union with God to draw closer its union with the body; whence it follows that the mind is led to believe the senses instead of passing judgment on their testimony. It is by this datum that he strives to connect religion to philosophy. Descartes had not given place to such a doctrine, and believed that man remains what his Creator made him.

The mind, therefore, according to Malebranche, must guard against consulting sensible things in order to arrive at the truth. The majority of mankind follow this false path, "the ordinary opinions, which we see generally approved by all men and in all ages," have no value as to philosophic certainty. "If men were greatly enlightened, the universal approbation would be a reason, but it is quite the contrary."[1] Never were pure rationalism and the contempt of universal consent carried further.

The consent of men set aside, individual reason remains face to face with God. It must interrogate him alone. Universal truth, which is God, will answer by manifesting to the mind *clear and distinct ideas*. We must wait for this answer, solicit it by prayer, and suspend our judgment as long as God does not reply.

In the presence of this audacious and sublime rationalism, what becomes of traditional religion, so dear to Malebranche? The

[1] *Recherche de la Vérité;* Preface, p. XLV., 8th edit. It is in the *Treatise on Nature and Grace*, and in the *Christian Conversations*, that he develops his system of alliance between religion and philosophy by a most extraordinary and bold theory on the character and *necessity* of the incarnation of the Word and of its mediation, — *a necessity which would have existed even without original sin*. At the bottom, he struggles against doubts on the necessity of an *infinite* satisfaction to God for sin, and consequently eternal punishment. The spirit of Origen revives in him. See a curious letter from Malebranche, published by M. Pascal Duprat in the *Revue Indépendante* of October 10, 1843.

logical consequence of his doctrine is, that, if we ought to believe in revelation, it is not because it has been transmitted to us by tradition, but because God renews it to us whenever we interrogate him. But then there is no longer a Church!

He endeavors to escape by a distinction between the order of faith and the order of reason. "God instructs us by faith in a manner quite different from that in which he discovers to us natural things." Malebranche affirms, but he neither explains nor demonstrates, and ends only by arbitrarily interdicting to reason access to a sphere into which the majority of the great theologians have themselves introduced it, — the sphere of the Christian mysteries.[1] He fails, therefore, in his project of an alliance between religion and philosophy.

Now, does he succeed in the theory of ideas? Where does he learn that God reveals to us *clear and distinct ideas?* What is the seat of ideas? They are not in external objects, whence they would be transmitted to us by emanation, as the Peripatetics claim; they are not created by our mind, or by the Creator in our mind in proportion to occasions. General ideas, eternal truths, are innate in our mind, said Descartes; we see them in us, where God placed them in creating us, and we see them also at their direct source, in God: the idea of God or of infinite perfection is our soul itself. Descartes, at the first flight, seizêd the mysterious truth under both its aspects.[2] Malebranche lets one of the two phases of the truth escape; he denies innate ideas, and claims that we see ideas only in God, who is the intellectual world or the abode of spirits. While he is swallowed up in the divine unity, human individuality tends to become annihilated in his hands: the duality of the finite being and the infinite being becomes more and more effaced. Descartes laid the foundation of the true theory, but he did not construct the edifice: having paused, in his definition of the soul, at the notion of thought, and not having gone back to the notion of force, he did not establish that the soul develops its ideas by its own force, and seemed to admit that the soul is passive as to ideas and active only as to volitions. Malebranche goes further and tends to render passive the will as the understanding. "Creatures," he says, "have

[1] He admits that reason can explain original sin, but ranks the holy Trinity among the mysteries which we should not attempt to fathom, and, some time after, Bossuet himself, who is orthodoxy incarnate, gives an admirable metaphysical explanation of this fundamental mystery.

[2] We have already said, that, by *innate ideas*, Descartes did not mean notions ready acquired, but the principles of notions, the faculty of acquiring them, and the tendency to use this faculty.

no force of their own; God makes everything in minds as in bodies. It is from His power that minds receive all their modifications; it is in His wisdom that they find all their ideas; it is by His love that they are agitated by all their regulated movements." Nothing remains to man but the liberty of sinning; that is, of stopping at particular objects, at false good, the regulated movements, which impel him towards the good in general, which is God himself. It is not easy to understand how a being that has no force of his own can have even the negative force to resist the divine impulse. There is here again an illogical reservation imposed on the philosopher by the theologian. If creatures have no force of their own, what have they? What are they? From this to denying the reality of being, and to seeing in them only modes of the universal being, there is but a step.

Malebranche does not take this step; but he falls short of it only through lack of logical rigor. He does not therefore found one of those full and compact systems of theology, the chain of which can no longer be broken as soon as one has suffered himself to be entangled in the first link. The reader escapes him by more than one broken mesh. He remains, notwithstanding, one of the great names of philosophy. He has developed one of the phases of truth, the theory of vision in God, with a magnificence worthy of Plato, and in the form clearest, most luminous, most worthy of the subject. Whoever is susceptible to great thoughts will always admire the beauty, the sublimity of this mind that hovers in the heaven of ideas as in his true country, and mounts naturally to God as the eagle to the sun.[1]

[1] It must not be forgotten that philosophy is indebted to him for having recognized in God the idea of *intelligent extension*. "We see in God," he says, "the idea of extension, but not the things themselves extended and divided; their existence is not necessary to God. God cannot be called Spirit: His true name is He who Is; that is, the Being without restriction, All-Being, the infinite and universal Being." See *Recherche de la Vérité*, t. II. p. 158.

Concerning the question of certainty, he takes a step beyond Descartes: he admits that we cannot prove by reason the existence of beings outside of ourselves. "Were it not for faith, we should be forced to think that God is the only being outside of ourselves." And here he distinguishes supernatural faith from natural faith (sentiment), which renders probable the existence of other creatures, but does not demonstrate it; he does not fail to admit this *natural faith* as a second principle of certainty opposed to pure reason.

Let us lastly recall his demonstration, wholly Cartesian, of God by ideas. "Clear and distinct ideas are true; they are immutable, necessary, and divine. All that we see clearly, directly, immediately, necessarily exists. We cannot see God as simply possible: nothing comprehends Him; nothing can represent Him; if, therefore, we think of Him, it must be that He exists." See *Bordas-Demoulin* and his luminous development of the different tendencies of Descartes by his disciples.

Philosophy remained with Malebranche, its head in a halo of glory, its feet suspended over an abyss towards which it was drawn by logic, and from which it was held back only by a foreign force, a faith drawn elsewhere than from method.

Another mind drew the consequences from which Malebranche recoiled: a mind that was bound by nothing, that was terrified by nothing, that disguised nothing, and that did not admit that anything could escape the sovereignty of method. We shall not undertake to set forth here in its full extent the colossal system of Spinoza, that powerful and solitary thinker who seemed to evoke in modern Europe the antique genius of India, and who opposed to Christian asceticism, to the asceticism of mystical sentiment, the asceticism of pure reason. The abstruse rigor, the gloomy austerity of his formulas, which reduce metaphysics to a sort of algebra, rendered his theory inaccessible to the multitude; among his contemporaries he engaged the serious attention, in France, of only a few lofty intellects, that were eager to combat rather than to understand and judge him; an object of terror to pious men, who only heard vague echoes of his name, an object of curiosity rather than of profound study to *libertines* and *free-thinkers*, who extolled him, as the devotees detested him, without comprehending him, he appeared to public opinion as little else than a destroyer, an unbeliever whose formidable criticism shook the whole edifice of tradition. As a theorist, he exercised but a feeble and indirect influence on the French mind, until he returned to us, after a century and a half, borne in triumph by Germany, which, more accessible to his dogmatic thought, was nevertheless itself very slow to give him entrance. The chain of ideas requires, notwithstanding, that we should attempt to indicate the principal outlines of this great character.

Born outside the pale of Christianity, the child of a proscribed religion and race, but affranchised from the prejudices and beliefs peculiar to this race, the Jew Baruch Spinoza[1] did not commence, like Descartes, by setting apart the established religion to conform to it in practice: he placed himself, on the contrary, outside of all religious forms, having renounced those of his fathers without having adopted any of the Christian creeds,[2] and begun by applying the geometrical method to positive theology and to politics, that is, to what Descartes had abstained from examining. He undertook

[1] Born at Amsterdam, in 1632, of a Jewish family of Portuguese extraction.

[2] Holland, under John De Witt, was perhaps the only country of Europe where Spinoza could live in this liberty.

a new examination of the Holy Scriptures, taking care, he says, to affirm nothing, to recognize nothing as sacred doctrine, except what the Scriptures themselves taught him clearly. A Protestant might have admitted this basis; but Spinoza was not long in laying down a principle superior to the Scriptures to judge the Scriptures and special revelation, — the permanent and universal revelation of God in the mind of man, on which is engraved the veritable original of the law of God. The only means, he says, of verifying the divinity of the Scriptures is to prove that they teach true virtue. This principle alone directly renders useless all positive theology, everything that rests on traditional facts. He arrives at the same result both by this dogmatic affirmation and by the criticism of the holy books. After a methodical examination, he decides that the first twelve books of the Old Testament were not the work of Moses or of the other authors to whom they are ascribed, and were only edited in their present form by Esdras; that the four books of Esdras, Nehemiah, Daniel, and Esther were posterior to Judas Maccabæus;[1] that the holy books were selected arbitrarily, from many other books, by the Pharisees of the second Temple. He sees no certainty, therefore, in the historical narratives of the Bible, at least as to details. As regards the miracles, understood in the common manner as a suspension of the laws of nature by the divine power, he judges them impossible; for "the universal laws of nature, by which everything is made and determined, are nothing else than the eternal decrees of God, which are eternal truths and always imply absolute necessity. If God should act contrary to the laws of nature, he would act contrary to his own essence." As to the prophets, they were only pious men, in whom a strong imagination predominated, and who taught virtue. There have been such among all nations.

The Scriptures should not, therefore, be searched for facts, but for ideas and precepts. Now, according to him, the Scriptures by no means contain metaphysics, but only ethics. The mysteries of transcendent theology which it is endeavored to find therein are scholastic visions. To love God and our fellows — this is all that the Scriptures teach man.[2] What is God? — An omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient being, who extends his providence over all things, who rewards virtue and punishes crime; a God of justice and mercy. As to his nature, the holy books do not define it

[1] He does not deny that these books were composed from ancient books, the original text of which is found transcribed in part in them.

[2] "All books," he adds, "which contain teachings of excellent morality, in whatever language they may be written, in whatever nation they may be found, are as sacred as the Scriptures." T. I. p. 218, ed. Saisset.

any more than our own, except that they call it eternal. Religion, which is the object of the Scriptures, has for its end only the regulation of morals; speculation, science, do not concern it. Religion and philosophy have each their independent sphere.

It follows more or less explicitly from all that precedes, that the higher sphere is that of philosophy; that pure reason alone attains abstract truth; that religion teaches only relative truth, a God conceived from the point of view of his relations with man.

The *Theologico-Political Treatise* of Spinoza[1] raised a lively agitation among Protestant theologians: the protectors and friends of the audacious philosopher, the illustrious brothers De Witt, perished meanwhile; Calvinistic fanaticism revived in Holland; Spinoza was silenced, and his whole idea was not revealed until after he had expired, still young, worn out by his solitary meditations.[2]

In the *Theologico-Political Treatise*, he had above all attacked what he called *error:* in *Ethics*, his great posthumous work, he establishes TRUTH. Entering metaphysics by the same path as Malebranche, where the French philosopher pauses, he goes on to the end. To him as to Malebranche, man, the particular being, has no force of his own, no innate ideas; but he deduces better than Malebranche the consequences of this principle. If the particular being has no force of his own, he has no will, no more liberty for evil than for good; he has no substance of his own; he is not a being, in the true sense of the word; he is a mode of the only being, a finite and relative mode of the absolute and infinite being. The human soul is a mode of the thought of God, destined to fall in time and to become the *form* of a *body*. God *is* all that *is;* that is, all that is *really* and *positively*, all that subsists after the elimination of accidents and phenomena. The two substances defined by Descartes, thought and extension, are only the two fundamental attributes of the only substance, or at least the only essential attributes of God that we can know.[3] They are the only two universals, or general ideas that really exist; all the others, all the so-called collective beings or *entities*, the human race itself, are vain abstractions.

Here is the meaning of that negation of absolute right, expressed in the *Theologico-Political Treatise*, and which contrasts so singu-

[1] Published in Latin at Amsterdam, in 1670, under the false imprint of Hamburg.

[2] He died in 1677, under forty-five years of age. His unpublished works were published a few months after his death.

[3] This divine extension, in him as in Malebranche, is not extension divided as it appears in phenomena, but intelligent, continued and infinite extension.

larly with the precept of the Scriptures on mutual love. There is no natural law of equity between men, since there are only individuals with no common type, with no natural order of relations, and, for these individuals, there exists towards God neither merit nor demerit, since their individuality is only apparent, and has neither liberty nor force of its own.

The consequence of this principle would seem to be the absolute negation of good and evil, entire indifference, entire abandonment to fatality, during the illusion that we call life, and, after death, the reabsorption of the individual into unity. It is nothing of the sort. There exists, in truth, neither good nor evil, neither reward nor punishment in the positive and direct sense understood by religions; but there are, in the individual, more or less *joy* (happiness), improvement and *being*, according as he more or less closely approaches pure and infinite reason, — that is, his true nature. There are no criminals, sinners; but there are unfortunates, madmen: those who live buried in the senses, in appearances, in separation from their true *being*, in a partial death. Man regains the only true liberty when he detaches himself from phenomena to attach himself to that which really *is* and which does not pass away. With liberty, he regains immortality. The *reasoning* and *philosophic soul* dies in external nature, but to revive in God. It loses, at death, the senses, memory, imagination, all that pertains to phenomena, and keeps the eternal reason, conceiving nothing longer, except infinite thought and infinite extension; it lives, not as a real being, but as an eternal idea in God; such as it was before its terrestrial life, as such it subsists after: it is only a mode of the divine thought; but this mode is imperishable. Herein is the sovereign good. This good the philosopher desires for others as for himself the more strongly as he knows God more, that is, as he knows better the unity of all apparent beings in the real being.

Arrived at this height, Spinoza finds therefore again in unity, right, charity, morality. But does he really find liberty? What is liberty, the principle of which is not in ourselves? We can change nothing in our destiny: it is the eternal decrees that make us *philosophic souls* or *vulgar souls*. Now these last, that is, the great majority of mankind, being composed almost solely of images and passions, and wellnigh strangers to reason, perish almost entirely at death, since they lose then all the accidents of life, and do not comprehend in exchange the absolute truth of which they had no idea on earth. Thus not only the men who have lived without law, but those who have followed religion, the law of

morals, through blind obedience and not through reason, have not eternal life. Religion, necessary to society, serves only for terrestrial life.

But those who have felt in their hearts the eternal truths which they have not conceived by the mind, those who have loved God without knowing him? — They, too, are excluded! their love was not *intellectual love.* Thus the humble, the simple of heart, will not have the kingdom of heaven which Jesus Christ promised them in preference! The pride of pure reason is inflexible.

This system is great: its iron logic attracts and fascinates like an abyss; but the fatality which it causes to hover over the universe casts over it an unspeakable melancholy. The necessity-God of Spinoza does not rouse the indignation, like the voluntary and free God of Calvin, who predestines his creatures to damnation; but he oppresses the soul: he has, to use the admirable expression of a philosopher, *mathematics in the place of heart.*[1]

It was thus that, sentiment once excluded from method, where it would have invincibly maintained the human personality, pure reason went on, from deduction to deduction, to PANTHEISM. The idea of *contradictories* alone could have arrested Spinoza and caused him to reconcile necessity and liberty, the divine unity and the individuality of beings; but this idea cannot impose itself without the concurrence of sentiment: Spinoza passed on, and the Great Whole was to him only a deduction continued on a single line.

A terrible rumor was raised: there was an outcry on every side against *the infidel, the atheist,* against this man, whose sole error had been that of believing only in God and annihilating everything in God.[2] It was pretended that he recognized no other divinity than the collection of creatures. The Cartesians, Malebranche at their head, clamored louder than the rest, to put away all suspicion of connivance. It was easier to execrate than to reply. Many sought an answer. A single man found it. It was Leibnitz. He answered, as genius answers, not by denying error, but by affirming new truths. He understood how Descartes had given some opening to Pantheism by identifying soul with thought, which might be impersonal, and thus completely insuring only the immateriality of the soul,

[1] Renouvier, *Manuel de Philosophie moderne,* p. 251. On Spinoza, see the translation of E. Saisset and his learned introduction. M. Saisset has rendered a great service to philosophy by happily carrying out a very difficult enterprise. See, also, the article SPINOZA, in the *Encyclopédie Nouvelle,* by J. Reynaud.

[2] Yet the instinct of the crowd did not deceive it essentially; for, if the universe is annihilated in God, God is himself annihilated in impersonality; the *living* God is swallowed up after the *real* man; the creator after the creation.

but not its individuality and persistency;[1] he saw clearly how Malebranche had enlarged this opening, in such a manner that Spinoza could pass through it entire, and he undertook the reform of Cartesianism, by retaining as a starting-point the method of Descartes, modified by a direct return to the great source of Plato. He perceived the hiatus in this method; seeing the whole question in the proper force or activity of creatures, and being unable to demonstrate this proper force by pure reason, he appealed to *inmost experience*, to *consciousness*, against the theorists who denied to the human soul that personality of which it has the irresistible sentiment. By this great idea he introduced a second principle of certainty opposite to pure reason, and reinstated sentiment into metaphysics, where Pascal had not known how to restore it to its place, the efforts of Pascal having ended only in the passionate negation of metaphysics itself. He established that there is something else in the world than *thought* and *extension;* that there is something else than extension in beings that do not think; that every being is a force; that every being endowed with reason, every force that thinks, sees ideas in itself as in God, as Descartes had affirmed. By the idea of forces, as we have said, he diffused life everywhere throughout this passive and inert world of *extension*, wherein Descartes was obliged to invoke unceasingly the immediate and unique action of God. Lastly, by the idea of perfectibility, which did not belong to him exclusively, but which he raised to the most sublime generality by conceiving it as the universal law of creatures tending towards the perfect, that is, towards the Creator, he threw a bridge between the abstract sphere of the philosophers and the living sphere of history, and inaugurated the new dogma of modern times, the dogma of progress.[2] The services rendered by Leibnitz to philosophy are inappreciable; he is the only metaphysician who essentially added to Descartes while rectifying Descartes, and who raised himself to his level by creating like him.

It might be perhaps affirmed, without temerity, that Leibnitz would have completed Descartes and founded an impregnable theory, if he had better fathomed the principle of the sentiment which he had invoked; if, while establishing that sentiment necessarily

[1] It was perhaps for this reason that Descartes did not affirm more clearly that the immortality of the soul can be proved by pure reason, although he knew very well that the thinking principle cannot perish.

[2] Perfectibility is not to him solely in society, in external nature, in organized beings: it is in simple and primordial beings, in the *monads;* the *monads* are perfected by their continual action, and it is in this manner that the universe, created at the lowest degree of being, goes on continually improving.

implies personality, he had sufficiently established that personality conscient of itself implies liberty;[1] if, lastly, he had bowed before the mystery of the *great contradictory*, Providence and Liberty, instead of attempting to explain what to us is inexplicable. Unhappily, the pretension to define everything misled him; the negation of the reality of *extension* had led him to the hypothesis of *pre-ëstablished harmony*, to explain the reciprocal action of monads, which he judged inexplicable between simple and immaterial beings. *Preëstablished harmony* led him to *determinism;* God having regulated from the beginning the correspondence between thoughts and volitions on one hand, and corporeal movements on the other, thoughts, volitions, and movements engender each other in an order immutably *determined;* the admirable formula, *The present, begotten of the past, is big with the future*, so true in a general sense, but with the reservation of free will, appears thus to assume a character of absolute necessity; it seems as if man concurs fatally in the plans of Providence, in the necessary progress of the human race and the universe; it seems as if liberty escapes him anew, with Leibnitz, as with Malebranche and Spinoza.[2] Leibnitz firmly establishes force, proper activity in man, but not sufficiently the free direction of this force. *Determinism* is applied even to God: God is *determined* by his wisdom and goodness to create the world as great and good as possible; the world is what it should be, and cannot be otherwise. This is the renowned *optimism* of Leibnitz, which Malebranche had laid down before him, perhaps from his inspiration, but without making it in this manner the key of a whole great system. God himself is not therefore free, if we do not wish to call free, like Leibnitz, the being who depends on no other being, and who is *determined* only by his own attributes.

The audacious hypotheses of Leibnitz, his *preëstablished harmony*

[1] Leibnitz was very far from denying free will, but we are about to see how he involuntarily compromised it.

[2] It *seems*, we say; for this is only an appearance, a misunderstanding; if certain of the systematic formulas of Leibnitz are perilous or erroneous, his thought is irreproachable. "The connection of the resolutions of God," he says, "makes the certainty of human events, without, on this account, implying the necessity." In the *preëstablished harmony* of souls and bodies, which to him replaces the movement immediately given from God (*occasional cause* of Descartes), "the agreement is natural and spontaneous." We must not fail to recognize that the preëstablished harmony is, after all, a great progress over the perpetual *miracle* of the Cartesian motion, and, whatever may be the value of this system, we must bow before the sublime sentiment of universal harmony that inspired it. See *Lettres et Opuscules inédits de Leibniz*, Paris, 1854, p. XXXI; and *Nouvelles Lettres*, etc., Paris, 1857, p. CLXXVI; published by M. Foucher de Careil.

and his *determinism*, and even his exclusive spiritualism, opposed in tendency to the awakening spirit of the eighteenth century,[1] endangered for a time the admirable revelations of his genius; the fecundity of his ideas, moreover, was injurious to their concentration, and his pretensions to explain everything, to reconcile everything, took away, apparently, something of his originality: with a very great name, he did not exercise on his contemporaries, unless it were in Germany, all the influence that seemed to belong to him; but what lessened the power of his immediate action, the absence of sectarian spirit and the universal comprehension which characterized him, were precisely what should constitute his greatness in the sight of posterity.[2]

This general reconciliation of ideas, this sublime syncretism to which he aspired and for which he so largely paved the way, he did not, however, accomplish: the philosophy of the seventeenth century, the philosophy of the mind and the reason, although in possession of all the essential principles, remained imperfect in consequence of not having known how to connect them together in a harmonious whole. Large breaches were left open in the edifice of truth; through them the enemy was to return. Already he was in sight, and the attack was begun!

The attack came from the country of Hobbes, that evil genius whom Descartes had vanquished. It came from a man who little thought of continuing the work of the theorist of atheism and despotism, and who professed opinions on public and private life quite opposite to those of Hobbes. John Locke, a broad and active mind, a judicious and sagacious observer, but better adapted to that sort of moral philosophy the materials of which are furnished us by observation

[1] Let us not forget, however, that the conception of *monads*, the basis of all the theories of Leibnitz, has remained as impregnable as the basis of the Cartesian method: the monads are the metaphysical support of every scientific theory on forces; without them, nothing would reign therein but blind empiricism.

[2] The recent important publications of M. Foucher de Careil have thrown much new light on the history and essential characteristics of the thought of Leibnitz. See *Réfutation de Spinoza*, Paris, 1854, and the two volumes of *Letters and Opuscules*, with the full expositions of the system of Leibnitz which precede these publications. A few reservations may be made; but there is much to be learned from this scholarly and ardent disciple of Leibnitz. We will only cite his well-founded refutation of the attacks of Kant (*Nouvelles Lettres*, etc., pp. CXXXIII–CXXXIX), and the fine passage in which he shows the essential unity of the method of Leibnitz, and how the incomparably fruitful applications of this method to the mathematical sciences, to physics, to the sciences of life, applications which are continued and will be continued indefinitely, are derived entirely from its metaphysical principles (pp. CCVII–CCXIX). See also the Introductory Lecture of M. Saisset's Course, 1857.

and experience than to transcendent speculations, claimed to enlighten philosophy and to put an end to the disputes of philosophers by studying thoroughly and in detail the faculties and operations of the understanding. This was an admirable undertaking, and Locke thus founded that important branch of philosophy which has since received so much development under the name of psychology. Unhappily, before establishing himself on the ground which he was to till with great profit, before analyzing ideas in themselves, he began by going astray in the investigation of their origin. He entered upon a vast *Essay on the Human Understanding*,[1] without possessing those *clear and distinct ideas* so much recommended by Descartes, and, consequently, without having at his disposal true philosophic language. He too often replaces clearness of thought by that false clearness of form which seeks the commonest instead of the most exact terms, and which takes commonplace for common-sense. He sees the origin of ideas only in the sensation caused by external objects, and in the reflection exercised on the materials furnished by sensation; he excepts only the knowledge of our own existence, which we have, he says, by intuition, and that of the existence of God, which we have by demonstration;[2] but this last exception is not rigorously accounted for in him, and seems only a concession to the religious beliefs of his country and to his own. As to the preceding exception, his *intuition* is little more than a generalized sensation, and ends by substituting *I feel, therefore I am* for *I think, therefore I am*. He puts away from science, as incomprehensible, all that does not fall within the imagination and the senses, all that is intelligible without being imaginable; he puts away metaphysical causes to see nothing but concrete effects. He transports without reservation into psychology, into the science of the *ego*, that method of observation and experience which his friend Newton had systematized with genius in the sciences of external nature. He does not go so far as to deny the mind, the subject that thinks, and accords to it the faculty of reflection, which modifies in a somewhat indefinite manner the ideas furnished by the senses; but he comes to doubt and to ask whether this subject of thought is really distinct from matter, or, in other terms, whether God could not accord to matter the faculty of thinking. This question alone, to whomsoever admits it,

[1] Published at London in 1690.

[2] Descartes, for want of having sufficiently fathomed the theory of ideas, had explicitly attributed *innateness* only to the ideas of God and the soul, and had appeared to place in external things the origin of ideas of number and extension. Thereby he had opened the way to Locke. See Bordas-Demoulin, t. I. p. 127.

overthrows all intelligible notions, and plunges metaphysics again into the chaos whence Descartes had drawn it! Locke, initiated into the labors of Newton, vaguely feels that there is something else than extension where there is no thought, and does not understand why these forces, these active principles, which he feels joined to the passive principle, should be essentially incapable of being elevated to thought; but he takes these forces for modes or qualities susceptible of being added to the *essence of matter*, that is, to extension; he does not understand that every force is necessarily a substance, since we do not conceive it reducible to any other principle, and he asks whether thought, force having consciousness of itself, may not be a property of matter, of extension, that is, whether one substance cannot be the property of another substance, which has no meaning.[1]

By the vague character given to the terms *matter* and *property*, Locke paves the way for the destruction of metaphysics.

In metaphysics, he has therefore overthrown fundamental notions in order to build up in vacuum a theory which ends, on one side, in sensualism by the origin assigned to ideas, on the other, in idealistic skepticism by the axiom that we see directly only our thoughts and not the things outside of ourselves; in ethics, he arrives at the system of well-understood interest by a somewhat singular path: he resolves all morality into religion, and all religion into consideration of our own interest in this world and in the next.

The success of Locke was immediate in England. The English genius, which recoiled before the rude atheism of Hobbes, was delighted with the ethics of utility and the philosophy of sensation, presented with decorum and gravity; it did not appear to perceive the nullity of the principles, in the presence of the patient and ingenious analysis of the faculties of the understanding, a long review of the operations of the human mind which excited its admiration, and which was, in fact, the original and durable part of the work of Locke. In France, the English philosopher was at first received only by the little school of Gassendi, which he revived under a more popular and more facile form, and by those of the *free-thinkers* who sympathized with this school. The ascendency of the Cartesians, and especially of Malebranche, was still too powerful; but

[1] If he meant by the *essence of matter* anything else than extension, this other thing can be only the *unique substance* of Spinoza, having the double attributes of thought and extension; he touches indeed for a moment on this idea; but he does not dwell on it. See Leibnitz, *Nouveaux essais sur l'Entendement, Avant-propos*, p. 77, edit. A. Jacques, 1846; and *Lettres et Opuscules inédits de Leibniz*, preceded by an Introduction, by A. Foucher de Careil, p. LXXVIII.

the partisans of Locke were destined by degrees to increase in numbers and to rally to their support the minds impatient of all dogmatism whom the austere majesty of Cartesianism importuned as a sort of religion, those who rejected the whole Cartesian theory on account of the hiatuses or the errors which they perceived in it, those above all who neither knew how nor wished to elevate themselves above sensible things. Other motives of a higher nature were also to militate in favor of the English philosopher. We shall see Locke one day invade France with Newton, and under the same auspices, to reign there for nearly a century on the throne usurped from Descartes, and we shall then be obliged to recur to the causes of this strange revolution.[1]

Locke was not only a metaphysician but a political theorist, and his influence as such was not less considerable and more legitimate. A devoted patriot, exiled to Holland under James II., then returning to England with and through the Revolution, he constructed the theory of liberty after having courageously served liberty in person. He attacked one after another, with more audacity than logic, the two great intellectual rulers of the France of the seventeenth century, the philosopher who had freed minds from scholastic authority, and the theologian who enchained persons to political authority; he attacked Bossuet after Descartes. Locke's *Treatise on Civil Government* (1690–1694) is truly the antithesis of the *Politics of the Holy Scriptures*. Almost a quarter of a century previous, and even before Bossuet had penned his theory of government, Spinoza had already enunciated in his *Theologico-Political Treatise* a system contrary to that of the French theologian. It is interesting to compare the two adversaries of Bossuet.

We have already related how Spinoza, considering the human race only as a nominal abstraction and not as a veritable archetype, or as a necessary conception, recognized no natural right binding men to each other; from the human point of view, and as long as souls have not recognized their unity in God, he sees no other right than force. Notwithstanding, reason shows man that society

[1] The system of Locke had been refuted by Leibnitz in his *New Essays on the Understanding;* but, Locke having died meanwhile, in 1704, Leibnitz committed the error of not publishing his book, as if the theory of Locke had died with him. The *New Essays* did not appear until 1765, when Locke reigned without dispute over England and France, and invaded Germany itself. Nevertheless it is not probable that the *New Essays* would have arrested a movement which proceeded from so many complex causes. See the translation of A. Jacques, and his remarkable Introduction on the whole works of Leibnitz; Paris, 1846. M. Jacques has done a very useful work in placing the principal works of Leibnitz within the reach of a great number of readers.

founded on compromise and mutual protection is better than the state of nature in which individuals are in perpetual conflict. Thence arises the social compact. This compact itself is again a fact rather than a right. The right of the State, of the magistrate, has no limits but his power; and, on the other hand, one is only bound to observe agreements as long as it is to his interest to do so. We fancy that we have returned to Hobbes on listening to these strange words; but the ideal which is at the bottom of the idea of Spinoza leads to conclusions quite opposite to those of Hobbes: reason, he says, which has counselled the social compact, maintains it by preventing the magistrate from oppressing, the citizen from disturbing the State. Spinoza is not progressive, and cannot be so. His Pantheism is as remote from the principle of perfectibility as the Catholicism of Bossuet. No more than Bossuet, does he wish the established government to be changed, but he has the same preference for democracy that Bossuet has for monarchy. "Democracy, in which no one transfers his natural right to another, but only to the majority, and in which all consequently remain equal as before in the natural state, is the most natural form of government, that most nearly approaching liberty, which nature gives to mankind."[1] This definition goes far beyond the republican theorists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, from Buchanan and Hotman to Sidney, almost all more or less imbued with aristocracy; Spinoza clearly lays down the republic of universal suffrage, and would deprive none of political right but women, children, criminals, and *slaves*.

This is to him only what is *preferable*, since he admits the various forms of government;[2] what is *necessary*, whatever may be the form of government, consists in the following principles: 1st, that the State should regulate religion, which should meddle only with morals, and by no means with philosophy or science; 2d, that each citizen should be free to think what he likes and to speak what he thinks. The true end of the State is liberty. The magistrate should repress acts, but leave liberty to words. One should never act in opposition to the decrees of the magistrate; but he may think, speak, and judge with full liberty, appealing only to reason, and showing that such or such a law is repugnant to reason. The

[1] *Traité Théologico-Politique*, p. 276, ap. *Œuvres de Spinoza*, t. I., translation of M. E. Saisset.

[2] He does not admit them with a very good grace. "The great secret of the monarchical system, and its principal interest, is to deceive men and to color with the beautiful name of religion the fear in which it is necessary to hold them enslaved." Preface to the *Theologico-Political Treatise*, p. 59.

liberty of speech should have no bounds but the social compact and faith (that is, the *moral* beliefs which regulate life). Never has reason perhaps been more eloquent than in the pages in which the Dutch recluse protests against those governments and sects which, pretending to regulate by laws matters of speculation, punish opinions as crimes, unable to endure the liberty of the mind, and wishing to carry despotism into the intelligent world. Now these governments, at the epoch when Spinoza wrote, were all Europe, except Holland; as to the sects, a few fractions only of Protestantism admitted liberty of beliefs.[1]

Between Spinoza and Locke, liberty had made a brilliant conquest: it had extended from Holland to England; speech and the press were freed on British soil. Locke systematized the victory to which he had contributed.

His starting-point is very different from that of Spinoza. He admits, 1st, natural right, by which man is independent of every other man, but not of equity, and immediately does justice to himself; 2d, civil right, by which men enter into community under a power established by the consent of all, and intrust the care of justice to this power. He admits that societies commenced in fact by the patriarchal power, which may have, oftenest, in proportion as societies extended, degenerated into hereditary monarchies; but this is pure fact in his eyes. Despotic monarchy, in which men depend on a man and not on the law, is not to him a *civil government*. The social compact begins only with the institution of legal and regulated powers. Regular government begins by the unanimous consent of the men who accept the compact, and continues by the necessary deference of the minority towards the majority. The majority can delegate the power, but this delegated power is not absolute and is limited by natural justice, which is the law of God: it is not irrevocable; if it goes astray, the people who made it can unmake it. In certain States there are kings reputed inviolable; this inviolability disappears if the king reverses the fundamental laws.[2]

The sovereignty of the people could not be more forcibly enunciated. Behold us far from all those writers who confound fact with right and see as many principles of sovereignty as there are

[1] See Preface, p. 60. *Traité Théol.*, p. 330. Spinoza, in a design by his hand, represented himself as Masaniello. *Vie de Spinoza*, p. 14.

[2] Corruption exercised in elections, or on the elect of the people, is one of the cases which, according to Locke, divest the king of his inviolability. William III., as well as his predecessors and the first of his successors, would have run great risks if this article had been rigorously applied to him!

forms of government! Events contributed to give Locke the superiority here over Spinoza. There was between them the Revolution of 1688.

Locke is not less firm or less bold concerning the right of nations than concerning internal policy. Unjust conquest, he says, constitutes no right. Victory, in a just war, gives a right only to the reparation of injury. The posterity of the conquered always has the right to shake off the yoke of the conqueror. From Grotius to Locke, what immense progress!

Spinoza remained in his abstract sphere: Locke entered with éclat into facts; his politics were not Utopian, they were the politics of a great revolution, as the politics of Bossuet were those of a great government; but Locke, nevertheless, and therein was his glory, went far beyond the facts of his times. Over the Revolution of 1688, he extended one hand, in the past, to the English Republic of 1649, the other, in the future, to the American Republic of 1773; and it was not in England, but in another hemisphere, that his idea was to receive its entire accomplishment.[1]

If Locke has ceased to be, in our eyes, the reformer of philosophy, he will never cease to be honored as one of the fathers of modern liberty.

We have just seen the successors of Descartes, like the successors of Alexander, quarrelling over his tomb among themselves and with the enemy from without. Behold us again in the presence of the other ruler of the century, who was living and still struggling for the defence of his empire. Bossuet, slighting the eternal law of change and progress, had thought to set the throne and the altar on a living rock and to build for eternity: scarcely was the structure completed, when everything tottered; all the winds of heaven joined in the tempest. The sphere of ideas, in France at least, was alone as yet affected by the storm; the *Politics of the Holy Scriptures* still reigned in facts, but Bossuet knew too well that the power which ideas escape will not long govern facts. From the height where he stood he saw innumerable enemies coming from every point of the horizon. He saw the old Calvinism struggling furiously against persecution and invoking vengeance; he had little fear of this adversary, vanquished in the moral world not less than in the material world, this counterfeiter of Catholic authority, which Catholicism must have logically overthrown; but he feared much more the new Protestantism, the powerful school

[1] It was not only as a theorist that he acted on English America; he drew up the laws of South Carolina, by request of Lord Shaftesbury.

of free investigation and Christian rationalism, which, with the disciples of Arminius, the conquerors of Calvinism in England still more than in Holland, and with the partisans of experimental philosophy, with Locke and Newton, tended to undermine theology and to reduce all Christianity to faith in the divinity of Christ grafted more or less legitimately on natural religion.[1] He fancied that he saw Arminianism ready to take one more step, to cross the barrier which still separated it from Socinianism, and to plunge into that Biblical Deism which Socinus reached in the first century of the Reformation, and which has nothing between it and Judaism except the belief, no longer in the divinity, but only in the divine mission of Christ.[2] Bossuet fancied that he saw the whole Reformation inclining towards and precipitating itself into Socinianism, which, in turn, had behind it something more radical than itself, the negation of Biblical revelation and pure philosophic Deism. All was fear, all was peril. Bossuet had accepted Cartesianism, not without distrust, and behold Pantheism issuing from it without avowing itself with Malebranche, then, avowing itself solemnly, with Spinoza! Yet the enemies of Descartes that were springing up were still more to be dreaded than Descartes, for they tended to destroy theodicy and the spirituality of the soul, so powerfully supported by the author of the Method. There were the same dangers in the order of traditions as in the order of pure ideas! Spinoza had attached the critical spirit, like an obstinate miner, to the rampart of the Holy Scriptures, and *exegesis*, that new art which fathoms the origin of everything, was proceeding, by historical examination, to the decomposition of the bases of faith. Pure reason and history were threatening; religious sentiment, in turn, deviated from the rule in its mystical flights. Bossuet feared ardent enthusiasm like cold criticism; he feared the innovating spirit which was manifesting itself in a thousand forms in the Church as out of the Church, and was striving everywhere to cross the circle traced by his inflexible hand. Anxieties assailed him on every side.

Fear, to a Bossuet, is not flight, but combat: his whole life, and especially the last part of his life, was something heroic; always in the breach, facing the enemy everywhere until his dying day,

[1] This is the spirit of *Rational Christianity*, published by Locke in 1695.

[2] The importance which the quasi Judaic spirit of the Socinians attached to the testimony of the senses in the appreciation of the Holy Scriptures was destined to facilitate their approximation to the school of Locke. The step which we have just indicated, Newton appears to have taken.

he is one of the great spectacles of history. His frequent journeys to La Trappe were almost his only moments of repose; he went to refresh himself in this gloomy cave, and to taste there for a few days, in anticipation, the peace of the tomb.

After the struggle with Ultramontanism (1682), he had applied himself again to polemics against the Protestants, and pursued the *refugees* into asylums where Louis XIV. could not reach them; these polemics had already led him to produce a dogmatic masterpiece, *Exposition of the Doctrine of the Church;* he continued it by an historical masterpiece, *The History of the Variations of the Protestant Churches* (1688). The title renders analysis unnecessary, and the book makes good the promise of the title. The learned Basnage attempted in vain to reply to it: it was only possible to succeed by denying Bossuet's standpoint, — namely, that variation is a sign of error; this was boldly done by Jurieu alone, who admitted the variations of the Protestants, and affirmed that "nothing is more common in Christianity; that religion was composed by piecemeal, and the truth of God known by particles."[1] This was not yet enough to oppose Bossuet, unless the existence of all infallible authority were absolutely contested and the independence of the individual conscience proclaimed, as had long since been done by a part of the English Arminians. On another important point, Jurieu was again the only one who coped with Bossuet. The *History of the Variations* reproached the Reformed Churches for having authorized rebellion in defence of their religion, contrary to the precept of obedience to the ruling powers. Basnage evaded the question. Jurieu openly maintained the right of resistance to tyranny, and proclaimed in express terms the *sovereignty of the people*, and this before the publication of the work of Locke. It was therefore a French writer who first brought back to our horizon this principle abandoned in France since the end of the sixteenth century (1689). Bossuet, in his reply, denied all sovereignty virtual and anterior to the constitution of the public power, and entirely confounded sovereignty and government.[2]

Whatever might have been the brilliancy of his controversy, Bossuet could not flatter himself that he would *convert* those *refugees* who had sacrificed property, family, and country to remain faithful to their belief; but he could some time hope for a great triumph in another direction. While the English, French, and

[1] Bausset, *Histoire de Bossuet*, t. III. p. 156.

[2] See *Avertissements aux protestants*. The *Avertissements aux protestants* are the replies of Bossuet to the criticisms of Jurieu against his work.

Dutch Reformers inclined in the majority to Arminian rationalism, if not to Socinianism, primitive German Protestantism, the ancient Church of Luther, was gliding down the opposite declivity, towards the Catholic Church. The treaties which sanctioned the religious peace in the Empire had always, like the Edict of Nantes among us, reserved the hope of the reëstablishment of unity, and the Germanic diets had at times agitated means of realizing this hope. Towards the end of the seventeenth century, serious negotiations took place between the Catholics and the Lutherans; prejudices were much diminished; equivocations were dispelled; the *Exposition of the Doctrine of the Church*, by Bossuet, had produced great effect. The Emperor Leopold, in 1691, invested the Bishop of Neustadt with full power "to treat with all the States, communities, or even private individuals of the Protestant religion, and to labor for their reunion in affairs of faith." The Electoral branch of Saxony and the House of Brunswick, whom the promise of a new Electorate bound to the Emperor, appeared to enter into his views. The director of the consistorial churches of Hanover, Molanus, a renowned doctor among the Lutherans, opened a correspondence with the Bishop of Neustadt, who soon had recourse to the great prelate whom the Catholics of Germany, as well as of France, regarded as the pillar of orthodoxy. Louis XIV. promised to favor the pious enterprise. Bossuet and Molanus arrived at an understanding on Justification and the Eucharist, and even on the Papal Primacy, Bossuet admitting the use of the vulgar tongue in a part of the sacred office, the communion in both kinds, provided that it was not made a point of faith, and "the retrenchment of everything that savored of superstition and sordid gain in the worship of saints and images."

Meanwhile, a person intervened in the negotiation better fitted than Molanus to treat on equal terms with Bossuet. This was Leibnitz, again Leibnitz; he was found wherever an idea was agitated capable of influencing the intelligent world or the real world. It was again his syncretistic genius which engaged him in this important affair. He wished to reconcile Rome and Augsburg, like Aristotle and Descartes. His inclination for unity attracted him to Bossuet; he loved order and harmony; he admired the organizing spirit and powerful institutions of the Roman Church; but this was at the bottom a political rather than a religious sympathy, and applied itself to the fitness of things rather than to their absolute truth. If he appeared disposed to an easy reconciliation on dogmas, it was because he did not attach great importance to the

points which separated the two communions. His unity, besides, was not that of Bossuet; if, by a return to the double ideal of the Middle Ages, he dreamed sometimes of a Europe confederated by mediation and under the supremacy of the Pope and the Emperor, it was with reservations of religious tolerance which Bossuet would have at once unhesitatingly rejected.[1]

The question of the Council of Trent was the stumbling-block. The Lutherans would not recognize the authority of this assembly, and proposed a preliminary meeting, while reserving certain points of doctrine and awaiting a new council. This was a question rather national than theological, and no one understood it better than Leibnitz. As profound in history as in philosophy, he saw Christian Europe apportioned into three groups by a division at once ethnographic and religious: the Latin or Catholic group, the Teutonic or Protestant group, the Slavic or Greek Church group. Their reunion would have been his Utopia; but he did not admit the submission of one to the others. Now, the Council of Trent had been formed not only by the Latins alone, but, among the Latins, almost exclusively by the Italians and Spaniards. Although Leibnitz appeared to rank France in the Latin and Catholic group, nevertheless he felt that she was not Latin like Italy and Spain,[2] that her spirit was more complex, and, with a lofty comprehension of her part in the world, he called on her to serve as a mediator between the Ultramontanes and the Northern nations. "God decreed," he says, "that the victory of Rome in France (in the sixteenth century) should not be complete, that the genius of the French nation should not be suppressed entirely, and that, notwithstanding the efforts of the Popes, the Council of Trent should never be received in France."[3] He therefore urged France, and Bossuet who represented her so gloriously, to labor for the reintegration of unity, by summoning a council truly European and universal.

France was not to be in this form the mediator of Europe. Bossuet could not accept the ground of Leibnitz without breaking with Rome. He sustained the Council of Trent as legitimately convoked and as received in fact in France as to faith, and declared

[1] He had just sustained a most admirable discussion against Pellisson on tolerance. This correspondence was published in 1692. According to a document published in the *Bulletin of the Society of the History of French Protestantism* (May–June, 1858), Pellisson, who died in 1693, finally returned in some sort to the Protestant faith of his youth.

[2] In the same manner as England, which has so many Celtic and French elements, is not Teutonic like Germany. We feel indeed that such a division cannot be made in absolute truth, and that reservations and explanations are necessary.

[3] *Œuvres posthumes de Bossuet*, t. I. p. 402.

a preliminary meeting impossible without perfect agreement on doctrine. The negotiation, after a somewhat long correspondence (1691–1694), was interrupted, then resumed by Leibnitz, then dropped again to be resumed no more (1699–1701).

Other contests had taken place during this negotiation. Bossuet did not in person attack Pantheism, which it was agreed to call Atheism; he contented himself with urging forward against Spinoza the Benedictine Lami, and a more illustrious champion whom we shall soon see appear in the struggle of ideas, Fénelon. He reserved himself for internal perils. He fancied that he heard the sapper laboring at the foundations; it was the echo of Spinoza which he heard again, no longer of Spinoza the dogmatist, but of the terrible critic. Learned ecclesiastics applied themselves to the study, both of the sacred texts and of the Fathers, with new ardor and a freedom of judgment unknown in the Church of this century. The Abbé Dupin, a remarkable and conscientious writer, after having made his début, while still young, by a *Treatise on the Ancient Discipline of the Church*, in which he reduced the authority of the Pope almost to a simple primacy, had undertaken, under the title of *New Library of Ecclesiastic Authors*, a general history of Christian theology (1686–1691). In this he criticised the Fathers, and set forth their opinions with no more consideration than if profane writers had been in question, and advanced the opinion that St. Cyprian was the first of the Fathers who spoke clearly of original sin; that St. Justinus and St. Irenæus meant by eternal punishment only punishment of long duration, etc. Bossuet interfered authoritatively and obliged the author to retract, and the Archbishop of Paris, Harlai, condemned the work (1691–1693).[1]

Another struggle of the same kind, but much more serious, had commenced long before, and did not end until long after, with the very life of Bossuet. A man who possessed the incarnate genius of criticism and the passion for truth at all costs, resisted, with the courage of obstinate conviction, the powerful ruler who claimed that all should yield to the interest of his doctrine: Richard Simon, at first engaged in the congregation of the Oratory, had embroiled himself with this learned society by the indomitable independence of his mind; he was no more willing to side with the Oratorians in favor of Port-Royal against the Jesuits than he would have been to enlist with the Jesuits against the Jansenists. He had devoted himself entirely to the study of the sacred books; a historian and not a metaphysician, he did not discuss principles but traditions;

[1] *Hist. de Bossuet*, t. III. p. 228.

religion was to him a thing of fact, but he wished to attain the source itself of the facts. After various works already eminent, being still a member of the Oratory, he had put to press, in 1678, the *Critical History of the Old Testament.* The royal censor and the general of the Oratory had authorized the printing, when Arnaud denounced the work to Bossuet as full of pernicious innovations. Richard Simon, while combating the assertions of Spinoza concerning the Bible, granted that the holy books did not emanate entirely from the authors to whom they are ascribed; for instance, that the Pentateuch was not wholly by Moses; but he maintained that this was unimportant to faith, the editors of the books of the Old Testament having been public scribes divinely inspired from generation to generation; that is, that those who subsequently made any additions to, or modifications whatsoever in the ancient texts, were quite as much inspired as the primitive authors. This was beating an ingenious retreat before the attack of Spinoza, and transporting himself on the only ground on which it was possible to defend the divinity of the Scriptures, for it became impossible to sustain the popular opinion against the progress of criticism. Bossuet would not comprehend this; his hatred of all innovation carried him away, and we cannot moreover be astonished that he recoiled before certain propositions of Richard Simon. For instance, the critic advances that he is not sure, like the Protestants, of seeking truth alone in books which have endured so many changes and which have depended in so many respects on copyists (these uninspired), and that religion can be assured in almost everything only by tradition preserved and interpreted by the Church. To translate the Scriptures, he adds, is almost impossible; the Scriptures are by no means clear in themselves, as the Protestants claim.[1] These assertions doubtless favored Catholicism against the Reformation, but shook the authority of texts, which Simon had appeared at first to strengthen by his new explanation of their origin. The impartiality with which Simon had compared, to arrive at the best possible understanding of the Holy Scriptures, all the Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Socinian interpreters, without according more authority to the Fathers than to the other commentators in linguistic and historic questions, must also have greatly shocked Bossuet. The inflexible prelate had recourse, according to custom, to *the secular arm*, and caused the edition to be suppressed by the chancellor. But the time had gone by when

[1] See the Preface to the *Critical History of the Old Testament*; the good edition is that of 1685.

it was easy to stifle thought. The *Critical History* appeared in Holland instead of appearing in France, without the avowed consent of the author, and Simon pursued his indefatigable labors without being the object of material persecutions. After publishing the *History of the Origin and Progress of Ecclesiastic Revenues* (1684), in which he advances bold facts concerning the primitive equality of bishops and priests, and the *Critical History of the Belief and Customs of the Nations of the Levant* (1684), he returned to his labors on the Scriptures by the *Critical History of the Text of the New Testament* (1689), followed by the *Critical History of the Versions of the New Testament* and the *Critical History of the Commentators of the New Testament* (1692). This last work renewed the irritation of Bossuet against him. Simon, in general unfavorable enough to the Latin Fathers, except to St. Jerome, whose Biblical erudition he respected, and fully imbued with the sentiments of the Greek Fathers in favor of free will, had shown himself hostile to St. Augustine, whom he accused of having introduced into the West innovations contrary to human liberty. Bossuet, wounded in his most cherished sympathies, entered upon a long and violent refutation, entitled *Defence of Tradition and of the Holy Fathers*, which, several times interrupted, did not appear till after his death.

Richard Simon, notwithstanding, had undertaken what he himself had declared almost impossible, a translation of the Scriptures. *The New Testament* was the first ready to see the light. The work was submitted to examiners chosen by the Archbishop of Paris, Noailles, and Bossuet himself. The examiners approved it, but Bossuet recommenced the examination in person, and was roused to indignation by the liberty with which Simon applied his critical and linguistic principles to the interpretation of the text, instead of submitting to the traditional authority of theologians. "The Gospel itself is used," he exclaims, "to corrupt religion."[1] Simon defended himself energetically against his formidable adversary; he had supporters in the literary world, and even among the clergy, where the imperious ascendency of the Bishop of Meaux was not always endured without impatience; he was protected by Pontchartrain, from comptroller-general become chancellor, who liked new and bold views. Bossuet swept away all opposition by main force; he persuaded the Archbishop of Paris to condemn the *rash* translator, then did the same in his own diocese, and finally caused the chancellor to be constrained by the King to suppress

[1] *Histoire de Bossuet*, t. IV. p. 320.

the book (1702–1703). Bossuet succeeded better this time than towards the *Critical History;* he deprived Christendom of the most learned version of the Scriptures that would have doubtless ever yet been seen, for Simon renounced the publication of the translation of the Old Testament during his life, and, a few years after, aged, wearied of strife, tormented by the Jesuits, who had at first supported him as anti-Jansenist, and who now impelled the lay authority against him, burned all his papers in a paroxysm of despondency, and died of the sorrow caused him by this loss (1712). It may be doubted whether religion gained by this. It was to other weapons than erudition that recourse was to be had ere long against it. Be this as it may, Richard Simon, too much neglected in France on account of the more passionate than scientific character assumed by the philosophic war of the eighteenth century, has become the father of the German exegesis, and will always be studied with respect by all who wish to take into serious account the important questions relative to the sacred texts.

About the time when Bossuet pursued so harshly the *Version of the New Testament*, he had taken part with the same ardor in a discussion quite different in character and of a still more thrilling interest, although the men who had raised the question did not themselves comprehend its full scope. We have said elsewhere [1] that the Jesuits had desired to reconcile Christ and the World, Nature and Religion, but that they had lacked frankness and integrity in this great enterprise; that they had attempted something analogous in the East by endeavoring to blend foreign religions with Christianity, and to attract the heathen by analogies instead of impressing them strongly by the difference of dogmas, as had oftenest been done until then by the preachers of the Gospel. In India, they had been reproached for making certain concessions to the religion of castes contrary to Christian equality; their conduct in China raised much more violent criminations against them on the part of the other missionaries, Lazarists and Dominicans, who made it the occasion of a great trial at Rome; but here, the only crime of the Jesuists was that of having been too soon right, in tendency, if not in details. Struck with the purity of the maxims of Confucius and the affinity of the law of this legislator to the law of Moses, they had authorized their Chinese neophytes to continue to participate in the ceremonies celebrated by the men of letters in memory of Confucius, as well as in the pious rites of the Chinese families in honor of their ancestors. Their relations concerning the traditions of

[1] See Vol. XII., Martin's *Histoire de France*, p. 78 *et seq.*

China had warmly stirred minds in Europe. The Protestant theologian Basnage spoke, after them, of the *ancient church* of the Chinese; in 1700, the French Jesuits Lecomte and Le Gobien openly advanced the idea that China had preserved for nearly two thousand years the worship of the true God, without alloy; that China had had its saints and its inspired of God, and that the Emperor of China, whose protection they solicited, should not consider the Christian religion as a foreign one, since it was the same, in its essential principles, as the ancient belief of the early sages and the first Chinese emperors. Meanwhile, the English Orientalist Hyde had published a book on the religion of Zoroaster, which gave almost similar conclusions concerning Persia; and a Sorbonne doctor, named Coulau, claimed, on his side, to establish by the Scriptures themselves that the Persians had known the true God, and had not quitted his worship until after having been subjugated by Alexander. Thus, on all sides, the progress of historic science and international relations shook the ancient antagonism which placed the religion of God face to face with the religions of the devil, absolute truth before absolute falsehood. A broad way was opened, which led, not to a vague negative Deism, but to universal and always living religion, the fundamental dogmas of which, innate in the human mind, are *the light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world.*[1]

Bossuet, the partisan of *narrow* dogma, then burst forth with indignation against those who gave to *universal history* other bases than his own, and who admitted that the Jews may not have been the only people of God, and that all the rest of the nations, all the Gentiles, may not have been given up to idolatry. The Sorbonne, by a majority of one hundred and fourteen votes against forty-six, condemned China in the person of the two Jesuits; Doctor Coulau apologized for Persia, and Rome, in turn, proscribed the tolerance accorded by the missionaries to the Chinese ceremonies. The Jesuits, too well sustained where they were injurious to the progress of the human race, were thwarted and paralyzed where they served it with intelligence and courage; Christianity, flourishing in China as long as it showed itself broad and comprehensive, was violently proscribed there as soon as it was judged exclusive and unsocial, and the great work of religious synthesis, repulsed by the heads of the Church, was put off to an unknown future.

[1] *Mém. chronologiques et dogmatiques*, t. IV. p. 165. Hallam, *Hist. of the Literature of Europe*, Vol. IV. c. 64. Bausset, *Hist. de Bossuet*, t. IV. Voltaire, *Siècle de Louis XIV.*, ch. XXXIX.

After his combats against Protestantism, against Ultramontanism, against the new sacred criticism, and before the struggle against those who wished to receive the *Gentiles* into the *Ancient Alliance*, Bossuet had still had to pursue another doctrine, *Mysticism*, to oppose another adversary, the greatest, the most brilliant of all, Leibnitz excepted, and the only one, in the Catholic Church, who was capable of being the rival of the eagle of Meaux. We have already named Fénelon! Fénelon morally ruled the close of the great reign, as Bossuet had ruled all the rest of it; but he ruled as a living protest; participating in two ages opposed to each other, he was at once the last genius of the seventeenth century and the first of the eighteenth. Between Bossuet and him, the struggle was entered into directly only on a single point, but indirectly on many others.

Fénelon has already appeared to us on more than one occasion. It is time for us to pause a little more leisurely before this noble and touching figure, one of the purest and most beloved that remains engraved on the heart of France. It has been possible to react against Bossuet and to blend hostility with a forced admiration of his great memory; but no sect, no party has ever had the courage to be hostile to the memory of Fénelon; all have considered it as belonging to entire humanity.

To recall the impression produced by the first sight of Fénelon is to depict Fénelon entire. Never was man more completely revealed by his physiognomy. The fine proportions of his large features and of his whole person, the fire of his eyes tempered by an incomparable sweetness, his serious and smiling mouth, half unclosed as if to suffer his soul to pour itself out upon all about him, exercised an almost irresistible fascination around him, inspiring men with an overpowering sympathy, and women with a chaste and impassioned attraction which seemed not to belong to this world. One felt that, in this tender nature, the heart had inherited all that had been ravished from the senses by the priestly oaths; but this was not the desperate victory of Pascal; the combat against nature had left but slight traces on this radiant physiognomy; scarcely a remnant of melancholy mingled a shadow with the serene joy which breathed from it. Spinoza had only known by austere intellect the joy of the soul that possesses God; Fénelon knew it by feeling, and it was not that light without heat of rational evidence, but all the flame of divine love which made his countenance radiant and illumined his discourses. Thence the equal charm of his face and his speech. One was moved before he had opened his lips; he was ravished,

fascinated, when he had spoken. Whether he spoke or wrote, the same harmonious and inexhaustible abundance overflowed without effort from a heart which nothing could exhaust.

The *Eagle of Meaux* and the *Swan of Cambray* have often been compared. One overawes, the other softens; one inspires fear of God, the other, trust in God; one, while rejecting the sectarian spirit of the Jansenists, adheres to the harsh ethics of Port-Royal; the other, not less above suspicion as to his own morals, teaches less gloomy maxims; he has not that hatred of the present life; he does not say, like Pascal, that self is detestable; he wishes us to endure ourselves as we endure our neighbors, to proportion the practices of piety to the strength of the body; he blames sorrowful austerity, excessive fear of tasting innocent joy and lawful pleasures; he wishes us to know how to recognize God in the delights of friendship, in the beauties of Nature and Art. "Enlarge your heart!" he exclaims. Everything breathes in him that fulness and happy harmony of life which the poets of the Middle Ages expressed by the beautiful word, gladness (*liesse*), and which they did not separate from valor and virtue. Never has the *broad path* of Christianity found such an apostle.[1]

In another order of ideas, Bossuet, a genius half Hebrew, half Roman, who reminds us of the great Latin organizers of the Church of the West, is above all the partisan of external order, of rule, of immutable unity. Fénelon, at once the most evangelical and the most Hellenic spirit of the seventeenth century, and who seems a Greek Father reared in the school of Athens, is, in the limits of his faith, the partisan of spontaneity, of impulse, of liberty. Feeling, which immolates itself so willingly to others, is precisely in us the principle of personality; to devote one's self, he must be strongly conscious of himself, he must be himself.

With respect to art, Bossuet and Fénelon offer the eternal duality of strength and grace: one is Michael Angelo, but a Michael Angelo more serene and more antique,—the other is Raphael; one is Corneille, the other is Racine.

Born in 1651, of a noble family of Périgord,[2] and reared by his parents, from infancy, for the ecclesiastic profession, Fénelon dreamed first of devoting himself to the missions of Canada, through evangelical zeal, then to the missions of the Levant, through devotion to the country of Homer at least as much as in

[1] See *Œuvres de Fénelon*, t. II.; *Lettres spirituelles*, pp. 250, 299, 301, edit. Lefèvre; 1838.

[2] The Salagnacs or Salignacs de La Mothe-Fénelon.

imitation of the apostles. Instead of infidels to convert, the *New Catholics* (a congregation of converted Protestant women) were given him to maintain in the faith (1678). Fixed at Paris by this post, he was soon appreciated by the most eminent men of the Church and court, and especially contracted a strong friendship with the Duke de Beauvilliers. Beauvilliers, of medium intellect but excellent heart, submitted for his whole life to an ascendency which he loved too well ever to seek to escape from it. Fénelon, in his turn, long submitted to the influence of Bossuet; the glory of the great bishop attracted him, and Bossuet responded to his passionate admiration by a high esteem and an almost paternal interest. The originality of Fénelon's genius was nevertheless too strong to suffer itself to be affected by this influence. The young Abbé enjoyed ten peaceful years, fruitful in philosophic, religious, and literary labors. The *Dialogues on Eloquence*, which were not published until after his death, are a masterpiece of æsthetics. He shows himself therein already innovating and systematic in spirit. The lustre of contemporary eloquence does not dazzle him; he denies that eloquence learned by heart and rigorously methodical, such as was practised by Bourdaloue and his competitors,[1] is true eloquence according to the art of the ancients and the moral needs of Christianity. He desires spoken, not *written* eloquence: the truth seems here in a sort of a medium course; be this as it may, the remarks and counsels which fill his *Dialogues* are a treasure for orators. Two very different moral tendencies are recognized in his *Dialogues*. On one hand, Fénelon finds among the preachers too much portraiture of manners, too much philosophic reasoning, and not enough dogma or evangelical teaching, and, strange to say in him, he wishes men to cling to the letter of the Scriptures and not to the spiritual sense. On the other hand, he shows profound understanding and admiration of antiquity. Who has ever explained like him the superiority of antique eloquence! "Among the Greeks," he says, "everything depended on the people, and the people depended on speech."[2] In his other writings we see more clearly what attaches him to the ancients, namely, the love of Nature; he understands what La Fontaine felt by instinct, and he always appeals in the arts to sentiment and Nature.

It is also to sentiment and Nature that he appeals in the first part of his great work of religious philosophy, the *Treatise on the Existence of God*. He fully admits the Cartesian demonstration of God

[1] Bossuet is to him, outside of and above this controversy.

[2] *Œuvres de Fénelon*, t. IV. pp. 469, 490.

by pure reason; but he judges this sort of proof too abstract for most men, incapable of purely intellectual operations and accustomed to depend on their imagination. He resumes, therefore, in the beginning, for the use of the majority, the demonstration of the Creator by the order and beauty of the creation; he goes back gradually from the visible to the invisible world, without ever forgetting that he is writing for the unlearned and the masses; he prepares his reader by degrees for an order of higher proofs, and ends by plunging him into the midst of metaphysics. This metaphysics, like that of Bossuet in the *Treatise on the Knowledge of God and of Ourselves*, is wholly Cartesian; a fine elaboration of the science of ideas is especially to be remarked in it; the ideas of the mind affirmed to be universal, eternal, and immutable; the idea of the infinite anterior to that of the finite;[1] the idea of unity presented as innate, absolutely foreign to the senses (which he demonstrates perfectly), and as a proof of God. He is very perspicuous concerning free will; he explicitly rejects *determinism*, and strongly proves the will voluntary and not necessitated. He lastly refutes Epicurean atomism and shows it to be a doctrine founded, without method, on arbitrary suppositions.

The second part of the *Treatise* is purely metaphysical; it is divided into two extended chapters, — one of which develops, by Descartes's method, the proof of the reality of God by the idea itself of God; the other refutes Spinoza and sets forth the author's own ideas on the divine nature. The refutation does not go to the bottom of the conception of God according to Spinoza; for, what Fénelon refutes is the idea according to which God is only the collection of beings, and this idea is not Spinoza's. It is, on the contrary, the conception of particular beings according to Spinoza that he attacks, by denying that it is possible to conceive of modes in God and establishing that these so-called modes are beings created of God, but which do not modify God. Besides, we find in him all the truth that there is in Spinoza, and even something more than the truth, as to the contempt of all that is relative, and, consequently, of particular beings and their nothingness. He grants that God is, eminently and in a perfect manner, all that there is real and positive in the beings that exist and all that there is positive in the essences of beings that might exist; the peculiarity of particular beings is only the limit, the imperfection which confines the being. There is in God an infinity of archetypes which represent all the possible degrees of being, and which he realizes

[1] This is also demonstrated by Leibnitz.

outside of himself in creation. We see in God those of these archetypes or general beings that God has rendered us capable of knowing, and we see the particular beings in themselves, by the faculty which God gives us of conceiving them, and which is not natural to our soul: our soul would conceive naturally only itself and God. We know but two species or archetypes: thought and extension. God comprises in himself these two species like all other possible species. If God were only spirit, thought, he would have no power over corporeal nature, being without relation with it.[1] All this is nearly allied to Spinoza. All that Fénelon says admirably of the Being one, simple, immutable, eternal, immense, differs little from Spinoza except by the substitution of the free form of sentiment for the rigorous form of geometry, and the recluse of Amsterdam would not have disavowed the invocation which ends the beautiful book of Fénelon, that ardent aspiration to the annihilation of all ideas of relations to see only the truth in itself, God in his absolute unity and simplicity.

It is not in this *Treatise*, but in a subsequent work, that Fénelon radically diverges from Spinoza by sustaining the liberty of God in opposition to Malebranche; the latter, before Leibnitz, had laid down the principle of *optimism* and affirmed that God, free to create or not to create, had necessarily, once decided to create, produced the most perfect world possible. Fénelon replies, with great profundity, that whatever degree of *relative*[2] perfection God might have chosen for his work, there would have been a higher degree, the degrees between nothingness and the infinite Being being innumerable. Consequently, there is no such thing as *more perfect*, and God has not been *determined* to create one world rather than another.

Fénelon essayed his strength, in the most different subjects, with marvellous versatility. He descended, meanwhile, from these sublime matters to an object more modest, but the full scope of which he had healthfully appreciated. To this period of his life belongs the *Treatise on the Education of Girls*, a work dictated by friendship and composed to aid Madame de Beauvilliers in directing her young family. It belonged indeed to the theologian of sentiment to occupy himself thus with woman, and to comprehend how

[1] He defines extension in God by *immensity*, — that is, infinite extension which cannot be divided or measured. The definition of the Catechism, according to the Scriptures, "God is pure spirit," means only that God has no body, that God is not composed of parts.

[2] *Relative*, because *absolute* perfection is in God alone, and is not communicable *Œuvres de Fénelon*, t. III. p. 29; *Réfutation du système du père Malebranche.*

important is the education of the sex on which repose social manners and the family. No system of education for girls then existed; the greater part, abandoned to ignorance and chance by the negligence of parents, had little other culture than the devotional practices of the convent; a few, by paternal tendency and their own energy, were brought up like men of action and science. Neither the one nor the other was a normal condition in the eyes of Fénelon. He prefers education at home to that of the convent. "If convents are worldly," he says, "one gains too flattering an idea in them of the world; if they are austere, one is not prepared in them for the life of the world, which one enters as if emerging from a cavern into broad daylight." As to learned women, "their sex should have," he says, with that singular charm of expression which is peculiar to him, "*a modesty concerning science*, almost as delicate as that inspired by the abhorrence of vice." If he does not accord quite enough to the intellectual development of woman, he is admirable concerning all that pertains to her moral development. His moral precepts are severe, yet with that severity which does not repress the soul, but which raises it towards the ideal and is tempered by a sort of emotion peculiar to his genius. A multitude of subtle and profound observations, of precious counsels which have never since been surpassed or perhaps equalled, is met on every page.[1]

This excellent treatise is moreover applicable in great part to children of both sexes. The method of Fénelon is quite the opposite of the rude and brutal education of the Middle Ages: everything in it is gentleness and reasoning; it bends to the child instead of bending the child to an inflexible rule; like Nature, it throws him amidst things, instead of shutting him up in abstractions; it instructs him by playing with him, telling him stories, artfully exciting the desire of knowledge, utilizing the little incidents of life. We find in the germ, in the work of Fénelon, almost everything that has been since attempted to transform instruction.[2]

[1] See the charming passage in which he points out so delicately how the elegant simplicity of the ancients was more favorable to true beauty than the contemporary fashions, which tended more and more to overload it and render it affected. And, in quite a different matter, his wise counsels against the petty superstitions which are the whole religion of so many women. "It is necessary never to permit anything to mingle in faith or in the practices of piety which is not taken from the Gospel, or authorized by the constant approbation of the Church," etc. *Œuvres de Fénelon*, t. III. p. 480 *et seq.*

[2] It would be interesting to compare Fénelon's book with the *Treatise on Education*, by Locke, a few years subsequent, — a work which is, like Locke's politics, far in advance of his metaphysics.

This work was to decide Fénelon's destiny. Another book, the *Treatise on the Ministry of Pastors*, which treats of the uninterrupted succession of the ecclesiastical ministry from the apostles, nevertheless had a more immediate influence on his career, and caused the mission of Poitou to be intrusted to him, after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1686); he displayed in it all the evangelical virtues, and was almost the only missionary who obtained serious and lasting successes, by gaining the hearts of the persecuted inhabitants, and not authoritatively imposing on them the practices which shocked them most. The zealots were not long in raising an outcry against his exaggerated gentleness, and succeeded, for some time, in shutting him out from ecclesiastical dignities. This species of eclipse was not of long duration. The friends of Fénelon grew in credit: the sons, daughters, and sons-in-law of Colbert were very intimate with Madame de Maintenon; Fénelon, introduced to her, charmed her as he charmed every one, and she soon lent her powerful coöperation to the Duke de Beauvilliers, appointed governor of the Duke of Burgundy, to cause Fénelon to be appointed to the office of preceptor of the young prince (1689).

Fénelon had not solicited the mission of rearing the heir to the throne, but it cannot be doubted that he had strongly desired it. He concealed in the depths of his soul a lofty ambition, the ambition of a good man, to whom power is an instrument and not an end. Bossuet had used politics only to impose in a general and abstract manner respect for what existed; and what existed, that is, absolute monarchy, was to him the ideal itself. Fénelon, on the contrary, was overflowing with the need of innovations, of practical ameliorations, of changes which were not all, as we shall see, changes for the better. Fénelon was not isolated: we have already indicated the formation of a group of men who aspired to reforms, the greater part, with a view to relieve the popular sufferings, by which they were deeply moved; a few others, by sentiments of a widely different nature; for instance, Beauvilliers and Chevreuse desired, with no well-defined system, but with an aristocratic tendency, moderation, peace, the good of the people; Catinat desired the same things with more enlightenment; Racine applied to the ills of his country that tenderness of heart which he had poured out on so many ideal passions; Vauban sought scientifically in extensive economical studies the means of realizing, at the expense of unjust privileges, the good of which his friends dreamed; the young Duke de Saint-Simon represented a contrary principle,

a spirit of sullen and angry opposition to absolute monarchy, not because it oppressed the people, but because it annulled the political influence of the nobility and weakened its privileges. Lastly, afar off and standing at the extremities of the group, appeared eccentric spirits, such as Bois-Guillebert and the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, who were the exaggeration of Vauban, and Boulainvilliers, who was the exaggeration of Saint-Simon. Fénelon summed up and blended, as it were, in himself these incongruous elements which, owing to the charms of his person, presented the illusion of a harmonious whole.

Fénelon applied himself therefore to pave the way for the future by his pupil, while striving to act on the present through Madame de Maintenon. The counsels which he gave her in writing for the guidance of the King have been preserved; he expresses himself therein with a frankness which is almost rudeness with respect to Louis XIV.[1] There was no sympathy between these two natures: we can repeat on this point with respect to Fénelon what we have already said of La Fontaine. Maintenon, Beauvilliers, and Chevreuse not daring to urge the King energetically enough to make peace, Fénelon took the resolution of intervening directly by that celebrated anonymous letter which we have cited above,[2] and which contains his external policy. It must be granted that this was the destruction of the national policy in behalf of a superannuated form of the law of nations. Within, as to the government of society, we are about to see in what direction he impelled his pupil.

The education of the Duke of Burgundy presented from the beginning an almost complete contrast to the celebrated *Education of the Dauphin*.[3] On one side, there had been neither familiarity nor intimacy between the master and the disciple, the austere genius of Bossuet not knowing how to become a *child with children;* the instruction had been given loftily and distantly, with the ancient scholastic rigor as a means of coercion. On the other side, the lives of the preceptor and the pupil were blended into one: the pupil, led by affection and reason, was accustomed to feel, to live only in his master. The success was as different as the methods: it is true that the two illustrious masters had to work on very different natures; the Dauphin, born without vices or virtues, remained mediocre, as nature had made him; the Duke of Burgundy, born with the germs of great vices and shining virtues,

[1] Rulhière, *Éclaircissements sur la Révocation*, etc., p. 251.

[2] See *ante*, p. 164.

[3] See preceding volume, p. 215 *et seq.*

stifled by the force of will and religious spirit, the violence, pride, and obstinacy which had signalized his infancy, gave to his intellectual and moral faculties all the development which they were capable of receiving, and became such, under the hand of Fénelon, that the happy master had only, as it were, to moderate his work.

We must now, as we have done with Bossuet, follow the development of Fénelon's idea in the books written for his pupil. We see him first awaken his youthful understanding by a series of *Fables*, which begin with the most infantine narratives and go on gradually to little moral poems daring in tendency;[1] then, the Fables are followed by the *Dialogues of the Dead*. Fontenelle had already lately opposed to each other, in a piquant and paradoxical fashion, the renowned dead of ancient and modern history; Fénelon resumes the theme with a more serious end. He stigmatizes Oriental despotism, "that barbarous government wherein there are no laws but the will of one man"; he condemns conquests; all wars are civil wars; "each one owes infinitely more to the human race, which is the great country, than to the particular country in which he was born"; he counterbalances what may be dangerous in this maxim by most wholesome notions on society, on the country, which exists, not by arbitrary agreement, but by the nature of things, by reason, which is the true nature of rational animals; he goes so far as to affirm that one is not at liberty to renounce his country. "Anarchy is the height of evils only because it is the extreme of despotism. . . . A medium is needed, . . . written laws, always the same, and sanctioned by the whole nation, which shall be above everything, . . . a liberty moderated by the authority of the laws alone, of which those who rule shall be merely the defenders. He who rules should be the most obedient to the law. His person detached from the law is nothing."[2]

Among these clear and simple views, he suffers more hazardous ideas to escape, which are neither capricious fancies nor accidents. He detests the complications, the refinements, the multiplied relations of civilization: *Solon*, whose voice he borrows (*Solon and Justinian*), desires neither dispositions by testament, nor adoptions, nor exheredations, nor substitutions, nor exchanges; he desires only that each family should possess a very limited extent of land, that this property should be inalienable, and that the magistrate should divide it equally among the children after the death of the

[1] See *The Nile and the Ganges*; *Œuvres de Fénelon*, t. II. p. 599.

[2] See the *Dialogues of Socrates and Alcibiades*, and of *Coriolanus and Camillus*.

father. When the families multiply too much, a part of the people should be sent to found a colony. This was doubtless but an ideal in part unrealizable in his own eyes; but he took pleasure in it: for want of admitting the necessary progress of society, he set the example, which was to be followed by a more radical philosopher, of causing the ideal to retrograde.

Among the kings of France, he offers Louis XII. as a model to his pupil: he is severe to excess towards Louis XI. and François I.; among the ministers, he accords the preference, we know not why, to Ximenes, who paved the way for the ruin of Spain, over Richelieu, who made the greatness of France. Mazarin is too harshly treated.[1] The judgments on persons may be disputed, but not the spirit of legality and humanity which is at the bottom.

About the same time was written, or at least commenced, a much more important work, but one which was not immediately communicated to the pupil. Fénelon reserved it for a more advanced period of youth. This work, as new in our literature in form as in substance, was a great prose-poem, *Télémaque*. Fénelon would have lacked time to write in verse; but it was not here only a question of time or of natural gift, but of system. This genius, who so well comprehended the substance of poetry, little appreciated its necessary form.[2] He displaced the boundaries of art and gave the signal of decline by a masterpiece.

The arrangement of *Télémaque* is new only through force of being old, for it is imitated from the antique epopee. The choice of the subject is equally borrowed from Homer, so much is Fénelon attracted by "that charming simplicity of the infant world," which sparkled in primitive Greece. *Télémaque* is an Odyssey transformed by Plato and Christianity; its clear, flowing, somewhat superabundant narrative is, as it were, bathed in that Elysian light which Fénelon paints with such sweetness.

The formation of a model king is naturally the idea which fills the whole book. Bossuet, in his *Politics of the Holy Scriptures*, desires to lead the King to good by exalting him as the image of God, as a terrestrial God. Fénelon takes the contrary course: he

[1] It is in one of these Dialogues that the word *philanthropy* appears, if we are not mistaken, for the first time. See *Dialogue of Socrates, Alcibiades, and Timon.* It was worthy of Fénelon to create it. The preference accorded by Fénelon to the Greeks over the Romans is remarkable. Bossuet would have done the contrary. "To the Greeks alone belongs the glory of having made fundamental laws to conduct a people on philosophic principles." *Dialogue of Solon and Justinian.*

[2] See his correspondence with La Mothe (1713–1714), in which he manifests his spite against the exigences of versification and rhyme.

shows his pupil, not an ideal king, but kings as they are, kings joining to the weaknesses which they share with other men all those which are the particular appanage of their condition; he unceasingly humbles the native pride of the prince, dwells with obstinate persistency on the fatal consequences of absolute power, of the spirit of conquest, does not cease to repeat that all should not belong to one, but one to all, to create their happiness, etc. It has been sought to deny the allusions of *Télémaque*: it abounds in them; the whole book is, as it were, nothing but allusions, and this was inevitable and involuntary. *Sesostris*, *Idomeneus* above all, *Idomeneus* nurtured in ideas of pomp and lordliness, too much absorbed in the details of business, neglecting agriculture to devote himself to the luxurious adornment of buildings, is Louis XIV.; *Tyre* is Holland; *Protesilaus* is Louvois; the *coalition against Idomeneus* is the League of Augsburg; the *mountain towers* are the places of the Rhine and of Belgium, "the fortified towns built on the lands of others." Certain speeches of *Mentor* to *Idomeneus* remind us strongly of the *anonymous letter* to Louis XIV. By way of compensation, the philosophic excuses which Mentor gives for the faults of kings apply equally to Louis. Lastly, *Mentor* saying to *Telemachus*, "The gods will demand of you more than of Idomeneus, because you have known the truth from your youth, and have never been abandoned to the seductions of too great prosperity," is evidently Fénelon speaking to the grandson of the Great King.

It is pretended that the government of *Salentum* does not seriously express the politics of Fénelon. This is a mistake. *Salentum* is the ideal of Fénelon, the ideal, not exactly, but approximately susceptible of realization; beyond this ideal he suffers us to discern the dream, the Utopia chimerical in his own eyes; this is more than the republic of *Solon*, which we just recalled, — it is the republic of Bœotia, that is, tribe-life, with community, not only of lands, but of personal property, absolute community. *Salentum*, on the contrary, is organized society, and with more inequality and aristocracy, in some respects, than existed in the France of Louis XIV. At *Salentum*, conditions are regulated by birth; the high nobility are in the first rank, "even before those who have merit and the authority of office." Noble deeds are only the beginning of nobility. Sumptuous arts and fashions in dress are forbidden.[1]

[1] He refutes the maxim that luxury should serve to feed the poor at the expense of the rich: the poor would be much better employed in multiplying the fruits of the earth than in enervating the rich by preparing for them instruments of pleasure. He wishes the splendors of the fine arts reserved for churches and public buildings;

Everything is regulated by law: meals, buildings, the extent of land each family may possess. It seems difficult to reconcile, with this complete prohibition of luxury and fashion, the great encouragement which Fénelon desires to give to commerce. It is by freedom that he designs to favor trade. "The prince must not meddle with it, for fear of obstructing it; let him not obstruct it to turn it according to his views." This is remarkable: it is the beginning of a new economic school. This opinion was shared more or less fully by all the group of whom we have spoken.[1] (l. III., l. VIII., l. X.)

As to education, he says plainly that "children belong less to their parents than to the republic," and should be brought up in public schools (l. xi.).[2]

Concerning religious worship, he warmly protests, on the contrary, against the interference of the State and the pretension of kings to regulate religion; the decision in this matter belongs only to the *friends of the gods* (the Church): the King should only insure respect to their judgment (l. xxii.)

The substance of his idea is therefore a monarchy regulated by fixed laws, which leave nothing to the arbitrary will of the King, and based on a strongly aristocratic hierarchy, nevertheless without privileged classes as to jurisdiction and imposts; no court, no pomp or royal etiquette; agriculture and peace the two great interests of the State. He does not discuss fundamental principles in *Télémaque*, and never composed a treatise on political philosophy. We see, on comparing his writings with the book published by his disciple Ramsay, as a summary of his conversations,[3] that he ac-

for he is very far from proscribing the fine arts as useless, — he, the most *artistic*, because the most antique, of the writers of the great century, — he who first discerned the intimate connection of the plastic arts with eloquence and poetry, and who unceasingly drew from it images and comparisons.

[1] He desires freedom of external as of internal trade. "It is by a decree of Providence that no land bears everything that is of service to human life; for necessity impels all men to commerce to give each other mutually what they lack, and this necessity is the bond of society between nations; otherwise, all the peoples of the world would be reduced to a single kind of food and raiment; nothing would impel them to know and sustain each other."

[2] It is to be observed that the great doctor of the Middle Ages, St. Thomas Aquinas, professes the same doctrine. "*Ad eum qui rempublicam regit pertinet ordinare de nutritionibus et instructionibus juvenem, in quibus exerceri debeant, et quales disciplinas unusquisque addiscere et usquequò habeat.*" See *Contrà Impugnantes religionem*. We see that, if there are reservations to be made concerning the doctrines of the scholastic theologians, they are in favor of the family and not of the State, to which they give everything. The maxim that *the State has not the right to instruct*, had not yet been invented, in the interest of the ecclesiastic monopoly.

[3] *Essai sur le Gouvernement civil*, 1724. This book cannot be accepted without

knowledges that the temporal power "comes from the community of men styled a nation," but that at the same time he confounds the necessary and providential existence of society with the forms which society receives, and denies to the people the right to change these forms once established, as if they were the direct work of Providence. The King may make concessions; the people have not the right to wrest them from him or to change the King. The King in fact is not the King by right. Fénelon is on this point more clearly a *legitimist* than Bossuet himself. He denies to kings the right to penetrate into the conscience of their subjects or to touch the property of private individuals, unless it be for public necessities. He inclines towards a monarchy moderated by a hereditary senate as to legislation, and by the necessity of the popular consent as to taxes. He closely approximates therefore to the English constitution, but grants less to the people.

Still too much attached to monarchy to admit the sovereignty of the people, he nevertheless foresees its advent if kings do not amend. "A sudden and violent revolution will come, which, far from moderating their excessive authority, will overthrow it beyond remedy."

The education given by Fénelon to the grandson of the King sapped the whole system of Louis XIV. This could not endure to the end without an outbreak. It was necessary that Fénelon should gain over the King or be crushed by him. The ideas of peace, of moderation towards foreign countries, of relief to the people, had obtained access to Louis, as was proved by the negotiations of Ryswick; but his mind remained inaccessible to all ideas of political reform, and one could not, without being chimerical, flatter himself that it would be otherwise: absolute power had become the very foundation of his being. Louis was already distrustful of what transpired through the friends of Fénelon and through Fénelon himself, although he did not appear to suspect him of having been the author of the *anonymous letter*. He granted him a favor which was only the beginning of disgrace; he gave him the Archbishopric of Cambrai (February, 1695), when his friends hoped for him, in a near future, the Archbishopric of Paris. This was removing him from court three fourths of the year. Fénelon was too scrupulous to transgress the canons which oblige bishops to reside at least nine months annually. The new archbishop notwithstanding retained the title of preceptor, and caused

reserve as Fénelon's thought. Ramsay may indeed have interpreted Fénelon on some points according to his English Jacobitish prejudices.

his place with the young prince to be supplied by the learned and pious Abbé Fleuri. Meanwhile, Louis wished to enlighten himself thoroughly concerning the ideas of Fénelon: this conversation was decisive. "I have just talked with the finest and most chimerical mind in my kingdom."[1] Such was the decree beyond appeal pronounced by the Great King. Fénelon had shocked this mind at once so clear and so limited both by the vastness and the impracticability of his views.

This incident was not however the direct cause of the fall of Fénelon. Religion and not politics caused the breaking forth of the storm. This political reformer was not less zealous for the reformation of souls than for that of society, and wished to reach the hearts as well as the actions of men, but by a path quite opposite to that taken by the men of the *narrow way*, Jansenius and Saint-Cyran. Jansenism was a species of rationalism turned against reason, a dialectic and militant faith, an eternal combat against others and above all against itself. Fénelon desired, in matters of piety, sentiment instead, we will not say, of reason, but of reasoning; peace in the soul instead of war; contemplation and passive abandonment to divine love instead of restless and violent effort against one's self; he desired the soul to forget itself for God and in God instead of detesting itself because of God. In the *broad way*, he attached himself to a particular path full of attraction and peril, in which a multitude of holy souls had preceded him, from certain of the Fathers to St. Theresa and St. Francis de Sales, his immediate and cherished model,[2] — the path of mysticism. The Mystics were generally agreed on two principles: *pure love* and the voluntary passivity of the soul towards God. These two principles were identified among them, because *pure love*, the love which loves God for himself and not for the good which is expected from him, leads the soul, according to them, to divest itself of self, to become absolutely disinterested with respect to itself, even to its salvation, to restore to God in some sort the being which it has received from him, to become annihilated in him. *What matters it?* was the great motto of the Mystics. *What matters* all that is not *He who is?* It was Pantheism of sentiment instead of Pantheism of reason. As in Spinozism, the finite being disappeared in the infinite being, but with this difference that it disappeared because it wishes to disappear; it immolated itself, therefore it existed.

Some extraordinary beings, whom a constant aspiration towards

[1] Voltaire, *Siècle de Louis XIV.*, ch. 38.

[2] See Vol. XII., Martin's *Histoire de France*, p. 61.

the infinite elevated above Nature, had come, by mysticism, to live in ideal contemplation and purity, as if they already belonged to a superior existence. Among beings who took the agitation of the senses and the imagination for religious enthusiasm, the *what matters it* of the Mystics might, on the contrary, lead to strange material disorders, and end in the maxim that, provided the soul is in God, it matters little what becomes of the body and what it does. This had been already more than once seen among divers sectarians; it had just been seen in Italy, where the Spanish priest Molinus, after long passing for a holy man and propagating mysticism with brilliant success, had been condemned to perpetual imprisonment by the Holy Office of Rome in 1687; in his doctrine of *quietism*, that is, of repose and inertia of the soul in God, had been recognized the principle of the irregularities to which his disciples abandoned themselves. It was Louis XIV., or rather Father La Chaise, the confessor of Louis, who, at the instigation of his brethren, the Italian Jesuits, had officially denounced Molinus to the Pope through the ambassador of France at Rome. The King, therefore, found himself already pledged against mysticism. Fénelon hoped to cause him to retrace his course, by acting with great reserve and prudence; but at the very moment when false *spirituality*, as it was then called, was unveiled and punished in Italy, true spirituality,[1] which was lurking in France, broke forth there through a new St. Theresa and drew Fénelon himself beyond his intentions and end.

Madame Guyon,[2] as formerly Madame de Chantal, left a widow, still young and beautiful, had abandoned fortune and family to belong wholly to God, and had set about teaching mystical devotion in Savoy, Dauphiny, and Piedmont, everywhere fascinating exalted or dreamy souls. It is from the general spirit of her books that we must judge this extraordinary woman, and not from a few fantastic or hazardous images, analogies to which might be easily found in the writings of more than one ecstatic saint canonized by the Church. Her principal works are *The Short Way*, and *The Torrents*. One is, as it were, the peristyle of the other. The *Short and Easy Way to offer Orisons from the Heart* is designed for all; every Christian, according to her, can elevate himself by meditation, which is a degree above orison, to a *silence in the presence of God*, in which the soul, without being inactive, acts no longer except by divine impulse. Orison, then, becomes a perpetual, unique, uninterrupted act, by which the soul is plunged continually *into the ocean of Divinity*.

[1] We mean that which does not cover *practical* sensuality.

[2] Born at Montargis in 1648.

The simplest are the best fitted for it. Instead of overburdening souls with so many external practices, let the country curés instruct the poor peasants to seek God in their hearts! "The shepherds, guarding their flocks, would have the spirit of the ancient anchorites, and the laborers, following the plough, would converse happily with God; all vice would soon be banished, and the kingdom of God would be realized on earth."

There is notwithstanding beyond this, for a few elect, a higher perfection, a more complete *passivity*, in which the divine fire consumes all impurity within us; that is, all property and all activity, because, God being in infinite repose, the soul, in order to be able to be united to him, must participate in his repose. One may arrive at the possession not of the gifts of God, but of God himself, in this life, and thus pass to a state of *deiform* life, to a new and wholly divine life. The *Torrents* teach the way that leads to it. Amidst strange darkness, there is in this book surprising grandeur of imagery and profundity of sentiment. The souls of which it treats are *torrents* issuing from God, which have no repose until they have returned to lose themselves in him and never again to find themselves; they lose, however, neither their nature nor reality, but their quality. . . . The soul no longer sees God as distinct from and outside of itself, having him in itself. There are no more desires; no more love even, or enlightenment, or knowledge; no more consciousness, but *identity*. All is alike to this soul; for all is alike God to it: it sees nothing longer but God, "as he was before the creation." This is not the ecstasy of *seers*, of *prophets*, whom men admire: the ecstasy, which causes the loss of the senses, attests only the insufficiency of a soul that is not strong enough to bear God; the soul arrived at perfect life is in ecstasy without effort, forever and not for hours, and men do not see it.

The soul, in this state, so long as it does not withdraw its abandonment to God, is *infallible*: all the creatures that might condemn it "would harm it less than a fly!" [1]

Never had the theory of mysticism been enunciated with more audacity or perhaps with more genius.

Persecution was not long delayed. The *Torrents* were still unpublished and unfinished. Madame Guyon, having come to Paris, was at first disturbed more about her morals than her books. She was accused of *Molinism*. She vindicated herself without difficulty: her purity was as shining as that of Fénelon. This first per-

[1] *Opuscules de madame de La Mothe-Guyon*, t. I. pp. 66, 68, 72, 77, 231, 248, 255, 256.

secution averted, brought about a lively reaction in her favor in the society of Madame de Maintenon: the Beauvilliers and Chevreuses were entirely subjugated; Fénelon contracted a close intimacy with her, and, in their relations, it was she who took the superiority, which may give an idea of the power possessed by this woman. Saint-Cyr was invaded: Madame de Maintenon was for some time under the charm, and, through her, Fénelon endeavored to introduce Madame Guyon's books to the King. The attempt failed: Louis understood nothing of these *reveries;* the calculating and reasoning mind of Madame de Maintenon soon escaped *spirituality* and *pure love:* she consulted her confessor, the Bishop of Chartres; she consulted Bossuet, Bourdaloue, and other eminent doctors, all of whom pronounced against mysticism; she thenceforth grew cold towards Fénelon, and became by degrees as hostile as she had been well affected to him. Madame Guyon, notwithstanding, at the instigation of Fénelon, had recently submitted to Bossuet's examination her sentiments and writings, even the *Torrents*, of which Fénelon as yet knew nothing: a step which proves that she had not drawn all the conclusions of her bold inspirations. Bossuet, the personification of positive theology and dialectic rigor, was the antipodes of mysticism; he had never read a mystic in his life, not even St. Francis de Sales! The very scandal which the maxims of Madame Guyon caused him made him desire to stifle noiselessly these perilous innovations: after long explanations, he admitted the innocence of Madame Guyon's intentions and gave her the communion with his own hand, thinking that he had convinced her of her errors and thenceforth obtained her silence. His hope was mistaken: Madame Guyon, supported by Fénelon, demanded commissioners to judge her doctrine, withdrawing meanwhile to a monastery of Meaux as a testimony of confidence in Bossuet. Bossuet, the Bishop of Châlons (Noailles), and another doctor were intrusted with this examination, and drew up, in thirty-four articles, the doctrine of the Church, as they conceived it, concerning the matters of *spirituality*. Bossuet was obliged to acknowledge that the Church had never condemned *pure love* in itself, and Fénelon, on his side, subscribed to the thirty-four articles (March, 1695). Madame Guyon abandoned her expressions, reserving the intention.

All seemed pacified, when Madame Guyon quitted Meaux and returned to conceal herself at Paris and to renew there the bonds of her little church. Bossuet, irritated, solicited her arrest. She was imprisoned at Vincennes, where a more explicit declaration of submission was finally extorted from her, which did not procure her

liberty (December, 1695–August, 1696). This sad victory was not sufficient for Bossuet. It was no longer Madame Guyon, but her defender, that he wished to reach. He attempted to obtain a disguised retraction from Fénelon, by obliging him to condemn, as archbishop, the books of Madame Guyon, and to give his assent to a work which he, Bossuet, was about to publish: *An Instruction on the states of Orison*, in which, after rapidly but powerfully studying the question of *spirituality*, he claimed to set the bounds between true piety and dangerous illusions. Fénelon refused, and Bossuet's book appeared almost simultaneously with one by Fénelon, *The Explanation of the Maxims of the Saints on the Internal Life* (January, 1697). In this, Fénelon set forth the grounds of his sentiments, and justified them by those of all the Mystics whom the Church had placed in the ranks of the blessed.

M. de Noailles, recently promoted from the bishopric of Châlons to the archbishopric of Paris, and several doctors above suspicion, consulted by Fénelon concerning the MS., had found nothing to reprove in it. Notwithstanding, the book had no sooner appeared than Bossuet threw himself at the feet of the King, asking his pardon for "not having sooner revealed to him the fanaticism of his brother." Bossuet did not cease thenceforth to wage against Fénelon an infuriated, implacable warfare. His conduct has raised grave imputations against him; some have sought to find in it motives of jealousy against a rival in glory and influence. Bossuet was too great to be jealous, and his terror of mysticism was sincere. In that passivity which cuts off reflection, communion with one's self, repentance and hope, the past and the future, to identify the soul with the eternal present of God,—in that *naked faith* which has for its object no truth of the Gospel, no mystery of Jesus Christ, no attribute of God, nothing whatever, except God himself or the Being in itself in its absolute unity and simplicity, — Bossuet saw the necessity of the mediator disappear, and the dogma and morality of Christianity swallowed up.[1] Positive theology aside, Bossuet was philosophically right in defending the perpetuity of the active principle in the soul; the sublime doctrine of *pure love*, while teaching us to love the ideal, the good and the true, for itself, should not make us abdicate the indestructible personality that God has given us.

[1] See the letter of Bourdaloue on *Quietism*, in the *Vie de Fénelon*, by M. de Bausset, t. I. p. 402. The division of the divine perfections, says Fénelon, exists only with respect to us; all this is one and identical. "It is not by surveying the multitude of divine perfections that we really conceive God, but by seeing them all united in himself." *Existence de Dieu*, p. 522.

Public opinion at first followed the impulse given it by Bossuet. The positive, active, strongly individual habits of the seventeenth century rose against the logic which impelled it to contemplation and to the unity of the Pantheists and the Mystics. The Jesuits stood on the reserve; the Jansenists stormed; the free-thinkers derided the amorous hyperboles of Madame Guyon. Fénelon appeared at first abandoned by every one save a few steadfast friends. He submitted his book to the Pope, with the King's consent; but, when he asked permission to go to Rome to defend it, the King answered him only by dismissing him to his diocese with a prohibition to leave it (August, 1697). Thenceforth, there was nothing but a long series of authoritative attacks in France, and imperious entreaties at Rome against the exiled archbishop. The greater part of the relatives and friends of Fénelon were driven from court. Beauvilliers with great difficulty escaped disgrace; the title of preceptor of the children of France was ostentatiously withdrawn from Fénelon, despite the tears of the Duke of Burgundy.[1] Fénelon did not suffer himself to be borne down without resistance; he maintained an obstinate struggle against Bossuet, and proved clearly that the *swan* could cope with the *eagle*. The prodigious talent which he displayed in this polemic, the interest inspired by his person, the painful impression caused by the fury of his enemies, by degrees regained him the public sympathy. He proved, moreover, by evidence that his maxims had been carried to extreme conclusions which were not in his mind. Bossuet, embittered by his perpetual combats and by the feeling of the instability of his work, showed no longer, towards his Catholic adversaries, such as Fénelon and Richard Simon, the moderation which he had formerly testified in the war against the Protestants: his violence detracted somewhat from his dignity and authority, and his increasing anxiety redoubled his violence.[2] He feared failure at Rome. Fénelon inclining somewhat towards ultramontane doctrines, the court of Rome had more sympathy for him than for Bossuet, and Pope Innocent XII. would have been very glad to let the matter subside. The commissioners whom he had charged to examine Fénelon's book being divided, five to five, the book should have been absolved, according to custom. The Pope dared not absolve it, and definitively referred it to the congregation of the Holy Office. The pressure

[1] A curé of Seurre in Burgundy was condemned to the stake, meanwhile, as guilty of *Molinist abominations*. See Dangeau, t. II. p. 126.

[2] See, in the *Journal de l'Abbé Ledieu*, t. I. p. 242, in what strange terms Bossuet expresses himself with respect to Fénelon.

from Versailles on the Vatican extended to scandal. The King demanded daily that the matter should be ended; he exacted most unequivocally, not a judgment, but a condemnation. The Pope yielded at last, by the advice of the congregation and against his personal feelings; he condemned the *Maxims* in the mildest terms possible, and without any qualification of heresy (March 12, 1699). It was time; the papal decree crossed on its way a fulminating memorial drawn up by Bossuet in the name of the King. The King declared that, if he did not obtain a clear and precise judgment on a book *acknowledged to be bad*, and which was kindling a conflagration in his kingdom, he should know what he had to do.[1] This was a threat of a national council and schism! We see how Bossuet treated in practice that Roman supremacy which he exalted in theory; he threatened the Pope in some sort to excommunicate him, if the Pope did not think with him on a point of doctrine.

There was reason to fear that schism might come from the opposite direction, and that Fénelon would follow the example of the Jansenists. Nothing would have been easier for him than to continue hostilities while treating Rome with consideration. He did not do so. He showed that, as he had said, the *spirit of contention* is not that of *true spirituality*. He preferred the peace of the Church to everything, and, without renouncing his inmost sentiments, which he set forth anew to the Pope in a work left in MS., he submitted fully to the pontifical brief, which was accepted by the assemblies of all the ecclesiastic provinces of France,[2] and thenceforth kept the most profound silence on these matters.

His political disgrace did not cease; but his moral influence thenceforth was only increased thereby. His place of exile became the theatre of a renown unsought by him; he gave there the most perfect and most illustrious model of evangelical charity and of all the virtues of a Christian pastor. Meanwhile, the publication of *Télémaque*, made without his consent, from a copy that had been abstracted from him, won him France and Europe, but rendered Louis XIV. forever irreconcilable (June, 1699).[3]

Bossuet was thus relieved from the fear of seeing Fénelon and his innovations reappear at court while the King lived; but afterwards, into what hands would the power pass and what ideas would reign over France? The future was too full of obscurity for Bos-

[1] See Bausset, *Vie de Fénelon*, t. II. p. 246.

[2] This was the application of the fourth of the articles of 1682: that the judgment of the Holy Father is irrevocable only after the consent of the Church.

[3] On the life and works of Fénelon, see his *Eulogy* by M. Villemain, and an excellent article by M. Joguet, in the *Encyclopédie Nouvelle*.

suet to find repose in his victory. He continued to watch under arms. Several of the polemics which we have mentioned were subsequent to the struggle against Fénelon. After *Quietism*, Bossuet again smote Jansenism and Jesuitism. *Probabilism* reared its head struck down by Pascal. The Jesuits had formerly had the credit of causing the separation of the celebrated assembly of 1682, at the moment when Bossuet was preparing in it the condemnation of the ethics of the casuists. Bossuet repaired this check in the assembly of 1700; he secured the unanimous condemnation by the bishops of *probabilism* and the other principles of lax morality, as well as of the semi-Pelagianism of some Jesuits, at the same time with the attempts of the Jansenists to renew the doctrine of the *five propositions*. He reigned absolute master over this assembly.

From combat to combat, age was advancing, the body was wearing out; the end of the career could not be far off. Bossuet collected his powers for a last work, no longer of discussion, but of faith and pure meditation, which was to be his testament to posterity. From this meditation proceeded the *Aspirations towards God concerning the Mysteries of the Christian Religion*, a work worthy of its title, for there is nothing more elevated among the monuments of the Christian mind. In combating the Mystics, the advocates of pure sentiment, Bossuet had developed in himself the principle which prevailed among his adversaries; genius always enriches itself at the expense of what it combats; but there is something more indeed in this book than pious effusions and acts of faith; there is an explanation of the fundamental dogma of the Christian religion, which links it to the essential principles of metaphysics, and which gives theology an immovable philosophic foundation. We speak of his explanation of the Holy Trinity. The question here is not simply to make the psychologic *ternary — power, intellect, and love* — correspond to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. The Church does not accept this interpretation, which changes divine *persons* into simple *attributes*. This interpretation is, indeed, insufficient: the psychological *ternary* is in God like every truth; it pertains much more closely than any other truth to the mystery of the Trinity, but it is not this mystery itself. The meditation on what ought to be the thought in God, leads Bossuet further into the depths of the divine.

To think is to conceive. Whoever thinks within himself conceives of himself. God can only think within himself, and, in thinking, therefore conceives of himself. To conceive and to beget are the same thing in God, because, God being all substance

and having in him nothing accidental, his thought is necessarily substantial and necessarily efficacious. God, conceiving of himself, therefore substantially reproduces himself by his unique and eternal thought. God conceived, or the Son, is therefore distinct from God conceiving, or the Father, yet one and consubstantial with him. God, knowing himself in his substantial thought, and being known of it, loves himself in it and is loved by it. The Love of God is substantial like his Thought. The Holy Spirit is the mutual love and the eternal relation of the Father and the Son. The Love of God, being substantial like the Thought of God, is, like it, God entire, and forms the third divine personification. Such is, as far as man can conceive it, the mystery of the supreme unity and triplicity, the three persons acting, in a certain point of view, the first as power, the second as intellect, the third as love, but each nevertheless uniting in itself power, intellect, and love, as well as all the divine attributes known and unknown.

Bossuet next finds the Trinity again in man, and thus explains the saying of the Scriptures, "God made man in his image and after his likeness;" only, in the psychological formula by which he expresses this likeness, *to be, to know, and to will*, he confounds will with love, while will, although having love for its motive power, refers to the first of the three principles, to power, *to be* being the same thing as *to be able*, and will being power determining itself.[1]

However it may be with this psychology, the explanation of the Trinity by Bossuet, the summary of the profoundest views of the Fathers, is the greatest step made by theology, and remains Bossuet's greatest claim as a thinker.

Bossuet was notwithstanding too much a man of action and of reality to be able to become absorbed in this sphere of pure mind in which he rose so high, and to lose sight of the interests of his faith on earth. Anxieties again seized him in the presence of the continually increasing hostile forces. With Fénelon, it was civil war. Foreign war was extending more and more. On the steps of the throne itself, the future was disputed between the devoted pupil of Fénelon and the *libertines*, the *free-thinkers*, at the head of whom were the Duke de Chartres and the Vendômes, and who surrounded the Dauphin, the indifferent and forgetful pupil of Bossuet; the *libertines* had the chance of succeeding first. Locke,

[1] *Œuvres de Bossuet*, t. IV. edit. Didot, 1841; *Élévations à Dieu sur les Mystères; 2d semaine, Élévations sur la Trinité.*

recently translated, penetrated into France (1700); finally, in the recesses of Holland, arose a last enemy still more dangerous and difficult to grasp than sensualism, namely, skepticism, which no longer opposed doctrine to doctrine, but which sapped all doctrines. In the bosom of the *refugee* colony, doubt and paradox were incarnated in a new Montaigne, more formidable than he who made the torment of Pascal, — an aggressive, polemical, systematic, and methodical Montaigne.

Pierre Bayle, born in 1647, at Carlat, the son of a Protestant minister of the province of Foix, had shown, from childhood, a passion to learn and to reason on what he learned: dialectics were to temper his blade, forged by erudition. At twenty-two, struck by the Catholic arguments on the tradition and authority of the Church, he abjured Protestantism; but, soon after, shocked by the worship of saints and images, and judging, after Cartesian principles, transubstantiation impossible, he returned to the Reformation. He withdrew to Geneva to escape the laws against backsliders, then returned, disguising his name, and was appointed Professor in the Protestant academy of Sedan, where he met Jurieu, at first his friend, then his irreconcilable adversary. In 1681, the measures hostile to Protestantism multiplying, the academy of Sedan was closed: hospitable Holland offered chairs of philosophy and theology to Bayle and Jurieu. Literary journalism had just dawned. *The Journal des Savants*, established at Paris, in 1665, by a counsellor of parliament, Denis de Salo, had called forth, in Italy, Germany, and England, divers critical reviews, through which it was destined to survive to our day. Bayle launched out into this new path with éclat by his *News from the Republic of Letters* (1684–1687).[1] But, before undertaking this purely critical publication, he had already entered upon his true career by an original work, *Thoughts on the Comet of* 1680 (1682). The form which he gave to his attack against vulgar prejudices led him to propositions of a nature to excite great scandal. After comparing atheists with idolaters, then with Christians, he concludes that religious beliefs, which he does not contest in themselves, have little influence on the conduct of the majority of men, who are governed according to their temperament and the impressions of the moment; that an atheist may be an honest man; that a society of atheists might

[1] Bayle had for a rival, as a journalist, Leclerc of Geneva, an Arminian with Socinian tendencies, settled like him in Holland, and the author of several well-known collections, the *Bibliothèque universelle* (1686–1693); the *Bibliothèque choisie* (1703), etc.

exist and be better than a society of idolaters. We perceive, through assertions, some paradoxical, others hazardous, an idea worthy of serious examination, — namely, that there is an innate morality in the conscience of man, independent of religious dogma.[1]

This idea, however, did not express the real motive power of Bayle. It was the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes which determined him to reveal his whole thought. With this public calamity had coincided to him a great private calamity. His brother, a Protestant minister like their father, had been imprisoned in the hideous dungeons of Château-Trompette, and had perished there of exhaustion and want. Bayle broke forth by letters in which he depicted in lugubrious traits, *What France is under the reign of Louis the Great* (1686). After flagellating the persecutors, he directly preached tolerance. *The Philosophic Commentary on the Compelle Intrare* (1687) is a broad and able refutation of all the theologians who have admitted the principle of constraint in religious matters, and especially St. Augustine.[2] TOLERANCE, such is the true principle of Bayle and the excuse for his skepticism: he is not skeptical in point of humanity. He attacks intolerance from the point of view of positive theology, by refuting the interpretations of the sacred text on which persecutors rest; he attacks it from the political point of view, by drawing the picture of a society in which the ruling power, instead of "abandoning the secular arm to the furious and tumultuous desires of a mob of monks and clergymen," would equally protect all religions. "Each religion would pride itself on proving, by its good works, that it was the most friendly to God, and also the most friendly to the country; and this noble emulation would produce a concert and harmony of several voices, as agreeable at least as the uniformity of a single one." His inmost idea appears finally in a third species of arguments, less developed and more radical; namely, that the greater part of debated matters are undemonstrable, and that, not being sure of much, we have no right to oppress others for things uncertain. Spinoza, the dogmatist, had affirmed the right of free thought; Bayle, the doubter, denied the right of repres-

[1] The moral sense, or conscience, does not depend on metaphysical or theological theories, it is true; it exists by itself; but, nevertheless, what is the object of the moral sense if it is not good in general, the idea of good; and what is the idea of good, if it is not the idea of God considered under a certain attribute? If the moral sense loses the idea of good, it becomes atrophied.

[2] Bayle precedes Locke and Leibnitz in the cause of tolerance, as Jurieu precedes Locke in the cause of the sovereignty of the people.

sion: an inverse process and a like conclusion.[1] Bayle wished to kill persecution by unsettling the beliefs for which men persecute their fellows and by forcing them to doubt themselves. A witness and victim of the frightful evils engendered by intolerance, he preferred indifference to it. The human mind always proceeds by excesses and contradictories, and arrives at tolerance, not by a belief superior to the persecuting beliefs, but by a negation of them.

The old Protestantism, quite as intolerant as *Popery*, was not deceived by this, and felt itself attacked quite as much as Catholicism. Jurieu inveighed against the impiety of his ancient friend. Bayle, harassed by attacks of extreme violence, turned against Calvinism, and, in an anonymous work (*Advice to Refugees*, 1690), treated the Calvinists as badly as he had lately done the Catholics. This book seems written in the ill-founded hope of a speedy return of the exiles to France: Bayle makes advances in it to the government of Louis XIV. for which he has been severely reproached. He radically condemns armed resistance to princes and the sovereignty of the people, which is to him only the pretended right of each citizen to obey no one. The greatest fault of the sovereignty of the people was perhaps, in his eyes, that of being preached by Jurieu. The *Advice to Refugees*, which reproved the Revolution in England, caused the removal of Bayle. The refugees suspected him of wishing to follow the example of the *apostate* Pellisson. They were mistaken: the *Advice to Refugees* was only a freak; Bayle was no more reconciled to Catholicism than to Calvinism, and plunged entire into a vast work which filled the rest of his life, the *Historical and Critical Dictionary* (1694);[2] a learned chaos, threaded by innumerable flashes which render the darkness still blacker, an arsenal of doubt, in which are mingled all the truths and all the errors which have been current among mankind. The Dictionary of Bayle leaves in the mind only an almost universal uncertainty. Metaphysics is obscured like theology. Dogmatic philosophy had seemed to Bayle less fitted than skepticism to bring forth tolerance; then, his mind had taken this tendency and delighted, as he says himself, in the part of the *cloud-compelling Jove*. He saw besides, more or less clearly, the defects of the various systems of philosophy, and felt himself better quali-

[1] As to the liberty of thought, at least; for Spinoza does not admit the liberty of worship.

[2] With the addition, nevertheless, of the collection of dissertations entitled *Réponses aux questions d'un provincial.*

fied to criticise than to improve them. Among religious dogmas, he is especially implacable towards predestination, and nothing is more natural, since in this dogma, combined with that of eternal punishment, is the principle of fanaticism: he goes on to exhume ancient Manicheism, while declaring it contrary to all reason, in order to oppose it to predestination, implicitly drawing from it the conclusion that, if it is impossible to comprehend that there are two gods, the one the author of good, and the other the author of evil, it is equally impossible to comprehend that the only and perfect god could be directly or indirectly the author of evil, and could create beings, with the foreknowledge that they would be damned; after which he concludes that we should silence reason before faith and believe predestination like the other mysteries, without comprehending them.[1]

This conclusion, evidently, is not in earnest, and no one can be deceived by it. Nevertheless, doubt has remained concerning the real opinion of Bayle as to religion in general, and especially as to Jesus Christ. This uncertainty does not exist with respect to morality: Bayle seemed to cling to morality, as a last support in the shipwreck of other beliefs. Thence arose his hostility towards Spinoza, whose transcendent doctrine he did not comprehend, and in whom he saw only a destroyer of right and duty. But we may ask him in turn, what insures this morality, which he defends with desperate energy. At the bottom, it is conscience, it is sentiment; but he had no theory, and then, one cannot make this theory without beginning by assuring thought of itself and returning to dogmatic metaphysics. He did not do this, and, after him, others would come who would deny conscience and morality with all the rest.

Behold then the fruit of religious persecutions and of unity of belief imposed by material force! Men had materially crushed Protestantism in France, and Jurieu would not be the one to raise it anew; but behold the avenger rising and beckoning to generations who would one day break down the Churches as they had broken down the chapels.

The last days of Bossuet were sad; words of bitter discouragement are reported of him. "I foresee," said he, "that free-thinkers may fall into discredit, not for any abhorrence of their sentiments, but because everything will be held in indifference, except business and pleasure." Combat inflames but does not discourage; combat is life; but above the combat of religion and philosophy,

[1] *Réponses à un provincial*, ch. 129.

Bossuet foresaw a peace in nothingness, a moral death, from which may God preserve France and humanity!

The old, worn-out athlete went at last to seek repose in the grave. Bossuet died (April 12, 1704); Voltaire had been born (February 20, 1694).[1]

[1] Bourdaloue died a month after Bossuet; Bayle, in 1706. The *Journal* of the Abbé Ledieu contains details concerning the last days of Bossuet, which show us how far this strong mind participated in human weaknesses: he let himself be governed by nephews and nieces unworthy of him; exhausted, dying, he could not decide to quit Versailles until he had secured his episcopal succession to his nephew and other advantages to his family. "Will he die then at court?" said Madame de Maintenon dryly, tired of his entreaties in behalf of his nephew. He left Versailles at last, but his nephew prevented him from proceeding to his episcopal town of Meaux, and he exercised himself in mounting the staircases of Paris, to return soon to climb those of Versailles. He testified a love of life which one did not expect to find in him. *Journal of the Abbé Ledieu*, t. II. 1703. In spite of everything, we do not consider that the great man loses much by these revelations of his private life; he is less imposing, but less rigid than we have been accustomed to see him, and goodness gains in him what majesty loses.

CHAPTER IV.

LOUIS XIV. (CONTINUED.)

SOCIAL ECONOMY. DIPLOMACY. Economical Situation of France. Administration; Finances; Commerce. Memorials of Intendants. Public Destitution. VAUBAN. Bois-Guillebert. Affairs of the Protestants. Foreign Affairs. Spanish Succession. Testament of Carlos II. The second of the Grandsons of Louis XIV. called to the Throne of Spain.

1697–1700.

THE history of ideas has shown us the France of Louis XIV. tending, so to say, to dissolution; an examination of the material state of the country gives the same result. The economical condition of the people was deplorable; the springs of government, excessively strained, brought out all the defects of the social order, and especially the defective organization of offices and public revenues. The evident exhaustion of the people had contributed, at least as much as the question of the Spanish succession, to decide Louis for peace. The best intentioned among the King's counsellors had suggested to him the idea of a vast investigation concerning the condition of France. This was the only basis on which an attempt could be made to establish the reforms which the best minds were seeking. The investigation was begun immediately after the peace: memorials were demanded from all the intendants concerning the provinces which they administered. It should not have stopped there. A far more efficacious plan had been conceived in the midst of the little group of reformers, whom the disgrace of Fénelon had afflicted, but not discouraged. Beauvilliers, who had escaped the storm that had overtaken his friend, and who was maintained in his post of minister of state and chief of the council of finances, induced the King to make the intendants transient, and to cause them to circulate from province to province, after the manner of Charlemagne's *missi dominici;* the reports which they would have successively sent in concerning all parts of France would thus have been controlled by each other, and, in the course of a few years, a complete statistical account of the kingdom would have been collected,

which would have allowed all desirable improvements to be effected with full knowledge of the case. The instructions designed for the intendants were drawn up in common by Beauvilliers and the Duke of Burgundy, who, in his extreme youth, (he was only eighteen in 1700,) already applied himself to matters of state with the sustained assiduity of a mature man.[1] The events that were brought about by the opening of the succession of Spain caused this project to be adjourned, and the intendants, to their great satisfaction, remained cantoned like petty provincial dictators, instead of becoming ambulatory commissioners. The council contented itself with the memorials which they dispatched, each concerning his own province, and which they prepared, for the most part, with little care and study; we feel, in reading them, that they were no longer restrained and directed by the strong hands of Colbert and Le Tellier.[2] These memorials, nevertheless, contain numerous and precious facts. We see in them that the population of France, about 1700, exceeded 19,000,000 souls: Paris had, it is said, 720,000 inhabitants; Brittany, 1,655,000; Normandy, 1,540,000; French Flanders and Hainault, then more extended than our Department of the North, only 582,000; Picardy, only 519,500; Champagne, 695,000; Burgundy, with Bresse and appendages, 1,266,000; Dauphiny, 543,000; Languedoc, 1,440,000; Upper and Lower Guienne, 2,266,000; Alsace, continually laid waste by the armies, only 245,000. According to the opinion of Vauban,[3] these figures are not entirely accurate, and those pertaining to Paris and some others are probably exaggerated. If we admit that France had about nineteen millions of souls in 1700, it must be acknowledged that she must have had at least twenty-two or twenty-three millions in the flourishing years of Colbert, for all the memorials of the intendants show that the population had diminished fearfully within fifteen years. The multiplied causes of this decline transpire on all sides through the admissions of the intendants.

Bridges, causeways, roads, were in an almost general state of neg-

[1] See this document in Boulainvilliers; *État de la France*, t. I., and in the *Vie du Dauphin, père de Louis XV.*, by the Abbé Proyart, t. I. pp. 240–272. Louis XIV. had caused the Duke of Burgundy to enter the Council of Despatches, in October, 1699.

[2] The Memorials of the Intendants (42 vols. folio) are among the MSS. of the Bibliothèque. Boulainvilliers has given a very extensive analysis of them in 8 vols. folio (or 6, in 12mo.), under the title of *État de la France* (published in 1727).

[3] See Vauban, *Dîme royale*, p. 121, ap. *Économistes financiers du* XVIII^e^ *siècle*, with a commentary by M. E. Daire, 1843. According to Vauban, the female population exceeded the male nearly one tenth. The statistics of Vauban, reproduced in the accounts of Mallet, are not wholly in accordance with those of Boulainvilliers.

lect. Fishery and the merchant-shipping were ruined in Normandy and at Dunkirk by the aggravation and complication of duties, and by the new privileged companies. The conquered and frontier countries had been overwhelmed by contributions, military quarterings, and requisitions; the owners of land who cultivated it themselves, in Flanders, had not received, during the war, more than one third of their revenues; proprietors who farmed out their estates had not received one tenth! In West Flanders and Hainault, the nobles paid the land-tax like the plebeians; in Hainault, it was the same with the priests; this equality, unique in France, was only, in the excess of burdens, an equality of distress.[1] In Alsace, the pasturage of the woods was taken from the inhabitants, a relic of the ancient community of the Gaulish clan and of the Germanic gaw: the production of cattle and swine was thus ruined.[2] Picardy had lost one twelfth of her population: the new duties on the ships and merchandise of England injured by their excess the commerce of Picardy, which preferred the moderate tariff of 1664. It was for the interest of commerce that foreign coin should be received in France, as in England and Holland, where it was considered as merchandise; the French trader was obliged either to lose by sending the foreign currency that he had received in payment to be recoined, or by taking his pay in letters of exchange on which he also lost. The provinces of the west did not suffer less than those of the north and east. In the generality of Alençon, the cities were almost abandoned: most of the proprietors were without shelter at home, through inability to repair and preserve their houses. In the generality of Rouen, out of seven hundred thousand inhabitants, there were not fifty thousand that did not sleep on straw. The great trade in linens that Brittany carried on with England had been broken up by the heavy duties on English and Dutch goods, by the

[1] In Artois, the clergy and the nobility paid the land-tax called the hundredth, but, when it was increased, they were exempt from the increase: in the last war, as many as six *hundredths* had been levied per annum; the privileged persons had paid only one.

[2] The intendant of Alsace draws an ingenuous and piquant picture of the clergy of his province. "They have no knowledge of what is called Jansenism in France. . . . Attached to the principal point of religion, without scruple and without overanxiety, they study at a certain age little more than is necessary to content the superior; they love life and good cheer, are very rarely avaricious, have no attachment to the other sex; in a word, have excellent qualities for the formation of an edifying and holy clergy." T. III. p. 368. A more important observation appears from the Memorial on Alsace; namely, that Alsace is the country of *written law;* the language is German; the law, the tradition, is Gallo-Roman. The law of custom exists there only in regard to fiefs, a few questions relating to the nobles and a few municipal statutes. T. III. p. 331.

monopoly of the importation of English cloths granted to the ports of Calais and Saint Valery, and finally by the war. The English formerly purchased in Brittany much more than they sold there. France was to lose the privilege which she had so long possessed of furnishing a great part of Europe with grain and linens. It is maintained that the exportation to England and Holland had reached one million two hundred thousand pieces of linen per annum! The manufacture of paper in Angoumois had been ruined by heavy duties. The river-tolls caused the route of the Loire to be abandoned for the land-routes; the commerce in wines was ruined in all the districts of the Loire by multiplicity of duties. The centre was still more unfortunate than the west: Touraine had lost one third of its laborers, one fourth of its whole population, and one half of its stock since the war of Holland; a part of the lands were abandoned. The silk-trade of Tours was ruined: one of the causes was the introduction of printed linens and calicoes from India. The cloth-trade was equally ruined at Tours, which had only thirty-three thousand souls left out of the eighty thousand it had under Richelieu and Colbert. There was the same decline at Troyes, fallen from fifty or sixty thousand souls to twenty thousand. The population of Anjou was also reduced one fourth. In Maine, the manufacture of linens occupied but six thousand workmen instead of twenty thousand: the exigencies of the farmers of the internal routes (internal customs) were the cause. Limousin had suffered terribly by the scarcity and mortality of 1693–'94. Berry was less unfortunate, because it produced an immense number of sheep,[1] the wool of which served to manufacture coarse cloths and cloth serges for the armies; nevertheless, feudal rights discouraged the peasants there. Bourbonnais lost one fifth of its population; grain was usually at so low a price there that the laborer did not pay his expenses. Périgord had lost one third of its inhabitants by the dearness of bread

[1] This is exceptional: sheep were generally very scarce in France. The intendant of Bourges gives curious details concerning metayer partnerships in the election district of Issoudun. These are groups of twenty or thirty families working a metayership in common, whose capital and animals belong to a proprietor; they employ a chief who distributes the labor; if he manages ill, they depose him, but acknowledge the debts that he has contracted. "No nation," says the writer, "is more *savage* than these people: troops of them are sometimes found in the country, seated in a circle in the midst of a ploughed field and always away from the roads; but on approaching them, the band immediately scatters." Boulainvilliers, *État de la France*, t. V. p. 83. Such was the basis of that society of which Versailles was the summit! Poor *savages* flying before *civilized men*, who appeared to them only as birds of prey ever ready to seize the fruits of their toil, in the name of the seignior or of the king.

and the freezing of the vines. These monstrous inequalities attest how imperfect was the intercourse between different parts of France.

Guienne and Languedoc were not in quite so bad a state: Gironde exported a hundred thousand tuns of wine per annum; in a good season there were always a hundred large ships, at least, in the port of Bordeaux, and as many as five hundred in times of fairs; yet the commerce was carried on in great part by foreign merchants, especially by the Dutch, and Bordeaux had only 34,000 inhabitants. The population of the great cities of Languedoc was, on the contrary, very considerable: Toulouse numbered more than 18,000 families; Montpelier, nearly 14,000; Nîmes, from 10,000 to 11,000. In the dioceses of Nîmes, Montpelier, and Alais, charitable boards had been established for some years by means of which all the poor were regularly assisted, and mendicity was banished. Father Chauran, a Jesuit, was the founder of this establishment. The manufacture of fine cloths, in the Holland style, founded by Colbert, was well maintained in Languedoc and had overthrown the Dutch in the Levant. The canalization of Languedoc had been increased by a canal connecting Perpignan with the great canal of the South, — a useful communication politically as well as commercially: the Roussillonnese were still *Catalans*, as they said themselves, and they needed to be made French.[1] The canal of Languedoc did not unfortunately produce all the results that had been hoped from it: the expenses with which its navigation was fraught prevented the merchants from making use of it; they preferred to run the risks that the canal was designed to obviate. Moreover, an oppressive measure crushed the cultivators of silkworms: this was a decree in council of 1687, which required all the silks of Languedoc to pass to Lyons and to be reassessed there, which killed exportation and put the producers of Languedoc at the mercy of the merchants of Lyons. The total commerce of Languedoc amounted to twenty-four millions per annum; the taxes had risen to eighteen millions during the war! The tyranny shown by the commerce of Lyons towards the producers of silk did not seem to profit it much. Lyons had lost 20,000 souls since the beginning of the war, and had not over 69,000; the manufacture of silk had fallen from eighteen thousand looms to four thousand. The manufacture of cloth had diminished one half. Marseilles exercised over the

[1] The régime of Roussillon was singular in regard to public burdens: this little province was exempt from almost all imposts; but half of the straw and forage belonged to the King. *État de la France*, t. V. p. 280.

commerce of the Mediterranean the same tyranny as Lyons over the producers of silk: merchandise could not be exported by sea until after it had been sent to undergo quarantine at Marseilles. Dauphiny had lost an eighth of its population since the Revocation. The militia and forced enrolments had contributed much to this. In the generality of Orleans there were but six thousand one hundred and eighty-two merchants for seven thousand seven hundred and forty-seven officers, either royal or seigniorial and municipal! Such figures reveal to what extent the social equilibrium was destroyed! No country had suffered more than the generality of Paris. Whilst the capital was encumbered with a surplus population, the province that surrounded it lost one fourth of its inhabitants, one third in some cantons, and nearly one half in the elective districts of Mantes and Étampes. The fault was especially in the subsidies and highways. Mantes, which furnished Normandy with common wine, had been ruined by the doubling of the duty on wine at wholesale in 1689. In all the provinces at the north of the Loire, and in some maritime districts, two thirds of the Huguenots had succeeded in leaving France: almost all the great merchants and manufacturers of Rouen, Caen, Tours, etc., had gone. The escape of a multitude of Huguenots, the obstacles put in the way of the marriage of those who remained, joined to the destitution from which the peasants had not been relieved since the scarcity of 1693, had reduced the population of the district of La Rochelle one third within twenty years.

The sadly monotonous echo resounds on almost every page: "The war, the mortality (of 1693), the continual quarterings and transits of soldiery, the militia, the heavy duties, and the withdrawal of the Huguenots, have ruined this district.[1] . . ."

This painful inventory, drawn up by witnesses little disposed to exaggerate the sufferings of the people, passed through a sufficient number of hands to receive a semi-publicity. Minds were painfully struck: it seemed as if a sombre vapor were rising in the atmosphere, lately so brilliant, of Versailles. Many constrained themselves to see in this only a transitory evil; but the most sagacious saw, like Fénelon, the monarchy inclining towards destruction. The evil was patent; but where was the remedy? Men who were impelled by their minds and hearts to the study of economic problems and of the state of the people, had not waited for the response of the intendants to seek this remedy. Towards the close of the

[1] The gradual diminution of the noble caste, despite frequent ennoblings, is a fact of another class, but one of the most salient of these memorials.

war, a provincial magistrate, Bois-Guillebert, lieutenant-general of the bailiwick of Rouen, had sought the comptroller-general, Pontchartrain, and declared to him that he brought him the salvation of the kingdom. "Listen to me with patience: you will at first take me for a fool; then you will see that I merit attention, and, finally, you will be satisfied with my system." Pontchartrain burst into a fit of laughter, answered him shortly that he was satisfied with the first point, and turned his back on him.[1] Bois-Guillebert was not discouraged, and addressed to the public the work that the minister had not taken the pains to examine: it was the *Details of France*, published in 1697.

Had Pontchartrain read the book of Bois-Guillebert, he would have received the author no better for it. We have elsewhere[2] told with what misconception of the past, with what material errors, with what enormous contradictions this grotesque and fiery writer may be reproached. And, yet, many gleams of light shine in his chaos. This mind so erroneous and so crude in his judgments concerning persons and things, in the bewildering assertions and the fabulous figures that he scatters at random, is endowed with a superior faculty of generalization: he opens a new road to thought by his vigorous efforts to attain and state economic laws. He was the first, if we are not deceived, who had attempted to give scientifically the theory of public wealth, and his definitions and propositions are often just and almost always profound even when they are contestable. He shows clearly that the precious metals are not wealth, but only the sign of wealth, wealth being "the power to procure the comfortable support of life."[3] The evil comes, he says, from shackles on consumption, and these shackles are the unequal and arbitrary villain tax, aids, and customs.[4] "Consumption and revenue are one and the same thing. The richer a country is the better is it in a condition to dispense with specie." By this somewhat bold axiom he seems to predict the England of the nineteenth century. He explains strikingly the superiority in exchange which countries that produce articles of commerce have

[1] Saint-Simon, t. V. p. 285.

[2] See the preceding volume, p. 82.

[3] He recognizes two kinds of real wealth: the fruits of the earth and the products of industry.

[4] He clearly shows how the fear of being overburdened with the villain tax hinders the peasant from increasing his stock, and how the exactions of the aid clerks destroy the traffic in beverages. One of the most terrible plagues of France was the exceptional jurisdictions which made the financial officers and the farmers of imposts judges in their own suits. The tax-payer could scarcely ever hope for justice.

over those that produce gold and silver: the first give products that serve only once for money which serves always, — which serves always, on the condition of circulating, for, the moment that consumption stops, money also stops short in the *strong hands* (in the hands of capitalists), who then prefer losing the profit to risking the principal, and it no longer serves for anything. When money stops, the country is paralyzed. "Money counts as so much revenue every step it takes." The wealth of a country, then, is in its fecundity of products, and in its great consumption, which causes one million (money) to produce more effect than ten millions where there is no consumption, this million renewing itself a thousand times (by circulation). He deeply feels the solidarity of all classes, and demonstrates how the wretchedness of the cultivator of the soil, who is the base of society, must involve the ruin of the rest. He proclaims the solidarity of interest, not only of man with man, not only of province with province in the same state, but of people with people. Every seller must be a purchaser, and reciprocally. Every exchange must be profitable to two parties, in the general interest. For this end, competition and liberty of producers is requisite. Nature demands the liberty of industry, and this liberty alone can paralyze the tyrannical efforts of cupidity and selfishness. To nature and not to men belongs the police of the economic order.[1]

The whole doctrine of liberal political economy is in this axiom.

The practical conclusions of Bois-Guillebert were the transformation of the system of imposts. The impost, according to him, was not too great: it was only badly distributed. It might even have been greatly increased without inconvenience: France, under proper regulation, might have given to the King as much as three hundred millions of revenue! It was requisite, first, to make the villain tax equitable, by rendering the existing favors and enormous inequalities impossible by an enumeration and by lists drawn up according to a plan which he explains; second, to suppress the aids, the provincial customs, and the impost duties of cities;[2] third, to make up for these suppressions by the increase of the reformed villain tax and by a hearth-tax; fourth, to adopt the system established in England since 1688 to enhance the price of grain, not only by freedom of

[1] Our citations are not all taken from the *Détail de la France*, but also from the subsequent works of Bois-Guillebert; the *Traité des Grains*, the *Dissertation sur les richesses, l'argent et les tributs*, and the *Factum de la France*.

[2] The suppression of imposts on consumption would cause 100,000 taverns to spring up in a week, he exclaims with naïve enthusiasm.

exportation, but by premiums for exportation and by shackles on importation; that is, to do exactly the reverse of what was usually done in France.

If the debasement of the price of grain had grave inconveniences, the fictitious rise, *the theory of dear bread* for the interest of the people, was untenable; it was, moreover, opposed to the principles of commercial liberty laid down by Bois-Guillebert. As to the reform consisting in the suppression of the indirect imposts, paid by all, for the purpose of increasing the direct impost paid only by the people *subject to the villain tax*, he was greatly mistaken concerning the result: it was too much or not enough: it was only a semi-revolution, and almost a revolution backwards: these conclusions ill responded to premises so bold.

A mind less carried away by speculation, but much more complete and more practical, was maturing in the mean time a much more comprehensive and logical project. Vauban had begun alone, twenty years before, an inquiry analogous to that with which the King's council charged all the intendants of the kingdom. With the same hand which fortified France, he traced admirable plans for the improvement of the soil which he had so well put in a state of defence:[1] the canalization of the territory, now almost completed, was only the application of his patriotic designs. At the same time he in some sort created statistics by the data of all kinds which he collected in his continual journeys through the kingdom:[2] he spent thus all the means with which the King had compensated him for his services; the most unimportant details concerning the lowest classes of the people were what touched him closest; his glance, too firm to be dazzled by outside splendors, penetrated society to its foundation to test its solidity, and he saw its successive strata as follows: "Nearly a tenth part of the people is reduced to mendicity; of the nine remaining parts, five can give no alms to the first, from which they scarcely differ; three are in very straitened circumstances; the tenth does not number over a

[1] It is not unimportant to remark here that the general system of the defence of the kingdom, as it was executed by Vauban, was not entirely his own. His correspondence with Catinat shows that he did not approve of such an excessive multiplication of fortified places. This is an objection, he wrote, which will be perceived when we shall no longer be so much in a condition to attack as to defend ourselves. See *Mém. de Catinat*, t. I. p. 84.

[2] According to the account that he gives of a square league of ordinary land taken as the standard, the proportion between the cultivation of serials and crops fit for forage was already destroyed: — Out of 4688 acres, there were 2707 under cultivation, 500 lay in meadow, and 286 in waste lands. The poorest lands would yield three and a half to four bushels for one: good lands ten, twelve, and even fifteen for one. *Dîme Royale*, p. 181.

hundred thousand families, of which there are not ten thousand that are completely at ease."[1] After the peace of Ryswick, he occupied himself in drawing up, from his abundant materials, a multitude of memorials on all sorts of political, economic, and military matters; most of them are unfortunately dispersed or lost. He touched upon almost everything that concerns the administration of a great State. The most important question, for him as for Bois-Guillebert, was that of impost: he devoted to this not a simple memorial, but a book. He had perceived the necessity of a radical change: Colbert had been able to revive the finances by simple reforms; reforms were no longer sufficient; a revolution was required.[2] Vauban did not attach himself, like Bois-Guillebert, to an investigation of the abstract laws of wealth and of political economy in general; he clearly laid down the special principle of the theory of imposts, which Bois-Guillebert had not seen, and he came to a conclusion without hesitation. Colbert laid especial stress upon indirect imposts, as relatively more equitable than direct impost, to which the rich and influential portion of the nation was not subjected; but this justice was only relative; it had even become wholly illusory, owing to the heavy duties in detail which weighed on the poor alone. Where then was true justice? What was the true principle in regard to impost? It was that every subject ought to contribute to all the needs of the State in proportion to his ability, and not in proportion to his needs. On what ought impost to be laid? On income and the fruits of industry. Every privilege that exempted from this contribution was unjust and abusive. This exemption ought to disappear.

Thus Vauban demanded nothing less than the radical abolition of the pecuniary privileges of the nobility and the clergy, whilst he demanded, like Bois-Guillebert, the abolition of the impost on beverages and of all the duties that shackled internal circulation.

With the proportional impost on income, the *royal tithe*, as he called it, there were to be no more revenue-farmers, no more extraordinary transactions, no more loans, no more vexatious collection that was often worse than the impost itself:[3] the king was to

[1] *Dîme Royale*, p. 84.

[2] All the abuses pruned away by Colbert had sprouted again with frightful vigor: the iniquity of the redistribution of villain taxes was so enormous that one farm of four or five hundred francs revenue paid one hundred francs or more, whilst another, of three or four thousand, under the patronage of some influential personage, paid only thirty or forty. — *Dîme Royale*, p. 51. Besides, the multitude of petty vexatious taxes engendered by what was called extraordinary transactions was a hundred times worse than all the direct increase of impost. — *Ibid.* p. 55.

[3] There were one hundred and fifty kinds of duties and taxes on law-matters only; this enables one to judge of the monstrous complication of the system.

increase or diminish the tithe according to the needs of the State, so that in ordinary times only a semi-tithe, or twentieth, was to be paid, artisans and laborers paying only one thirtieth, and that, in case of necessity, the impost might rise gradually as high as the entire tithe. But care was to be taken not to blend this new system with the old, not to blend the tithe with the villain tax or the aids; this would ruin France! This was an indirect impeachment of the capitation-tax, an imperfect essay of impost on income grafted on the established system.

Vauban, however, too practical to seek the absolute, did not pretend to make the impost on revenue the sole impost, but merely the principal and only direct impost: he consented that the State should preserve some other sources of revenue, as, 1st, the miscellaneous duties (registration, stamped paper, postage, etc.), which were the price of services rendered by the State to individuals, or of authenticity given to their transactions; 2d, an impost on luxuries;[1] 3d, foreign customs, which he wished greatly to reduce; 4th, impost on salt, made uniform in all France and reduced one half or two thirds.[2] The impost on salt was, it should be acknowledged, a concession made at the expense of principle, whilst the impost on consumption of luxuries was reduced to this same principle. He thought that the tithe, at the minimum of a twentieth, would give about sixty millions as the revenue of the land, nearly fifteen millions and a half as the revenue of city-houses, manufactures, and commerce, *rentes*, salaries, and offices. The second sum was manifestly too light; but he acknowledged the necessity of conciliating manufactures. Salt, at eighteen livres the minot, would yield 23,400,000 francs; other imposts about eighteen millions: total, nearly one hundred and seventeen millions in ordinary times, susceptible of being increased to more than two hundred millions as an exception and in case of extreme necessity. Thus, Vauban, like Bois-Guillebert, although with much more reserve and moderation, thought that heavy imposts were not necessarily an evil, provided they were properly assessed, and that the question was not to diminish taxation, but to augment public wealth.

[1] Brandy was one of the luxuries which Vauban rightly wished to tax. He had not the same enthusiasm for taverns as Bois-Guillebert.

[2] At the present time Vauban would certainly grant to the State, among the supplementary resources, the maintenance of the impost on tobacco. It is just and proper, he said, to tax State stocks as well as other income. P. 781. He already feared that the abundance and convenience of *rentes* might divert capital from agriculture.

Vauban desired that the army, as well as the finances, should be reformed. This was the other ulcer of France. Formerly, the armies were not numerous, and the pay high enough, soldiers were found without trouble; but now, the armies had become immense, and the pay had not been increased, whilst all products continued to rise. In order to fill up their ranks, officers were obliged to employ force and trickery everywhere;[1] hence multiplied desertions of these compulsory soldiers, and the misery of so many families perishing with hunger because their props were wrested from them: hence another emigration along with that of the Huguenots! To prosecute such deserters was a revolting iniquity, yet, if it were not done, "the armies would soon be reduced to nothing." The militia did not give room for less fraud and violence than the recruiting for the regular army. Vauban proposed that there should be an enumeration made of all the *hearths* in the kingdom, that men legitimately exempt from military service should be set apart, and that all the rest of the families should be divided into cantons of a hundred hearths: the cantons were to furnish soldiers by drawing lots. Substitution was to be authorized, with guaranties; the pay was to be increased, etc.; that is, the details excepted, the present system of conscription.[2]

Vauban, during several years, published none of those works which he meditated upon and perfected day by day; he perpetually endeavored to insinuate his ideas into the mind of the King and of his ministers. Yet only a few details were borrowed from him; for example, the drawing of lots, which was applied, not to the army, but to the militia, an objectionable reservation which he wished to abolish,[3] and purely military ameliorations, as the general adoption of the bayonet, which definitively constituted the modern infantry and made it superior to the Roman legions. The King and his council shrunk from the colossal innovations proposed by the warrior-reformer: the head of a government seldom undertakes a revolution at sixty years of age. Still the evil was increasing every year, and the patriotic heart of Vauban was grieved. . . . We shall see presently how Vauban broke forth and destroyed himself by seeking to force those to hear who refused to listen to him.

[1] There were houses in Paris to which young men were attracted by all sorts of tricks and retained there till the moment of sending them to the army. These were called *oeufs*.

[2] *Mémoires inédits* of Vauban, published by Lieutenant-Colonel Augoyat, 1841. It is in one of these memorials that Vauban proposes to fix the bayonet on the musket by a socket, that will not prevent taking aim and firing.

[3] Ordinance of January 26, 1701; ap. *Anciennes Lois françaises*, t. XX. p. 378.

Before Vauban, another great man, great in another order of genius, had been the victim of a similar zeal for the public good.

Soon after the peace of Ryswick, Racine, whose upright sense and quick perception rendered him fit for almost everything, and who had been for many years admitted to intimacy with the King, conversed one day with Madame de Maintenon on the wretchedness of the people: she was so much struck with his observations concerning the evil and its remedies, that she asked him to give them to her in writing. The King found the memorial of Racine in the hands of Madame de Maintenon, ran over it, and exclaimed in a tone of ill-humor, — "Because he can make verses, does he think he knows everything? And, because he is a great poet, does he want to be minister?" It was the sentence of Racine. Madame de Maintenon, faithful to her circumspect selfishness, abandoned the man whom she had compromised, and gave notice to Racine to visit her no more until he was requested again to do so. Racine could not bear this blow. He had been able to renounce the glories and pleasures of the stage; he could not renounce the King's favor. To say that the courtier in him had survived the poet would not justly explain the feelings that broke his heart. He loved Louis. He had linked his life to that of the Great King, the object of a kind of worship to his heart as to his imagination. To live without the royal intimacy, was to cease to live. His grief brought on a disease of the liver, which carried him off at the end of a year (April 21, 1699).[1]

The government was unwilling to engage in great innovations; it attempted to reëstablish the finances and to procure some relief for the people, but by ordinary expedients that were wholly inadequate to the situation.[2] The total receipts of the treasury, which had been one hundred and fifty-eight millions in 1697, were reduced, in 1698, to one hundred and twenty-two millions, which left only the net sum of seventy-three millions in the public coffers, the expenses being deducted. Pontchartrain, imitating Colbert after the peace of Nimeguen, profited by the relative confidence that peace reëstablished, to pay off, by loans at five and a half per cent., the loans contracted during the war at seven and one ninth and eight and one third per cent.; then, the credit continuing to advance, he made new loans at five per cent. to pay off the loans at five and a half per cent. These operations diminished the debt;

[1] *Mémoires sur la vie de J. Racine* (by his son L. Racine, t. II. p. 284).

[2] Whilst economy was aimed at, habit prevailed, as the extraordinary pomp of the camp of Compiègne attests (September, 1698).

but the annual charges remained increased by twenty millions since 1683, whilst the resources of the country had diminished.[1] This was the heritage of the war. Without directly attaining to the radical revolution proposed by Vauban, he might have preserved and increased the capitation-tax while making a fairer distribution of this new impost, and have diminished in the same ratio the aids and villain taxes; but he did not dare to break his word with the privileged persons; the capitation-tax was suppressed immediately after peace. Recourse was again had to *extraordinary transactions*, in order to make up for the insufficiency of imposts and to glide smoothly down the usual declivity.

The comptroller-general, Pontchartrain, had too much sagacity not to perceive down what a road to perdition he was travelling. He also, in his turn, as formerly his predecessor Le Pelletier, only aspired to lay upon another the responsibility of the finances. When Madame de Maintenon, who found him too independent in character, strove to drive him from the comptroller-generalship, he would willingly have thanked her. Meanwhile, Chancellor Boucherat died (September 2, 1699). The opportunity was seized; the office of chancellor was offered to Pontchartrain as an honorable retreat; he transmitted the ministry of the marine to his son, who was to be the most fatal example of ministerial hereditability, and the comptroller-generalship was given to Chamillart, intendant of finances, who had won the favor of the King by his talent for playing billiards, and the favor of Madame de Maintenon by his zeal in conducting the affairs of Saint-Cyr. Honest, orderly, polite, docile towards his patrons, obstinate towards his inferiors, he had the virtues of a steward of a good household; the taste of Madame de Maintenon for honest and devout mediocrities made him a minister. The King shared this taste more and more. Louis the Great was declining; his perception, formerly so sure, was dimmed with age; his assumption to inspire everything, to conduct everything, to be served only by machines, became more absolute in proportion as he was less capable of realizing it.

Chamillart rushed headlong into extraordinary transactions and into anticipations. His intentions nevertheless were good. He

[1] The French debt was then about one thousand millions in capital; the debt of Holland, three hundred and twenty-five millions; of England, two hundred and twenty-eight millions. Holland had paid, during the war, as much as seventy-eight millions in a year, about one third of its total revenue. The general revenue of Holland was, as is believed, about two hundred and thirty millions; that of England, from five hundred and sixty to five hundred and seventy; of France, from one thousand and fifty to eleven hundred millions. Forbonnais, t. II. p. 296.

occupied himself conscientiously, if not intelligently, with commercial and agricultural interests. He began by some absurdities, such as the prohibition to weave coarse hose, lest fine-knit hose might suffer thereby, and the prohibition to export thread, linen, and hemp from Brittany, which discouraged the cultivation of these textile plants and soon compelled France to purchase abroad Northern hemp, cables, and sail-cloth, instead of supplying Europe with them as formerly. The establishment of a board of trade, composed of the comptroller-general, the minister of the marine, the elder D'Aguesseau, and some other councillors of state and masters of requests, and of twelve merchants of the chief commercial places, seemed to put things in a better condition. Different export duties that fettered exportation were reduced or suppressed. The prohibition to seize cattle, which had borne such excellent fruits under Colbert, was renewed for six years in 1701.[1] Commerce with distant parts was encouraged; a company had been formed in 1698 for the commerce and agriculture of St. Domingo; free trade to China was introduced with success, whilst the privileged East India Company sustained itself with great difficulty. New manufactures were founded; for example, that of glass-ware, glass engraved, cut, etc. But all this did not restore the finances, and, moreover, political events soon arrested this progress.[2]

In this effort made by the ruling power, after the war, to come to an understanding of itself and of its surroundings, the religious condition of the country attracted the attention of the King, as well as the economical condition. Louis had in vain wished to turn his attention from the great Protestant question, in which he bitterly felt that his enterprise had miscarried. "They think," wrote Madame de Maintenon, "that they can annihilate things by not speaking of them."[3] It was indeed necessary in the end *to speak of them* and to form a plan of conduct. Information and advice were demanded of the intendants. The result of this information was that there were but few more true Catholics in France than before the revocation of the Edict of Nantes; that the *new converts* had almost generally preserved *heresy in their hearts*, and continued to form bodies among themselves, living without any external profession of religion, as soon as acts of Catholicism ceased

[1] It was renewed in 1708 for six years more. In 1677, the waste lands of the public domain had been ceded to any one who would reduce them to cultivation: this was an excellent measure; unfortunately, it was all used as grain-land, and none for raising forage.

[2] Forbonnais, t. II. pp. 114–122.

[3] Noailles, *Hist. de madame de Maintenon*, t. II. p. 558.

to be extorted from them by violence; wherever the intendants, instigated by the clergy, continued to burden the recalcitrants with taxes and military quarterings, emigration was incessant. According to the confession of the pitiless intendant of Languedoc, Basville, there were districts of twenty or thirty parishes in which they had not succeeded in making a single Catholic, or even in introducing one from without. Many pretended converts presented themselves at the church for the principal civil acts; then never went again; but a host of others never presented themselves there at all, and married, baptized their children, interred their dead in secret. A deplorable confusion was introduced into the condition of persons.

The council deliberated long on the affairs of the Protestants. Pontchartrain suggested tolerance for reasons of state, and counselled the consultation of certain eminent bishops and magistrates. The Archbishop of Paris, Noailles, then in great credit, was naturally first called upon to give his opinion. He gave it without reserve in favor of tolerance, and recalled the fact that the first Christian emperors forced neither pagans nor heretics to go to church, did not take their children away from them, allowed them to contract marriages, which were only civil contracts, and to break them by divorce, as the civil laws allowed them. He besought the King to authorize him to ask the opinion of all the bishops in writing. He hoped that experience had recalled a majority of his brethren to sentiments similar to his own. He was deceived. The greater number of the bishops pronounced in favor of continued constraint. "Force has been employed to deprive them of their religion, and now, when they have no religion, has it not become necessary to give them one by force?" This sentence of a prelate expresses with cynical frankness the opinion of the majority. We see with pain that the celebrated Bishop of Nîmes, Fléchier, by no means sustained, on this decisive occasion, the evangelical reputation that has been attributed to him and that he merited in other respects. He, too, desired "a salutary constraint." The Bishop of Chartres, Godet-Desmarais, the director of Madame de Maintenon, was the most unequivocal and violent of all. "If no difficulty was raised," he said, "in receiving the abjuration of a great number of Calvinists whose conversion there was reason to fear was not sincere, why raise difficulty now against constraining them by the same means to receive the sacraments?" And he refuted the fear that some manifested of making themselves accomplices in their sacrilegious actions by arguments the equals of which could scarcely be found in the *Provincial Letters*. Bossuet did not, in these

grave circumstances, take the predominant part that seemed to belong to him; he was in some sort at war with himself; his conscience revolted against the consequences of the principle of persecution that he had admitted; he was opposed to compelling the so-called converts to take part in the mass, as most of his brethren desired, and he did not hesitate to condemn formally these sacrilegious communions imposed by constraint.

The government had the merit of resisting, to a certain extent, the majority of the bishops. The King charged Pontchartrain to come to an understanding with the Archbishop of Paris and the elder D'Aguesseau concerning the drawing up of an edict which appeared December 13, 1698. This edict acknowledged that the work of conversion had not been accomplished, and that *some* of the King's subjects had not returned from their errors. It *exhorted* but did not constrain the new converts to take part, as punctually as possible, in divine service, and ordered them thenceforth to observe, in marriages and baptisms, the canonical solemnities, leaving it to the King to provide for the civil effects of marriages contracted by them since the Revocation (in secret). The obligation to send their children to Catholic schools and to cause them to be taught the Catholic catechism was confirmed. The attestation of Catholicism was exacted anew from every candidate for judicial and municipal office, from every licentiate in law, medicine, etc.; but the edict observed a studied silence concerning industrial avocations, and added that all subjects of the King might peaceably pursue their business on condition that they should seek instruction in the Catholic religion.[1]

The Archbishop of Paris, if he had been master, would have done better than this ambiguous edict, which relieved the present somewhat, but left all the embarrassments of the future remaining, by not freely granting the civil state to all remaining Protestants. Scarcely had the edict appeared, when the persecutors sought to win back what they had lost by the interpretation. Basville and the bishops of Languedoc, giving up the imposition of the sacraments, made extreme efforts to have the new converts compelled to

[1] *Anciennes Lois françaises*, t. XX. p. 314. A second edict of December 29 authorized the refugees to resume possession of their property, on condition of abjuring on their return to France. *Ibid.* p. 322. M. de Bausset is mistaken in declaring that the refugees were not required to become Catholics in order to recover their property. *Hist. de Bossuet*, t. IV. p. 120. The lieutenant of police, at Paris, received secret orders to make no more investigations with reference to religion, provided there was no public scandal. On this whole question, see Rulhière, pp. 312, 375, 428–434.

go to mass. Bossuet opposed it, but nevertheless approved that they should *hold firm on the marriages*, and make all the religious exercises obligatory for such of the pretended converts as had promised to live as Catholics for the purpose of marrying or rehabilitating their marriages. This was unworthy of a logician like him; there is no possible mean between persecution and tolerance. Basville prevailed, and he was allowed to act in Languedoc as he wished; that is, to impose fines on those who did not go to mass. The barbarous law against backsliders was, in fact, allowed to fall into disuse; but many outrages were still committed in Languedoc, and the public mind there was not tranquillized. Of this, there were soon to be terrible proofs.

The semi-tolerance, that did not dare avow itself, succeeded no better than open constraint had done. In this, as in finances, the governing power only knew how to take half measures, and failed of its end.

However serious might have been internally the preoccupations of the government, which, moreover, did not acknowledge to itself the whole extent of the evil, the leading interest to it was less within than without. During the three years that followed the peace of Ryswick, men lived in daily expectation of an event that was to change the face of the world, and the Houses of Bourbon and Hapsburg were almost exclusively occupied with preparations for the day when the Spanish branch of the Austrian stock should disappear. They labored, on both sides, to secure positions and allies in Europe.

In 1697, during the negotiations of Ryswick, Louis XIV. had desired to establish France in Poland and to remove this republic from Austrian influence. During the double war of France against the League of Augsburg and of Turkey against the coalition of the Emperor, Poland, Russia, and Venice, French diplomacy had not ceased to urge Sobieski to break with Austria and to treat with the Turk. It had only succeeded in causing him to relax but not to stop the war. At the death of Sobieski, Louis XIV. renewed, for the purpose of causing a French prince to be elected King of Poland, the attempts that he had formerly made on the death of John Casimir. The Prince de Conti was the candidate proposed by France. The Emperor, the Pope, the Jesuits, and Russia united in supporting the Elector Augustus of Saxony. The Elector had just abjured, in view of the throne of Poland, and the Pope found it quite natural to recompense the hereditary chief of the Lutheran party for having reëntered the Roman Church. The Jesuits, who

were only too powerful in Poland, feared the Jansenist relations of Conti. As to the young Czar Peter, he wished to have Poland remain his ally, his instrument against the Turk and the Swede, and feared lest the French spirit should come to reorganize that country. He had chosen his candidate wisely: the Saxon king was to begin the ruin of Poland!

The financial distress of France did not permit the necessary sacrifices, in an affair wherein money was to play an important part, to be made in time. The Elector of Saxony, on the contrary, exhausted his States to purchase partisans and soldiers. The Prince de Conti had, nevertheless, the majority, and was proclaimed King at Warsaw, June 27, 1697; but the minority proclaimed and called the Elector, who hastened with Saxon troops, and was consecrated King of Poland at Cracow (September 15). Conti, retarded by an English fleet that had obstructed his passage, did not arrive by sea till September 26 at Dantzic, which refused to receive him. The Prince took with him neither troops nor money. The Elector had had, on the contrary, all the time necessary to organize his resources. The Russians were threatening Lithuania. Conti, abandoned by a great part of his adherents, abandoned the undertaking, and returned to France in the month of November. It is said that a passion for the Duchess de Bourbon, one of the King's natural daughters, had contributed to retard the departure and hasten the return of the Prince, who did not respond, on this great occasion, to the opinion that had been entertained of his talents.

In the following year Augustus of Saxony was recognized as King of Poland by all Europe, even by France.

Louis XIV. succeeded no better in Turkey than in Poland. After having uselessly induced the Porte to take part in the general negotiations of Ryswick, he would now have gladly hindered it from making peace, in order to preserve for himself a formidable diversion at the moment when the Spanish succession should be opened; it was not to the interest of the Porte in fact to conclude a peace which, after the defeat that the Sultan had sustained, in 1697, at Zenta on the Theiss, against Prince Eugene of Savoy, could only be disadvantageous and humiliating to the Ottoman empire; but the Porte was ill-governed and France ill-represented at Constantinople. The ambassador Fériol offended the Divan by his injudicious contempt for Ottoman usages, and was not sagacious enough to secure any influence, whilst the agents of England and Holland won or ruled the Ottoman ministers, and imposed on them the partial medi-

ation of William III. and the States-General. Towards the close of the year 1698 and the beginning of 1699, Turkey signed, at Carlowitz, a truce for two years with Russia, a truce for twenty-five years with the Emperor, and peace with Poland and Venice. The Sultan ceded to the Emperor Transylvania and the Imperial conquests of Hungary, to the Russians Azof, to Venice the Morea, and restored Kamieniec to Poland. For the first time the Ottoman empire receded and acknowledged itself vanquished by a treaty of peace. It at least honored its reverses by refusing to give up the illustrious chief of the Hungarians, Tekeli, to Austrian vengeance.

All Europe was thus at peace, at the close of the seventeenth century, but scarcely for a year. War was to begin again with the new century, at first in the North, then in the South. Austria found herself in a condition, as well as France, to think of nothing longer but the inheritance of Spain. Russia's hands were free to urge Poland and Denmark on Sweden. Leopold, fearing the renewal of the old Franco-Swedish alliance between Louis XIV. and the young Charles XII. who promised to be another Gustavus-Adolphus, arranged for the Czar Peter a prolongation of the truce with Turkey. The Czar, after having conquered an outlet to the Black Sea, wished at present to plant himself on the Baltic: the European rôle of Russian policy was beginning.

Louis XIV. was more successful in Germany than in Eastern Europe. He saw a chance of dividing that fasces of the Empire which Austria had formed against him in the last war, and he adroitly availed himself of it. The creation of a new Electorate in favor of the Duke of Hanover had excited the jealousy of a portion of the German princes. After long disputes, the opponents sought the diplomatic intervention of France, as a guaranty of the treaty of Westphalia, which they declared violated by innovation, and Louis hastened to address a protest to the Diet of Ratisbon (October 14, 1700). It was unexpected good fortune to find again the elements of a French party beyond the Rhine. The condition of Hungary, always restless under the yoke, also promised to Louis other means of action against Austria.

The great affair of Spain, however, progressed towards its conclusion through singular turns of fortune.

Three pretenders claimed beforehand the heritage of the unfortunate Carlos II., that royal spectre who had seemed continually dying for a third of a century. The first, according to the laws of hereditability, was the Dauphin of France, son of the eldest sister of Carlos II. The second was the Electoral Prince of Bavaria,

a child of tender years, grandson of the second sister of Carlos II.; the second sister of Carlos had married the Emperor Leopold, and left at her death a daughter married to the Elector of Bavaria; the Electress had died in turn, and her rights had passed to her son. The third claimant was the Emperor Leopold. The Emperor, son of the second daughter of Philip III., aunt of Carlos II., being one degree below the Dauphin and the Prince of Bavaria, should have given way, according to the laws of hereditability, not only to these two competitors, but to Louis XIV. himself, son of the eldest daughter of Philip III. But the Emperor argued, against the House of France, the double renunciation subscribed to by the mother and wife of Louis XIV., and against the House of Bavaria, a renunciation subscribed to by the Electress of Bavaria. He therefore pretended that the succession should not leave the House of Austria and claimed it, not for himself or his eldest son, — he felt that Europe would not permit it, — but for his second son, the Archduke Charles. There was a fourth pretender, who was not regarded as having a serious claim, although his pretensions were most in conformity with the true interests of Spain: this was the King of Portugal, descendant of Juana, the putative daughter of King Henry the *Impotent*, formerly set aside from the throne in favor of Isabella the Catholic. The chimerical hope of preserving in their integrity scattered possessions ready to be detached piecemeal, closed the eyes of Spain to the immense advantage of peacefully annexing Portugal. Not only the statesmen, but the nation in general, had no other idea than that of securing a king strong enough to maintain as a whole the Spanish monarchy, that gigantic and incoherent empire which had exhausted and ruined the true Spain. This idea even predominated over the national hostility towards France. The renunciation of the mother of Louis XIV. to the inheritance of Spain had been considered as definitive, but it was not so with that which the wife of the Great King had subscribed to, the *Cortes* not having been called upon to sanction it, and the dowry not having been paid. Gourville recounts in his *Memoirs*, that, finding himself at Madrid in 1670 during an illness of Carlos II., he sounded many of the grandees of Spain on the subject of making the Duke of Anjou, second son of Louis XIV.,[1] King of Spain, and that his suggestions were well received.

The Spanish nation, despite many official protestations in favor of the *most august* reigning house, had not therefore taken sides between the Houses of Bourbon and Austria. As to the unfortu-

[1] This child, born in 1668, died in 1671. *Mém. de Gourville*, p. 555.

nate prince whose spoils were in dispute during his lifetime, he instinctively had more inclination for his house than for the French princes; but he was as incapable of thinking as of wishing for himself,[1] and he was unceasingly drawn in contrary directions by opposing intrigues as long as he dragged out his vegetating existence. His uncle had at first married him to a French princess after the peace of Nimeguen; but his wife had died young, and suspicions of poison had been raised against his mother, an Austrian princess, and against the ambassador of Austria. His mother married him again to the Princess Palatine of Neuburg, sister of the Emperor's second wife and wholly devoted to Austria. But, suddenly the queen-mother abandoned this Austrian party, which she had been accused of serving even by crime, and labored to form a third, — the Bavarian party. She was the grandmother of the Electress of Bavaria, and, when the latter gave her a great-grandson (1692), she attached herself to the interests of this child with all the violence of her character. Public opinion in Spain, without being decided in favor of the Bavarian prince, was, at least, very decided in regard to the nullity of the Electress' renunciation of her eventual rights, a renunciation imposed by the Emperor on his daughter without the participation of the Spanish government. Only, the Spaniards did not think that the Prince of Bavaria could bring them force enough to sustain the weight of their Empire. This force, in truth, might be lent from without to the Bavarians. England and Holland, despite their engagements with the Emperor, inclined towards the Bavarian party as soon as it was formed, and saw in its success the maintenance of European equilibrium; they therefore completely abandoned the Emperor in the negotiations of Ryswick, where they said not a word of the Spanish succession.

The unfortunate King Carlos II. fluctuated between his wife and his mother, equally tormented by both. His wife succeeded, it is said, in causing him to sign a first testament in favor of the Archduke Charles; his mother forced him to tear it in pieces. The queen-mother, in the mean time, died (1696), and left the Bavarian party without a chief. If the Austrian cabinet had had penetration and decision, it might have carried the question and have caused the Archduke to be declared heir presumptive, by sending him as speedily as possible to the court of Carlos II. under the auspices of the Queen. It did not seem to comprehend how important it

[1] He did not even know his own States. When the French took Mons, he imagined that it was from William III. that Louis XIV. had conquered this place.

was to end the matter while the war still lasted against France. It lost time. The French, however, penetrated to the heart of Catalonia, and the taking of Barcelona gave a terrible blow to Austrian interest by deciding Spain for peace. If the Emperor, as the Queen of Spain demanded, had sent the Archduke with ten thousand veterans, the effect of the fall of Barcelona might still have been counterbalanced; but the Austrian cabinet, as deeply in debt as that of Madrid, was miserably mean, and wished to put the ten thousand soldiers at the expense of Spain. Spain signed the peace.

The Austrian party declined. The Queen injured it still more in public opinion than she aided it in council. The little *camarilla* of Germans whom she had brought from her country invaded everything and trafficked in everything; the Spaniards, always suspicious and ill-disposed to foreigners, are of all people in the world the least patient towards a domination of this sort; therefore, the unpopularity of the Queen and her countrymen passed all bounds. The French profited by it. Immediately after the peace they had begun again to overrun Spain, according to their custom: it was by thousands, we might say by hundreds of thousands, that the French turned Spain to advantage, and executed there the work that her proud indolence interdicted her to execute herself — a continual exchange in which one of the two nations carelessly gave its gold and the other its labor and industry. Often oppressed, sometimes massacred when war broke out, the French always returned. This time they reappeared under the auspices of a peace very advantageous to Spain, which, conquered, had recovered all her lost places, as if she had been victorious. The Spaniards had been sensible of the generosity that cost France dear, but was very profitable to the House of Bourbon. They received with great splendor the ambassador that Louis XIV. sent to Spain in the beginning of 1698. The ambassador, Marquis d'Harcourt, was commissioned to declare to Carlos II. that any disposition made by His Catholic Majesty prejudicial to his legitimate heirs would be a signal of rupture. He gave the Spanish ministers to understand that the Most Christian King had in readiness a hundred thousand witnesses ready to depose in favor of his rights: this was not a vain boast, and a numerous army was cantoned on the French declivities of the Pyrenees.[1] Several of the grandees began to make overtures to

[1] Intimidation was not the only means employed by the ambassador; if we are to believe Flassan, Harcourt spent ten millions in purchasing friends for the House of Bourbon.

the ambassador concerning the coronation of a French prince "who should maintain the integrity of the monarchy." Among them figured the most important man of Spain, the Cardinal Porto Carrero, Archbishop of Toledo, who had long been attached to the Austrian cause, but had been injudiciously alienated by the Queen. The Cardinal succeeded in inducing Carlos II. to postpone the declaration which the Queen was obstinately soliciting in favor of the Archduke. Meanwhile the Moors besieged Ceuta, and threatened to take from the Spaniards what remained of their conquests on the coast of Africa. Louis XIV. offered the aid of his fleet. The Queen forced her husband to refuse it; but the people were not the less thankful to the French.

The affairs of Louis XIV. were prospering better, in some sort, than he himself desired, and he recommended to the Marquis d'Harcourt to secure the good-will of the Spaniards without formally pledging himself to them. The real idea of Louis was not then to take the entire succession of Spain for his son: he felt the impossibility of succeeding in this without a new universal war, the whole weight of which, ruined Spain would throw on France, and he had had other views in signing the peace of Ryswick. He returned to the idea of a division, even though he should not obtain conditions as advantageous as those of the eventual treaty of 1668 with the Emperor. He could no longer think of negotiating the affair, as in 1688, with Leopold, who now claimed the whole inheritance for his second son: he judged that only one means would lead to the end, namely, to come to an understanding with William III., and then to impose on the Emperor what should have been decided. This was unquestionably very politic, admitting that any sincerity could be expected from William. Louis thought that England and Holland had no less need than France of a compromise that might prevent the renewal of a general war. William, in fact, seemed to enter into the views of the King of France. After different propositions and counter-propositions (March–October, 1698), a secret treaty was concluded at the Hague October 11: it was agreed between the plenipotentiaries of France, England, and Holland, that the Dauphin should have the Two Sicilies, the presides of Tuscany, Finale in Liguria, and Guipuscoa; that the Archduke should have Milanais, and the Prince of Bavaria all the rest of the monarchy, Belgium included. This was far different from the treaty of 1668 for France;[1] but the share of Austria was also

[1] See the preceding volume, p. 289. It was about this time that Louis XIV. assembled the camp at Compiègne, under the pretext of showing an army to his

reduced to a single province. Louis XIV. had given an incontestable proof of his pacific views by renouncing, for the satisfaction of England and Holland, that portion of the heritage most valuable to France — Belgium. The Italian possessions that were granted to him were doubtless very important for the domination of the Mediterranean, but they were not secure in case of a rupture with England, Holland, and Savoy; and William, with little sincerity, had foreseen this case. William hoped that the Pope and the Italian States would come to an understanding with the Emperor to interpose an obstacle to the occupation of Naples by the French, that the fleets of England and Holland would be called upon to serve as arbiters, and that France would finally be compelled to yield to the wishes of the two maritime powers; his confidant, Burnet, hints that he had negotiated only to keep Louis from using his forces if the King of Spain should die soon: Louis was alone ready in Europe, Parliament having obliged William to disband his army.[1]

Despite the agreement to secrecy, the treaty was soon known at Madrid, where it caused extreme agitation. It seemed very hard to Spain to see the descendant of William the Taciturn determining with France the dismemberment of the monarchy of Philip II. The counsellors of Carlos II. took their course with intelligence and decision. The Cardinal Porto-Carrero, who at once ruled the council of Castile by his creatures, and the conscience of the King by a faithful confessor, dictated to Carlos II. a testament which declared the Prince of Bavaria universal heir. It was the only chance of bringing England and Holland to defend the integrity of the Spanish monarchy. France protested, January 19, 1699, through the Marquis d'Harcourt.

A sudden turn of fortune annihilated at a single stroke the treaty of partition and the testament. The Prince of Bavaria died at the age of seven, February 8, 1699. The Imperial cabinet was strongly suspected of having caused the death of the Emperor's grandson by poison: the ties of blood, when Austria is in question, are not sufficient to make such a suspicion absolutely improbable; nevertheless, no indication is mentioned that authorizes history to insist on the accusation.

Louis XIV. persevered in his policy of compromise, and made new overtures to William III. It was now impossible to avoid giving a large share, even the largest, to the House of Austria; for

grandson, but, in reality to be ready to occupy Belgium if Carlos II. died unexpectedly.

[1] Burnet, trans. of the Hague, 1735, t. IV. p. 464.

it was evident that the two maritime powers would no more give to France Spain and the Indies than Belgium. Louis himself proposed Spain and the Indies for the Archduke, on condition that the crown of Spain should never be united to the Imperial crown, and adding Milanais to the portion given to France by the first project of partition. As to Belgium, it was to be given to a third party. William consented, reserving the right of modifications, but delayed signing, for the purpose of striving, he said, to induce the Emperor to accede. The Emperor, after many delays, refused. William still protracted his delay: the second treaty of partition was finally concluded at London and the Hague, on the 13th and 25th of March, 1700. A wise modification had been made in the propositions of Louis XIV.: namely, that France, instead of Milanais, should have the Duchy of Lorraine, and that the Duke of Lorraine should become the Duke of Milan. Louis had consented that Belgium should be added to the portion of the Archduke. Three months were granted the Emperor to accede; on his definitive refusal, the share of the Archduke was to pass to a third party, who was not designated; this third party was the Duke of Savoy. The dispatch of the Archduke to Spain or Italy was to be regarded as a rupture.

This compact, by which one of the claimants and two foreign powers arbitrarily disposed of the Spanish monarchy in the name of European equilibrium, was officially communicated to the Diet of Ratisbon and to the different European States. The Duke of Lorraine accepted the lot that was offered him; all the other princes and States avoided pledging themselves to guarantee the treaty, and awaited events. William III. and the States-General seconded the solicitations of Louis XIV. in this respect, but very feebly.

The second treaty of partition was not the final conclusion of William III., who had never seriously wished to surrender the Mediterranean to the French by giving them the Two Sicilies. He undertook to induce Louis XIV. to exchange Sicily and Naples for the States of Savoy. The circumstances of this negotiation are unknown; but we cannot help warmly regretting that Louis XIV. did not accept the plan of his old enemy; France would have happily extended her frontier,[1] while avoiding for herself and Europe one of the most terrible wars that ever desolated humanity: England and Holland would have sincerely sustained a com-

[1] Piedmont might some day have been ceded to the Duke of Milan in some European combination that would have given us the Walloon Provinces.

bination which was not in the least alarming to their commerce or their territory, and Austria would not have been in a condition to oppose it.[1]

At the news of the second compact of partition, the courts of Vienna and Madrid expressed equal irritation against England and Holland: the Emperor complained of their taking Italy from his House, which it was able to defend, in order to give to his son a powerless monarchy, dependent on two maritime States; he endeavored to induce Louis XIV. to negotiate directly and separately with him, and his ministers suggested more or less specious propositions to the ambassador of France. The ambassador of Louis XIV. at Vienna, the Marquis de Villars (subsequently the celebrated Marshal de Villars), believed that the Emperor was sincere, and that Belgium, the Indies, and still other possessions might be obtained from him; he advised the King to come to terms with Leopold without an intermedium. Louis did not follow this advice, and thought that Leopold had no other aim than to embroil him with William. According to the confession of Villars himself, the Emperor, at the moment when he was making these advances to the King, protested to the ambassador of Spain that he would not consent to the dismemberment of the Spanish monarchy.[2] Louis not having yielded to the overtures of the Emperor, the latter, at the expiration of the delay fixed, reiterated his refusal to accept the compact of partition (August 18, 1700).

At Madrid, the first explosion of wrath caused by the treaty was followed by an obstinate struggle between the Queen and Cardinal Porto-Carrero. The Queen, who had for a moment abandoned the Austrian cause, through resentment at some unfriendly proceedings of the Imperial cabinet, and had not opposed the testament in favor of the Prince of Bavaria, had returned to her old party; she extorted from Carlos II. the dispatch of an ambassador extraordinary to Vienna, with new instructions to summon the Archduke to Spain (the close of April 1700). The Emperor did not dare to send his son immediately to Spain, nor his troops to Milan and Naples, which would have been a declaration of war against the authors of the partition. His delays cost him dear. In the mean

[1] She would, however, have resisted with all her power so far as the question of Italy was concerned. The combination that would most easily have avoided war would have been to give Spain and the Indies to the Duke of Savoy, the Spanish States of Italy to the Archduke, the States of Savoy and Lorraine to France, and Belgium to the Duke of Lorraine. On the exchange of the States of Savoy for Naples, see *Mém. de Torci*, p. 592.

[2] *Mém. de Villars*, pp. 67, 70, 89.

time nearly all the counsellors of Carlos II. threw the weight of their influence in a direction opposite to that of the Queen. Judging that there was more chance of maintaining the integrity of the monarchy with a French than an Austrian prince, they urged Carlos to make a testament in favor of one of the grandsons of Louis XIV. The poor prince only asked to die in peace, and could not obtain his wish. Incapable of judging for himself of his duties, and tormented with the fear of carrying into another world the weight of an unjust act, he caused the most renowned theologians and jurisconsults in Spain and Italy to be consulted concerning the respective rights of the pretenders. He would willingly have consulted the whole world, except those alone to whom it belonged to decide the question — the *Cortes* of Spain ; he had preserved through tradition that horror of national assemblies which Louis XIV. systematically professed. The nuncio of the Pope, at the instigation of Porto-Carrero, suggested that the advice of the Holy See should be asked. A courier set out from Madrid for Rome in the course of June. The ambassador of Spain at Rome, a partisan of France, communicated the despatches to the representative of Louis XIV. Although thus well informed of the favorable intentions of the council of Spain, Louis did not depart from the treaty of partition, and again urged the Emperor to accept (October 6). The Emperor replied negatively for the last time ; he now thought himself assured that William III. would not help to constrain him.

The reply of the Pope, meanwhile, had reached the Escurial. Innocent XII. had had a grave cause of complaint against Leopold, who had recently renewed obsolete pretensions to the fiefs of the Roman State formerly dependent on the Empire ; yet we may believe that, near the grave as well as he who interrogated him, Innocent allowed his conscience and not his resentment to speak. He laid the question before a congregation of three cardinals, who treated it not as common casuists, but as statesmen. They declared that the renunciations of the mother and wife of the Most Christian King had been made only to secure the peace of Christendom, and prevent the union of the two crowns of France and Spain ; that, provided the Bourbon who should be called to the Spanish succession should renounce the throne of France in perpetuity, the end would be attained ; that Spain was fully justified, if the good of her people required it, in resuming the common right of hereditability, which had been abandoned only in view of the same good. The Pope ratified the opinion of the three cardinals, sent it to the Catholic King, and died a few weeks afterwards (September 27).

A remnant of attachment to the Austrian name still retained Carlos II.; but when he felt his last days approaching, and Porto-Carrero threatened him with damnation if he did not make the choice most in conformity with justice and the good of his people, he finally yielded: he authorized that prelate to draw up his testament according to the opinion of the most learned theologians and jurists. The testament was signed October 1; Carlos therein recommended his successor to be careful of the faith and obedient to the Holy See, to honor and aid the Inquisition, to sacrifice everything to the defence of the faith; if any of his successors fell into heresy, he was to be deprived of all right to the crown. After this preamble, he declared as his heir, "in conformity with the laws," his nearest relative after those who were destined to ascend the throne of France, — that is to say, the Duke of Anjou, second son of the Dauphin. If the Duke of Anjou should come to inherit the throne of France, and should prefer it to that of Spain, the Duke of Berry, his younger brother, was to take his place; in default of the Duke of Berry, the Archduke Charles; in default of the Archduke, the Duke of Savoy, descendant of a daughter of Philip II. It was interdicted to the successor of His Majesty to alienate any part of the monarchy, and to admit foreigners to government offices.[1]

Carlos II. died thirty days after this great act (November 1).

The *junta* or council of regency, designated by the testament of the late King, immediately wrote to the King of France to announce to him that his grandson was called to the inheritance of Carlos II., and would be put in possession as soon as he should have taken the oath to observe the laws, privileges, and customs of each kingdom. The minister Torci adds, in his *Memoirs*, that in case of refusal on the part of the King, the courier was immediately to bear to the Archduke the offer that should not have been accepted for the Duke of Anjou. In a letter of Porto-Carrero to the ambassador of Spain at Paris, of November 5, the cardinal only tells the ambassador to protest if Louis undertakes to maintain the treaty of partition, and to make an effort to gain time.

November 9, on the reception of a courier from the *chargé d'affaires* of France, who preceded the courier of the junta, Louis

[1] On the whole affair of the testament of Carlos II., see *Mém.* of the Marquis de Torci, French minister of foreign affairs; *Mém.* of the Count de Harrach, ambassador of the Emperor in Spain, and his successor La Torre (*Mém. et négociations secrètes des diverses cours de l'Europe*, t. I. II.; The Hague, 1725); — *Mém. secrets sur l'établissement de la maison de Bourbon en Espagne*, extracts from the correspondence of the Marquis de Louville; Paris, 1818, t. I.

XIV. assembled in council the Dauphin and the three ministers, who alone had the rank of ministers of state: they were the Chancellor Pontchartrain, the Duke de Beauvilliers, and the secretary of state for foreign affairs, Torci, the nephew of the great Colbert. After a preliminary deliberation, the details of which are unknown to us, the King at first resolved to maintain the treaty of partition; then, hesitating in presence of this immense question, he recalled his councillors.[1] Torci reopened the discussion by showing that war was inevitable in any case: if we refused to accept the testament, we should have war with Spain and Austria united to prevent the partition of the monarchy. Would England and Holland sustain France, as they had bound themselves to do? They not only would not sustain her, but they would not be slow to find some pretext for joining the enemy. Could it be supposed that they had ever sincerely wished to grant to France the maritime States of Italy? The acceptance of the Emperor would alone have given validity to the treaty of partition. We should therefore be alone, and for the maintenance of a bad cause. Should we accept, on the contrary, we should have Spain on our side, which would at least furnish important military and maritime positions, and great commercial advantages for sustaining the war, and we should indeed find other allies in Germany and Italy. Beauvilliers attempted to refute Torci: he depicted, in pathetic terms, exhausted France, the wounds of which were scarcely beginning to heal. He showed, in the universal war that acceptance would bring, the ruin of the country. A hundred times better for France, he said, would be the annexation of several fine provinces to the monarchy than the elevation of one of her princes to a foreign throne, which would soon make the descendants of this prince strangers to the country of their ancestors. Beauvilliers would have been quite right had he been able to establish against Torci that a general war could be shunned, and the treaty of partition realized, by the refusal of the testament; but he did not succeed in this. It was clear that the treaty of partition, *as it was*, would not be executed by William III. The Chancellor summed up the arguments on both sides, without daring to decide. The Dauphin, awakening from his usual apathy, energetically demanded the acceptance, and

[1] This fact has been brought to light by M. Ernest Moret, from the documents collected by M. Mignet for the supplement of his great publication on the *Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne sous Louis XIV.*; see E. Moret; *Quinze ans de règne de Louis XIV.* (1700–1715), t. I. p. 82. This volume was to be only the first part of a vast work on the *Histoire de France au XVIII. siècle*, interrupted by the death, so much to be regretted, of the young and conscientious writer.

declared that he intended to cede his personal rights only to the Duke of Anjou, satisfied if he could say, all his life, "The King my father, the King my son."

Louis XIV. decided to accept.[1]

November 12, Louis signified his resolution to the junta of Spain in a dignified and noble letter. The 16th, the new King, *Philip V.*, was *declared* at Versailles. After the Spanish ambassador had saluted and complimented his young master on his knees, in the Spanish manner, Louis XIV. opened to the whole court the folding-doors of his cabinet: — "Gentlemen," he said, "behold the King of Spain." And, turning towards his grandson, "Be a good Spaniard; it is now your first duty; but remember that you were born a Frenchman, in order to maintain the union between the two nations. This is the way to make them happy, and to preserve the peace of Europe." [2]

The junta accepted the reply of Louis XIV. by immediately proclaiming Philip V. at Madrid, and praying "the Most Christian King to be pleased to dispose of all things in Spain, and to be assured that his orders would be as exactly followed as in France" (November 24–26). The President of the Council of Aragon, who had hitherto abstained from taking part in the acts of the junta, in default of sufficient powers to represent the crown of Aragon in this council of regency, signed the letter to Louis XIV. with the President of Castile and the other members of the junta.[3] Aragon had come to a decision. The foreign possessions began to follow the example. The Elector of Bavaria, who had established himself at Brussels since William III. had procured him the government of the Catholic Netherlands, was the first among the governors of foreign possessions to cause the new monarch to be acknowledged by the subjects of his administration. Louis XIV. had given him hopes, in the name of Philip V., of the grant of Belgium as a hereditary government, and the Elector, moreover, cherished a violent hatred towards the Emperor, whom he accused of having procured the poisoning of his son. Vaudemont, prince of the House of Lorraine, who commanded at Milan, did the same,

[1] We have followed Torci, one of the interlocutors in this great debate, in preference to Saint-Simon, who inverts the parts. (*Mém. de Torci*, p. 550. *Mém. de Saint-Simon*, t. III. p. 25. *Mém. de La Torre*, t. II. p. 159.) According to Louville, Madame de Maintenon was of Beauvilliers' opinion, and most earnestly combated the acceptance in other less formal conferences which took place at her residence. The minister of war, Barbezieux, refuted her, and in some sort reduced her to silence. — *Mém. de Louville*, t. I. p. 27.

[2] Saint-Simon, t. III. p. 38. Dangeau, t. II. p. 207.

[3] La Torre, t. II. p. 197.

despite close and long-standing relations with the Emperor and William III.

Philip V. set out from Versailles, December 4, carrying with him the written advice of his grandfather concerning his new *trade of king*,[1] and the assurance of preserving in France his rights of succession for himself and his heirs. Louis XIV. had expressed his wish on this point in letters-patent, that were registered in parliament on the 1st of the following February. By not mentioning, in these letters, that Philip, if he were called to the throne of France, was to choose between this throne and that of Spain, Louis committed the grave error of reviving fears in relation to the union of the two crowns on the same head.

"My son," said the King of France, on embracing the King of Spain for the last time, "*there are no more Pyrenees!*"[2] This great saying, if it be authentic, does not warrant us in accusing Louis XIV. of having thought only of his family in accepting the testament of Carlos II.; he saw France thenceforth supported by Spain instead of being threatened by it in the rear; he saw the idea of Henri IV. and Richelieu accomplished by other means and under another form, the House of Austria cast down, Southern Europe and America incorporated with France by a close alliance.

Philip V. crossed the Bidassoa, January 22, 1701, and entered Madrid, February 18. The reception of the *French King* by the people attested, at least so far as Castile was concerned, oblivion of the long quarrels that had divided France and Spain, and the revival of the old friendship that united the two nations in the Middle Ages.

Happy news reached the new monarch daily from both worlds. After Milan, Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia, — after Europe, America, and possessions still more remote in the archipelagos of Asia, — the whole monarchy, in fine, submitted to Philip V. without the least opposition. Savoy and most of the Italian States, Denmark, several princes of Germany, then Portugal, then Holland and England themselves (it will soon be seen for what motives and with what reservations) recognized Philip. The eighteenth century, as Saint-Simon says, thus opened for the House of Bourbon "with an over-

[1] In it is remarked the advice not to marry an Austrian princess; to wage no war unless forced to it; to strive to employ only Spaniards in the important governments, and to keep the French in order in Spain. — See *Mémoire remis par Louis XIV. à son petit-fils*, etc., ap. *Œuvres de Louis XIV.*, t. II. p. 460.

[2] See the letters-patent in La Torre, t. II. p. 298. Voltaire, *Siècle de Louis XIV.*, ch. xxviii. The phrase, *There are no more Pyrenees*, is not found in the Memoirs anterior to Voltaire.

flow of unheard-of glory and prosperity." Yet France, sad and disquieted, did not abandon herself to this prosperity as she would have done in those days of intoxication when she felt herself living in the Great King: with a deep-seated malady preying upon her vital organs, she no longer felt the force to sustain the fortune of her masters.

CHAPTER V.

LOUIS XIV. (CONTINUED.)

WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION. War commenced in Lombardy by the Emperor against Spain and France. Repulse of Catinat before Prince Eugene. Renewal of the Triple Alliance between the Emperor, England, and Holland. DEATH OF WILLIAM III. Queen Anne and the States-General of the United Provinces continue his Policy. The *Triumvirate* of MARLBOROUGH, EUGENE, and Heinsius directs the War. Vendôme repairs in Lombardy the Repulses of Catinat. Maritime Disaster of Vigo. Success of Marlborough on the Meuse. Loss of Landau. The Electors of Cologne and Bavaria declare for France. The Diet of Ratisbon declares War on France. Victory of VILLARS at Friedlingen. Revolt of the *Camisards* in Cévennes. Insurrection of Hungary under Rakoczi. Junction of the French and Bavarians in the Heart of Germany. The Mistakes of the Elector of Bavaria cause the Chance of invading Austria to be lost. Taking of Breisach. Victory of Speyer and Recapture of Landau. The Electorate of Cologne invaded by Marlborough. The King of Portugal and the Duke of Savoy go over to the Enemy. Disaster of Hochstadt and Ruin of Bavaria. Landau lost the Second Time. Taking of Gibraltar by the English. Naval Battle of Velez Malaga; Sterile Glory. Conquests of Vendôme in Piedmont. Marlborough threatens France by the Sarre and the Moselle; he is arrested by Villars. Vendôme expels Eugene from Lombardy. Taking of Barcelona by the Allies. Catalonia gives itself to the Austrian Pretender. Philip V. foiled in his Attempt to retake Barcelona. Revolt of Valencia and Aragon. The Allies invade Castile and enter Madrid. Rout of Ramillies. Loss of Brabant and Spanish Flanders. Raising of the Siege of Turin. Evacuation of Upper Italy. Castile expels her Invaders. The Allies unwilling to negotiate. Victory of Almanza. Valencia and Aragon recovered. Loss of Naples. Success of Villars in Germany. Eugene obliged to raise the Siege of Toulon. Loss of Sardinia and Minorca. Defeat of Audenarde. Loss of Lille; France encroached upon. Ruin of the Finances; Frightful Misery of the People. The Reformatory Plans of Vauban rejected by the King. Ministry of Desmaretz. Conferences of the Hague. Immense Concessions offered by Louis XIV. to the Allies in order to purchase Peace. They are not contented with them. War begins anew.

1701–1709.

AT the beginning of 1701, the peoples of Europe saw with sadness the repose take flight in which they had scarcely had time to recover breath. The North was already, since the preceding year, convulsed by a contest in which valor balanced numbers and a hero of eighteen, Charles XII., King of Sweden, triumphantly drove before him the Czar of Russia and the King of Poland. A war

of still vaster proportions was about to set on fire the rest of Europe. Neither the taking possession of the Spanish inheritance by the grandson of Louis XIV., nor even the recognition of him as King of Spain by the greater part of the governments, resolved the European question. The Emperor was decided on a desperate contest to reconquer what he called the inheritance of his House. He had always preserved, in the most critical situations, an obstinate and superstitious faith in the fortune of the House of Austria, and this faith had now a foundation more solid than astrological visions; that is, the genius of a great warrior, of Eugene of Savoy, who had finally revealed himself in the last campaign against the Turks.

This would not have been enough, however, to attack the Bourbon colossus without temerity, had not Leopold regarded himself as certain of powerful supports; but he did not doubt that he would speedily involve England, Holland, and the Germanic Diet in his quarrel. Already several German princes were pledged to him; he had gained the Duke of Hanover by an elector's hat, and a more powerful prince, the Elector of Brandenburg, by a royal crown. By a treaty of November 16, 1700, the Emperor had consented to the erection of ducal Prussia into a kingdom, on condition that the new King should furnish him an aid of ten thousand soldiers. The Elector Frederick III. apprised his courtiers of this important news at the close of a repast, by drinking *to the health of Frederick I., King of Prussia;* then caused himself to be proclaimed King at Königsberg, January 15, 1701. The head of the House of Brandenburg therefore succeeded to royalty shortly after the head of the House of Saxony, but this crown was hereditary and not elective like that of Augustus of Saxony, and the greatness of the Brandenburgs, the way for which had been better paved, was to be better sustained and more durable. Austria was preparing for herself a formidable rival![1]

The Emperor, who had not disbanded his troops since the peace with the Turks, was armed; Holland partly so; England not at all. William III., therefore, after the first angry impulse caused him by the acceptance of the testament of Carlos II., and which he expressed, it is said, by a pointed speech to the ambassador of France,[2] judged it necessary to veer about and suffer Louis XIV.

[1] The Pope protested against this new royalty, not only because ducal Prussia had formerly been wrested from a religious order, the Teutonic Knights, but because "it belonged only to the Holy See to make kings!" Lamberti, *Mém. pour servir à l'hist. du* XVIII. *siècle*, t. I. p. 888, in quarto; The Hague, 1724. These useful Memoirs form a species of diplomatic history in which the documents are intercalated.

[2] As the ambassador Tallard endeavored to persuade William that the choice

to hope for peace. He turned the time thus gained to profit: the House of Commons had caused him great embarrassment in its last sessions; he declared Parliament dissolved (December 29, 1700), and convoked, for February 6, 1701, another which he flattered himself he would find more docile. January 20, 1701, his minister, and the minister of the States-General at Copenhagen, signed a treaty with Denmark that put twelve thousand Danish troops in the pay of England and Holland; analogous compacts were negotiated with the Palatinate, Brandenburg, Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, etc.

It was between France and Holland that the dispute was to be first opened: there was here not only a general question of European equilibrium, but a special and immediate question of frontiers. At the first news of the acceptance of the testament, the States-General had addressed to Louis XIV. a memorial in which they entreated him to remember the engagements which he had contracted with them for the maintenance of the peace of Europe, "which doubtless was about to be disturbed, . . . unless some just and reasonable satisfaction should be given to the Emperor."[1] The policy indicated in this memorial was the same as that decided on by William III. The testament of Carlos II., and the subjection of the whole Spanish monarchy to the successor designated by the late King, had made a new situation which it was very necessary to take into account. William, and the statesmen whom he had indoctrinated with his views in England and Holland, understood that it was no longer possible seriously to demand the treaty of partition as it was, and aimed to transpose, so to say, its provisions, that is, to cause Italy to be given to the Archduke Charles, to cause Belgium to be occupied by the Dutch and the English, and to obtain the condition that the Bourbon government of Spain should grant no commercial privilege in the Indies to the French that was refused to other nations.[2] This compromise was, in great part, that in which the war was to end after many years of calamities![3] But it was impossible to arrive at it at the outset; Louis XIV., as William knew, was pledged in honor to enter into, if not to carry to the end, a

made by Carlos II. was the only means of maintaining the equilibrium of Europe; "Sir," said William, "I beg you not to trouble yourself so much to justify the conduct of your master: the Most Christian King could not contradict himself; he has acted as usual." La Torre, t. II. p. 250.

[1] La Torre, t. II. p. 216.

[2] This same year (August, 1701), the deplorable privilege of the Slave-Trade in the Spanish Colonies was granted to a French company.

[3] La Torre, t. II. pp. 216 and 247.

struggle to defend the impossible integrity of the Spanish monarchy.

December 4, 1700, the ambassador of France at the Hague presented to the States-General the reply of the King: the French memorial, well reasoned but too haughty in form (the States-General were exhorted in it *to strive to merit* the continuance *of the favors and protection of the King*), justified the acceptance of the testament on the ground of the refusal by the Emperor to accept the treaty of partition and of the certainty that the succession, if it had been refused at Paris, would have been immediately accepted at Vienna.[1] The King decidedly rejected all idea of partition. The States-General did not reply till January 15. They proposed a conference to provide for the maintenance of the general peace and of their own safety, but made no explanations in regard to the accession of Philip V. The position was a strange one. The Dutch, in virtue of their treaties with Spain, kept garrisons in numerous Belgian places, that is, in places belonging to a king whose title they did not acknowledge. This state of things could not be prolonged. Louis XIV. had only to choose between two courses: either to gain the Dutch by granting them full military possession of the places which they regarded as their *barrier*, or to expel them from these places as quickly as possible. Would Louis have succeeded in obtaining their neutrality by granting them the *barrier* and by giving them guaranties against all French monopoly in America? This is very doubtful: it was enough for the interests of Holland; but it was not enough for the political system of William, who would have well known how to prevent the Dutch from isolating themselves. Louis took the second course. Plans were concerted with the Elector of Bavaria, the Governor of Belgium, who showed a disposition to attach himself without reserve to the Franco-Spanish cause. In the night of February 5–6, French troops were introduced by the Spanish governors into all the places where Dutch garrisons were found. The ambassador of Spain at the Hague signified to the States-General that the calling in of French *auxiliaries* had been caused by the menacing armaments of the United Provinces and by their delay to recognize Philip V. The States-General feared something worse. Their troops had been the object of no violence; but they were retained some days in the Belgian places, as if it had been designed to keep them prisoners. Counsels of this kind were not lacking Louis XIV.: he was urged to seize the opportunity to impose terms on

[1] La Torre, t. II. pp. 216 and 247.

Holland. Louis would not commit a violation of the law of nations, which, besides its odiousness, would have deeply wounded a useful ally, the Elector of Bavaria. This prince considered his honor pledged to send back safe and free the troops that the States-General had confided to him. The Dutch garrisons had therefore the liberty to return to their country; but, at the same time, Louis XIV. earnestly urged the States-General to explain themselves. The States decided to recognize the King of Spain, while repeating that they were ready to negotiate for the peace of Europe and for their private safety, but in concert with England (February 22). They demanded provisionally that the French should evacuate the Catholic Netherlands as the Dutch had done. Louis XIV. promised to withdraw his troops as soon as Holland should cease her armaments (March 5). This was a kind of vicious circle. Already the States-General had required the English government eventually to lend them the aid promised by the defensive compact of 1677, which remained in vigor between the two maritime powers (March 2).

The new English Parliament had opened in February. William had found himself considerably embarrassed on the occasion of the elections; the Whigs had irritated him by their attacks on the royal authority;[1] the Tories, by way of compensation, were little inclined to the war against France. William had resolved to return to the Tories, in the hope of taking advantage of their monarchical docility and of drawing them on, despite themselves, to warlike measures. He did not succeed in this without difficulty. Parliament consented that the King should come to an understanding with Holland for the mutual safety of the two nations, and secured by a decisive measure the succession in the Protestant line. Anne Stuart, Princess of Denmark, heir to the throne according to the act of 1689, had lost her only son, the young Duke of Gloucester; Parliament passed a law that, if the Princess Anne should die without issue, and King William should also have left none,[2] their rights should pass to the Princess Sophia, Dowager-Electress of Hanover,[3] and daughter of a daughter of James I., and that whoever should be called to the crown should conform to the com-

[1] They had recently exacted from him harsh measures against the Papists, who were interdicted to possess lands (1699); this was not seriously executed.

[2] The act of 1689 had provided that, if William should leave children by another wife than Queen Mary, these children should be called after the Princess Anne and her heirs.

[3] She was widow of Ernest Augustus of Hanover, for whom the Emperor had created the ninth electorate, and who had transmitted to his son George this still contested title.

munion of the Anglican Church. Wholly Tory as it was in the majority, Parliament, to satisfy public opinion, added to this bill new limitations, for the most part very wise, of the royal prerogative. It decreed, 1st, that, if the crown should fall to any prince who was not a native of England, the nation should not be obliged to engage in any war for the defence of foreign territory; 2d, that the future King should not leave the three kingdoms without the consent of Parliament; 3d, that thenceforth the members of the privy council should sign the resolutions which they had approved; 4th, that no foreigner should be eligible thenceforth to occupy a post, royal office, or seat in Parliament; 5th, that no person holding a salaried office, or receiving a pension from the crown, should be eligible to membership in the House of Commons. These resolutions, which William sanctioned, not without displeasure, were a new advance in the English Constitution. The two Houses then pronounced vehemently against both treaties of partition, which promised to France the dominion of the Mediterranean, and the House of Commons went so far as to commence prosecutions against the ministers who had negotiated them. This conduct of the English Parliament justified Louis XIV. for not having adhered to a compact which would have certainly remained unexecuted. It is true that this exasperation would doubtless not have taken place if the question had been concerning the States of Savoy instead of the two Sicilies.[1]

Diplomacy proceeded in the same direction with the parliamentary debates. England and Holland had just taken a first step in concert. March 22, these two powers had together demanded of Louis XIV.: 1st, a reasonable satisfaction for the Emperor; 2d, that France should withdraw her troops from the Catholic Netherlands and should never have power again to send them thither; 3d, that the chief places of the Netherlands should be remitted to Dutch and English garrisons, so that Spain should retain nothing longer there in reality but useful domain; 4th, that the Dutch and English should share all the advantages granted to the French in the Spanish possessions. Louis XIV. did not reply. William feared that the answer would be an immediate attack on Holland. April 19, his ambassador in France received official notice of the accession of Philip V. This was a formal demand for satisfaction. William was not ready. He resigned himself to reply to *his very dear brother the King of Spain* by a letter of congratulation on his happy accession;[2] but he only continued the more actively his

[1] Lamberti, t. I. p. 499. [2] La Torre, t. III. p. 108.

preparations to endeavor to wrest from the new monarch the greatest possible part of his monarchy. On a second demand from the States-General, who were arming with all their force, and who had begun to inundate Holland almost as in 1672, the House of Lords, become more Whig than the House of Commons, owing to the promotions made by William, invited the King to contract a new alliance with the United Provinces and the Emperor, "*for the same purpose as that of* 1689." This was more than William himself claimed; for the Great Alliance of 1689 promised the entire succession of Spain to the House of Austria. The House of Commons, urged, menaced by popular opinion, finally engaged also to sustain the King "in all the alliances that he might contract for the purpose of limiting the exorbitant power of France." The gold distributed by Louis XIV. among the members of the House of Commons had not produced much effect. The session was closed, June 24, after Parliament had granted the raising of thirty thousand seamen and two millions seven hundred thousand pounds sterling. William sent to Holland the aid of ten thousand soldiers and twenty ships promised by the treaties, and repaired to the Hague himself in the beginning of July. The following month, the French ambassador, D'Avaux, took leave of the States-General by a memorial which was a veritable declaration of rupture. The States replied in moderate terms, but without abandoning their ground. The recall of the French ambassador was a mistake. It was necessary either to fight or to negotiate; during several months neither was done. Since it was not wished to take the offensive, despite all the advantages it offered, it was the more proper to preserve diplomatic relations at the Hague, as it was then possible to foresee an event of the greatest importance, — the approaching end of King William. The health of this prince was completely ruined, and it was only by force of moral energy that he sustained his part, decided, like Richelieu, to die on his feet, the reins of Europe in his hands.

Whilst the opponents were mutually preparing and observing each other in the Netherlands, they were acting in Italy. The Italian States had seen with affright the coming shock that was to crush them between France and Austria. The new Pope Clement XI. (Albani), elected November 23, 1700, in the place of Innocent XII., had been one of the authors of the famous opinion given to Carlos II. in favor of the House of France. Well disposed towards the Franco-Spanish cause, but desiring above all the peace of Italy, he would have gladly established the neutrality of the

peninsula by a confederation of the Italian States, into which the Spanish possessions of Italy would enter, until the Houses of Bourbon and Austria should have accommodated their differences. He lacked the spirit of leadership and the energy to realize his good intentions and to rouse the Italian States from their timid inertia. The Italian governments knew not how to take any collective decision: some remained in isolated neutrality, that is, destined to be the prey of the conqueror, whichever it might be; others engaged secretly with one or the other of the belligerent parties. The Duke of Modena treated with the Emperor; the Dukes of Savoy and Mantua with France and Spain. The Duke of Savoy had hesitated much: the hand of his second daughter, the younger sister of the Duchess of Burgundy, had been asked for King Philip V., and the title of generalissimo of the two crowns in Italy had been offered him with a large subsidy. He accepted, less sensible perhaps to these advantages than to the fear of seeing his domains once more invaded by the French. It was impossible to be perfectly sure of him without granting him a part of Milanais; he indicated this clearly enough; but a deaf ear was turned to him, and Louis was forced to repent of it!

The Emperor, however, had drawn the sword without listening either to the Pope or to Venice, who besought him to suspend his attack on Milanais; on the news of the death of Carlos II., Leopold had claimed this duchy as a fief devolving on the Empire by the decease of the Catholic King without direct heirs. In the month of June, he published a manifesto in which he established the rights of his house to the whole succession of Spain. At this epoch, military operations were already in full activity.

Two great generals, Eugene and Catinat, were face to face, but in conditions very different from each other. Eugene, in all the lustre of a youth ripe before its time, uniting audacity and activity to coolness and reflection in an admirable proportion, had at his disposal only moderate forces, but disposed of them as an absolute master. He had conquered independence by his glorious disobedience at Zenta, where, giving battle despite the prohibition of the cabinet of Vienna, he had driven before him the Sultan in person, and exterminated the Grand-Vizier with twenty thousand Turks. Aulic routine had yielded to the ascendency of genius, a victory more difficult than that of Zenta; the Emperor had resigned himself to let Eugene thenceforth conquer in his own way. Catinat, on the contrary, was old, weary, worn out in body; a great sorrow of heart — the death of a brother on whom had been concentrated

all his domestic affections — had taken away from him something of his wonted elasticity. His hands, moreover, were bound by the injunction to subordinate his operations to the defence of Milanais, not in his own way, but in that of the governor of Milan, the Prince de Vaudemont. The rank of generalissimo, granted to the Duke of Savoy, was to be a still greater embarrassment, as soon as this prince joined the army. France was about to experience in her turn the inconveniences of coalitions, so often experimented upon by her enemies. This was not all; not only was it necessary to share the command in the field, but to depend upon a minister who sent his orders from three hundred leagues distant; and what a minister! Barbezieux had just died (January 5, 1701), at the moment when he began to be efficient, and the King had conceived the unheard-of, incomprehensible idea of putting the war in addition to the finances on the shoulders of Chamillart, already overburdened by the comptroller-generalship. It was such a man that bore a burden under which Colbert or Louvois would have bent — such a man that drew up the plans of campaign with Louis the Great, and was about to dictate the law to a Catinat and a Vendôme!

The Imperialists could not descend into Milanais without traversing the territory of the Venetians or that of the Grisons: this latter road being very difficult, and the Grisons moreover not seeming disposed to open their mountains to foreign armies, the Venetians, with a little vigor, might have averted from Italy the scourge of war: they had only to close their territory to the belligerent armies and to declare that if either of the parties presumed to invade them, they would join the other. They did not do so; they refused to the Emperor the route of Friuli, and resolved to close their towns to both parties, while leaving the route of the Adige and the level country open. This singular *neutrality* was wholly to the advantage of the aggressors, and the Venetian government inclined, in fact, towards the Emperor, contrary to its interests, and through an ill-founded fear of the so-called *universal monarchy*. Everything announcing, therefore, that the Imperialists would descend by the Adige, Catinat, it is said, proposed to the King to anticipate them by pushing on directly to Trent and occupying the debouches of the German Tyrol in order to prevent the army of the enemy from forming itself in the territory of Trent.[1] The King did not

[1] *Mém. de Saint-Hilaire*, t. II. p. 246. We have found nothing on this point in the important documents published by General Pelet; *Mém. militaires relatifs à la Succession d'Espagne*, t. I. These documents, extracted from the correspondence of the court and the generals, are, in some sort, the official narrative of the campaigns of 1701–1709.

authorize this admirable movement, and wished nowhere to assume the offensive, as if the Emperor's claim to Milanais had not been a sufficient provocation. The moderation of the Great King became as injurious as his pride had been to him. Louis only ordered the occupation of the source of the Adige on Venetian territory, in order to cut off from the enemy the departure from the territory of Trent. Catinat, having arrived at Milan April 7, took command of the *auxiliary army* that Louis had sent into Lombardy. Mantua had just received a Franco-Spanish garrison, with the consent of its Duke, and was about to be the point of support of the combined army; but this advantage was counterbalanced by the necessity of dividing itself for the purpose of defending, at the same time, the territory of Mantua and Milanais. Catinat repaired to Rivoli and barred the debouches of the territory of Trent, between Lake Garda and the Adige. The Venetians not wishing to deliver to any one the town or the bridge of Verona, Eugene, who had massed his army at leisure in the vicinity of Trent and Roveredo, saw the route closed before him. He made himself new ones. He opened passes with prodigious efforts in the mountains that separate the territory of Trent from the territory of Vicentin and that of Verona, unexpectedly descended with twenty-five thousand men into the plains of Verona, and hurled a body of cavalry towards the Lower Adige (end of May, beginning of June).

Thenceforth the campaign was ill begun. Catinat should have had twice the forces of Eugene to be able at once to follow the movements of his adversary towards the Lower Adige, and to guard the sources of this river and the debouches of Tyrol, as the governor of Milanais urgently demanded. Now, the Spaniards had furnished only a handful of soldiers, and not a battalion from Piedmont had yet joined the army. Catinat, although superior in numbers, was not enough so to defend at all points the great bow of the Adige, — a bow of which his adversary held the string. Finally, the connivance of the Venetians with the Imperialists, always well informed and well guided, whilst the French were very imperfectly so, rendered the situation very embarrassing. The movements of Catinat and his correspondence revealed the uncertainty and the discouragement. Eugene, on his part, acted with extraordinary precision and celerity. In the course of June, he possessed himself of the Adige at Castel Baldo, of the Tartaro, which communicates with the Adige by the Blanco Canal, at Canda, of the Po at Ficcarolo, and threw bridges across these

three watercourses. Catinat fell back on the Lower Adige and the Po, in the direction of Legnano, Carpi, and Ostiglia. Eugene instantly crossed the Blanco Canal with fifteen thousand men and took the French detachment posted at Carpi, on the Adige, in the rear: the French defended themselves valiantly; their dragoons even beat back the cuirassiers of the Emperor; but it was necessary to yield to numbers, to evacuate Carpi and even Legnano (July 9). Catinat, who was at Ostiglia during the action, seeing his line broken, fell back on the Mincio. The Piedmontese had finally joined him, and the Duke of Savoy reached the camp July 25; but the great numerical superiority due to this reinforcement helped him much less than the too just mistrust excited by the Duke of Savoy embarrassed him. Catinat was soon persuaded that this strange *generalissimo* only aimed at preventing the army from conquering. Eugene, however, continued to advance; July 28, he crossed the Mincio below Peschiera, then, acting more and more boldly against the ordinary rules of war, rapidly gained the left bank of the Oglio at Palazzuolo. Nothing remained but this river between him and the Spanish territory. Catinat returned to the right bank of the Oglio in order to cover Milanais.

The disappointment of Louis XIV. was extreme: Catinat had disappointed all his hopes, and he would not consider the circumstances that excused this general's want of success; he only saw Eugene forcing, with thirty thousand men, passes defended by nearly fifty thousand. He resolved to replace the unfortunate general instantly, and saw nothing better to do than "to send Villeroi as a hero to repair the faults of Catinat."[1] This was a new sign of that vertigo which had travestied Chamillart into a minister of finances and war. Marshal de Villeroi had commanded in chief but a single time, in 1695, and had given proof of an inefficiency equalling his presumption. He reached the army, August 22, talking only of driving the Imperialists out of Italy quicker than they had been suffered to enter. Catinat received, without complaint, the blow that fell upon him: he did not quit the service; he descended from the first to the second rank with a philosophic resignation that astonished and touched Villeroi himself. The *hero* of the court was soon seen at work. Villeroi threw his army across the Oglio without obstruction, and led it directly to the camp of the enemy, strongly established between canals, and supported by the little Venetian city of Chiari. The Duke of Savoy approved of immediate attack. Catinat had only to submit. The

[1] Voltaire, *Siècle de Louis XIV.*, ch. XVIII.

attack was made without having reconnoitred the position. Villeroi was persuaded that Eugene would not expect him and that he would only have to deal with a rear-guard. He found the whole Imperial army well intrenched before him, and Chiari delivered to the enemy by the Venetian commandant, who had feigned to yield to force. The attack, in which the troops vainly displayed great courage, was repulsed with the loss of three or four thousand men (September 1). Catinat and the Duke of Savoy had both exposed their lives again and again, to sustain an enterprise which the one had discouraged, and of which the other had desired the miscarriage and, it is affirmed, had even given notice to the enemy. A strange character was that of Duke Victor Amadeus! His life, like that of his subjects, was what cost him least to risk in his combinations at once adventurous and Macchiavellian.

Villeroi, rendered more circumspect by this reverse, posted himself in a good encampment at Urago, near Chiari, and there held the enemy long in check. Despite the success of Chiari, Eugene, who had plunged into a country where he had neither magazines nor fortified towns, could not have maintained himself by his own resources alone in the heart of Upper Italy; but the good-will of the population supplied whatever he lacked: the Venetians furnished him provisions, guides, and information through a false policy; the Milanese did the same, through weariness of Spanish dominion, and through hope of gaining by a change of masters, — the delusion of peoples that dare not aspire to be free. After more than two months had passed without important action, the Franco-Spaniards, ill provisioned by the country which they were defending against its will, decamped first (November 12), and moved back to the other bank of the Oglio, between this river and the Adda; then, the enemy descending, on his side, between the Oglio and the Mincio, Villeroi, whom the Duke of Savoy had just quitted, cantoned his army before Cremona, endeavoring to maintain his communications with Mantua; but Eugene established himself at Borgo Forte, on the Po, between Mantua and the French army, and secured a fortified town on the south side of the Po, by gaining the Princess di Mirandola, who had received into her city a small Franco-Spanish garrison, and who traitorously delivered it to the Imperialists.

Such was the end of this deplorable campaign, in which the reputation of the most renowned general that remained to France had been lost; — a grievous presage, and one well calculated to encourage declared, and to decide uncertain, enemies! Louis XIV.

did not disguise from himself the scope of these first reverses. October 31, he wrote to Marsin, his ambassador at Madrid, that Spain contributing almost nothing to the defence of her possessions, and France not being able to do everything by herself alone without being ruined, it would be necessary to decide on territorial concessions in order to have peace. He had himself entertained, moreover, the thought of making the first encroachment on the so much promised integrity of the Spanish monarchy; the minister Torci had recently consulted the ambassador Marsin on the project of demanding from Philip V. the cession of Belgium to France, as an indemnity for the expenses that France would have to incur in order to defend the rest of the Spanish possessions: Marsin strongly discouraged this idea, which would have wounded Spain and have rendered peace impossible with the maritime powers. The cabinet of Versailles did not insist.[1]

September 7, before information could have been received of Villeroi's ill success at Chiari, a secret treaty had been signed at the Hague between the plenipotentiaries of the Emperor, England, and Holland, to "obtain for His Imperial Majesty a just and reasonable satisfaction, . . . and for the King of Great Britain and the States-General a sufficient security for their lands and countries, navigation and commerce." The allies engaged to make "for this end the greatest efforts to conquer the Spanish Netherlands, as naturally forming a dike and barrier between France and the United Provinces; to conquer Milanais, as a fief of the Empire, serving for the security of the hereditary provinces of His Imperial Majesty; and to conquer Naples and Sicily, the islands of the Mediterranean, and the Spanish possessions on the side of Tuscany, as being able to serve for the same end, and for the navigation and commerce of the subjects of His Britannic Majesty and of the United Provinces. The King of Great Britain and the States-General should have power to conquer, for the utility of the said navigation and commerce, the countries and towns of the Spanish Indies, and all that they should be able to take there should be for them and should remain theirs. The war commenced, none of the allies could treat without the others, nor without having taken just measures, first, to prevent the kingdoms of France and Spain from

[1] *Mém. de Noailles*, p. 97. Flassan, *Hist. de la diplomatie française*, t. IV. p. 219. *Œuvres de Louis XIV.*, t. VI. p. 74. According to Louville, this idea was not immediately abandoned; the consent of the council of Spain (*despacho*) was even obtained, and they receded only through fear of losing the alliance of the Elector of Bavaria, who laid claim to Belgium (June, 1702). — *Mém. de Louville*, t. I. p. 249. Louville was the confidential agent of Louis XIV. to Philip V.

ever being united under one and the same king; second, to prevent the French from ever making themselves masters of the Spanish Indies, or from sending ships thither to engage there directly or indirectly in commerce; third, to secure to the subjects of His Britannic Majesty and of the United Provinces the commercial privileges which they enjoyed in all the Spanish States under the late King." [1]

This was a new *treaty of partition*, but one in which, this time, the two maritime powers which had declaimed so much against the ambition of France took their share with almost cynical avidity. William III., who had conducted all, had taken care not to endeavor to exhaust England and Holland in order to restore the Spanish monarchy intact to the Emperor: his final condition was, as we see, to reduce Philip V. to Spain proper, and to secure to England and Holland the commercial use of all that had been the Spanish monarchy, with important military and maritime positions against France. William had omitted but one thing, which was to arrange another partition in the partition, — that between England and Holland, — a work the most difficult of all!

The war did not begin this year in the Netherlands or on the Rhine. The Emperor and his allies were not yet in a condition to attack Belgium, and Louis XIV. occupied himself only with the military reorganization of this country, where finances, troops, fortified towns, were in the last stage of decay. There were in all but ten thousand troops; the cavalry was not mounted; the arsenals and magazines were empty. France was obliged to furnish everything, — money, munitions, and soldiers. The fortified places were repaired as well as possible, and the entire country was covered by an immense line of ditches, interspersed with redoubts, which extended from the Meuse to the sea, seventy leagues in length: a gigantic work, which satisfied and reassured the Belgian people, but the real utility of which was much controverted among military men. Beyond this line, through Spanish Gelderland, strongly occupied, a hand was extended to the Electorate of Cologne. The Elector of Bavaria had drawn his brother of Cologne into the interests *of the two crowns:* a singular change of policy! This was that same Clement of Bavaria whom the Emperor had made Elector of Cologne, despite France, and whose elevation to the Electorate had been the immediate cause of the war of 1688.[2] Louis

[1] La Torre, t. III. p. 185.

[2] The Elector of Cologne had signed a secret treaty with the King, February 18; the Elector of Bavaria signed his, March 9. The King consented that the two

XIV., moreover, did not exactly seek offensive alliances in this direction; he did not desire to carry hostilities to the Rhine or beyond the Rhine, and what he wished of Germany was that she would preserve neutrality between him and the House of Austria. It was by agreement with him that the Elector of Bavaria had gone into his duchy to negotiate an act of neutrality, which was signed, August 31, between the electoral circle of the Rhine and the circles of Bavaria, Swabia, Franconia, and the Upper Rhine. The Germanic Diet seemed at first disposed to take the same attitude; but the Emperor, seconded by the energetic Anglo-Batavian diplomacy, made violent and obstinate efforts to change this too pacific disposition, and to rekindle the passions of 1689. The Electors of Treves and Mayence were comprised in the *union of neutrals*, as members of the electoral circle of the Rhine. Louis XIV. had desired that the electorate of Cologne and the bishopric of Liege, with the circle of Westphalia, on which they depended, might enter this association; but the archiepiscopal chapter of Cologne, conflicting with its archbishop and wholly Austrian, opposed this, and protested against the *union of neutrals*. The Dutch troops and those of the Elector-Palatine threatened to invade the Electorate in order to sustain the chapter and city of Cologne; the Elector summoned the French into the towns of the Electorate and to Liege (November, 1701). War was thenceforth inevitable on the Lower Rhine, and it became probable that the *union of neutrals* would not be long in dissolving.

General war had become inevitable at the end of the year; it had not become absolutely so till the month of September. Holland would certainly have hesitated to take the initiative, if England had not urged her, and England herself hesitated. The Tories, despite the warlike demonstrations of the last session, preserved their repugnance to war, and the powerful class of manufacturers and merchants hesitated between their antipathy to France and the recollection of the terrible losses inflicted on commerce by the war of the League of Augsburg. William feared lest he might have great difficulty in obtaining the means of executing the agreements of the new *triple alliance*, and, moreover, it was now certain that William would not long direct the coalition; he was struggling in vain against the phthisis that was visibly hurrying him to the

Electors should not declare themselves offensively before having raised sufficient forces, and engaged not to make peace till the Electors had been again put in possession of all that the war had taken from them. *Hist. abrégée des Traités de paix*, etc., by De Koch, revised by Schœll, t. II. p. 22.

grave. The approaching death of William might profoundly modify the policy of Europe.

Meanwhile, the father-in-law and rival of William, the dethroned King James II., was seized at Saint-Germain with an attack of apoplexy, which suffered him to prolong his death-struggle but a few days. A question of the greatest gravity was raised in the council of Louis XIV.: Should France acknowledge to the son of James II. that title of King of England which the father had preserved without reclamation since Louis XIV. had recognized King William? The Dauphin and the Duke of Burgundy insisted on the affirmative, in the name of the dynastic principle; the ministers of state forcibly pronounced in the negative, in the name of the interests of France. The King resigned himself at first to follow the advice of his ministers, and to sacrifice his inclination to his true duties. But scarcely had he left the council, when the Queen of England, the wife of James II., sought him at the house of Madame de Maintenon, and conjured him, weeping, not to be less generous towards her son than towards her husband, not to refuse him "a simple title, the sole relic of so much greatness." Madame de Maintenon joined her importunate prayers to those of the fallen Queen. Louis yielded. He announced to the dying James II. that he would recognize *James III.* A fit of sensibility in Madame de Maintenon, so rarely led by sentiment, was more fatal perhaps to France than all her interested calculations.[1]

James II. died September 10, and royal honors were immediately paid to his son. Louis XIV. essayed in vain to lessen the effect of this act by a species of manifesto, in which he declared his intention to observe the fourth article of the Treaty of Ryswick, that is, "not to trouble King William III. in the possession of his States." At the news of the recognition of James III., William recalled the ambassador which he still had in France, and expelled from England the *chargé d'affaires* of Louis XIV. An explosion of anger burst forth throughout Great Britain.[2] Addresses were sent from all parts to William against the King of France, "who dared to offer to the English nation the affront of pretending to impose on it a king." William thenceforth was sure of England. He became reconciled to the Whigs, and returned from Holland to England in November, after having regulated with the States-

[1] Voltaire, *Siècle de Louis XIV.*, chap. xvii. *Mém. de Berwick*, t. I. pp. 169, 498, note 4.

[2] The extra taxes or prohibitions that had just been established in France on English merchandise, in response to the hostile demonstrations of William III., had already made the mercantile classes very ill disposed.

General and the ambassador of Leopold the contingents of the coming campaign. The Emperor promised to keep under pay ninety thousand soldiers; Holland, one hundred and two thousand! William, for the second time within a year, declared Parliament dissolved, and summoned another at the close of December. The Whigs triumphed by a few votes, and the Tories abandoned themselves to the new national impulse, in order not to lose all influence. William opened the session by a violent and warlike speech. Both Houses replied by addresses still more violent. The House of Lords declared that there would be no security "till the usurper of the Spanish monarchy had been brought to reason." The House of Commons unanimously voted a contingent of fifty thousand soldiers and thirty-five thousand sailors, besides subsidies for the Danish and German auxiliaries; they demanded that an article interdicting peace with France till reparation should be made for the outrage committed against the King and nation of England should be inserted in all the treaties of alliance. A bill of attainder was issued by both Houses against the pretended James III.

Everything was therefore prepared according to the wishes of William; but he was not to behold the success of his plans. March 4, 1702, a fall from a horse ruptured his diseased lung and hastened his end. The obstinate adversary of Louis the Great expired March 19, at fifty-one years of age, absorbed, in death itself, to use the forcible expression of Saint-Simon, by the thought of the political system into which he had thrown his whole soul, and consoled by the certainty that this system would survive him.[1] He had secured a successor less passionate, but as formidable as he in negotiations, and more formidable in war. This was John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, who had recently betrayed him,[2] but in whom he had recognized the only genius capable of continuing his work; by making him the most powerful man in England, he hoped to obtain from him a posthumous fidelity founded on interest. He had therefore made him, in 1701, general of the English troops in Holland and plenipotentiary to the States-General. The wife of Marlborough did the rest. Anne Stuart, Princess of Denmark, was wholly governed by Sarah Jennings, Duchess of Marlborough. When Anne ascended the throne, Lord and Lady Marlborough reigned in her name. The hopes that the French government had

[1] He left to England, to sustain this system, such naval forces as the nation had never possessed: two hundred and eighty-two men-of-war, one hundred and thirty of them ships of the line. — Sainte-Croix, t. II. p. 90.

[2] See *ante*, p. 172.

been able to found on the known sympathies of Anne Stuart for the Tories and for her exiled family, were speedily dissipated. Queen Anne declared to Parliament that she should follow in all things the policy of the late King. She created Marlborough commander-in-chief of the land-forces. Louis XIV. was not more fortunate on the side of Holland. The republican revolution that he had often undertaken to excite against William was effected without difficulty or agitation. William had uselessly endeavored, a little before his death, to cause his cousin, Frison of Nassau, already hereditary stadtholder of Friesland and Groningen, to be designated as his successor in the stadtholdership of the Five Provinces (Holland, Zealand, Utrecht, Gelderland, and Overyssel); the stadtholdership was abrogated, *de facto* and by extinction, in the Five Provinces, and the government was reëstablished on the basis on which it had been in the time of the De Witts; but this internal change reacted in no way on the external policy; the principal influence passed to the Pensionary of Holland, Daniel Heinsius, a creature of William, and indoctrinated with his system. Eugene, Marlborough, and Heinsius formed what was called the *triumvirate* of the coalition. The States-General, while resuming their republican liberty, were indignant that an agent of Louis XIV. should have presumed to remind them that the death of William "had restored the republic to itself"; they protested that they were faithful to the principles of that great prince, and repelled every proposition for separate negotiation (April 8, 1702).[1]

The anti-French policy also prevailed in Germany. The *union of neutrals* was broken and replaced by a new association of five circles, into which the circle of Austria entered, and which the circle of Bavaria, which persisted in its refusal to espouse the Imperial cause, quitted (March 16–20, 1702). The five circles acceded, March 22, to the Great Alliance of the Emperor, England, and Holland. The Austrian party had equally the ascendency in the North. The King of Prussia, the Elector of Hanover, and the Duke of Lüneburg-Zell obliged the Dukes of Brunswick, Wolfenbüttel, and Saxe-Gotha to disband the troops that they had levied on account of France, and to abandon the French party.

It was necessary to be resigned to the necessity of sustaining a universal war. A new levy of a hundred battalions attested that France was preparing for it.

Military operations had been resumed in Italy, in the middle of the winter, by a great, sudden blow on the part of Eugene, who

[1] *Mém. de La Torre*, t. IV. pp. 50–59.

had hoped to decide in advance the fate of the campaign in a single night. The French troops were cantoned between the Oglio, the Po, and the Adda, with the headquarters at Cremona. The Imperialists were extended along both banks of the Po as far as the territory of Parma; the Duke of Modena had just declared in their favor, and delivered to them the important post of Brescelia. Eugene conceived the project of capturing the headquarters of the French at Cremona. He gained over a Cremonese priest, whose house, situated near the rampart, had a cellar communicating with an old aqueduct that debouched into the country. He set out from Ostiano with eight thousand men without baggage, and went straight from the Oglio to Cremona, whilst another corps of Imperialists marched on this city by the south bank of the Po, with orders to enter by the pontoon-bridge that had been laid down by the French. Eugene arrived in the middle of the night and dispatched a detachment through the aqueduct, which seized two gates and admitted the rest of the assailants: Villeroi, starting from his sleep, and hastening to discover the cause of the uproar, was taken prisoner on entering the street; the Imperialists were at the same time on the ramparts and in the heart of the city; everything seemed ended. . . . Everything was beginning. A regiment assembled by chance for a morning exercise, gave the signal of resistance: the French troops, surprised, cut to pieces, surrounded, were not for a moment panic-stricken; they rallied, barrack by barrack, street by street; they everywhere took the offensive. Had the enemy's corps that was coming from the other side of the Po appeared at this moment, the French would have been overwhelmed; but this corps was delayed some hours; when it finally showed itself, the brave garrison had reconquered, at the cost of a sea of blood, a part of the ramparts, and had preserved the gate of the Po: an officer ordered the bridge to be broken down, and thus rendered the junction of the two corps of the enemy impossible. Eugene saw the moment approaching when he in his turn would be surrounded and taken like Villeroi. He only had time to beat a retreat, abandoning Cremona to the French, but carrying off their general. This was a great service rendered to the French army (February 1, 1702.)

In fact, it was very necessary to replace Villeroi. The King sent Vendôme. The army received with lively joy the conqueror of Barcelona. Vendôme had quickly become the most popular of our generals, by his marvellous art of winning the soldiers, and by the familiar manners which he had inherited from his uncle Beau-

fort, the favorite of the populace (*the king of the Markets*). On reaching Milan (February 18), the new general found that Eugene, despite the check at Cremona, had drawn some advantage from his enterprise. The French troops that guarded the posts on the Lower Oglio had abandoned them to succor Cremona. The governor of Milanais, Vaudemont, had then removed the general quarters behind the Adda, and had made Cremona, formerly the centre, the headquarters, leaving only advanced posts on the Central Oglio. Eugene had therefore occupied the Lower Oglio, on the north of the Po, and the open country of the territory of Parma, on the south of this river, — the Duke of Parma, who inclined towards France, having refused his towns to the Imperialists and declared himself neutral under the protection of the Pope, his suzerain. Eugene continued to blockade Mantua.

Vendôme began by driving the Imperialists from the territory of Parma; but he needed time to reorganize the army before marching to the aid of Mantua. Louis XIV. agreed with Philip V., who had just disembarked at Naples, in endeavoring to make the operations in Italy decisive, and had sent to the Po twelve thousand veterans, eighteen thousand recruits,[1] and abundant supplies. Eugene, on the contrary, was somewhat neglected this year by the cabinet of Vienna, and sacrificed to the Imperial army of the Rhine, commanded by the King of the Romans. Vendôme put himself in motion May 4: he deceived Eugene by skilful marches and countermarches, crossed the Upper Oglio (May 15), and flanked the positions of the Imperialists. Eugene was obliged to abandon the whole country on the west of the Mincio, save the Mantuan island called the Seraglio, formed by the Mincio, the Po, and the Great Canal or Fossa Maëstra; he intrenched himself on this island (May 23), while keeping troops and places on the south of the Po, but could not hinder Vendôme from raising the blockade of Mantua, and found himself in danger of being blockaded in his turn on the Seraglio: the French were greatly superior in forces. They did not immediately use their advantages. The King of Spain was to come from Naples to put himself at the head of the army. Was it not necessary, according to monarchical customs, to wait for the monarch at any cost, in order to reserve for him the honor of success?[2] Philip V. and

[1] These were at least the official figures, but it is probable that a considerable deduction should be made from them.

[2] Philip V. had expressly sent to Vendôme "to wait for him to attack the enemy." See the letter ap. Dangeau, t. II. p. 888.

Vendôme did not join each other at Cremona until July 12. A small corps of two thousand Spanish soldiers was finally seen to take part in the defence of the Spanish possessions; this was, besides a few thousand men employed in garrisons, the whole contingent of Spain!

Vendôme had left nearly half of the army strongly intrenched before the Fossa Maëstra, under command of Prince de Vaudemont; the other half, under Philip V. and Vendôme, crossed the Po, entered the territory of Modena, and pushed on without stopping to begin siege-operations. Vendôme in person, at the head of the vanguard, overthrew on the Tassone three thousand of the enemy's cavalry (July 26); Reggio and Modena opened their gates. The aim of Vendôme was attained: Eugene, seeing his positions overrun and his supplies endangered, evacuated his camp on the Seraglio and crossed to the south of the Po, August 3, only keeping Borgo Forte on the north bank.

The first idea of Vendôme was to hasten directly to Eugene and engage him. Eugene had not more than twenty-five thousand men at hand, and Vendôme had at least an equal number. The care of the person of the Catholic King arrested the French general, and he did not dare involve Philip V. in a decisive contest, before having demanded reinforcements from the corps of Vaudemont. This consumed some days. Disposition was finally made for battle, and, August 15, the army marched towards the camp of Eugene, leaving behind it the small city of Luzzara, occupied by a detachment of Imperialists. Eugene, contrary to all expectation, anticipated the attack: he had chosen his field of battle exceedingly well, and in the afternoon he assailed the army *of the two crowns*, whilst it was painfully debouching across a broken and uneven tract of ground. The Franco-Spanish troops were obliged to begin the contest in marching-order instead of in battle-array, and to form their lines under fire. It required all Vendôme's presence of mind, and all the firmness of our veteran regiments, to arrest the enemy and reëstablish a situation so much endangered. The army of the two crowns was finally all in line. Night came on opportunely for Eugene, who employed it in strongly intrenching himself. The next day, he was found so well posted that it was regarded impossible to attack him. Luzzara, however, surrendered in sight of Eugene (August 17). Vendôme did not intend to be satisfied with such a victory. He wished to send for Vaudemont, and to hem in Eugene with all the forces of the two crowns united. Philip V., following the advice of a majority of the general officers,

insisted on ordering Borgo Forte, on the north bank of the Po, to be attacked by the main body of Vaudemont's corps. Ten days were thus lost; then the siege was raised (August 28). They were more fortunate against Guastalla, which was taken, September 29, in the rear of the army. But, in the mean time, Eugene had made his position between the Po, the Zero, and the Secchia impregnable; the Venetians aided him to subsist, by furnishing provisions, whilst they refused them to the French. Inferior by one half in force as he was, there was no means of compelling him to quit his camp on the Zero. Philip V., meanwhile, set out again for Spain, on the news of a descent by the Anglo-Batavians near Cadiz (October 3). Although he had shown courage, the presence of this monarch of nineteen had been only an embarrassment to the army.

After the two camps had been face to face for more than two months and a half without a general engagement, Vendôme first decamped, November 5, but in order to advance on the Secchia. Eugene fell back on this river. The unfavorable season checked Vendôme, and he made a show of taking up his winter-quarters; but suddenly he ordered a new attack on Borgo Forte, in which Eugene had left but a feeble detachment, and which was carried November 15. He then divided his troops into cantonments; in the middle of December he assembled them again and took Governolo, which achieved the thrusting back of the enemy beyond the Mincio, and terminated this long and scientific campaign that for nine months had hinged on Mantua. Vendôme had shown himself an eminent strategist: Eugene had been forced back, but not conquered or driven from Italy; nothing had been decided.[1]

Grave events had taken place on the coasts of Spain during the last months of the campaign in Italy. The Anglo-Batavian navy had undertaken the duty of executing the *political testament* of William III. Holland had issued her declaration of war, in the most virulent terms, *against the Kings of France and Spain*, May 8; England had done the same, May 14, *against France and Spain;*[2] and the Emperor, May 15, *against the King of France and*

[1] If Vendôme was a good strategist, he was not a good administrator. The contractors robbed the state without stint, with the connivance of the intendant and of many general officers. There was no care of the soldier; the provisions were detestable; the wounded were in need of everything; men died like flies in the French army, very different from the Piedmontese, who were admirably cared for. It was thus that Italy swallowed up fifteen or twenty thousand of our men annually. See Louville, t. I. p. 317.

[2] Queen Anne was unwilling to accord the title of King to Philip V., who had followed the example of Louis XIV. in recognizing the pretended James III. as King of England.

the Duke of Anjou. Before attacking Spanish America, the allies had resolved to possess themselves of Cadiz, that is, of the port in which were concentrated the relations between Spain and the New World. Seventy ships of the line and a multitude of transports carrying a small army appeared, August 23, before Cadiz. Philip V. was absent from his kingdom; the coasts seemed defenceless; the French fleets were far away; the fleet of Toulon, under Victor Marie d'Estrées, had been in the waters of Naples ever since it had been summoned there, in November, 1701, to aid in suppressing a revolt incited by the Imperial agents; the squadron of Brest, under Château-Renaud, was on the ocean, bringing back from Mexico the galleons that had been expected for two years.[1] The descent, however, did not succeed. French ship-owners furnished the munitions that were lacking in the arsenals of Cadiz; the Andalusian people, far from responding to the appeal of the allies in favor of the House of Austria, rose in a body against the *heretic* soldiers, who had pillaged the churches on landing; the attack on Fort Matagorda, which defends the port of Cadiz, was repelled, owing especially to the fire of a few French galleys, and the allies were compelled to reëmbark towards the end of September.

They indemnified themselves but too soon for this check. Whilst they were before Cadiz, Château-Renaud had arrived on the coast of Spain, with his rich convoy of seventeen galleons escorted by fifteen French ships carrying from forty-two to seventy-six guns. The galleons could not be brought to Cadiz; Petit-Renau, whom Louis XIV. had sent to Spain to endeavor to reorganize the marine, urged the council of Castile to authorize Château-Renaud to conduct the convoy to France. Partly through pride, partly through an absurd distrust, the council refused and compelled the French admiral to bring the galleons into the Bay of Vigo in Galicia. The enemy's admirals, transported with joy, immediately set sail for Vigo. When their approach was signalled, the galleons were as yet only in part unloaded, the council having long hesitated to permit this operation, because the regulations gave this privilege to the port of Cadiz.[2] Château-Renaud put himself in the best state of defence that he could; he ordered the French ships and the Spanish galleons to ascend the river Vigo as far as Redondela, under

[1] Tourville and Jean Bart had just died at the moment when France had the most need of their services: Tourville, May 28, 1701; Bart, April 27, 1702.

[2] We are not astonished at such absurdities when we see how the Spanish administration was organized: an old Inquisitor had been appointed *judge of commerce* by the influence of Cardinal Porto-Carrero, who was himself colonel of the guards. The priests overran all the offices, as at Rome. *Mém. de Noailles*, pp. 79–82.

the protection of two small forts and a stockade. The enemy entered the bay with overwhelming force, passed Vigo without attacking it, and threw two thousand soldiers on the south bank of the river (October 22). The Galician militia, posted on the heights, fled. The little fort on the south side, a wretched work defended by a few hundred men landed from the French ships, was carried, as well as the other river-batteries, and the English turned the guns against the Franco-Spanish fleet. The fleet of the enemy, borne by the wind and the tide, forced the stockade, penetrated into the upper part of the river, and launched their fire-ships. When Château-Renaud saw that all was lost, he burned or sunk ten of his ships; the other five fell into the power of the enemy; all the galleons were taken or burned. Although the greater part of the bullion had been disembarked (about forty-five millions, it is said), the conquerors still found several millions of it on the conquered ships; nearly all the merchandise, which was of immense value, perished or became the prey of the enemy; a great part of it belonged to English or Dutch merchants, which tempered the joy of the allied nations, without softening to us the bitterness of that counterpart of La Hogue, due to the stereotyped obstinacy of the council of Castile. France, bound to the Spanish monarchy like the living to the dead, felt herself much more feeble than when isolated, — she had had full liberty of motion.[1]

The unreasonable moderation of Louis XIV. had left the offensive to the enemy everywhere, on land as on sea. The campaign had opened, on the side of the Netherlands, by an attack of the allies on the Electorate of Cologne: it was the execution of an Imperial monitory issued against the Elector Clement of Bavaria. An English, German, and Dutch army-corps invested Kaiserswerth, April 16, a place on the right bank of the Rhine, which the Elector of Cologne had confided to a French garrison. The different corps into which the two armies were divided put themselves in motion throughout the country between the Rhine and the sea. Marlborough, joining to his English title a commission from the States-General, was to dispose of all the forces of the allies; but at that moment he was still at London, occupied in removing the last obstacles interposed by the Tories to his policy, and in urging the declaration of war. The Duke of Burgundy, then twenty years of age, had obtained from his grandfather authority to command the army of the Netherlands, as his brother the King of Spain

[1] Lamberti, t. II. pp. 249–255. *Mém. de San-Felipe*, t. I. pp. 203–208. Hume, Vol. VII. Bk. VII. E. Sue, *Histoire de la marine*, t. IV. p. 421. The English took besides, this year, the French half of the Island of St. Christopher.

commanded the army of Italy, and Philip V. had appointed the Duke of Burgundy his vicar-general in the Netherlands; the real chief of the army was Marshal Boufflers, a brave and worthy soldier, who strove to supply by his courage and devotion the exhaustion of his physical powers, but had neither the extent nor profundity of views necessary to contend against Marlborough.

Boufflers began by crossing the Meuse; he moved to Xanten, on the Lower Rhine, and occupied the communications between the army-corps that was besieging Kaiserswerth and two other corps of the enemy posted between the Lower Rhine and the Lower Meuse (end of April); but he did not prevent these two corps, that numbered over thirty thousand men, from joining each other at Cleves. The Duke of Burgundy joined Boufflers, May 8; but he brought him no artillery, materials for bridges, or necessary supplies for acting against places as well fortified as those of Holland. Chamillart had not known how to prepare anything in time; all that could be done was to send a strong detachment to endeavor to succor Kaiserswerth. During this time the Dutch General Cohorn effected a diversion against West Flanders. Boufflers diverted the Dutch from Flanders by making a feint of besieging Grave; he then marched against the camp of Cleves, which was commanded by the Earl of Athlone, Ginkell, the famous lieutenant of William III. in the war of Ireland. The Earl of Athlone, somewhat inferior in numbers, evacuated his position and fell back on Nimeguen, pursued, sword in hand, by the French cavalry, who charged him up to the very glacis of Nimeguen. The enemy, although supported by the cannon of the ramparts, could neither sustain this shock nor the fire of the French artillery; he passed in disorder through and around the city to reach the bridge of the Waal, and put this arm of the Rhine between himself and the French (June 11). The Duke of Burgundy gave proof of valor, coolness, and military intelligence in this more brilliant than fruitful affair, which indirectly caused the loss of Kaiserswerth. Boufflers, in fact, had recalled to him, in order to support his movement, the corps which he had commissioned to succor Kaiserswerth and which had established itself on the left bank of the Rhine, in a position that greatly interfered with the operations of the besiegers on the right bank; no sooner had this corps left than the besiegers occupied its post, flanked the place and overthrew it. It surrendered June 15, after a resistance that had cost the enemy two months and from nine to ten thousand men.

The two armies concentrated themselves after these first opera-

tions. Marlborough had arrived. The allies, strongly reinforced, had become superior in their turn, and the King had just drawn troops from the Netherlands for menaced Alsace. They fell back on Spanish Gelderland. Marlborough crossed the Meuse (July 26) and threatened Brabant. The French covered Brabant by moving on the Demer, and the Duke of Burgundy, or rather his guide Boufflers, manœuvred prudently so as not to give Marlborough an opportunity to encroach upon the French army or to penetrate into Brabant. Marlborough indemnified himself by undertaking sieges in the rear. Boufflers could not cover Brabant without uncovering the Lower Meuse. Marlborough, August 29, invested Venloo. The Duke of Burgundy would have gladly succored this place: a council of war judged the enterprise impossible. The young prince quitted the army September 6, that he might not have the chagrin of seeing the enemy take the cities of his brother without being able to oppose it. Boufflers abandoned the Lower Meuse and retired on Tongres; he had not more than thirty thousand available men, the sick and detachments not included, so incomplete were the corps. He sent a detached corps towards the Upper Electorate of Cologne, in order to attempt a diversion beyond the Rhine, but the enemy did not release the towns of the Meuse. Venloo capitulated, September 23; Stevensweert, October 2; Roermond, October 6. Master of the Lower Meuse, Marlborough reascended this river towards Liege. Boufflers, with only half the strength of the enemy, saw himself reduced to the hard necessity of choosing between the preservation of Liege and that of Brabant. The Belgian towns were in so demoralized a condition that they could not be abandoned, even for a few days, to their own forces. Boufflers retired from Tongres on Huy and on the new lines that ended in the Mehaigne. He had left a few thousand men in the fortresses of Liege. The city of Liege opened its gates to the enemy without striking a blow (October 13). The citadel, ill defended, was carried by assault, October 23; the fortress of the Chartreuse capitulated the 29th.

Lieutenant-General Tallard, who had been detached to the Rhine, had in the mean time fallen back to the Moselle and had occupied Treves, then Trarbach and Zell; but the occupation of a part of the Lower Moselle, although annoying to Germany, did not compensate for the loss of the Lower and Middle Meuse. The Spanish Netherlands had lost nearly all their advanced posts.[1]

[1] A small maritime affair, which deserves to be cited for its originality, had taken place, during this campaign, in sight of the Downs of Flanders. Three French

The third theatre of the continental war had been, this year, Alsace, that is, French territory. This means that the war at first was carried on still worse on the Upper Rhine than in the Netherlands. If the army of the Netherlands, where the heir of the throne commanded, was so ill supplied and so ill recruited, we may judge what was the army in Alsace, under a general partly in disgrace. The King had decided, as a favor, to employ Catinat on this side; but Catinat was not put in a condition to oppose the designs of the enemy. The King no longer knew the real situation of his troops or of his strongholds, and it was impossible to know it with such a minister as Chamillart, who became bewildered in the management of these masses, deceived himself or was deceived concerning everything, and knew how to listen to no one. Modest before the King, to whom he humbly confessed his insufficiency, and who delighted in exalting him in proportion as he abased himself, he was very obstinate towards all others: he made his plans, or caused them to be made, on paper; and was then astonished that the generals had not executed his orders, when he had sent them neither money, nor soldiers, nor munitions. Money disappeared in his hands, no one knew how: the secrets of state and of the war transpired through his obscure intimates; regiments and crosses of Saint-Louis were put up at auction; he made them an *extraordinary* resource!

The enemy, however, profited by our lessons, which we no longer knew how to practise! — celerity, secrecy, discipline, full corps, regular advancement in the lower grades, emulation among the general officers, were now on their side. Prince Louis of Baden was before Landau and on the Lauter in the month of April, ere Catinat had arrived from Paris in Alsace, and had several thousand men in readiness. The enemy firmly established himself on the Lauter, and secured the liberty of besieging Landau without the possibility of being disturbed. In the middle of June, when the blockade of Landau was changed into a siege, the Prince of Baden had forty thousand men, without mentioning a corps assembled opposite Huningue. Catinat had as yet only twenty-one thousand men to put in the field, on account of the necessity of keeping the fortified places garrisoned. The inconveniences of the too great multiplicity of strongholds began to be felt, — inconveniences that Vauban was far from disregarding. Catinat, discouraged, retired into the centre of Lower Alsace, and thought it impossible to undertake any diversion during the whole season.

galleys had taken a Dutch ship of sixty guns, in presence of twelve other ships lying powerless in a dead calm.

Landau defended itself obstinately. At the beginning of autumn good news came to reanimate the army of Alsace: the Elector of Bavaria had not declared himself as promptly as his brother of Cologne, and had hitherto continued to affect neutrality, and to negotiate with the Emperor, while raising an army of twenty-five thousand men: June 17, a secret treaty with Louis XIV. and Philip V. had just promised him the hereditary government of Belgium; at the beginning of September he entered Swabia, took Ulm by surprise, and summoned the circles of Swabia and Franconia to return to neutrality. The joy at this happy event was much allayed by the fall of Landau, the bulwark of Alsace, which capitulated, September 9, before the King of the Romans and the Prince of Baden. The *bastioned towers*, with which Vauban had supplied this place, had greatly prolonged its defence.

The taking-up of arms by the Elector only drew closer the bonds of the circles with Austria,[1] and aided the Emperor to obtain from the Diet of Ratisbon a declaration of war against the King of France and the *Duke of Anjou* (September 28). This declaration of the Empire, although ill-grounded, was inevitable; all the Germanic States, save the two Bavarian electors, having successively sided with Austria. The diversion of Bavaria remained, nevertheless, a most important fact. Southern Germany was cut in twain; Central Germany was opened, and the war could be carried by the Franco-Bavarians to the heart of the Austrian States. The question now was to join the Elector of Bavaria on the right bank of the Rhine. The army of Alsace had been reinforced by a corps under Villars, a general full of ardor and ambition, who thought only of gaining a marshal's baton by some brilliant action, and who had not ceased to urge Catinat to act. Villars was charged by the King to take to the Elector the better part of the army, whilst Catinat remained to guard Strasburg. The enemy, immediately after the taking of Landau, had thrown to the right bank of the Rhine twenty thousand men, who went to join a corps of seven thousand soldiers, already intrenched at Friedlingen, opposite Huningue, a point through which the French could debouch into the south of Swabia. The Prince of Baden hastened thither in person; but already the active Villars had relaid the bridge of Huningue, destroyed after the treaty of Ryswick. Although decided, if necessary, to debouch under the

[1] The circle of Westphalia gave its adhesion to the Great Alliance, September 29.

cannon of the enemy, Villars sought a less perilous passage, and embarked a detachment, which surprised, in the night, the little city of Neuburg, between Breisach and Huningue; haste was made to throw over a second pontoon-bridge at this point. The Prince of Baden, fearing to be outflanked, evacuated his camp at Friedlingen; Villars, who had already moved the main body of his troops to the head of his bridge at Huningue, immediately crossed the Rhine, although a part of his army was at Neuburg. The infantry of the enemy paused on the wooded heights; Villars put himself at the head of the French infantry, charged the enemy with the bayonet, and drove him from the heights into the plain; but there, the enemy having planted himself and repulsed the head of a column that was pursuing him with too much ardor and too little order, a panic seized all that body of infantry which had just fought so valorously; it fled in all directions, and Villars could not succeed in rallying it. He thought the battle lost, when, glancing over the plain, he saw the enemy's cavalry completely routed: General Magnac, who commanded the French cavalry, had charged with sabre in hand, without answering to the enemy's fire, and broken fifty-six squadrons with thirty-four. The French infantry recovered from its inexplicable terror, and the enemy's infantry retired in good order towards the mountains (October 14).

Villars had his marshal's baton; but his junction with the Elector of Bavaria was not effected during the rest of the campaign. The Elector, who, after the surprise of Ulm, had occupied the course of the Iller, did not keep his promise to move towards the Rhine, and Villars judged it impossible to cross the Black Mountains to join him. All the passes of these mountains were fortified on the side towards France, and the Prince of Baden, who had hastily recalled most of the troops that had taken Landau, found himself on the flank of Villars with an army that had again become superior in numbers. Villars judged that he must think of nothing more, at least during the depth of winter, but of covering Alsace and Lorraine. Catinat had been recalled; Villars recrossed the Rhine, established himself on the Moder, opposite to the lines of the enemy on the Lauter, and intrenched the most important points of Lower Alsace. In the mean time the French corps of the Moselle occupied the line of the Sarre, and took possession of Nancy without resistance (December 3). The Duke of Lorraine, enlightened by the example of his predecessors, would have gladly preserved neutrality, despite his

sympathies for Austria.[1] Louis XIV. would not have refused it to him, but there was no doubt that the Prince of Baden would attempt to occupy Nancy in the following spring, and it was thought necessary to anticipate him. With this exception, or little more, the Duke of Lorraine and his subjects were treated with consideration, and Lorraine, in the midst of a continent desolated by a gigantic war, continued to appear an oasis of peace and prosperity; the country that had long been the most wretched in Europe became the most fortunate.

The loss of Landau and the Bavarian diversion in Swabia nearly balanced each other; great operations seemed reserved for the year 1703.[2]

Though a diversion had been effected in Germany in favor of France, the enemy, on his side, began to hope for a diversion in France in behalf of the coalition: civil war had broken out in a corner of France!

The feeble relief afforded the Protestants, since the peace of Ryswick, had not sufficed to calm passions or to put an end to acts of oppression, which unceasingly revived too just resentment. From time to time preachers were still sent to the gallows, and their auditors to the galleys, where they were subjected to the most barbarous treatment;[3] the execution of the celebrated minister Brousson had moved the whole South in 1698. Towards the close of 1700, the *prophetic spirit*, which had aroused Vivarais in 1689, reappeared in Cévennes. The gloomy enthusiasm that brooded in these mountains broke forth in strange phenomena. It was told that nocturnal assemblies of the *faithful* were guided in the wilderness by meteors; that children prophesied in the cradle.[4] The extraordinary facts that have surrounded the cradle of religions were seen reproduced at the dawn of the eighteenth century. Ecstasy was propagated like an epidemic;

[1] He had espoused a princess of Orleans, niece of Louis XIV.

[2] On the campaign of 1702, see *Mém. milit.*, etc., published by General Pelet, t. II.; *Mém. de Villars*, p. 97; *Mém. de Saint-Hilaire*, t. II. pp. 262–308. To the year 1702 belongs an anecdote reported by Fontenelle, and honorable to the humanity of Louis XIV.; *Éloges*, t. I. p. 341. The Italian chemist Poli offered to Louis a secret that would have made the war more destructive; Louis refused.

[3] See *l'Hist. de la Guerre des Camisards*, by Count de Gébelin, t. I. p. 19; 1819. *Documents administratifs sous Louis XIV.*, t. IV.; *Affaires des protestants.*

[4] One of the narrators of the *Théâtre sacré des Cévennes* declares that he had heard children of thirteen and fifteen months of age, who could not yet talk, prophesying in a loud and intelligible voice, *in the French language*, and not in the Languedoc dialect. It is certain that all the ecstatics prophesied in French, doubtless, because they were accustomed to think in the language of their Bibles.

Catholic children were seen prophesying against the Romish Babylon, after the example of Protestant children. The Intendant of Languedoc, Basville, collected as many as three hundred young *seers* in the prisons of Uzès, and caused them to be visited by the Faculty of Montpelier, who declared them *fanatical*, that is, affected with a sort of religious madness.[1] Basville sent the eldest to the galleys or the army. Executions recommenced. Several assemblies were surprised and massacred in the wilderness by the soldiers. The emigration was renewed on a great scale. After eighteen months had passed in this wise, a *blast of wrath* arose: *the spirit*, as in 1689, began to breathe resistance, — war on the priests and the King. Despite the abandonment of French Protestantism at Ryswick by foreign nations, the persecuted raised their eyes anew towards the Protestant powers. The reëstablishment of the capitation-tax, which was made to bear with iniquitous rigor on the recalcitrant *new converts*, redoubled their irritation. The departure of the garrisons of Languedoc for Italy encouraged them; the signal was given from the wildest retreats of Cévennes. An Abbé du Cheyla, archpriest of Upper Cévennes and inspector of missions, had, for fifteen years, been the tyrant of these mountains; he perpetuated the *dragoonades* there; he made his house a dungeon and place of torture; he renewed there the atrocious inventions of the old feudal despots, without even having the excuse of the austerity of fanaticism, for he blended lust, it is said, with ferocity. About the middle of July, 1702, some Cévennese, who had set out to emigrate, were arrested, and conducted to the archpriest at Pont-de-Montvert. The galleys were reserved for the fugitives, the gallows for their guide. At this news a *seer* named Séguier assembled a band of mountaineers on Mount Bougès, led them to Pont-de-Montvert, liberated the prisoners, and put the archpriest to death.

Séguier was taken and broken on the wheel a few days after; but he was immediately avenged by the massacre of several of the principal persecutors, priests and laymen; the collectors of the capitation-tax were hung, and a partisan warfare, ardent, indefatigable, was kindled in this central wilderness of Cévennes, where

[1] Brueys (*Hist. du Fanatisme*, t. I.) attributes the origin of this overflowing of the spirit of prophecy to a Huguenot called Duserre, who had prepared children for ecstasies and visions by causing them to fast, and by exciting them through the reading of the prophets and the Apocalypse. The details are curious; but it is very possible that Duserre may not have been an impostor, as Brueys endeavors to prove, and that he may have sincerely formed this school of *seers*.

rise the triple summits of Lozère, Aigoal, and Esperou, and whence descend the Tarn and the two Gardons.[1] The insurrection remained faithful to its origin. The *prophetic* spirit guided it, as it had prepared the way for it. All the leaders were *seers;* the hierarchy of military command was established according to the degrees of *inspiration.* One of the first among these strange captains was a lad seventeen years of age, Cavalier, who has preserved a name renowned in history. They elected for their supreme chief a young man of twenty-seven, Roland, an elevated, severe, meditative character, made for command, and mingling, with savage heroism, something romantic, that strongly impressed the imagination. Roland soon found himself at the head of three thousand men, who called themselves *Children of God;* the Catholics gave them the name of *Camisards,* on account of the white shirts they put on to recognize each other at night.[2] The caves of the mountains served them as citadels and arsenals; they demolished all the churches and presbyteries in Upper Cévennes, exterminated or expelled the priests, surprised the castles and towns, cut detachments in pieces, levied imposts and tithes, shooting the farmers of the clergy who did not bring them the tithes instead of taking them to the priests. The States of Languedoc, assembled in November at Montpelier, voted to raise militia to fight the rebels. Basville demanded troops from the Minister. It must, indeed, have cost him much to acknowledge what result had been reached by so many cruel rigors and skilful combinations! Chamillart and his protectress, Madame de Maintenon, agreed to conceal from the King, for some months, what was taking place in Languedoc! — The infallible, omnipresent, omniscient monarch had attained the point of not knowing that civil war was devouring a portion of his kingdom!

It was necessary to decide on breaking this silence, when the war, descending from the mountains into the plains of Nîmes, extended from Mende to the sea, and when the Lieutenant-General of Languedoc, Count de Broglie, had been defeated by the Camisards on the banks of the Vistre (January 12, 1703). The King sent a marshal of France, Montrevel, with ten thousand soldiers, drawn from the armies of Germany and Italy, twenty cannon, and six hundred Miquelets from Roussillon, a militia fitted

[1] Upper Cévennes is the centre of all that mountainous region which is the source of so many rivers and streams that flow in all directions, the Loire, Allier, Lot, Tarn, Hérault, Vidourle, Gard, Cèze, Ardèche.

[2] The name has the same origin as that of the *White Boys* of Ireland.

for mountain warfare (February 1703). Already troops, arrived before Montrevel, had caused the failure of an expedition undertaken by Cavalier to stir up Vivarais. Roland, at the head of fifteeen hundred Camisards, was defeated at Pompignan by five or six thousand soldiers under the command of Montrevel, who wished to take advantage of his success to end the revolt by an amnesty. He convoked the Cévennese nobility, generally strangers to the insurrection, declared to them that religion was no longer in question, but fidelity to the King, and induced them to interpose to disarm the rebels. The Camisards shot such of their companions as accepted the amnesty, and continued the hostilities. Montrevel, exasperated, ordered a mill near Nîmes, in which the Protestants, men, women, and children, were holding a religious meeting on Palm-Sunday, to be burned, and caused the unfortunates who endeavored to escape to be thrust back into the flaîmes; he then banished entire neighborhoods, to punish them for furnishing aid to the Camisards: fifteen hundred persons were removed in Vaunage alone, near Nîmes, and a proportional number in the rest of the lowlands and in the mountains. All these unfortunates were dragged to Roussillon, or crowded on the benches of the galleys, with the exception of those who were sent to torture! The parishes less compromised were subjected to heavy fines. The violence of the military chiefs was such that Basville, who was unwilling to see his province depopulated, seemed humane in comparison with them!

The cruelties of Montrevel succeeded no better than his clemency. By driving the non-militant population to desperation, he only swelled the ranks of the insurrection. Roland showed himself more formidable than ever. Cavalier, surrounded at night by masses of troops at Tour-de-Bellot, between Anduze and Alais, cut his way out through heaps of dead bodies. A new element had intervened in the struggle and redoubled its atrocity. The Catholic peasants of the valley of Cèze (diocese of Uzès) had taken up arms against the rebels, under the name of the *White Camisards*, or *Cadets of the Cross*. A hermit commanded these bands, which the King authorized, and the Pope gratified with a plenary indulgence in the style of the ancient bulls of the Crusade. The *Holy Militia*, as the papal bull called it, committed such robbery on friends and foes that Montrevel was obliged to employ the regular troops to repress its excesses. Hostilities continued without interruption: the Camisards, divided into small troops, disappeared when they seemed on the point of being

seized, and fell like a thunderbolt where they were not expected. New *miracles* confirmed the faith of the insurgents: it was recounted that one of the prophets, Claris, seeing his brethren giving way to doubt, had undertaken to pass through the *testimony of fire*, and had emerged intact from the burning pile.[1] The war of Cévennes threatened to become perpetual!

This, then, was the general aspect offered by the war of the Succession in the beginning of 1703: on the side of the North, the Spanish Netherlands encroached upon in Gelderland, Liege lost, and the Electorate of Cologne nearly so; on the East, Alsace encroached upon, but the Bavarian army forced like a wedge between Austria, Swabia, and Franconia, and, in the distance, Hungary giving utterance to the deep rumblings that precede the storm; on the side of the South, a religious war rending one of our provinces; Spain still intact, but our marine mutilated in defending her; beyond the Alps, the enemy repulsed from Milanais and Mantua, but maintaining himself at the extremity of Upper Italy, by the connivance of the Venetians.

Louis XIV. comprehended that the decisive point was in Germany, and resolved to push the offensive strongly in that direction, whilst he endeavored to bring matters to a close in Italy; as to the Netherlands, he would content himself with self-defence there. Vendôme retained the command in Italy; he had begun the work well: it was for him to finish it. Villars, the conqueror of Friedlingen, was in the same condition with respect to Germany: the King expected much of him, and was not wrong.[2] Villars, bustling, and full of himself, was one of those rare characters that conceal a man of great heart and intellect under the

[1] Recounted by two ocular witnesses, in the *Théâtre sacré des Cévennes*, a collection of testimony concerning the prophetic and warlike facts of the insurrection. See, on this war, the *Histoire des Pasteurs du désert*, by Nap. Peyrat; Paris, 1842; a touching and profoundly original book, which we can scarcely believe was written by one of our contemporaries, in such burning features are the passions and beliefs of another generation reproduced in it. The author has done better than Sir Walter Scott's *Old Mortality*: he has not only restored the epitaphs of his heroes; he has raised them living from their tombs. M. E. Alby has just published an interesting summary of the *War of the Camisards*; Paris, Meyrueis, in 12mo. See also *Quinze ans du règne de Louis XIV.*, by Ernest Moret.

[2] Louis XIV., on a visit of Villars to the court in January, 1703, held the following language to him, which honors that monarch: "I am a Frenchman as well as a king . . . whatever tarnishes the glory of the nation touches me more closely than any other interest. . . . During more than three months, Chamillart brought me nothing but disagreeable news (of Alsace). The hour of his arrival was marked by a thrill of dismay. You have delivered me from that state: rely upon my gratitude." *Mém. de Villars*, p. 102.

appearance of a braggadocio, and that, always boasting, perform all that they promise; he had the exterior of a Villeroi, but the substance of a Luxembourg. He was destined one day to be the last and happy resource of France! He therefore had the army that was to join the Elector of Bavaria, no longer only on the right bank of the Rhine, but on the Danube, and another army-corps was designed to free Alsace. The choice of general-in-chief for the Netherlands was not so happy. It was the deplorable hero of Cremona, Villeroi, delivered from captivity by a ransom, who was opposed to Marlborough! This was veritable infatuation in the King: the more the opinion of the army, of the court and of the country, showed itself opposed to Villeroi, the more obstinately the King adhered to this superannuated favorite. Fortunately, he again gave to him, as second in command, the brave Marshal de Boufflers. Whilst Villeroi triumphantly set out to take command of the largest of our armies, Catinat, rejected as incapable of serving, retired with resignation to his house of Saint Gratien (Enghien), near Montmorency, where he spent the rest of his days in the study of letters and philosophy.[1] It is said that the spirit of narrow devotion that reigned around Madame de Maintenon was not a stranger to the disgrace of Catinat, who was religious, but not a devotee, and whose orthodoxy was suspected.

The enemies had great projects on the side of the Netherlands. Marlborough, who had gone back to England, returned in the month of March. He had been magnificently received at London; thanked by the Commons for his first successes, gratified by the Queen with the brevet of Duke, and a pension of £5000. His intimate ally, the minister Godolphin, a skilful politician and financier, obtained from Parliament an augmentation of subsidies for increasing the army of the Netherlands by twenty thousand men. Holland, that already had such enormous engagements, again consented to take half of these. The allies could thus put in motion, in the spring of 1703, a hundred thousand men, between the Lower Rhine and the Meuse. In the month of February, Rheinberg had been compelled to surrender through famine. April 25, fifty thousand men invested Bonn, the last place that remained of the Electorate of Cologne. A second army, equal in force, covered the siege from a distance, posting itself under Maestricht. As in the preceding year, the French had been anticipated: times were indeed changed. The French were

[1] Died in February, 1712.

not ready in season, either to succor Bonn, or to attack the citadel of Liege during the siege of Bonn. Bonn surrendered May 15.

The Anglo-Batavians, masters of the Electorate of Cologne, were expected to move to the aid of the Emperor in Germany against the Franco-Bavarians. They did nothing of the kind. Belgium was their chief object. They concentrated themselves on the Meuse. Marlborough had been inclined to operate thoroughly on this river, for the purpose of taking Namur, and opening a road into France at the cost of a battle; but the Dutch government had other views, in which it had caused the council of England to participate: it was on the Lower Scheldt and the coasts of Flanders that it wished especially to operate. Marlborough was forced to second this plan. Villeroi and Boufflers covered Brabant with fifty thousand soldiers. The rest of the forces of the two crowns, which numbered scarcely less than a hundred and twenty thousand men, was distributed in the large cities of Belgium, which neither their dilapidated fortifications nor their indifferent inhabitants would have defended. They could only be preserved by encumbering them with soldiers, or by manœuvring with a strategic skill beyond the reach of Villeroi. Marlborough therefore held Villeroi and Boufflers in check on the left bank of the Meuse, whilst a great part of the allied troops defiled towards Antwerp. A strong detachment pushed still farther, crossed the Scheldt, and forced the lines that protected the Pays-de-Waës, on the north of Ghent; the rest set about attacking the lines of Antwerp: this great city was the essential aim of the expedition. Boufflers, separating himself from Villeroi, hastened by forced marches to the aid of the Spanish general, Bedmar, who defended Antwerp and Flanders. Boufflers and Bedmar anticipated the Dutch general, Obdam, assailed him at Eeckeren, near Antwerp, among the innumerable canals of the polders (*watergangen*), and drove the enemy back under the guns of Lillo, after a long and murderous fire, in which the superiority of aim of the Dutch infantry seemed likely to secure them the advantage (June 30). The enemy returned on the Meuse. This operation did the greatest honor to Marshal Boufflers.

The failure of the allies proved Marlborough in the right; he recommenced acting on the Meuse, and carried Huy in ten days (August 15–25). The two marshals dared not attempt anything in favor of Huy, lest Marlborough should leave this place to throw himself into Brabant; they contented themselves with

prolonging as far as the Meuse, in order to protect Namur, the defensive lines that stopped at the Mehaigne. Marlborough wished to return to his first plan, attack the lines at Namur, and fight a great battle. The representatives of the States-General opposed this bold resolution. Marlborough recrossed the Meuse, took Limburg (September 27), then went into winter-quarters early in November, only leaving a detachment before Gelders, which surrendered December 15. The two crowns thus lost their last positions between the Meuse and the Rhine. The result of the campaign, however, was far from answering the expectations of the allies. Marlborough bitterly complained of the obstructions put in the way of his enterprises by the delegates of the States-General to the army, and strove to obtain thenceforth that species of military dictatorship without which he declared great events impossible.

The French had not been tardy this year, on the Upper Rhine, as on the Lower Rhine and in the Netherlands. The active and brilliant leader to whom Louis XIV. had confided the army of Germany, had not waited for the close of winter to act. Villars took his troops from their quarters in the beginning of February, although there were scarcely any superior officers in the army,[1] and carried them across the bridges of Huningue and Neuburg, from the 12th to the 14th; the enemy believed that he was about to attempt to force the passes of the Black Mountains, and gave their whole attention in that direction; but, instead of entering the mountains, he passed under the guns of Breisach, defiled along the Rhine, crossed the Kinzig, captured the little cities of the Kinzig and the Rhine, which the enemy evacuated in disorder, and took Kehl in the rear. The Prince of Baden was near being shut up in Kehl, and only had time to reach Bühl, where he with difficulty reassembled his shattered army. Kehl, into which three thousand five hundred men had been thrown, was invested, February 20. Villars, supplying the insufficiency of his artillery by the guns that he had just collected from the dépôts of the enemy, conducted the siege with an audacity that transcended all rules: happily rash assaults carried the outworks of Kehl, and this stronghold surrendered March 10.

The campaign began brilliantly: the Elector of Bavaria[2] had not

[1] Most of the officers were still permitted to quit the army during winter-quarters. Villars, p. 102. Another passage of Villars shows that at this epoch the cavalry, except the gendarmes, had already thrown aside the cuirass, and that Villars desired to restore it, which took place in 1706. See Lémontei, addit. to Dangeau, p. 175.

[2] By a new secret treaty, Louis XIV. promised him the sovereignty of Belgium,

interrupted his operations, and had, on his side, carried Neuburg on the Danube, February 2. Villars, however, did not think it proper to attempt an immediate junction: he took some weeks to rest and reorganize his wearied, ill-armed,[1] and ill-provisioned troops, and to wait for the melting of the snows. Meanwhile, the Elector found himself in great danger. The Emperor and the circles had not been in a state immediately to repel the attack of the Bavarians on Swabia; the war in the North, which had brought the victorious Swedes to Warsaw, owing to the too well-grounded hostility of a great part of the Poles to their King Augustus of Saxony,[2] deprived Leopold of a large portion of the aid that had been granted to him by Northern Germany, — the Elector of Saxony, King of Poland, being engaged in a contest that threatened to cost him his crown, and the Elector of Brandenburg, King of Prussia, having to preserve his domains entangled with the Polish provinces. At the close of the winter, however, the Imperialists and the contingents of the circles were strong enough to resume the offensive: the Austrian general Schlick invaded Bavaria on the side of the Inn, and Count de Styrum, general of the circles, attacked the Upper Palatinate. The Elector, well guided by his field-marshal, Count d'Arco, fought Schlick on the borders of the Inn, at Scharding (March 11), then, crossing the Danube, defeated the vanguard of Styrum (March 28), drove him into Swabia, and returned to occupy Ratisbon, in order to anticipate the Imperialists there, who had refused neutrality to this important city. The seat of the Germanic Diet was thus found in the power of the allies of France.

If the Elector had been able to extricate himself from peril by his own forces alone, what might not be hoped after the junction! Villars again moved in the earlier part of April, and left to Tallard, commandant of the army-corps designed to remain on the Rhine, the care of holding the Prince of Baden in check. He turned rapidly towards the mountains, carried the posts that the enemies had preserved at the head of the valley of the Kinzig, crossed the crests that separate the basin of the Rhine from that of the head-waters of the Danube, and descended into the valley of the Danube

reserving Luxemburg, Namur, Charleroi, and Mons to France. Philip V. consented (May, 1708). *Mém. de Noailles*, p. 149.

[1] A third of the infantry was without muskets, and the arsenal of Strasburg was empty. *Mém. de Villars*, p. 109.

[2] Augustus had brought Charles XII. in favor with Poland, by attacking him contrary to the interest and wishes of the Polish nation.

by Dutlingen (May 8). The junction so much desired was effected at Ehingen.

They were in a situation to undertake everything. Villars knew this well. He caused the Elector to adopt the plan of descending the Danube as far as Passau, and of opening an entrance into Austria by the capture of that city and of Lintz, whilst the French closed the way against all aid that might come from Count Styrum and the Prince of Baden. Passau and Lintz, weak places, once taken, the Elector could go straight to Vienna, which was no stronger and was stripped of troops. An event, of which Villars could not yet have known, doubled the favorable chances: this was the insurrection in Hungary, which had broken out in the month of June, and which would have broken out sooner if the French minister had paid more attention to the advances of the Hungarian malcontents. When the Emperor learned, through the spies of high rank that he kept near the Elector, of the design of entering the archduchy of Austria, he was seized with terror and prepared to quit Vienna. The end of the war and a triumphant peace were probably in the hands of the Elector.[1]

He let everything escape! Villars suddenly learned with astonishment that the Elector, whom he believed to be on the road to Passau, had deferred the invasion of Austria and was turning towards the Tyrol. This prince, brave and loyal, but capricious, irresolute, fickle, and more occupied with his pleasures than his business, in turn attempted and abandoned the greatest deeds for the most frivolous reasons;[2] his wife, by a blind attachment to Austria, his favorites, and his mistresses, through cupidity, betrayed him to the Emperor, and suggested to him the resolutions most opposed to his interests. Villars resigned himself to second the expedition to the Tyrol, by guarding the Danube against the Prince of Baden, who had rejoined Styrum, the general of the Circles, in the centre of Swabia. He urged the King to order the army of the Rhine to march on Freiburg and the Black Mountains, and to cause Vendôme to advance on Trent, with half of the army of Italy, the rest being quite enough to keep the Imperialists east of the Mincio and the Secchia. The march on Vienna might perhaps be still resumed in time.

The expedition of the Tyrol began under happy auspices (June).

[1] Prince Eugene, later, said this himself to Villars. *Mém. de Villars*, p. 126.

[2] He owed enormous gambling debts to his general and his ministers, and the latter had urged him to attack the Emperor, in the hope of obtaining pay from the war-contributions. Villars, p. 114.

The Elector possessed himself, almost without striking a blow, of Kufstein, Innspruck, and all the upper valley of the Inn. If Vendôme had effected his movement at the same time on the Upper Adige, they might have coöperated over Mount Brenner; the Imperial army of Italy might have been cut off from Germany and the great idea of Villars have been realized. Unfortunately, Vendôme did not stir before July 20; perhaps there was some negligence on his part in an operation that deranged his own combinations. There was a delay of a fortnight at least. This delay was fatal to the Bavarians; the Tyrol, which had witnessed no war since Charles V., was at first stunned by the invasion; but the energetic population of mountain-hunters promptly came to itself and rose throughout its wild valleys. The Elector, harassed on every side and fearing to be cut off, moved back from the foot of the Brenner beyond Innspruck. Vendômè, however, finally advanced and bombarded Trent; the Elector made some efforts to move towards him; but, either through treason or cowardice, several Bavarian officers surrendered impregnable posts to the insurgent peasants and a few Austrian soldiers; a corps of Austrians and Danish auxiliaries meanwhile encroached on Bavaria, by crossing the Lower Inn; another corps attacked the Upper Palatinate and threatened Ratisbon. The Elector evacuated the Tyrol and reëntered Bavaria; the expedition had completely miscarried (August).

During the campaign of the Elector in the Tyrol, Villars, well posted between Dillingen and Lauingen on the Danube, had held in check the Prince of Baden, who had massed the bulk of the forces of the Emperor and the Empire. Baden persevered in his plan, which was to flank Bavaria through southern Swabia; reinforced anew, he left half of his army with Styrum, in an intrenched camp, before the camp of Villars, and, with the rest, ascended the Danube to Ehingen, crossed this river, then turned rapidly to the east (end of August). The French and the Bavarians were thus threatened with being hemmed in between four army-corps. The situation had its perils, but also its advantages, if Augsburg, the most important point of all the region on the south of the Danube, were occupied, and if the troops were massed in order to fall on the too much scattered adversaries. The Elector would neither occupy Augsburg, which had given him hostages as a guaranty of neutrality, nor make arrangements with Villars for attacking Baden at the crossing the Iller or the Lech. During these discussions, Baden pushed on by forced marches as far as

Augsburg, and seized it by the connivance of the inhabitants. Villars proposed a heroic course, namely, to abandon Swabia, with the exception of Ulm, to defend the Lech with one army-corps, and to precipitate himself upon Austria with another. The Elector assented, then refused, and rejected every reasonable proposition. He was ready to yield to those about him who pressed him to treat with the Emperor. Villars was seized with bitter discouragement: he saw himself paralyzed by the folly of a prince with whom he had been associated, and he did not receive from the King the aid on which he had counted. He had nothing more to hope on the side of Italy. As to the French army of the Rhine, since its separation from Villars, it had performed no other feat than to raze the lines of the Lauter abandoned by the enemy. It had long lacked resources; the best that there were had been given to Villars, and none of those men were found in the army of the Rhine who know how to supply the place of resources. It attempted no serious operation till the middle of August, and this operation, which was the siege of Breisach, was not a sufficient diversion to disengage the army of the Danube. Villars wrote to the King, asking for his recall.

He extricated himself from embarrassments in a more glorious manner. He joined the Elector near Nordendorf, on the south of the Danube, with a part of his army, leaving the rest in the camp of Dillingen. Informed that Baden and Styrum, who were, the first at Augsburg, the second before Dillingen, were planning an attack on the camp of Nordendorf, he finally persuaded the Elector to baffle the enemy by an inverse manœuvre, — that is, to gain a march on Baden, and to move in advance of Styrum, whilst the French corps at Dillingen took him in the rear. In the night of September 19–20, the Elector and Villars crossed the Danube at Donauwörth; the next day they met Styrum on the plain of Hochstadt. The French corps from Dillingen had already made its attack prematurely, and had been repulsed. The second collision was more successful. The enemy's cavalry was overthrown; the enemy's infantry, superior in number to the Franco-Bavarian infantry, defended itself with great vigor, and fell back two leagues in good order, sustaining the successive charges of our squadrons and battalions. It was finally turned and broken with great carnage. The victory was complete, little destructive to the conquerors, and cost the enemy twelve thousand men killed, taken, or disabled, and thirty-three guns. Styrum fled with the remnant of his army as far as Nordlingen.

The network of the enemy's armies was broken by this great blow. Villars proposed to employ the Bavarians in defending Bavaria and threatening Austria, and to ascend the Danube with the French to possess himself of Würtemberg, and to assist the army of the Rhine. Owing to Marshal de Vauban, who had directed the works of the siege, Breisach had surrendered, September 7, to the Duke of Burgundy, who had commanded this army for the last three months. The Elector rejected the plan of Villars, and made a pretence of going to attack Baden under the walls of Augsburg. As Villars had foreseen, this prince was found so well posted that it was necessary to renounce the attack. Villars returned to his project, and drew the Elector on, in some sort, as far as the confluence of the Iller and the Danube; but, there, the Elector began to clamor for the return of the whole army to Bavaria. Villars, seeing the fruits of his victory lost, and convinced of the impossibility of doing anything with such an ally, entreated the King anew to give him a successor. Louis consented with regret, and sent Marshal de Marsin. Villars quitted the army in the month of November: it was the departure of the fortune of the war!

Marsin, however, began happily; but it was still to Villars that the merit was due. The movement of Villars towards the Upper Danube had been so well calculated, that it had sufficed to cause Baden to abandon his camp at Augsburg, and to draw him between the Iller and Lake Constance, through fear of losing the whole of Swabia. Baden had left a corps of six thousand men in Augsburg. The Franco-Bavarians moved rapidly thither, and, after a few days' siege, compelled the Imperialists to evacuate the city by capitulation (December 4–13). This success released Bavaria, and secured the southeast of Swabia to the Franco-Bavarians. Meanwhile, news of the greatest importance arrived from Hungary. Tekeli, on going shortly before to seek an asylum and a grave among the Turks, had bequeathed his confiscated property and his vengeance to the son of that beautiful Helen Zrini, whom he had loved so well, and who was the faithful companion of his exile; the young Francis Rakoczi,[1] a descendant of the Magyar sovereigns of Transylvania, son-in-law of Tekeli, and grandson of Count Zrini, Ban of Croatia, who had died on an Austrian scaffold, was, by his origin as well as by his patriotic heroism, the man whom Austria had most to fear in Hungary; the Emperor had therefore caused him to be arrested at the open-

[1] Ragotzski, according to the Slavic orthography.

ing of the European war, in 1701. Rakoczi had escaped, and taken refuge in Poland; he reappeared in June, 1703, and put himself at the head of the malcontents who had begun to arm themselves in the mountains of Upper Hungary. The insurrection in a few months assumed colossal proportions: the peasants, the first to rise, drew in the nobles; the Austrian garrisons, scattered and weak, were swallowed up, as it were, in the midst of a boundless inundation. Towards the end of the year, the insurrection extended beyond the Waag and the Leytha, surrounded Presburg, and hurled its light cavalry as far as the gates of Vienna. The Emperor recalled the main portion of the garrisons of Presburg and Passau to defend his capital. It seemed as if Providence persisted in giving us magnificent chances that we suffered to be lost. On the reception of pressing letters from Louis XIV., the Elector and Marsin, after hesitation, grounded on the fatigue of their troops, finally decided to execute the plan of Villars: the Elector, with fifteen thousand troops, took Passau in two days (January 7–8, 1704), broke, almost without striking a blow, the lines that protected the entrance of Austria, and pushed as far as Enns; but, having arrived there, he recoiled before the rigor of the season, contented himself with posting garrisons in Passau, and a few small Austrian places, and returned to Munich (January 20).

The lost opportunity was never more to be found.

The campaign, nevertheless, upon the whole, had ended advantageously, since Bavaria had been released, and Austria encroached upon. It had closed in a still more satisfactory manner on the Rhine. After the taking of Breisach, the Duke of Burgundy, Vauban, and Tallard had not thought it possible to besiege Freiburg, as the King and Villars desired; the garrison was six thousand strong, the circumvallation was very extensive, and the army was so much thinned, that it did not number more than three hundred men per battalion instead of six hundred; again, half of it consisted of bad recruits; desertion had been frightful.[1] In renouncing the attack on Freiburg, the junction so much demanded by Villars was renounced, and the siege of Landau was decided on by the King; Burgundy and Vauban returned to the court, and Tallard alone led the army on Landau, which was invested, October 11. The siege, without being as energetically conducted as that of Breisach, was progressing well, when Tallard learned that the allies were preparing for a great effort to succor the place.

[1] See *ante*, p. 298, the causes of the desertion indicated by Vauban.

The Prince of Hesse-Cassel, detached from the army of the Netherlands with a large corps, had summoned to him the troops left by Baden in the lines of Bühl. He arrived, November 13, at Speyer; he had gained two marches on Pracontal, commandant of the French corps of the Moselle, whom the King had commissioned to succor Tallard. Fortunately, he lost this advantage again by stopping to wait for a Hessian and Mayence reinforcement. Tallard did not allow himself to be attacked in his lines; on the 14th he moved half of his battalions and three fourths of his squadrons between Landau and Speyer, leaving the rest to guard the lines against the garrison of Landau; in the night he was joined by Pracontal, who had pressed forward by a forced march with his cavalry. The next day he moved on the enemies, encountered them in front of the Speyerbach, and, believing that he saw among them a movement to retreat, charged with his cavalry, without giving the infantry time to arrive on the field of battle. The French squadrons, with their accustomed superiority, at first broke the squadrons of the enemy; but, taken in flank by the fire of the German infantry, they were in turn thrown in disorder. Had the enemy vigorously pushed his advantage, the day would have been lost; by good fortune, he advanced but slowly and methodically, and the French infantry had time to arrive in line. The aspect of the combat speedily changed. Our squadrons rallied, broke the enemy's cavalry a second time, and our battalions, although greatly inferior in number, marched up to the German infantry, received their fire without replying, and charged them with the bayonet. The loss of the Germans in killed, wounded, prisoners, and cannon, was not less than at Hochstadt. Landau surrendered two days after (November 17). Lower Alsace was thereby completely delivered, Lorraine covered, and a great part of the cis-Rhenish Palatinate placed at the discretion of the French. The victory of Speyer, and the recapture of Landau, gave Marshal de Tallard a reputation much above his merit.

Whilst these great movements were taking place in Central Europe from the Rhine to the Theiss and the Carpathians, the campaign of Italy had been carried on under auspices that seemed to promise the entire expulsion of the Imperialists. Even before Hungary in its turn had risen, the attack of the Bavarians on the heart of Germany had deprived the Emperor of the means of sufficiently reinforcing his army of Italy; Prince Eugene, who had hastened to Vienna at the beginning of the year to demand aid, judged the situation of Austria so grave, that he remained with the Emperor

to direct the general defence as president of the council of war (minister of war), and left the army of Italy to his lieutenant Stahremberg, the most capable, next to him, of the Austrian generals. Stahremberg never had more than twenty-five or thirty thousand men at his disposal; the French and their allies had at least fifty thousand. Vendôme did not derive from these conjunctures the profit that might have been hoped from him. The vivacity, the clearness of the preceding year, were no longer found in him, in 1703; variations and an unwonted uncertainty were remarked in his plans, and slowness and negligence in their execution. His was a singular character,—now a lightning-like activity, worthy of Cæsar, then an indolence that kept him in bed half the day at the most critical moments! His health, undermined in consequence of his debauches, had much to do with these capricious irregularities. Circumstances independent of his will also contributed to deprive him, in 1703, of the advantages of his situation. The Imperialists were intrenched on both banks of the Po, on the east of the Mincio and the Secchia: Vendôme had attempted an attack on the north of the Po, which the Austrians had thwarted by cutting the dikes of the Po and the canal that runs from Ponte-Molino to Ostiglia, and submerging all this canton (June 10). Vendôme was preparing to resume, on the south of the Po, the attack that had failed on the north of that river, when he received orders to march into the Tyrol. He obeyed with regret: the junction with the Elector of Bavaria, as we have just said, could not be effected, and Vendôme returned to the banks of the Po. The whole summer had been consumed in this fruitless expedition, and an event was in preparation, which was about to change the face of the war in Italy: this was the defection of the Duke of Savoy. It had been long suspected; it was now certain. Victor Amadeus had given the two crowns very distinctly to understand that they were "to have regard to his interests." Louis XIV. seemed for a moment to comprehend him, although late, and suggested to him an exchange of Savoy and Nice for Milanais; the Duke entered into this plan; Louis did not follow up his overture, doubtless through fear of exciting the clamors of the Spaniards, who found it very convenient to see France expending twenty thousand men and thirty millions francs annually to preserve Milanais for them.[1] The Emperor knew better how to manage, and promised the partition of what he could not conquer for himself alone. In January, 1703, he induced the Duke of Savoy to accept his secret

[1] *Mém. de Villars*, p. 185.

offers; namely, Montferrat, which was to be taken from the Duke of Mantua to punish him for his *rebellion* against the Empire, together with Alessandria, Valencia, Lomellina, and the Val de Sesia. The autumn arrived, however, without Victor-Amadeus having dared to avow himself; but Louis XIV. was certain that he only waited for a favorable moment. September 29, Vendôme, by the orders of the King, disarmed and arrested three thousand soldiers that Victor-Amadeus still had in the French camp; then marched on Piedmont with a part of the army, and summoned the Duke to deliver up Turin and Susa. The Duke refused, ordered the ambassador of France and all the French who were found in Piedmont to be arrested, and signed his definitive treaty with the Emperor (October 25). Vendôme would have gladly attacked Turin at once; but the rice-fever and the murrain among the horses had so ruined the army that he would have been unable to undertake the siege of this place without reinforcements which the King was not in a condition to send him. It was necessary to postpone the enterprise. Vendôme established his army-corps in quarters in the territory of Asti, within reach of Turin, whilst troops coming from the interior of France invaded Savoy; then returned to the camp of the Secchia.

Vendôme counted on overthrowing the Duke of Savoy in the spring; but the Imperialists neglected nothing to succor their new ally. A first detachment, thrown forward by Stahremberg, had been cut off and destroyed without having been able to reach Piedmont. Stahremberg decided to march thither in person; he left a small corps on the Secchia, and, with all the rest, suddenly crossed the Secchia at Concordia (end of December), gained a march on Vendôme, traversed the territory of Parma and the part of Milanais south of the Po; Vendôme twice overtook and charged his rear-guard, but the main body of the Imperialists, numbering fifteen thousand men, nevertheless, joined the Duke of Savoy on the Tanaro (January 16, 1704). The principal theatre of the war of Italy was thus carried back from the Lower Po to the foot of the Alps, and France found herself suddenly separated from Milanais by a mass of mountains and fortified places, yesterday friends, today enemies.

The maritime warfare had offered no great collision this year; the French fleet had not kept the sea, but the cruising warfare had begun again with brilliancy under the Duguai-Trouins, Saint-Pols, Coëtlogons, etc., who in part avenged the disaster of Vigo. The fleets of the enemy had undertaken nothing notable; they were

preparing to deal heavy blows to the coast of Spain in the coming campaign.

To sum up in a few words the campaign of 1703, the Electorate of Cologne was lost, with all that Spain had possessed beyond the Meuse; Alsace was delivered, and the offensive resumed in the Palatinate; the offensive was maintained in the centre of Germany, in Swabia, and Franconia; and Austria was shut in between the Bavarians and the Hungarians. The situation, remaining very good in Germany, despite the faults of an imprudent ally, was endangered in Italy by the defection of another ally.[1]

The ulcer of Cévennes, if it had not spread so much as might have been feared, was not healed. In September, 1703, Marshal de Montrevel, the intendant Basville, the bishops, the general officers, and the governors of the towns, had conferred at Alais on the means of bringing the rebellion to an end. Basville opposed the extermination of the mountaineer population, proposed by most of those present, but consented to the destruction of the villages and isolated habitations, which he had hitherto prevented; the inhabitants were to be summoned to retire with their household goods to the cities and principal market-towns, so that all revictualling might be impossible to the insurgents. At the moment when this renewed expedient of the war of the Albigenses was decided upon, the peril was more serious than it had yet been: a younger scion of the high nobility, the Abbé de La Bourlie, a violent, audacious and intriguing spirit, had projected to stir up Rouergue, his native district, not in the name of religious liberty, but in that of the abolition of imposts; he had put himself in relation with the great chief of the Camisards, Roland, and undertook to unite Catholics and Protestants in the same contest: on the other hand, the Protestant powers had resolved to aid the Camisards. When the devastation of Cévennes began, the Camisards suddenly made a terrible diversion in the plain of Nîmes. Meanwhile, the English squadron of Admiral Shovel appeared in sight of Montpelier. Concert, however, could not be established. The emissaries of the English did not reach the Camisards, and Shovel, seeing that his signals were not answered, again put to sea. The movement prepared by La Bourlie broke forth prematurely through the impatience of the Protestants of Rouergue, and was stifled, partly by arms, partly by an amnesty; the Catholics had taken no part in it, irritated on account of the outrages which the Camisards contin-

[1] On the campaign of 1703, see General Pelet, t. III.; Villars, pp. 101–184; Saint-Hilaire, t. II. pp. 309–340.

ued to commit against the churches, despite the prohibitions of Roland. The devastation of Cévennes, hemmed in, crushed by a network of troops and Catholic militia, was accomplished: more than four hundred villages, hamlets or farms were destroyed; twenty leagues of country were completely ravaged (December 1703). The Camisard chiefs, especially Cavalier, none the less continued to hover between the plain and the mountain, in turn breaking the meshes of the network which surrounded them, returning fire for fire, ravage for ravage, and wresting from enemies the subsistence that friends could no longer furnish them. They maintained themselves the rest of the winter: they failed in a second attempt to stir up Vivarais; but Cavalier obtained new successes in the valleys of the two Gardons. Everywhere the rebel bands resumed the offensive with desperate audacity. The King, dissatisfied, forwarded to Montrevel an order of recall, and resolved to send Villars, left without an army in consequence of his disagreement with the Elector of Bavaria. A deplorable employment for a man whose absence was about to make itself so cruelly felt on the theatre of great European conflicts!

Montrevel, humiliated, was touched in his honor and endeavored to end with a brilliant stroke. He lured Cavalier into the plain of Nîmes, towards Langlade, and surrounded him (April 16, 1704); Cavalier displayed not only the courage of a heroic soldier, but the talents of a general; he defended himself a whole day with twelve hundred men against six or eight thousand, and finally cut his way out, leaving five hundred of his men on the field; the same day, another corps of from four to five thousand men assailed Roland near Alais, who had but six or seven hundred; Roland's little troop was borne down, and Cavalier, in his retreat, fell in his turn on the midst of the corps that had combated Roland. A part of Cavalier's remaining force perished in this second action. A third band of Camisards was overthrown at Pont-de-Montvers, on the Tarn, which had been the starting-point of the insurrection. The principal magazines of the insurgents in the caves of the mountains were discovered and carried off.

For the first time, discouragement made its way among these indomitable men. Villars profited by it: he arrived with authority to make one more trial of clemency; the King felt that it was necessary at any price to heal this wound. The great chief Roland, of an iron soul, unchangeable, inaccessible to doubt, thought only of reviving the war; Cavalier, a more brilliant warrior but a less inflexible character, was more accessible; he negotiated; after

having addressed to Villars a letter of submission to the King, he went to Villars at Nîmes, having received a safe-conduct and hostages, then established himself at Calvisson, two leagues from Nîmes, during the parleys. Thousands of Protestants hastened from all the country to pray and sing psalms with Cavalier and his troop. To the great scandal of the clergy and the whole persecuting party, Villars put no obstacle in the way of this. A treaty was concluded, May 17: Villars, in the name of the King, granted to the Protestants permission to expatriate themselves, and to sell their property; those who wished to remain could do so by giving known persons as bail; the captives held in prisons or in the galleys were to be set at liberty to go away or to remain in France on the above conditions; Cavalier was to have the title of colonel, with authority to raise among his companions a regiment that should have free exercise of worship, like the foreign regiments in the pay of France.[1]

Thus, bloody, vindictive insurrection had extorted, even conquered, what had been refused to suppliant justice and humanity. A striking, if not profitable lesson for the rulers of the world!

The end was not attained: Roland refused to ratify the treaty of Cavalier, at least till the free exercise of religion was generally reëstablished. On the rumor of succor prepared by the English and the Duke of Savoy, the subaltern chiefs declared for Roland, and returned to the mountain with most of their comrades. Cavalier was abandoned at Calvisson with a hundred and twenty men. Villars sent this small troop to Burgundy, whence Cavalier, by his request, was summoned to Versailles. He had, as he recounts in his Memoirs, an interview with Louis XIV., and the Great King manifested some spite at the mean aspect of this poor peasant, who had dared, during two years, to maintain war against *his master*. Cavalier was sent back to Burgundy, then conducted to Alsace; but there, believing his liberty menaced, and having no more hope of seeing the realization of a treaty rejected by the body of the Camisards, he threw himself into Switzerland with the friends who remained faithful to his fortunes, and joined the French and Vaudois refugees in Piedmont, who were fighting for the Duke of Savoy against France. Like the Schombergs, like the Ruvignis, like so many others, he carried to the enemies of his country a sword that might have defended it with glory!

While Cavalier set out for exile, La Bourlie, who had gone abroad after the miscarriage of the Rouergane insurrection, brought

[1] *Mém. de Villars*, p. 189. *Hist. des Pasteurs du désert*, t. II. ch. IV.

from Nice, to the coast of Languedoc, a small flotilla carrying a few hundred refugees, arms, and munitions. The Camisards, forewarned, descended from Cévennes in a crowd, disguised as harvesters; but the affair had been divulged; most of the counterfeit harvesters were taken, and a tempest scattered or drove on the coast La Bourlie's barks (June–July). Roland remained unshaken, despite the dark presentiments that assailed him. Villars began again, although with regret, to burn villages and to use severity towards the partisans of the rebels.[1] The revolt, since the defeat of the Camisards, seemed on the point of gaining regions which it had been unable to reach during their success. Vivarais became restless; bands showed themselves in the forests of Dauphiny. Roland might have again become formidable; a traitor delivered him up for a price; he was surprised in the chateau of Castelnau, with a young lady of rank who shared his faith, and had conceived an enthusiastic passion for him. He defended himself like a lion; they could only take his dead body (August 13). The head of the party destroyed, the members agitated but feebly; Villars returned to mild means, which were according to his instructions and his inclination. Most of the subaltern chiefs submitted and set out for Geneva, after having obtained the release of their imprisoned comrades. A few accepted subaltern grades in the army. Villars disarmed the Cévennese, but encouraged the peasants to rebuild their cottages, and granted the burnt houses exemption from villain taxes for three years. All persecutions on account of religion virtually ceased. At the close of the year there remained but three or four chiefs, concealed in the wilderness of Upper Cévennes, who had not submitted. Villars set out on his return to Versailles, where the King received him as the pacificator of Languedoc (January 1705).

While this petty religious war was circumscribed within its first nucleus, then seemed extinguished, the great political war was enlarging its proportions, already so vast. Germany and Spain, in 1704, appeared destined to be its two principal theatres. The Great Alliance had concluded, May 13, 1703, an important secret

[1] "The signs of submission are rare and very equivocal. Even in the prisons, when they think they are not seen, they give themselves up to their fanaticism. . . . . I have seen things of this kind that I never should have believed if they had not taken place before my eyes, — an entire village, all the women and girls of which, without exception, seemed possessed of the devil. They trembled and prophesied publicly in the streets. I had twenty of the worst arrested, one of whom had the hardihood to tremble and prophesy an hour before me. I had her hung as an example, and the rest shut up in the hospitals." — Villars, p. 141.

treaty with Portugal. The old King, Don Pedro II., had recognized Philip V., and pledged his alliance to the *two crowns* only through fear. He believed that his dynasty would be endangered if the House of Bourbon, heretofore the protector of the House of Braganza against Spain, remained master of the Spanish monarchy, and in a state to revive the pretensions that it had combated in the heirs of Philip II. To shun a remote, if not chimerical peril, Don Pedro was about to deliver his country to be harshly used to advantage by England. The Emperor acted with him as with the Duke of Savoy, and, in order to make him break his treaty with Louis XIV. and Philip V., offered him territorial advantages; but, this time, it was at the expense of Spain herself, and not of the Spanish possessions; with the American provinces situated between the Rio de la Plata and Brazil, Leopold promised a part of Estremadura and Galicia. This was not the way to win back the Spaniards to the House of Austria. The maritime powers guaranteed a subsidy. The King of Portugal promised to join fifteen thousand soldiers to twelve thousand foreign veterans that the allies were to send to the Tagus to attack Spain. He was, however, unwilling to declare himself till the Austrian Pretender should disembark in Portugal. The Emperor, pressed by a few Spanish refugees of high rank, decided, after some hesitation, to launch his second son in this perilous career. Leopold and his eldest son, the King of the Romans, ceded all their claims to the Archduke Charles, who was proclaimed King of Spain at Vienna, September 12, 1703, and recognized as such by the allied powers. This was an important step beyond the treaty of September 1701; England and Holland surpassed William III.; the point in question here was no longer partition or *equitable satisfaction*, and peace was made impossible. The pretended *Carlos III.* repaired to Holland in the month of November. A frightful tempest, December 8, caused enormous losses among the navies and merchant-shipping of England and Holland, flooded Bristol and a part of London, broke the dikes of Texel and Zealand, and retarded Carlos nearly a month: he crossed over to England in the beginning of January 1704, with a sorry equipage; sumptuous English generosity charged itself with equipping him as a king. The disaster of December 8, worse than the loss of a battle, was repaired with a promptness that attested the great resources of the two maritime powers, and the expedition to Portugal, which set out the middle of January, but was detained by the winds, definitively set sail, February 17, 1704.

England and Holland, or rather Marlborough and Heinsius, had resolved, at the same time, to succor the Emperor strongly in his hereditary States, where he could no longer maintain himself, without the aid of the Anglo-Batavians, against the French, Bavarians, and Hungarians, at liberty to form a junction before Vienna. The first months of 1704 were employed in preparations on both sides: Louis XIV. had ordered a levy of nearly thirty thousand recruits to be apportioned throughout France. In the middle of May, Marlborough crossed the Meuse with his English troops and the auxiliary troops in the pay of England, and ascended the Rhine, directing his course towards the Lower Moselle. Villeroi effected a parallel movement, through Namur and Luxemburg, with the main body of the French forces of Flanders. Marlborough carried with him the whole interest and impulse of the war. Nothing notable took place in Belgium during the season.

At the moment when Marlborough began this march, which indicated that all action was about to be directed towards Germany, the armies that had been waging war in the Empire, in the preceding year, had also put themselves again in motion. They had been for some time extended over a large space. The Elector of Bavaria kept his troops at home, between the Lech and the Inn, with his advance posts in Austria; Marsin, with his French auxiliaries, was stretched from the Lech to the Iller; Tallard, with the army that had retaken Landau, was in Alsace. The enemies separated Marsin from Tallard, Baden occupying the country between the Iller, the south bank of the Danube, Lake Constance, and the Black Mountains, whilst the remnant of Styrum's army, reinforced by whatever troops the Emperor and the Empire had been able to add to it, was deployed on the north of the Danube, from the lines of Bühl to Franconia. This second German army was no longer to have the incapable Styrum for chief, but Eugene, who had directed the defences of Austria, in 1703, without acting in person, and had made fruitless efforts to treat with the Hungarians. The enemy's great captains were about to unite on that theatre abandoned by the French general most capable of coping with them, and occupied by mediocrities. This was not reassuring. Tallard and Marsin, far from the presumption of Villeroi, seemed to feel their insufficiency, and showed, from the opening of the campaign, an ill-omened timidity. They succeeded, however, in an important operation: in the beginning of May, the Elector and Marsin, on one side, Tallard on the other, marched towards the Black Mountains by a well-combined movement; the Imperialists

had not time to concentrate sufficient forces to oppose both sides, and the junction took place at Villingen, May 19. Tallard remitted to Marsin twelve or thirteen thousand soldiers, recruits as well as reserve troops, which he had been charged with conducting to him; but, instead of remaining with the Franco-Bavarians to act in a body in the centre of the Empire, he returned to the Rhine, according to the plan agreed upon with the King. The Elector and Marsin fell back on Ulm, closely followed by Baden, who had massed the main body of the German forces on both banks of the Danube. Eugene soon arrived at the camp of Baden, at Ehingen.

Marlborough, however, had thrown himself to the right bank of the Rhine (May 26), crossed the Main (May 30), and reached the Neckar (June 4). He was joined there by reinforcements from Holland. The speedy concentration of the allies on the Danube could no longer be doubted. Villeroi arrived from Luxemburg to join Tallard on the confines of Alsace. At the news of the movement of Villeroi, Eugene and Baden, leaving their army at Ehingen, hastened to confer with Marlborough at Rastadt (June 16).[1] They agreed that Marlborough and Baden should operate against the Franco-Bavarians with the greater part of the combined forces, and that Eugene should post himself between the lines of Bühl and the Lower Neckar, with a reserve composed of new German, Dutch, and Danish reinforcements. Louis XIV., without knowing the projects of the allies, sent similar orders to his generals, namely, that Tallard should join the Elector and Marsin, and that Villeroi should establish himself at Offenburg, on the right bank of the Rhine, opposite the lines of Bühl. Unfortunately, though these plans were similar, their execution was very different. Precious time had been lost in hesitation, in exchange of letters, at a distance of a hundred and twenty leagues, between Versailles and the marshals. Tallard did not cross the Rhine at Kehl till the 1st of July, and Villeroi till the 7th. Since June 22, the army of Marlborough had been united to that of Baden at a distance of four leagues from Ulm. These two generals immediately took the offensive with sixty thousand men against the Elector of Bavaria and Marsin, who, June 26, had assembled thirty-five thousand men between Dillingen and Lauingen, and detached ten thousand to the heights of Schellenberg, near Donauwörth; the Elector ordered Schellenberg to be intrenched, in order to cover Donauwörth, a vital point in the defence of Bavaria. He should

[1] The Prince of Baden had built a château there that was a miniature of Versailles.

have put himself in a condition to sustain this post: the Elector and Marsin suffered themselves to be amused by the enemies; the latter, after having threatened for four days to attack them at Dillingen (June 27–July 1), defiled, July 2, at daybreak, on Donauwörth, with such rapidity that Marlborough reached the foot of Schellenberg at five o'clock in the afternoon, and opened the attack with a vanguard of twelve thousand men. The Bavarian general, D'Arco, repulsed him three times with great carnage; but, when the entire mass of the enemy's army, led by the Prince of Baden, had entered into action about eight o'clock, longer resistance soon became impossible: it only remained for the Franco-Bavarians to retire under cover of the night. The conquerors had lost many more than the conquered; but the result was important. The Elector of Bavaria evacuated Donauwörth, Neuburg, and Ratisbon, that is to say, the whole line of the Danube, except Ulm and Ingolstadt, and withdrew under Augsburg. The generals of the enemies threw bridges over the Danube and the Lech, carried Rain, which opened to them Bavaria, and offered the Elector advantageous conditions of peace. They were willing to make him concessions of territory and to reëstablish his brother in the Electorate of Cologne. On the news that Tallard was finally crossing the Black Mountains, the Elector refused, and the allies avenged themselves by dispatching parties throughout Bavaria, whose cruelties recalled the devastation of the Palatinate.

Tallard, as he had done in May, descended from the valley of the Rhine into the valley of the Danube by Villingen, from the 12th to the 15th of July: on the 21st, informed that Eugene had quitted the lines of Bühl and was marching on his flank, he took the right bank of the Danube and pushed on without hindrance as far as Augsburg, where he joined the Elector and Marsin, August 3 and 4. Eugene had advanced between the Upper Neckar and the Upper Danube with half of his army-corps (fifteen thousand men). Villeroi should have followed the movement of Eugene; but he allowed himself to be deceived for some days by the marches and countermarches of this great strategist; then, at the moment when he suspected his true design, he received an express order from the King to engage in no case among the mountains, for fear of uncovering Alsace, as if the fifteen thousand men left by Eugene in the lines of Bühl could be feared by Landau and Strasburg! This deplorable order secured the superiority to the enemy at the points where the fate of Germany was about to be decided. Whilst Villeroi remained stationary on the Kinzig,

Eugene winged his flight towards the Danube and reached it, August 8, at Hochstadt, on the field of battle lately made illustrious by Villars. Marlborough returned from the entrance of Bavaria to meet Eugene, whilst Baden marched against Ingolstadt with the infantry. Tallard and Marsin, being unable to prevent the junction of the chiefs of the enemy, formed the project of cutting off their communications with Nordlingen and Franconia, whence they drew their supplies. August 9, the Elector and the two marshals moved from Augsburg to Lauingen, where they crossed the Danube, the 10th; but, once there, the Elector would think of nothing else than of hastening to meet the enemy. The gravest reasons prescribed the gaining of time, as Tallard demanded. The Elector, despite the representations of Marsin, had dispersed most of his troops through Bavaria to repel the parties of the enemy;[1] it was necessary to wait for the return of these Bavarian corps. The French cavalry was in a very bad condition and needed to be reorganized. The enemies, if they had been held somewhat in check, would have been obliged to retire into Franconia to subsist, which would have released Bavaria without striking a blow. On the other side, the affairs of Poland and Hungary were assuming an aspect more and more menacing to the Emperor and his allies. Rakoczi was again threatening Vienna with a Hungarian levy in a body, and was about to be proclaimed Prince of Transylvania by that country freed from the Austrians. The Elector-King, Augustus of Saxony, a member of the Great Alliance, had just been declared dethroned in Poland by the Polish confederates, united with the Swedes against the Saxons and the Russians, their auxiliaries; these junctures, which were becoming more and more favorable, forbade the risking of anything without necessity.

The Elector listened to no reason: he would not even stop at Hochstadt, where the space between the Danube and the heights that bound its valley is quite narrow, marshy, and easy to defend. He took the army, the 12th, between Blenheim (Blindheim) and Lutzingen, with the project of marching thence on Donauwörth, where Eugene and Marlborough had united on the 11th. The enemies anticipated him: the 13th, at daybreak, they moved directly on the Franco-Bavarian camp. The army of Tallard, resting on the Danube and the village of Blenheim, formed the right; the combined army of the Elector and Marsin, resting on the wooded heights and village of Lutzingen, formed the left;

[1] There were in camp but five battalions and twenty squadrons of Bavarians.

Marlborough, with the Anglo-Batavians and the auxiliaries in their pay, faced Tallard; Eugene, with the Austro-Germans, faced the Elector and Marsin. The enemy numbered about thirty-three thousand foot and twenty-nine thousand horse; the Franco-Bavarians may have had thirty-five thousand foot and seventeen or eighteen thousand cavalry, a great number of which were dismounted in consequence of a murrain that devastated the army of Tallard. These forces were distributed in a very unequal manner, Marlborough having much more infantry and more than twice as much cavalry as Tallard, whilst Eugene was inferior to the Elector and Marsin more than one half in infantry, and was little superior to them in cavalry. Marlborough somewhat lessened this inequality by reinforcing Eugene with a few battalions. The great effort was about to fall on Tallard. That marshal did nothing that should have been done to lessen the peril. Forced to fight in a position that he disapproved, he was troubled and made his dispositions badly. He did not put himself in a posture to dispute the crossing of a brook that covered his front: he crowded a mass of infantry into Blenheim and took little care to support his cavalry in the plain; he even reduced this cavalry, already so weak, by dismounting his dragoons to join them to the infantry in Blenheim. Nearly all the general officers were, like him, demoralized in advance.

The first hours of the day were nevertheless very fatal to the Anglo-Batavians, who remained a long time exposed to the fire of the French artillery (ninety field-pieces), waiting for Eugene, who had ravines and woods to turn, to arrive in line. The first attacks against Blenheim were vigorously repulsed; but when Marlborough, contenting himself with keeping up the fire against Blenheim in order to amuse Tallard, had hurled the mass of his troops beyond the brook into the plain, the struggle became evidently unequal: the French squadrons had only been able to form themselves in two ranks; the enemies were in three; the squadrons of the enemies, if broken in a charge, rallied under the protection of a powerful infantry; the French had not this resource. Tallard sent to the Elector and Marsin, asking for indispensable succor; a part of their cavalry had been joined to that of Tallard; they refused to weaken themselves further. The cavalry of Tallard, pressed by four lines of squadrons and taken in flank by the fire of the enemy's battalions, broke and abandoned in the plain a small corps of infantry, which was cut to pieces. Tallard sought to regain Blenheim in order to extricate from there the main body of his infantry and attempt a retreat; he was surrounded and taken

before his arrival. The greater part of Marlborough's troops fell back on Blenheim. The rest went to succor Eugene, who, attacking a well-posted enemy with inferior forces, had met with great losses and had been fortunate in not having to contend with more skilful generals. When the Elector and Marsin saw from a distance the army of Tallard routed, and the columns of Marlborough turning against them, they retired in good order by the heights, without making the least attempt to extricate the infantry of Tallard, or to rally his cavalry. The last effort of the battle was concentrated on Blenheim. The greatest confusion reigned in this village, so foolishly encumbered with soldiers. The general who commanded there lost his presence of mind: he urged his horse into the Danube and was drowned there. His lieutenant neither knew how to take his place nor to secure retreat while it was still possible. Blenheim was hemmed in and assailed by masses. A first brigade, surrounded, surrendered; at evening, the general officer commanding capitulated in behalf of all the rest; twenty-seven battalions of veteran infantry and twelve squadrons of dragoons, or at least what remained of them, surrendered themselves prisoners of war; the regiment of Navarre burned its colors and broke its arms in rage! Ten or twelve thousand prisoners remained in the hands of the enemy; twelve or fourteen thousand slain or wounded covered the field of battle, or dragged themselves after the Elector and Marsin on the road to Ulm.

The immediate consequences of the defeat were worse than the defeat itself. The Elector and Marsin might have stopped at Ulm, and summoned the army of Villeroi and the troops left in Bavaria. The greater part of the artillery had been saved; the cavalry of Tallard had come up; the enemy must have been weakened by twelve or thirteen thousand killed or disabled, and defensive warfare on the Danube would have been by no means impossible; it is maintained that the Elector first gave this advice; but the discouragement was too great: a council of war voted for the evacuation of Augsburg and all the posts occupied in Swabia, except Ulm; four thousand soldiers and the wounded were left in Ulm, and Villeroi was summoned to Villingen only to protect the retreat of the conquered across the Black Mountains; the flying army did not stop till it reached the left bank of the Rhine. It abandoned all Germany to the allies, as the price of a single victory![1]

[1] General Pelet, t. IV. pp. 369–621. Saint-Hilaire, t. III. p. 48. Lamberti, t. III. pp. 84–105. Quinci, t. IV. pp. 258–290. Dumont, *les Batailles et Victoires du prince Eugène.* The resolution of the council of war was in conformity with the intentions of the King.

The material damage was immense; the moral damage still greater; the renown of our legions, so long invincible, was profoundly shaken by this unheard-of capitulation of a whole army-corps on the field of battle; the prestige of France was gone! There was but one cry among the allied nations: "The ruin so long expected at last has come! What the war of 1688 could not do, the war of the Succession will accomplish! After three years' oscillation, Fortune declares herself! Let Louis XIV. acknowledge at last that no one, before his death, should be called the Great or the Happy!" [1]

The Elector of Bavaria sadly regained his old government of the Netherlands, which was about to be his only asylum. Villeroi took the command on the Rhine. The enemies reached this river almost as soon as he. Eugene, Baden, and Marlborough, leaving troops before Ingolstadt and Ulm,[2] marched directly to Philippsburg and crossed the Rhine there, September 5–7, without an effort being made by Villeroi to dispute their passage. Neither did he attempt to support Landau; he left a strong garrison in this place and retired to the Moder. Landau was immediately invested (September 9). Eugene and Marlborough would willingly have gone further, and have sought at once to penetrate into France; but the Prince of Baden obtained the concession that his own country and the Rhenish circles should first be rid of a formidable neighborhood. At the end of some weeks, the generals of the enemies, seeing Landau far from surrendering, compounded concerning their respective views: the Germans remained before Landau, where the King of the Romans came to join them; the Anglo-Batavians moved to the Moselle, occupied Treves, which was not defended, (October 30,) invested Trarbach, and pushed their advanced posts on to the Sarre: Marlborough thus put himself in a position to attack Lorraine in the spring. In the mean time, a treaty was signed in the camp before Landau, between the commissioners of the King of the Romans and of the Electress of Bavaria endowed with power by her husband; all the fortified towns of Bavaria were to be delivered up to the Emperor; all the troops remaining in Bavaria were to be disbanded with an oath no longer to bear arms against the Emperor and the Empire: the only con-

[1] AGNOSCAT TANDEM LUDOVICUS XIV. NEMINEM DEBERE ANTE OBITUM AUT FELICEM AUT MAGNUM VOCARI! Inscription proposed for a monument in commemoration of the battle of Hochstadt.

[2] Ulm surrendered September 10, in consideration of the free retreat of the garrison and the wounded.

ditions were the maintenance of the privileges and customs of the country and the residence of the Electress at Munich, dismantled, with the useful domain of the regency of Munich (September 9).

Landau, after an admirable defence, which had reduced the garrison from five thousand men to two thousand, and cost the enemy more than nine thousand, was finally surrendered, November 24, by Laubanie, its governor, who had lost his sight by the bursting of a bomb. Trarbach defended itself with the same heroism; it cost the Anglo-Batavians fifteen hundred soldiers and six weeks' time to overcome five hundred men in this fortress. These brave garrisons retrieved the honor of the army.

The confidence of the allies was not thereby diminished: their hopes were boundless, like their joy; English pride, especially, so long wounded and crushed, overflowed in veritable delirium; Marlborough was elevated above all the heroes of history and fable. Created a Prince of the Empire by Leopold, received at the Hague by the States-General with the honors that would have been rendered to a stadtholder, he was at London the object of an enthusiasm which the constituted powers translated into solemn congratulations, and magnificent gifts; the Queen transferred to him a domain of the crown, Woodstock, where a splendid palace was built for him, which was called Blenheim, in honor of his victory.

The events in Spain, if they did not answer as well as those of Germany to the wishes of Austria, were still of a nature to increase the satisfaction of the English. The opening, however, had not been fortunate for the allies: the Archduke Charles, having disembarked at Lisbon, March 7, with a small English, German, and Dutch army-corps, had not found Portugal in a position to fulfil the engagements of her king; Spain, despite the deplorable state of her finances and army, was first ready, owing to levies of militia in Castile and Galicia, and, above all, to the forwarding of ten or twelve thousand Frenchmen, whom Louis XIV. had sent beyond the Pyrenees, under the command of the Duke of Berwick, a natural son of the late King James II. and a sister of Marlborough, and recently naturalized as a Frenchman. Philip V. and Berwick anticipated the invasion by invading Portugal themselves, with from twenty-six to twenty-eight thousand combatants. They carried, almost without resistance, a goodly number of places, and took there, in detail, a portion of the allied troops. Had the plan of campaign been well executed, Portugal would have been in extreme peril. Two army-corps

were to march on both banks of the Tagus as far as Villa-Veilha, where they were to unite, in order to proceed as far as possible towards Lisbon. The Flemish general, Tserclaës, who commanded the corps on the south bank, did not second Philip V. and Berwick at all, and caused the project to fail by his timidity and false manœuvres. Time passed; the intense heats came on, and it was necessary to canton the army and raze most of the places taken. The penury of the Franco-Spanish army in equipage and provisions would, probably, in any case, have prevented complete success (May–June.)

The allies also failed at first on the side of the sea. Admiral Rooke, after having uselessly laid in wait for the American galleons, had set sail for Barcelona, and attempted a descent: he had been informed that the Catalans were ready to rise at the first sight of his fleet; a plot had, in fact, been concocted at Barcelona, but the secret had been divulged; the hostile fleet, after a fruitless bombardment, put to sea again (May–June).

The English admiral succeeded better in an enterprise less essential to the direct success of the war, but more useful to England, and more menacing to that European equilibrium which each claimed from the rest, and which each desired to break for his own advantage. August 1, he presented himself before Gibraltar: this block of rock, the boldest promontory projected by Europe in the face of Africa, defended on the land-side by other rocks, towards the sea by the perpetual storms of a bay without shelter, was regarded as inaccessible, and would have been so had it had defenders; but there were less than a hundred soldiers there, almost without mounted cannon and without munitions. The French ambassador, Grammont, had uselessly warned the council of Spain to supply Gibraltar. The allied fleet silenced the batteries of the mole by fifteen thousand shot; the shallops effected a descent there, and carried the mole and an outwork; the little garrison capitulated (August 4). The inhabitants left in a body, sooner than acknowledge *King Carlos III.* It was not for *Carlos III.* that England had made this conquest, to which the arms of Holland had foolishly contributed. Rooke put two thousand English into Gibraltar. It was thus that England acquired the key of the Mediterranean, repaired, and much more, the loss of Tangiers, which she had had for a moment in her hands, and realized the last counsels of William III.!

The French fleet appeared on the Andalusian coasts a few days too late! The squadron of Brest had left this port, May 16, led

by the Admiral of France, Count de Toulouse, the second son of the King and Madame de Montespan, a prince of twenty-six, of valiant heart and good mind; he had a lieutenant capable of guiding his maritime inexperience, Victor Marie d'Estrées, now called Marshal de Cœuvres. The squadron of Brest, by the audacious orders of the King, had passed the Straits of Gibraltar at the close of May, happily avoiding a collision with the Anglo-Batavian fleet, greatly superior in numbers, and gained the coast of Provence to join the squadron at Toulon. On arriving there, Toulouse and Cœuvres had found nothing ready, through the criminal negligence of the Secretary of the Navy, Jérôme de Pontchartrain, son of the Chancellor. This minister, the most fatal to whom the absurd system of ministerial hereditability had given birth, arrived, through the perversity of his egotism, at still worse results than Chamillart had done through his incapacity. Madly jealous of the High Admiral's authority, who would not slumber in a sumptuous sinecure, his only thought was to disgust him with the sea, and his ill-will increased till it reached treason. By dint of activity, Toulouse and Cœuvres succeeded in doing what the minister had not done, and in putting the squadron of Toulon in a condition to put to sea; but the united French squadrons were unable to reach Barcelona till the 1st of August, and Gibraltar was lost before they knew where to seek the enemy.[1]

The two fleets encountered each other, August 22, off Velez Malaga. August 24, the enemy, having the windward, took the offensive. The French numbered forty-nine vessels, only one of which had less than fifty guns; the *report* of the enemy's fleet mentions forty-three vessels of more than fifty guns, and nine of from thirty to fifty; but this report seems incomplete, according to the testimony of two of the principal actors, Villette and Sourdeval, who give to the enemy, the one, sixty-two, the other, sixty-five sail, besides light craft. The French had also twenty-three galleys, four of them Spanish, and the enemy seven bomb-ketches. It was a terrible engagement: equal obstinacy was shown on both sides, with the difference, however, that the French

[1] See the *Mém. sur la Marine de France*, by Valincourt, Secretary-General of the Marine, and the *Mém. au roi*, by Count de Toulouse, prefixed to the *Mém. de Villette*, p. lxviii. Saint-Simon, who merits little confidence in his envious declamations against Luxembourg, Villars, Vendôme, and nearly all our eminent generals, is here much more credible. With his insane hatred of *royal bastards*, there must have been superabundant reason for his taking the part of Count de Toulouse, as he does, against the minister. See Saint-Simon, t. IV. p. 225; t. XIII. p. 304.

sought to board, and the enemies refused it, preferring a contest of artillery, in which their bomb-ketches promised them an advantage not compensated for by our galleys, which could render little service on account of the heavy sea. The fire of our artillerists, however, was so well directed, that the French flag-ship forced the English flag-ship to fall back, and two others after it; the ship of Lieutenant-General Villette, commanding the vanguard, had driven four ships, and his mate, the famous privateer Ducasse, ex-governor of Saint Domingo, had forced the English vice-admiral, Shovel, to give way, when a bomb, hurled by a galliot, set fire to the stern of Villette's ship, and compelled him to relinquish the combat, — a movement which was imitated by the rest of the vanguard. Shovel, and the English vanguard, terribly maltreated, retired on their side. It was five o'clock; the contest in the centre and rear-guard was prolonged till night. In the rear-guard, the ship of the Dutch admiral, Calemberg, had sunk, with all its crew; another Dutch ship and an English ship had also perished. Many vessels, on both sides, were damaged, unrigged, or dismasted, but the French had not lost a single vessel.

The next morning the wind turned in favor of the French. Count de Toulouse assembled a council of war. The brave Lieutenant-General de Relingue, from his death-bed, where he lay with his thigh shot away, entreated, conjured the admiral to renew the battle. Toulouse was disposed to do so; but a kind of Mentor that the King had given him, a certain Marquis d'O, an ignorant vice-admiral, sprung from the antechamber of Madame de Maintenon, opposed it so peremptorily, that Toulouse and Cœuvres dared not overrule him. The enemy was permitted to depart, without molestation. A short time afterwards it was learned that most of the Anglo-Batavian ships were almost out of ammunition, and that Admiral Rooke had determined, in case of attack, to burn twenty-five of his vessels, to prevent them from falling into the hands of the French! The recapture of Gibraltar would, probably, have been the consequence of the victory![1]

The opportunity to retake Gibraltar was not found again, any more than had been the opportunity to march on Vienna. The battle of Velez Malaga was the last great engagement of that navy which Colbert had created, and which perished in the hands of Pontchartrain. Louis XIV., less clear-sighted and more obstinate

[1] *Hist. de la puissance navale de l'Angleterre*, par Sainte-Croix, t. II. pp. 104–110. Villette, pp. 154–849. Saint-Simon, t. IV. pp. 232–236.

in his selections as he grew older, retained Pontchartrain, despite the just complaints of Count de Toulouse, and the minister was not long in persuading the King that great fleets were useless, and that separate squadrons were sufficient to protect French commerce, and disturb that of the enemy. The disastrous state of the finances but too well aided Pontchartrain's arguments. That navy, which was deprived of the chances of great deeds, should at least have been kept up; but everything was allowed to fall to decay, the materiel, the stocks, the ports themselves. Pontchartrain, in a vindicatory memorial, subsequently threw the blame on Chamillart.

An attempt, however, was made to reconquer Gibraltar by a regular siege. The fleet, on returning to Toulon, had left before Gibraltar, already reprovisioned and reinforced, a squadron charged with seconding a small Franco-Spanish army-corps that attacked it by land. But the Spanish general, Villadarias, neither knew how to conduct attacks, nor to profit by works directed by Petit-Renau, our illustrious maritime engineer; the English, after succeeding, at the close of November, in a first attempt to succor the place, made preparations for another attempt, on a larger scale, towards the close of winter. The commander of the blockading squadron, Pointis, the conqueror of Carthagena, knowing that the English vice-admiral, Leake, had a greatly superior force, retired to Cadiz to wait for reinforcements from Toulon; the council of Castile commanded him to return before Gibraltar. He obeyed; he had thirteen French ships and four galleons against thirty-five Anglo-Batavian ships; a gale dispersed his squadron, and he was attacked, with five ships, by the whole fleet of the enemy: he fought, during four hours, one against seven; three French ships were taken, after having three times repulsed boarding; Pointis and another commander broke their way through, stranded their ships, and burned them on the coast. It had cost the English two ships sunk and several dismasted (March 21, 1705). The siege was raised a few weeks afterwards (end of April).[1]

Italy alone afforded Louis XIV. sources of consolation.

The allies had been able to make their great effort in Germany

[1] On the affairs of Spain and the sea, see Quinci, t. IV. pp. 400–454; *Mém. de Louville*, t. II. pp. 127–154, and t. I. *passim*. Louville attributes the reverses of Spain to the fact that Louis XIV., by paying too much attention to the prejudices and suspicions of the Spaniards, had not resolutely enough undertaken the reform of their councils and of their whole government. He would have gladly sent from France, in 1701, three capable, energetic men, to reorganize the finances, the army, and the marine of Spain. It is doubtful whether Spain would have permitted it.

only by neglecting Italy and sacrificing their new auxiliary, the Duke of Savoy, to the success of their general plan. In truth, the succor brought by Stahremberg, in January, had momentarily saved the Duke by preventing the siege of Turin; but this succor was the only one during the whole year, and the small corps left by Stahremberg on the Lower Po, and reduced to five or six thousand men, received no reinforcement in the spring. At the beginning of April, this corps, pressed by the French troops of the Secchia, under command of the Grand-Prior, brother of Vendôme, was constrained to evacuate the positions that remained to it on the south of the Po, except Mirandola. Whilst the Imperialists were abandoned to themselves, the French army was increased by twelve thousand recruits, and by an amnesty offered to deserters who might rejoin their colors. Piedmont, in May, was attacked on both sides at once. The corps that had occupied, almost without resistance, the whole of Savoy, except Montmeillan, crossed the Alps and took Susa (June 1–12), whilst Vendôme invested Vercelli. The King, by excessive circumspection, had prevented Vendôme from undertaking a more decisive operation, that is, from besieging Verrua, which covered Turin, in sight of the Austro-Piedmontese army intrenched at Crescentino. During the siege of Vercelli the Grand-Prior, with the corps of the Secchia, crossed to the north of the Po and drove the Austrians to the east of the Adige; from there they regained the territory of Trent, whence they had set out in 1701. Lombardy was completely freed, save the little place of Mirandola, and the whole war of Italy was concentrated for the moment in Piedmont. Vendôme would have gladly combined all the French forces in order to operate more energetically; but the army-corps of the Alps, commanded by Lieutenant-General La Feuillade, son of the famous courtier of that name and son-in-law of Chamillart, was not subject to the general of the army of Italy, and the vanity of La Feuillade was better pleased to command in chief than to be second in command. La Feuillade set about waging war on the Vaudois valleys, instead of repairing to the camp of Vercelli. The most curious incident of this petty warfare was, that one of the Vaudois valleys, Saint-Martin, suffered itself to be gained by the French, and declared itself independent under the protection of the King; Pignerol, French by long habit, also sided with the French.

Despite La Feuillade's refusal to coöperate, Vercelli capitulated, July 20. At the close of the following month, in accordance with the intentions of the King, Vendôme assailed Ivrea. The city was

abandoned by the enemy, September 18: the two fortresses surrendered the 26th and the 29th; Fort Bard, which commands the outlet of the Great Alps above Ivrea, was taken, October 7. La Feuillade had tardily decided to join Vendôme, by forcing the pass of the Tuile (Little Saint-Bernard); the communications of Piedmont with Switzerland and Swabia were intercepted by the occupation of the Val de Sesia and the Val d'Aosta.

The Imperialists, however, had finally reëstablished in the territory of Trent an army-corps of fifteen thousand men; towards autumn, after Hochstadt, they descended again from the Italian Tyrol by the Val de Chiese; but the Grand-Prior prevented them from debouching into the plains of the territory of Brescia. This attempt could not fail to be more powerfully renewed in the coming spring, and it was essential to make an effort to conquer Piedmont before Eugene could bring his victorious bands back into Lombardy. Vendôme was at last free to return to his first design, the siege of Verrua. This was a difficult conquest: the place, well fortified, was supported by an intrenched camp on the right of the Po; a second camp was established on the other bank of the Po, at Crescentino, opposite Verrua, and the two camps and two cities were connected by a bridge and an island strongly intrenched. Vendôme at first attacked the camp on the right bank; he opened the trenches as before a fortified place. The Duke of Savoy evacuated his intrenchments without awaiting an assault (October 6), and regained Crescentino. The siege of Verrua was immediately entered upon, but the unfavorable season, the communication of Verrua with Crescentino, and the sturdy defence of the besieged, rendered the operations exceedingly slow and painful. The whole winter was consumed in them. A constancy and patience, meritorious in an epicurean like Vendôme, was required of the general and the army. It was not till March 2, 1705, that the bridge and the island of the Po were taken by assault; dispositions were being made to assail the Duke of Savoy under Crescentino, when he abandoned his second camp (March 24). The governor of Verrua still defended himself more than three weeks; when he saw himself reduced to extremities, he destroyed what munitions he had remaining, and blew up a part of the ramparts, before surrendering at discretion with fifteen hundred men, the remnant of the garrison (April 9). All the north of Piedmont, between the Great Dora, the Alps, the Sesia, and the Po, was thus in the hands of the French, and Milanais was strategetically reannexed to France; in another quarter, the corps of La Feuillade, detached at the close

of the siege of Verrua, had possessed itself of the county of Nice, with the exception of the capital; but the spring of 1705 had arrived without the attack on Turin, the great city that was the destiny of Piedmont, having yet been begun: a new storm was brewing on the side of the Tyrol, and nothing was decided in Italy, despite the successes of Vendôme, who had regained his former standard in this campaign.[1]

Bavaria lost, Germany evacuated, Alsace invaded, the enemy on the Moselle, the key of the Mediterranean in the hands of England, France superior only in Italy, but without definite success, — such was the general result of the year 1704.

The chiefs of the Great Alliance were preparing to reopen the campaign with exorbitant hopes. They had at their disposal two hundred and twenty-five thousand combatants, without counting the Piedmontese, the Portuguese, and the marine. They decided to have only thirty thousand men in Italy, with Eugene, it is true, at their head, thirty thousand in Hungary, fifteen thousand only in Spain, but supported by a powerful fleet, and to mass a hundred and fifty thousand men in three corps between the Rhine and the sea, in order to attack France at home. They endeavored to resuscitate the revolt of Cévennes, and at the same time to disarm the Hungarian insurrection by negotiations. The Emperor Leopold died meanwhile (May 5, 1705). This obscure and vulgar rival of the Great King, who had no other political genius and virtue than obstinacy, or, if we will, Austrian patience, had the satisfaction of dying after a victory, full of the thought that the House of Bourbon in its turn was about to be humiliated before the House of Austria. His eldest son Joseph, King of the Romans, a young man of twenty-seven, immediately took the Imperial title. Joseph dismissed the friends of the Jesuits, so much detested in Hungary, from high offices, made advances to the Hungarians, insinuated to them that he had neither the prejudices nor the resentments of his father against them, and accepted, although contrary to his inclination, the mediation of England and Holland between him and his revolted subjects; but Rakoczi and his friends, that is, almost the whole Magyar nation, that had already brilliantly retrieved the loss of a battle at Tyrnau, would listen to nothing without the reëstablishment of their elective constitution and the renunciation of the Emperor to Transylvania.[2] Transylvania, independent, would have

[1] General Pelet, t. IV. pp. 75–868. Saint-Hilaire, t. II. p. 401; III. pp. 1–39. Quinci, t. IV. pp. 334–400.

[2] Rakoczi, in a diet held in September, 1705, was "elevated on the buckler" as Duke and Supreme Chief of the Magyar Confederation.

been the citadel of Hungarian liberty. Joseph would never have made such a concession; he carried on the negotiations and the war together, and succeeded in rousing the Slavic tribes of the Raitzes (Rascians) against the Magyars. Despite this diversion at home, the Hungarians continued to ravage the States of the Emperor, who was delighted at the arrival of a Danish auxiliary corps. Louis XIV. furnished Rakoczi with a few officers and some money, much less than he would have done in more prosperous times [1]

The Hungarian war could not bring about decided events, Turkey remaining neutral and the irregular levies of Hungarians not being in a condition to besiege Vienna, without a junction of which Hochstadt had deprived them of the hope. The great interest of the campaign was therefore elsewhere, — on the frontier of France. The allies had imagined that they would find before them only the remains of the French armies; they knew that the murrain, which had paved the way for the disaster of Hochstadt, had extended to the army of the Netherlands, and they thought themselves rid of that French cavalry, so long their terror, which they had just conquered for the first time; but Louis XIV., feeling that it was a question of life or death, made unheard-of efforts during the winter. Extreme danger, as is usual with strong natures, restored to him the buoyancy and activity of his youth. At the beginning of winter all the French cavalry was dismounted; in the spring the whole of it was found again on horse. The infantry was again rendered complete by militia. The Spanish troops of the Netherlands and the remnant of those of Bavaria and Cologne were recruited, and again put in condition at the expense of France. Three imposing army-corps faced the three great corps of the enemy between the Rhine and the sea. The Elector of Bavaria and Villeroi commanded in Flanders; Marsin in Alsace; the middle corps, on the Moselle, was confided to Villars: this was the most efficacious of the defensive measures! Villars was replaced in Cévennes by Berwick, whom a court intrigue had caused to be recalled from Spain.

Scarcely had Villars quitted Languedoc, when disquieting symptoms had caused the pacification to be judged less assured than he had thought it. Several of the amnestied Camisard chiefs had returned from Geneva, excited by agents of the allies, who had not succored them when there was time to do so, and who now coldly impelled them to their destruction, in order to draw from it some

[1] See, on the whole war of Hungary, the admirable *Mémoires* of Prince Rakoczi, one of the greatest characters that that heroic nation has produced.

distant diversion; the allies had promised them that the Anglo-Batavian fleet should seize Cette, and that the Vaudois should descend from the Alps into Dauphiny. The Camisard chiefs did not recommence the partisan warfare; they concocted a conspiracy ramifying throughout all the cities of Lower Languedoc; April 25, they were to rise and put the intendant Basville to death, to arrest as hostages the Duke of Berwick, the bishops, the governors of the cities, etc., and to stir up the Protestants, and, it was hoped, a part of the Catholics, by joining the cry of *No more imposts!* to that of *Liberty of conscience!* The plot was revealed by an accomplice; the principal conspirators were arrested in Nîmes. Catinat[1] and Ravanel, the two most renowned Camisard chiefs next to Cavalier and Roland, suffered the punishment of incendiaries, the stake! Many others died on the gallows, at the stake, or on the wheel. Some, who had regained the mountains, perished there fighting. Others grew old, savage recluses, concealed in caves among the rocks and in the forests. Here and there some execution of a *rebel* discovered in his retreat, some murder of an informer by the friends of the victim, seemed the last sparks of an extinguished fire. The governing power did, at least during some years, to prevent the conflagration from being rekindled, what it should have done to prevent its birth: it not only ceased to search into consciences, but even shut its eyes on meetings enveloped in some degree in mystery. This period of systematic indulgence lasted till the year 1713, which was destined to leave sad traces on our religious history.[2]

The affair of Cévennes was only an episode: all eyes, towards spring, were fixed on the northern frontier; the great name of Eugene scarcely succeeded in diverting a few glances to Italy. The main question was to know whether France would see the armies of the enemy on her own soil. The plan that Marlborough had meditated at the close of the preceding year, with the approbation of Eugene, and which he caused to be adopted by the States-General, was to maintain the defensive in the Netherlands and on the Rhine, and to attack by the Moselle and the Sarre with a formidable mass. Towards the middle of May, a part of the Anglo-Batavian army crossed the Meuse, leaving two large corps, one at Maestricht, the other in Flanders, and moved towards the Moselle, where it was to be joined by the main body of the forces of the Emperor and the Empire. Marlborough hastened to Coblentz to

[1] This surname was given him because he incessantly talked with admiration of Marshal Catinat, under whom he had borne arms.

[2] *Mém. de Berwick*, t. I. p. 276. *Hist. des Pasteurs du désert*, t. II. l. IX.

confer with the Electors of the Rhine, then to Rastadt to confer with the Prince of Baden, who commanded the Imperial army of the Rhine; the Electors and the Prince agreed to send three thousand artillery horses immediately; Baden promised to march without delay towards the Moselle with the greater part of his troops. Marlborough returned to join his army-corps, which was reinforced at Treves by masses of Germans in the pay of the maritime powers. June 3, he crossed the Sarre near its confluence with the Moselle, and deployed his troops on the heights of Perl. Villars was encamped before him, on the heights of Kerling and Früching, resting on the Moselle and the little town of Sierck. From the 4th to the 12th of June, Marlborough received new reinforcements, which swelled his army to eighty thousand men; Villars had only fifty-five thousand, and Marlborough was still expecting Baden. Villars, full of confidence in his excellent position and in the order of his troops, who were burning to avenge Hochstadt, did not recede. He was every day expecting to receive battle, when, on the morning of June 17, he learned with astonishment that the enemies had decamped during the night and fallen back on Treves. A messenger brought the explanation of this retreat in the name of Marlborough himself: Marlborough begged Villars to believe that it was not his fault that he had not attacked him; that it drove him to despair; but that the Prince of Baden had not kept his word.

Baden, in fact, jealous of the conqueror of Hochstadt, and irritated because he was obliged to relinquish Alsace in order to second Marlborough on the Moselle, had advanced slowly and with an ill grace, and had not yet joined him. The other Princes of the Rhine, through negligence or fear of seeing Austria too completely victorious, had not furnished the promised supplies. The soldiers were suffering and deserting. The States-General were disturbed by the operations begun on the Meuse by the Elector of Bavaria and Villeroi, who, having to face only greatly inferior forces since the departure of Marlborough, had retaken Huy and its four fortresses (May 28–June 10), occupied the city of Liege, and threatened the citadel; the States-General re-demanded their troops. These circumstances no longer permitted Marlborough to besiege Sarre-Louis in order to penetrate into Lorraine, his first project; the allies might have moved either against Thionville or against Luxemburg, which would probably have arrested the enterprises of the French on the Meuse; but the German generals were unwilling to follow Marlborough beyond the Mo-

selle. An attack in front on the French army remained possible. Marlborough was audacity itself, yet he dared not undertake it: he knew the post and the general, and he judged success impossible with less than a hundred thousand men. He left one German corps at Treves, sent back others to the Rhine, and returned to the Meuse.[1]

The expedition of the Moselle, the object of so many triumphant speculations, had entirely miscarried; the allies learned that France was not overthrown by a single reverse.

A few days after the retreat of Marlborough, the corps that he had left at Treves, menaced by a detachment of Villars, abandoned that city. Villars did not follow up his advantages on the Moselle, but hastened to join Marsin in Alsace, to endeavor to carry the line of the Lauter, and to invest Landau before Baden should concentrate his forces. Wissembourg was taken July 4, but the main body of the German troops of the Lauter withdrew into a good position at Lauterbourg, and was speedily reinforced there; Villars and Marsin believed themselves unable to take possession of this intrenched camp, and the order received by Marsin to go to the aid of the army of Flanders obliged Villars to put himself on the defensive again before Baden.

Marlborough had counted, on returning to the Netherlands, to avenge himself on the Elector of Bavaria and Villeroi for the mischance that he had experienced through Villars. On his approach, the French army of the Netherlands had reëntered the main lines; he retook Huy without difficulty (July 9–10), then marched against the French, whose front was much too extended, passed the lines by surprise, on the Gette, between Landen and Tillemont, and drove back the French army on Louvain, after overthrowing the left wing (July 18). The firmness of a few battalions prevented the repulse to which this wing was subjected from being turned into a rout. The army sought cover behind the Dyle. Marlborough destroyed part of the lines behind him, and attempted to force the passage of the Dyle. He was repulsed, July 30, at Corbeeck and Neeryssche. He crossed the Dyle much farther up, towards Genappe (August 16), and threatened Brussels, in order to lure the French to battle. The French posted themselves between Brussels and Louvain, on the Yssche, a brook that descends from the forest of Soignies and empties into the Dyle. The position was advantageous, but the allies had some numerical superiority, and had not a Villars at their head. Marlborough

[1] Villars, p. 151. Lamberti, t. III. p. 469. General Pelet, t. V. pp. 881, 550.

wished to open the attack; the deputies that represented the States-General in the army formally opposed it. We may imagine the wrath of the English general, who thought that he saw, for the second time in the year, victory wrested from his hands by his allies. He retired (August 19), took in his rear Leau, or Leewe, a small place that commands the confluence of the two Gettes (September 3–5), then crossed the Demer, moved towards the two Nethes, and detached a corps against Santvliet. The French generals effected a diversion by retaking Diest, a city on the Demer, that the enemy was fortifying (October 25). Santvliet surrendered a few days afterwards. This was, in the Netherlands, the end of a campaign that had suggested so many hopes and given so few results to the allies.

On the side of the Rhine, the allies, by superiority of numbers, obtained a trifling advantage towards autumn. Villars, by the departure of Marsin for the Netherlands and of some other troops for Italy, found himself reduced to thirty-five thousand men. Baden, reinforced by German contingents, had at least fifty thousand; he succeeded, during September, in crossing the line of the Moder. Villars, fearing to be cut off from Strasburg, and seeing the enemy still increasing, fell back on Strasburg and the canal of Molsheim, leaving in Drusenheim and Haguenau a few troops that occupied the enemy for three weeks. The garrison of Haguenau, when it found itself no longer in a condition to defend this wretched place, quitted it, during the night, with such audacity and good fortune that it reached the Saverne safe and sound (October 6). The murrain, which was raging in both armies, the desertion that especially weakened the allies, and the want of harmony of their generals, prevented Baden from endeavoring to push on farther into Alsace.

During the autumn, movements had taken place in Bavaria that caused Austria grave disquietude. The Austrian government, with its accustomed perfidy, had violated all the conditions of the treaty of Landau, had pillaged, ransomed, outraged, communities and individuals, robbed even the palace of the Elector, obliged the Electress to quit the country, and undertaken to constrain the population to furnish it twelve thousand recruits. The peasants fled into the woods: their villages were sacked; their mothers and wives were dragged to prison. They armed themselves, guided by old soldiers, seized Braunau and Scharding, and attempted to surprise Munich (December 26). Unfortunately, the sudden rise of the rivers prevented them from uniting their bands and throwing

twenty thousand men on Munich: they were defeated in detail, and the promise of an amnesty caused them to lay down their arms. Austria kept her word as usual, and all the squares in the Bavarian cities were theatres of murders to which she had the impudence to give a judicial form. The Hungarians took warning from it.[1]

The war in Italy, where Eugene and Vendôme again found themselves opposed to each other, offered a strategic spectacle of high interest, especially since the great operation of Marlborough had failed. The disposition of the French forces was good, this time: the corps of the Alps or of La Feuillade was absorbed into the army of Piedmont, and Vendôme had full authority over the two armies of Piedmont and Lombardy, charged, the one to take Turin, the other to repel Eugene. The enemies, on their side, operated as well as possible. The Duke of Savoy, driven from Verrua, was intrenched at Chivasso, in order again to bar the approaches to Turin. Prince Eugene arrived, April 23, at Roveredo, in the territory of Trent: Marlborough, in order to relieve the Emperor, had gone, during the preceding November, to ask of the King of Prussia eight thousand soldiers for the army of Italy;[2] but Eugene did not wait to be in full readiness before acting. May 18, he crossed the Adige below Verona with six thousand horse and seven thousand foot, and marched towards the Mincio, for the purpose of joining another corps of six or seven thousand men that had descended by the Val de Chiese to the entrance of the territory of Brescia. On the 11th, his vanguard was stopped by that of Vendôme near Goita. Vendôme hastened thither in person, thinking that the most pressing thing was to repulse his formidable rival. During this time, Mirandola, a stronghold preserved by the Imperialists on the south side of the Po, surrendered to the Grand-Prior, brother of Vendôme. Eugene fell back towards the mountains, embarked his infantry on Lake Garda, sent his cavalry round the head of the lake, and thus, by a route opposite to the first, joined the corps engaged in the territory of Brescia. Vendôme returned to oppose him by the Chiese, established the army of Lombardy, superior by some thousands of men to that of Eugene, in a good position between the Chiese and Lake Garda, towards Moscoline, intrusted the command to his brother the Grand-Prior, and returned to Piedmont to besiege Chivasso (end of May).

This was an act of great imprudence. His brother had all his

[1] Quinci, t. IV. p. 569. Lamberti, t. III. p. 614.

[2] He took the new King through vanity; the conqueror of Hochstadt *handed the napkin* to Frederick I.

vices, carried to the furthest excess, and not one of his virtues. Indolent, obstinate, brutal, overburdened with the diseases which were gnawing upon him, it required all the fraternal weakness of Vendôme not to see how unworthy and incapable he was of so lofty a mission. Eugene, who had received reinforcements, profited by this change of adversary. He opened roads through the mountains to Brescia, and stole a march on the Grand-Prior, who, despite the advice of his lieutenants, obstinately refused to move. The latter was finally shaken, and held Eugene in check some days near Brescia; but he persisted again in refusing to gain the Oglio before the enemy, and Eugene, moving westward, crossed the Oglio, June 27–28, at Calcio. Vendôme, on the news of this, left La Feuillade in charge of the siege of Chivasso, and returned in haste to the army of Lombardy. The enemy had already taken Palazzuolo on the Oglio; the Grand-Prior was thrust back into the angle formed by the Serio and the Adda, between Crema and Lodi, abandoning the whole of the Oglio and even the Lower Adda. Vendôme, arriving July 13 with a reinforcement at Lodi, on the Adda, immediately resumed the offensive, recrossed the Serio, and again seized the important post of the *fourteen canals* (*navigli*), which commanded the Lower Oglio, and precipitated his brother beyond this river, with orders to fall back on the Chiese and take the enemies' posts in the rear. The tardiness and ignoble indolence of the Grand-Prior, who could not be made to march when he was gorged with food and wine, saved a corps of three or four thousand Imperialists (August 2). Eugene, seeing himself taken in the rear, instead of beating a retreat, pushed resolutely forward on the Adda, crossing the Serio at Crema. Vendôme followed him a few hours behind, hastened, with twenty-four squadrons of dragoons, to cross the Adda at Lodi, then ascended this river to Cassano and Trezzo, where he found a small reserve corps which was guarding the Adda, and which had already repulsed the first detachments of Eugene. His celerity repaired the negligence of his brother (August 11–13).

The main body of the army, led by the Grand-Prior, followed the movement of Vendôme to the west, but did not cross the Adda: Vendôme was unwilling to abandon the Oglio in defending the Adda. The two fractions of the army communicated by a bridge of boats laid at Cassano. Eugene, on his side, succeeded in throwing a bridge over the Adda, at Paradiso, above Trezzo: Vendôme sent for a reinforcement of five battalions from the main body of the army, and posted himself in such a manner as

to prevent Eugene from debouching. Eugene, then, in the night of August 15–16, broke down his bridge, and, defiling along the east bank of the Adda, fell on the corps of the Grand-Prior. Vendôme, informed at daybreak, hastened on the gallop, followed closely by his whole corps. Had the Grand-Prior occupied the positions prescribed by his brother, Eugene's attack would not have had the least chance of success; but Vendôme found the troops crowded in confusion in a narrow field between the Adda and the Canal of Crema; he was forced to defile from this cut-throat place and to effect a change of front before the enemy, that was attacking with extreme impetuosity. The battle, for a moment, seemed wholly lost: after a terrible fire almost within reach, the enemies, throwing themselves into the water, crossed at two points the two branches of the Canal of Crema and pierced the centre of the French army; the French left was also repulsed and thrown in disorder, and the tête-du-pont of Cassano was taken by the Imperialists. All was saved by the wonderful energy infused by Vendôme into our infantry: he dismounted, charged sword in hand at the head of the left wing, and retook the bridge;[1] he then hastened to the centre and brought back the battalions to the charge in the same manner; the enemies, who had wet their powder in crossing the canals, were repulsed with the bayonet with great carnage beyond the first canal; the second canal was recrossed by the order of Eugene himself, who saw the turn of fortune, and wisely decided to sound a retreat. This issue of a day so ill begun was the more glorious to Vendôme, inasmuch as he had received scarcely any aid from his right wing. The Grand-Prior, whom he had posted with this wing a league from Cassano, and who was not attacked, did not stir during the whole battle, and conducted himself in such a manner that he would have been shot had justice been done him: the King punished him by recalling him to France.

The affair of Cassano was the counterpart of that of Chiari, but on a larger scale; the loss of the Imperialists was very serious. Eugene passed from the offensive to the defensive, but he was by no means disabled, and only retired a league from the battlefield. The success of Cassano permitted Louis XIV. to choose between two plans for the rest of the campaign. The French were not strong enough at once to take Turin and to drive Eugene from

[1] Saint-Hilaire cites a noble example of the devotion inspired by Vendôme: a soldier of the enemy aiming at him, his captain of guards, called Cotteron, threw himself before him and received the shot through his body. Saint-Hilaire, t. III. p. 196.

Italy. The King had therefore to decide whether the siege of Turin should be postponed, and the army of Lombardy reinforced, in order to expel Eugene, or whether the army of Piedmont should be reinforced in order to prosecute the siege, whilst Vendôme contented himself with holding Eugene in check. Vendôme urgently counselled the second course. Chivasso, the last advance-post of Turin, had been abandoned by the enemy in the night of July 29–30. Vauban, who would have been glad to terminate his career by a brilliant feat, had, in the course of August, promised the King to take Turin in a month, if the King would insure to him the necessary resources. Unfortunately, Louis XIV. had not at his disposal, in troops or matériel, all that Vauban demanded, and Chamillart, who wished to reserve for his son-in-law, La Feuillade, the honor of this conquest, thought only of evading the offer of the great taker of cities.[1] This offer was not renewed. Vauban, on the contrary, when he knew the real state of the resources, dissuaded the King from permitting the siege to be undertaken before the next spring. After many alternations, the King decided that Turin should be only blockaded during the autumn and winter, and that Vendôme should act on the offensive against Eugene.

This decision taken, Vendôme executed it as skilfully as possible. Eugene, after having sojourned nearly two months at Treviglio, a league from Cassano, abandoned this camp, (October 10,) made an attempt to penetrate into the territory of Cremona, which was foiled by the manœuvres of Vendôme, then found himself compelled to recross the Serio, the Oglio, and finally the Chiese (middle of November). Vendôme, in his turn, crossed these rivers, outflanked Eugene, obliged him to reascend the Chiese towards the mountains, and attempted to hem him in by attacking him at once on the west bank of Lake Garda and on the road to Brescia. The Venetians, whose policy had been modified since the battle of Hochstadt, and who were beginning to comprehend that their true enemies were at Vienna, and not at Paris, had already signified that they would no longer permit winter-quarters on their territory. They did more: they delivered Desenzano to the French, and refused to deliver Lonato to the Austrians. Nevertheless, Vendôme was unable to accomplish his purpose; the defiles of the west bank of Lake Garda were too strongly occupied

[1] He offered to go there, "while putting his marshal's baton behind the door," and contenting himself with giving counsel. Saint-Simon, t. IV. p. 429. La Feuillade boasted, it is said, that he would dispense with Vauban, and that he would take Turin *à la Cohorn*.

by the enemy. He, therefore, took up his winter-quarters, but extended them from the lake to the Oglio, and cut off from the Imperialists the road, at least the direct one, from the Mincio to the Adige (end of December). The army of Eugene had suffered so much, that, despite its reinforcements, it was reduced to fifteen thousand men when it reëntered the territory of Trent. The French army, better maintained, still had twenty-seven thousand men, besides the Spaniards.

On the side of Piedmont, La Feuillade had experienced, through his own fault, a check at Asti, which was reoccupied by the Austro-Piedmontese of Stahremberg. By way of compensation, Montmeillan surrendered (December 11); the city of Nice had surrendered, November 16, to the Duke of Berwick, who had arrived from Languedoc. The citadel capitulated January 4, 1706. A hundred cannon were found there. Nice and Montmeillan were dismantled.[1]

The aspect of affairs was wholly different in Spain from what it was in Italy. The English, who, the year before, had labored for themselves in taking Gibraltar, were now laboring for their ally, the Austrian Pretender. The preceding autumn, the allies, reinforced from beyond the sea, had attacked, in their turn, the Castilian frontier bordering on Portugal, and Berwick had baffled their efforts. This attempt, renewed in the spring, succeeded little better, although Berwick, a wise and skilful captain, had been recalled in consequence of a disagreement with the Queen of Spain, a very youthful princess, intellectual and courageous, but with the impetuosity and fickleness of her age, who led and moved everything in the name of the effeminate and inert Philip V. The persistent hostility of the Castilian people to the invaders dissipated the illusions with which a few grandees of Spain, refugees at Lisbon, had surrounded the Pretender. The proclamations of Carlos III. were responded to only by musket-shots. The conspiracies concocted at Madrid and elsewhere by a few intriguers, the object of one of which was the abduction of the King and Queen, were discovered and punished with the applause of the people.[2] The allies hoped to be more fortunate in another part of the Spanish monarchy. July 17, the Pretender embarked on an Anglo-Batavian fleet assembled in the Tagus; the fleet passed the Straits of Gibraltar, excited some agitation on the coast of Valencia, then

[1] General Pelet, t. V. pp. 8–279. Saint-Hilaire, t. III. pp. 178–220.

[2] Very imperfectly punished, for the government of Philip V. did not dare to proceed, without the Pope's permission, against the conspiring monks.

stopped on the coast of Catalonia, and landed seven or eight thousand soldiers near Barcelona (August 19). The Catalan peasants began immediately to agitate in favor of the allies. The old opposition between the *coronilla* of Aragon and the crown of Castile was rekindled, especially in Catalonia, the least Spanish province of Spain. Philip V. had been received there very coldly, and that province, so hostile to the House of Austria when it reigned in the Escurial, became favorable to it again after the Bourbons had been called in its place to the throne of the Spains by the Castilians. The rancor that had succeeded, since the last war, the old friendship of the Catalans for the French, contributed greatly to this revulsion.

The Pretender, encouraged by this popular welcome, undertook the siege of Barcelona by land and sea. Had Chamillart listened to the advice sent by Berwick from the recesses of Languedoc, and dispatched Berwick into Catalonia with the troops that were held in reserve on our coasts of Languedoc and Provence, the allies would have failed, according to all appearance; but the inept minister answered that the King could not furnish an army for the defence of each Spanish province, as if Catalonia were an ordinary province! The allies, therefore, carried on their operations without obstacle on the part of France. The French fleet did not appear, any more than the land-troops. Count de Toulouse did not leave the ports of Provence; he was not in a condition to cope with the powerful Anglo-Batavian fleet. September 14, the allies carried the intrenchments that protected the foot of Mount Juich; the 17th, the citadel that crowned this height surrendered, in consequence of the explosion of a powder-magazine. Masters of Mount Juich, the allies opened the trenches before Barcelona, and advanced their bomb-ketches to bombard the city. Their forces would have been wholly insufficient for such an enterprise, if the surrounding country had not been in their favor, and if the city had wished to defend itself; but the spirit of the population was such that the viceroy Velasco judged it impossible to await the assault. He capitulated as soon as he saw that a breach was effected (October 4–9). A large part of the garrison went over to the service of *Carlos III.* At this news, the whole province, in a few days, acknowledged Carlos III. The feeble Spanish garrisons attempted little or no resistance. Rosas was alone preserved to Philip V. by a French detachment that hastened from Roussillon.

The movement, from Catalonia, gained the kingdom of Valencia;

the defection there was not so general as in Catalonia; the majority of the nobility and clergy remained in favor of Philip V.; nevertheless, the capital and the greater part of the country declared for Carlos III.; Aragon was also infected; a handful of Catalan Miquelets excited several Aragonese cities to revolt; these open places were retaken by the troops of Philip V., who, in order to arrest the progress of the Archduke, ravaged and burned twenty leagues of the frontier of Aragon and Valencia. Despite this barbarous expedient, there was reason to believe that Carlos III., if not prevented, would penetrate into Aragon as soon as he should have organized his army with the coöperation of Catalan levies. The Spanish government was in a deplorable state: the spirit of routine, the national jealousy, and the ill-will of men interested in the abuses, had paralyzed the efforts of the counsellors and generals that Louis XIV. had sent from France; the French agents themselves had given many causes of complaint, by their levity, or by their cabals and dissensions. The result was, that the public coffers and magazines were empty, the famished soldiers were disbanded, and it would have been impossible to meet the most pressing necessities without a loan of two millions which Louis XIV. made to Philip V. The year 1706 was about to open in Spain under sinister auspices for the cause of the Bourbons.[1]

Our armies, reëstablished after Hochstadt, arresting the coalition, by their firmness, on our northern and eastern frontiers and in Belgium; France remaining superior in Italy, but not yet having been able to decide the question by the capture of Turin; the allies masters of Catalonia and near taking Castile in the rear; — such had been the campaign of 1705.

During the winter of 1705–1706, preparations were made on both sides with energy. Louis XIV. made the most vigorous efforts to save his grandson, to resume the offensive in the Netherlands, and to overthrow the Duke of Savoy, who had been unwilling to listen to any proposition apart from his allies. Twenty-seven thousand auxiliaries went to reinforce the armies of Spain and Italy.[2] The princes of the blood and the richest of the courtiers, finally deciding to aid the State in its distress in a less illusory manner than by a capitation-tax, offered to the King to raise and equip thirty-five battalions. The enemies, on their side, exceeded their

[1] *Mém. de Noailles*, pp. 182–187. Quinci, t. IV. pp. 635-661.

[2] The drawing of the militia gave rise to painful scenes. The despair of the militia-men that were sent to Italy, whence not one of them ever returned, was so great, that many mutilated themselves in order to be exempt. See Saint-Simon, t. IV. p. 482.

contingents of the previous year by several thousand men, made new attempts to terminate by diplomacy the Hungarian war, and put themselves in a position to reinforce their army of Italy, long neglected, and to follow up their successes in Spain. Marlborough had inveighed so strongly against the commissioners of the States, — against those cabinet and counting-house men who controlled and paralyzed the generals, — that, aided by the Pensionary Heinsius, he had attained almost unlimited power for the Netherlands, this year.

During February, the offensive was resumed by the French in Spain, in order to recover what the ineptitude of Chamillart had suffered to be lost for want of aid in due time. Berwick, appointed Marshal of France, was again placed at the head of an army-corps that defended the frontier bordering on Portugal. Tessé, with new French auxiliary troops, was charged with operating, under the command of Philip V., against Catalonia, on the side of Aragon, whilst the Duke de Noailles, son of the marshal of that name, made a diversion on the side of Roussillon, and a Spanish corps blockaded Valencia. While the Catalan clergy threw themselves with enthusiasm into the Austrian party, the bishops of Murcia and Orihuela had, on the contrary, raised militia to combat the rebellion of Valencia, and had preserved Alicante for Philip V. The young King, by the advice of his grandfather, had decided on a great and difficult enterprise, the siege of Barcelona; he recovered, without serious obstacle, a part of Catalonia, and arrived, April 5, before Barcelona, with twenty-five thousand soldiers, nearly all French, and excellent artillery. The Count de Toulouse, who, the year before, had found himself unable to dispute the sea with the powerful fleet of the enemies united to attack Barcelona, appeared before the city at the same time with Philip V.; the French fleet numbered thirty ships of the line, fourteen galleys, five bomb-ketches, and a hundred and fifty transports destined to provision the army. The pretender Carlos III. was in the place with four or five thousand regular troops, and eight or ten thousand Miquelets and armed citizens, who had compelled him to remain and share their fate. It was therefore a decisive question with the allies, and the utmost efforts were to be expected on their part to save Barcelona.

The only chance of success, for the besiegers, was in the vigor and rapidity of the attack. It was necessary to attack the body of the place, which was very badly fortified, immediately, and to neglect Mount Juich. The reverse was done: three weeks were consumed in taking Mount Juich: during this time, a veritable army of Miquelets was formed outside, mixed with some allied troops,

who besieged, as it were, the besiegers, and threw frequent aid into the great city which the army of Philip V. was not in a state to invest completely. The body of the place was not breached till May 5; a first assault was repulsed. The priests, the monks, even the women, fought with fury. The Pretender had recourse to a strange expedient to sustain the courage of an ardent and credulous population: he solemnly announced that the Holy Virgin had appeared to him and had guaranteed him the victory. The *heretics* charged themselves with redeeming the word of the Holy Virgin. May 10, on the approach of the Anglo-Batavian fleet, forty-eight ships of the line strong, Count de Toulouse set sail again for Toulon. The fleet of the enemy threw a considerable reinforcement into the city. The siege was raised in the night of May 11–12; the guns were spiked, the mortars burst, the provisions abandoned, and the sick and wounded left to the humanity of the enemy. Retreat to Aragon was judged too long and perilous: the army marched towards Roussillon, in order to make the circuit of the Pyrenees and reënter Spain by Navarre. The effect of this retreat of Philip V. to France was disastrous: all Aragon revolted and proclaimed Carlos III.

The situation was not less gloomy at the other extremity of Spain. The allies took Philip V. between two fires. They had sent new troops into Portugal during the winter, and in March they crossed the frontier anew, but with chances infinitely more favorable than the first two times. Owing to the detestable organization of the Spanish government, in which the captains-general (governors), instead of depending on a minister of war, disposed each, like true viceroys, of the military forces of his provinces, Berwick had received none of the necessary reinforcements; he could only throw four or five thousand foot-soldiers into Alcantara and hover before the enemy with a corps of cavalry. The garrison of Alcantara, ill commanded, surrendered April 14. Several other cities of Estremadura and Leon succumbed almost without resistance. As soon as the raising of the siege of Barcelona was known, the generals of the enemies, the refugee Ruvigni, Earl of Galway, and the Portuguese Las Minas, marched by Salamanca on Madrid with seventeen or eighteen thousand men; no fortified place separated them from this capital. June 19, Philip V., who had returned by post to Madrid through Navarre, evacuated the capital, followed by the grandees, the councils, and the tribunals, and joined the small army-corps of Berwick, that was falling back step by step before the enemy. June 25, Galway and Las Minas en-

tered Madrid: the streets were deserted; Madrid seemed a city of the dead, a symbol of Castile crushed between Aragon and Portugal.[1]

The sad news from Spain fell successively on Louis XIV., already sorely tried elsewhere; misfortune was let loose on every side on the aged King and on France, which he involved in his destiny.

His plan of campaign for the northern and eastern frontiers had been imprudently and badly laid. It was to cause the lines of the Moder and Lauter to be retaken by Villars, and to raise the blockade of Fort Louis, then to put Villars again on the defensive in Alsace, whilst the Elector of Bavaria and Villeroi took the offensive in Belgium. The respective capacities of the generals should have dictated the reverse, that is, Villars alone should have been charged with active operations. He executed his instructions perfectly: reinforced by Marsin, who commanded a corps on the Moselle, he surprised, May 1, the lines of the Moder, raised the blockade of Fort Louis, pushed on to the lines of the Lauter, which were not defended, caused Haguenau to be taken in the rear, carried the tête-du-pont of Statmatten, and drove beyond the Rhine the Prince of Baden, who had but very inferior forces, the new Emperor, contrary to the examples of his father, having neglected the army of the Rhine for the army of Hungary. It would have been easy to retake Landau, or to effect a formidable diversion in Germany, and perhaps to raise Bavaria anew, indignant at seeing her prince put under the ban of the Empire with the Elector of Cologne by an Imperial decree of April 26. Louis XIV. persisted in his projects, checked the aspirations of Villars, and ordered Marsin to go to second Villeroi in the Netherlands, as he had seconded Villars in Alsace. Villars, separated from Marsin, deprived of a part of his own troops, that were taken away from him for Flanders, was still able to carry the tête-du-pont that the enemies had built opposite Fort Louis, at the head of the lines from Stolhofen to Bühl. We may judge what he would have done if his wings had not been clipped.

The armies had assembled in the Netherlands about the beginning of May, the French in Brabant, the allies in the territory of Liege. The King, animated by the successes of Villars, by an advantage that Vendôme had secured in Lombardy, and even by the taking of Mount Juich, — a deceitful presage, as we have seen, — enjoined Villeroi to recapture Leau, and to give battle if the

[1] *Mém. de Noailles*, p. 198. *Mém. de Tessé*, t. II. pp. 218–228. Quinci, t. V. pp. 192–235. *Mém. de Berwick*, t. III. pp. 235–255.

enemy attempted to oppose him. This would have answered for a Vendôme or a Villars. Two years before, the timid and untimely order that had chained Villeroi on the Rhine had caused the disaster of Hochstadt. This new order, not less rash than untimely, was to be at least as fatal!

Marlborough entertained, on his side, the project of attacking Louvain at the risk of a battle. From Tongres he moved, May 20–22, on Cortessem and Waremme. Villeroi advanced, the 21st, between the two Gettes, towards Heylissem; he expected, in two days, twenty squadrons detached by Marsin, who was a few days' march in the rear with eighteen battalions and eleven squadrons, coming from Metz. Good sense required him to wait for Marsin and his whole corps before engaging in battle; but Villeroi was very ill informed concerning the real force of the enemies, and suspected nothing. With Villars, presumption sprang from the sentiment of a force and intellect capable of making the greatest audacity succeed; with Villeroi it sprang from very mediocrity and narrowness of vision. Marlborough resolved to prevent the junction between Villeroi and Marsin, to cover Leau, and to throw the French back on Louvain. The 23d, the two armies advanced, to meet each other, towards the narrow space that separates the valley of the Mehaigne, an affluent of the Meuse, from the valleys of the two Gettes, which empty into the Demer, one of the ramifications of the basin of the Scheldt. Marlborough marched by Merdorp on Boneffe. Villeroi supported his right at Taviers, on the Mehaigne, occupying Taviers and a small neighboring morass with five battalions; then came the French cavalry, joined at that very instant by the twenty squadrons that preceded Marsin; this filled up the space between the Mehaigne and the two Gettes, which was only a quarter of a league; on the left of the French cavalry the infantry was deployed, having before its front the village of Ramillies; then the Spanish and Bavarian cavalry, behind the villages of Offiez and Autre-Église, filled with infantry, like Ramillies. The front was not less than a league and a quarter in length. The French army numbered seventy-four battalions and a hundred and twenty-eight squadrons; the army of the enemies, eighty battalions and a hundred and twenty-three squadrons.

At four o'clock in the afternoon Marlborough attacked Autre-Église and Ramillies. These attempts were repulsed; but they were only feints. Marlborough had perceived that the French left and a part of the centre were covered by ravines and brooks, almost insurmountable obstacles; he amused the Elector and Villeroi on

this side by a few demonstrations, massed all his cavalry against the French right, and precipitated fourteen battalions on the village of Taviers. The five battalions that occupied this village summoned to their aid fifteen squadrons of the dragoons, that dismounted; the infantry of the enemy was repulsed; but, during this engagement, the whole of the enemy's cavalry surrounded and hemmed in the French cavalry, which at the same time was turned by a large body of infantry. The French right was broken; then a mass of infantry and artillery assailed anew, and carried Ramillies. The Elector and Villeroi ordered a retreat, which began at first in good order; but, suddenly, the Spanish and Bavarian cavalry, which had been left completely inactive during the contest, and which covered the retreat by the defile of Jodoigne, disbanded, seized with a panic. At the same moment some broken wagons stopped the artillery trains, and, consequently, the whole column on the march. The flux and reflux were terrible; all broke and dispersed! The enemy, who had not at first followed closely, came up, and took men and guns without resistance. But two thousand men had been lost on the field of battle, against four thousand of the enemy; six thousand men made prisoners were lost in a few moments. Night arrested the pursuit. Louvain received the greater part of the remains of this rout, unexampled in our military annals of the seventeenth century. The corps of infantry and dragoons that had defended Taviers succeeded in reaching Namur.

The Elector and Villeroi, unable to defend the Dyle, withdrew behind the canal from Antwerp to Brussels. Marlborough entered Louvain, May 25; he marched so precipitately that he did not even pick up the artillery abandoned on the field of battle; the garrison at Namur recovered thirty-four pieces of it. The Elector and Villeroi hastily evacuated Brussels, Mechlin, and Lierre, and, on the 26th, recrossed the Dender. The enemy occupied the evacuated cities, the inhabitants of which changed masters with indifference. The 27th, the Elector and Villeroi recrossed the Scheldt in disorder at Ghent, and posted themselves between the Scheldt and the Lys; all the dikes of the Scheldt were raised; the fifteen battalions that were guarding Flanders rejoined the army. During this time, Marsin, with his small army-corps, arrived from the Moselle on the Sambre, and put Charleroi, Mons, and Ath in a posture of defence. The principal army was reorganized, in some degree, under Ghent; but it was demoralized: the troops of Spain and of the two Electors could no longer

inspire any confidence; the Hispano-Belgians, tampered with by the agents of the allies, deserted in crowds. May 30, Marlborough, having crossed the Dender at Alost, and marched on the Scheldt at Gaveren, the French evacuated Ghent, Bruges, and Damme, and fell back on the Lys to Deynse, then to Courtrai. June 2, Chamillart arrived in camp, and ordered the army to be separated; the infantry was thrown into the towns, and the cavalry was divided into small corps. Marlborough, completely master of the field, crossed the Scheldt, June 4, then the Lys, and took possession of the abandoned places. Audenarde and Antwerp surrendered, June 4 and 6, to simple detachments: the inhabitants of Antwerp and the Spanish garrison of the citadel being unwilling to defend themselves, the French garrison of the city was obliged to capitulate. The bad conduct of the Hispano-Belgian and Bavarian regiments at Antwerp and elsewhere obliged the King to reorganize these corps, to reduce them, and to take those that he kept directly into his pay; thenceforth the war, in what remained of the Netherlands, was carried on in the name of France, and no longer in that of Spain. In a fortnight, all Brabant, and two thirds of Spanish Flanders, had been lost!

Louis XIV., recognizing at last the imbecility of Villeroi, an experiment that had cost somewhat dear! recalled Vendôme to France to save the Northern frontier, and "to restore to the troops," to use his own words, "the spirit of strength and daring natural to the French nation." What was to become of Italy without Vendôme? . . . . The King resolved to send to Italy the Duke of Orleans, his nephew and son-in-law,[1] whom he had hitherto, systematically, kept from military commands, like the other princes of the blood, in order to deprive them of all chance of acquiring personal importance. He offered Villars the command under the Duke of Orleans; Villars excused himself: the experience he had had in Bavaria of such associations had thoroughly disgusted him; it was a great misfortune, for the Duke of Orleans would have agreed with Villars better than the Elector of Bavaria. In the place of Villars, Marsin, one of the conquered at Hochstadt, was sent; a bad omen. It would have been more natural to have left Vendôme in Italy, and to have summoned Villars into Flanders, sending Marsin to maintain the de-

[1] The Duke Philip of Orleans, brother of the King, had died, June 9, 1701, and his title had passed to the Duke Philip of Chartres, his son, who had espoused one of the daughters of the King and Madame de Montespan. The new Duke of Orleans, in 1706, was 32 years of age.

fensive on the Rhine; but Louis did not wish to humiliate his old favorite, Villeroi, by replacing him by any other than a Marshal-General: Vendôme arrived, if not with the title, at least with the functions of this grade, created formerly for Turenne. It was for such considerations that Louis risked consummating the ruin of his house and that of France.[1]

Marlborough pursued the course of his successes. Ostend, bombarded, ruined, surrendered July 6; the garrison was compelled to capitulate by the inhabitants. The aged Vauban, charged with the supervision of the places on the coast, had arrived at Dunkirk to defend his work. The States-General prevented Marlborough from besieging Dunkirk; it by no means suited them to see the English resume possession of this port, formerly conquered by Cromwell, then sold by Charles II. Marlborough avoided the sea, moved back on the Scheldt at Espierre, and caused Menin to be invested in his rear, an important French place on the Lys, which was, as it were, the advance-post of Lille (July 23). Vendôme arrived a few days afterwards at Valenciennes, and finally reorganized the army on the Lower Deule, in front of Lille, August 19–23; he reëstablished the old lines from Ypres to Marquain, which covered French Flanders. During this time, Menin, battered by a hundred cannon and sixty mortars, succumbed, after a splendid defence (August 22). Marlborough, seeing Ypres, Lille, and Tournay protected by the position which Vendôme had taken, detached a division on Dendermonde, which for three months had obstinately defended itself in the midst of a country occupied by the enemy, and had repulsed a first attack. Dendermonde was obliged to capitulate, September 6. From there the enemy moved on Ath. The French government had made such efforts that the army found itself almost equal to the enemy in infantry and artillery, and superior in cavalry; it revived under the guidance of Vendôme, who would gladly have opposed the siege of Ath; but the King, who had lately enjoined audacity on Villeroi, restrained Vendôme, and forbade him to hazard anything. Ath capitulated, October 2, and gave to the enemies the whole of the Dender; they already had the Lower Scheldt and the Lower Lys. The weather was very bad; the States-General, fearing to ruin their army, opposed the undertaking of a new siege by Marlborough, and the army was sent into winter-quarters at the beginning of November. A

[1] General Pelet, t. VI. pp. 1, 136, 201. Villars, p. 157.

part of the French frontier submitted to a contribution of war, in order to purchase exemption from pillage and fire.[1]

The events in Italy were not less important or less fatal than those in Spain and Flanders.

The operations had begun favorably in Lombardy. During April, the enemy having as yet but eleven thousand men in the territory of Brescia, on the Chiese, and six thousand on the other side of Lake Garda, on the Adige, Vendôme had profited by his great numerical superiority to assail the Imperial quarters established along the Chiese. The Imperial cavalry was driven from the heights of Calcinato, at the point of the bayonet, by the French infantry, which was aided by a corps of cavalry that charged up a steep hill. At least half of the small Austrian army-corps were killed or taken (April 19). Eugene arrived the next day, from Vienna, whither he had gone to hasten the promised reinforcements; he could only rally the remains of his troops and take them back in haste to the territory of Trent. Vendôme obstructed or occupied the passes between Lake Garda and Lake Idro, and established an intrenched camp at Garda, on the other shore of the lake, in order to bar to the Imperialists the descent of the mountains from the Chiese to the Adige.

This first advantage seemed to promise an important success to the siege of Turin, so long deferred. There had been a discussion of several months around the King concerning the plan

[1] This kind of ransom had passed into use on the respective frontiers at the approach of armies, and saved the country from the ravages of parties of the enemy. It was the beginning of the softening of the usages of war. An interesting anecdote on this subject is found in the MSS. of the Benedictine D. Grenier, who had prepared a History of Picardy. The King, in 1706, having demanded an extraordinary contribution, even from the exempt districts, four parishes of Artois, forming what was called the *Alleu*, refused, believing that the point in question was the payment of ransom to the enemy for their lands, and two hundred peasants set out to go to the King at Versailles. Chamillart had them arrested at Senlis, obliged them to return home, and sent troops to live at discretion in the *rebel* villages. — "What has led them to such great *obstinacy* is not that they refuse to pay the sum that is demanded of them, but that they are unwilling to pay it to an enemy. They cannot be persuaded that His Majesty obliges them to pay contribution to enemies, seeing that they offer themselves to defend their district and the entrance of Artois. They say in their tongue that all that is signified to them does not come from the mouth of the King, and that they would make no difficulty in obeying if they had themselves heard it from the King's mouth. These peasants, who are still proud of having never paid contributions, and of having always defended their region themselves, which is capable of stopping an army, although there are but four parishes in it, are blamed, and bitterly complained of here." — Letter of the Artois Jesuit Brunet to his confrier, Le Gobien, at Paris, of the 18th January, 1707; ap. MSS. de D. Grenier; 27th packet, No. 1; cited by J. Janoski; *National* of December 19, 1841.

to be followed. Vauban maintained that it was necessary to have fifty-five thousand effective men, and first to take the heights on the right of the Po, especially the fortified hill of the Capuchins, then to attack the city, and lastly, the citadel. La Feuillade, supported by Vendôme, who had at first held the same opinion as Vauban, proposed to attack the citadel directly, and only on its most projecting front; the King decided that he was right, and, May 13, he appeared, at length, before Turin. Although his forces had been much increased by recruits, he had not, perhaps, by nearly fifteen or twenty thousand men, the fifty-five thousand demanded by Vauban. He marked out his lines between the Po and the Little Dora, below the city, then planted his camp on the other side of Turin, the right on the Po, the left on the Dora, and completed the investment on the left bank of the Po. The trenches were opened June 2. On the right of the Po, La Feuillade did not attack the heights in the neighborhood of the Piedmontese capital, but occupied the places that more or less commanded the roads terminating in Turin, such as those of Chieri, Moncaglieri, and Mondovi (June 16–July 2). The inhabitants of Mondovi were unwilling to defend themselves; they were favorable to the French, doubtless through resentment for the evils brought upon them by their Duke. La Feuillade pushed Victor Amadeus from post to post. The Duke retired towards Saluzzo, with a few thousand men that remained to him, in order to gain the Vaudois valleys as a last refuge. Asti, in the mean time, was retaken by a French detachment. All this was of no serious importance; the siege of Turin was everything, and the siege progressed very slowly!

Eugene, however, had received considerable reinforcements, and found himself at the head, no longer of a few scattered forces, but of a veritable army. Seeing the right of the Adige barred by Vendôme, he descended along the left bank as far as Polesine, as if to attempt to carry the war towards the mouths of the Po. Vendôme believed himself in a condition to prevent him from crossing the Adige, when he received orders to quit Italy for Flanders (middle of June). Having a presentiment that all was about to be lost, he entreated the King at least to give him Berwick as a successor: he had appreciated the talents of this bastard of the Stuarts; but Berwick was necessary in Spain, and Marsin was sent. Vendôme kept the command a month longer, till the arrival of the Duke of Orleans and Marsin; he kept it too long for his glory: July 5–6, Eugene succeeded in throwing part of his army

across the Adige, near Anguillara, which opened to him Polesine. Vendôme moved to the Blanco Canal. July 12, a corps of the enemy crossed the canal near its confluence with the Adige, towards Carpi, and cut off a French corps, which was obliged to throw itself to the south of the Po. Vendôme then decided to fall back behind the Mincio, a course which he had hitherto absolutely rejected. He, in his turn, had just experienced the same checks as Catinat in 1701; this double experience was decisive against the line of the Adige. Eugene sent only one detached corps towards the Mincio, and crossed the Po at Polesella with twenty-four thousand men (July 18). The same day, Vendôme surrendered the command to the Duke of Orleans and to Marsin, who had joined him at Cremona, and set out for France. He left affairs in a deplorable state: he threw the blame of his ill success on the discouragement caused in the army by outside events, and by his recall; his own discouragement could not but have had some share in it; there had been, on his part, in the last few weeks, much negligence and obstinacy, in the presence of an adversary who made few mistakes, and who never failed to profit by those of others.

The Duke of Orleans strove to prevent Eugene from doing what Stahremberg had done in 1703: he recalled the troops that were between Lakes Garda and Idro to the Mincio, moved to the south of the Po with the rest of the army of Lombardy, in order to hover on the skirts of the enemy, and asked La Feuillade to send a large corps to Stradella, in the territory of Pavia, in order to place the enemy, who could not fail to pass through this point, between two fires. This was the last advice given by Vendôme on his departure. La Feuillade protested that it was impossible for him to strip himself of his infantry, and only sent some cavalry to the Duke of Orleans. Eugene, however, continued to advance with his usual audacity, without magazines or provision-trains; the drought rendered all the small rivers fordable, and the intrenchments on their banks had been allowed to fall out of repair. Eugene crossed the Panaro and the Secchia. Orleans asked La Feuillade whether he would join him at Valenza with a part of his troops, in order, at least, to stop Eugene at the Tanaro, since they had been unable to agree to stop him at Stradella. La Feuillade replied that he preferred to await Eugene at Chieri, and demanded his cavalry again, and even reinforcements from the army of Lombardy. Orleans yielded, and recrossed to the north of the Po, renouncing the project of obstruct-

ing the march of Eugene, who crossed the territory of Parma, and reached the banks of the Tanaro. During this time, Orleans joined La Feuillade before Turin. He found the siege in a bad condition. La Feuillade, indeed, had finally occupied, by a detached corps, the heights in the neighborhood of the Capuchins, without, however, attacking the Capuchins, and had thrown a bridge below over the Po, in order to connect this detachment with the besieging army, and to complete the investment by the right bank of the river; but the artillery and the engineering were ill directed: the heads of these departments were not in harmony with each other; an alarming decline manifested itself in the special departments, lately so brilliant;[1] the absence of the *great city-taker*, whom the fatuity of La Feuillade, and the ineptness of Chamillart, had abstracted from an enterprise that could have succeeded only by him, was everywhere felt. The fire of the enemy, and still more the sickness and desertion, had so ruined the infantry, that scarcely more than a hundred and fifty efficient men remained in each battalion. August 27, the besieged had just retaken the outworks that they had lost: the Duke of Orleans, on his arrival, ordered a new assault, August 31, which was unsuccessful. There was no longer any hope of carrying the citadel by force before the approach of Eugene.

Eugene had crossed the Tanaro between Asti and Alba, August 29, and joined the Duke of Savoy between Carmagnola and Moncaglieri. Orleans proposed to march on the enemy; Marsin, La Feuillade, and the greater part of the general officers, were of the opinion that it was better to wait in the lines. The 31st, after the assault, Orleans wrote to the King, two hundred leagues off, on the subject! While waiting for an answer, they did not move. The fate of Italy was destined to be decided before this answer! Eugene and Victor Amadeus crossed the Po at Carignano, September 4, with twenty-three thousand men, the rest of their troops being employed in guarding the towns and posts of communication. The 6th, they advanced on the Little Dora. Orleans proposed, a second time, to go to meet them; the generals opposed it. Marsin declared to the Duke that the King had not given him the right to take the besieging army from its lines! The fixed idea of approaching death took away from Marsin all freedom of mind and judgment. Orleans, a general without authority, dared not come to an open rupture with the guide that the King had im-

[1] Saint-Simon gives us the cause of this: grades were sold there as elsewhere. See Saint-Simon, t. V. p. 98.

posed on him. The same day, the enemies crossed the Little Dora, and moved between the Dora and the Stura. This was the only side on which the position of the French had seemed to them assailable. The space between the Dora and the Stura had not been intrenched, it being too narrow, it was thought, for a hostile army to manœuvre in. Haste was made to throw up an embankment there. The Duke of Orleans wished a party of infantry that occupied the heights on the right bank of the river to descend to this point. Marsin pretended that the Duke had not even the right to move the troops. This bordered on insanity. Although there were, probably, thirty-five or forty thousand troops, as they were scattered over an immense circumvallation, but seventeen battalions were found to defend the menaced post. They were put in a single line, supported by sixty-five squadrons.

On the morning of September 7, after essaying a violent cannonade, the enemy charged on the new intrenchment scarcely marked out. The attack was twice repulsed on the French left and in the centre; but, during this time, on their right, the Duke of Savoy, perceiving that an empty space had been left between the bed of the Stura and the dike of that river, cut through the dike and penetrated into this space with a column of infantry, followed by a convoy. Marsin hastened to charge it at the head of fifteen squadrons. He was repulsed and mortally wounded: his presentiments had not deceived him. The Duke of Orleans was wounded in turn in a second charge, which succeeded no better. Eugene assailed the intrenchments a third time towards the centre and carried them. The French left, the position of which, on the Dora, was better supported, defended itself longer and with great energy; but it was finally obliged to give way in its turn. The Duke of Orleans, having received two wounds, quitted the field of battle. The retreat was effected in disorder by the three bridges of the Stura, the Dora, and the Lower Po. Thirty squadrons of dragoons, that had dismounted to support the infantry, were cut off from their horses, which fell into the hands of the enemy. Saint-Frémont, commander of the left wing, rallied the troops and carried off forty-five field-pieces; but all the siege-guns (a hundred and four cannon and forty mortars) were abandoned by La Feuillade. The munitions were burned or thrown into the water.

The loss, however, did not exceed four thousand men, and the victors had lost six thousand. The main body of the army was intact, neither the troops that were on the river above Turin, nor

those that were on the heights of the right bank, having been engaged in the contest. The Duke of Orleans conceived the excellent idea of retiring by the right bank of the Po towards Alessandria and Milanais; but, on the erroneous news that the enemies were masters of Moncaglieri and of Chieri, and had already cut off this route, the generals urged him to fall back on the contrary on Pignerol, where large magazines prepared by the enemy might be taken, they said, and where aid might be received from France. The Prince, unable either to see or to act for himself, yielded, and Pignerol was reached the day after the battle. This fatal resolution transformed a check into a veritable disaster. Orleans received, September 13, the King's answer to his letter of August 31. The King authorized him not to attack the enemy, but to raise the siege. It was the best possible satire on the deplorable strategic system of Versailles! The Duke of Orleans had found no kind of magazines at Pignerol, and, lacking subsistence, saw himself reduced to the necessity of dispersing his troops in the valleys of the Clusone and the Little Dora, and even in Savoy and Dauphiny. All the communications with the garrisons of Piedmont and Lombardy were interrupted.

Two days after the disaster at Turin, a successful and brilliant action had taken place between the Chiese and the Mincio (September 9). The Prince of Hesse-Cassel, who commanded the corps of the enemy on the Mincio, lately reinforced from Germany, had been completely defeated at Castiglione by Médavi, commandant of the French corps left in that region by the Duke of Orleans. The enemy had lost four thousand men and fourteen cannon, and had been dispersed, part towards the mountains, part towards the Adige. Médavi was about to cross the Po and expel the Austrian garrisons from the territory of Modena, when he learned of the catastrophe at Turin. There was nothing more for him to do than to endeavor to defend Milanais, in concert with the governor, Vaudemont. September 15, Eugene and Victor Amadeus crossed the Great Dora and marched on Vercelli, leaving behind them a detachment that retook Chivasso, the 17th, and captured twelve hundred prisoners there. The castle of Bard, Ivrea, Crescentino, and Verrua, surrendered in a few days to other corps of the enemy. Eugene and Victor Amadeus entered Vercelli, the 18th, and Novara, the 20th; the inhabitants delivered to them this last city after disarming the little garrison. The 22d, the two princes crossed the Ticino; the 24th, they entered Milan, the deputies of which had gone to meet them to recognize *King Carlos III.* A corps block-

aded the castle, occupied by a Franco-Spanish garrison. The 27th, Eugene entered Lodi, the castle of which surrendered the next day. October 2, the inhabitants of Pavia rose in insurrection against its garrison, and constrained it to capitulate before a detached corps.

Vaudemont and Médavi had no hope except in the offensive return of the Duke of Orleans. This was, in fact, the King's intention; but the power did not answer to the will. It would have required a Louvois to re-create in available time the necessary resources. The army, on the contrary, had continued to melt away in its forced inactivity. About the 20th of October, the epoch at which Louis XIV. had prescribed to Orleans to report himself on the advance, the Duke had but twenty thousand defeated and discouraged men at his disposal. The King, enlightened in time with respect to the real situation, sent counter-orders, commanded the Duke to put the troops into winter-quarters, and gave notice to Vaudemont and Médavi to treat as they could, if they were not in a condition to maintain themselves till spring. It was unfortunately the only course to take, for Eugene was already in a position to render the junction of the Duke of Orleans with Médavi impossible. He had returned from the Adda towards the territory of Tortona and the territory of Alessandria, the only route that Orleans could have pursued. He had occupied the city of Tortona October 10, charged a detachment with besieging the castle, and attacked Alessandria on the 16th. The bishop and municipal magistrates roused the inhabitants; the commandant was forced to capitulate on the 21st. During this time, Pizzighetone surrendered to the Duke of Savoy and the Prince of Hesse (October 29). A multitude of other places opened their gates. The country was everywhere in favor of the Imperialists. The poor people believed that they were bettering their lot by returning to their fetters and changing foreign masters!

Before the end of the year the castle of Tortona was also lost, into which the governor of the city had thrown himself, and had been assaulted and killed in the breach with the commandant of the castle (November 29). The castle of Casale was not defended with such heroism; the garrison surrendered themselves prisoners (December 6); the city had shown no resistance. Modena had been taken, November 20.

A first attempt at negotiation, based on the neutrality of Italy, failed in December: new propositions were addressed to Eugene by Vaudemont and Médavi in February, 1707; these were limited

to asking neutrality for Mantua and Mirandola, which the French had preserved. Eugene refused any other condition than the pure and simple evacuation of Lombardy and the return of the Franco-Spanish troops to France by Susa. The treaty was signed March 13, 1707. All Upper Italy was abandoned, save Susa and the upper valleys of the Little Dora and the Clusone. The Imperialists took possession of Milanais and of the territory of Mantua, and the House of Austria, in conformity with its engagements, ceded to the Duke of Savoy the territory of Alessandria and that of Lomellina. Had Louis XIV. and Philip V. resigned themselves in time to this necessary sacrifice, Victor Amadeus would not have been disaffected and Italy would not have been lost.[1]

The agreement of March 13, 1707, in some sort sealed the disasters of the year 1706, the most fatal yet seen by this reign, which had so long counted the years only by victories! Ramillies and Turin marked two new degrees in the scale of that decline begun at Hochstadt.

The first consolation came to Louis XIV. from that Spain which was the cause of all our ills.[2]

The official powers of Spain were dissolved; the government was swallowed up in its impotence; but, the government undermined, there remained a people in Castile, a strong, obstinate race, fanatical in its nationality as in its religion, and which, wholly impoverished, reduced as it was in numbers by a century and a half of detestable administration, had preserved all its native virtues. When it was known that the *heretics* and the Portuguese commanded in the Escurial, a prolonged shudder ran from the Asturias to the Guadalquivir. The inhabitants of Toledo arrested the partisans of the Archduke, who had proclaimed Carlos III., as prisoners, and shut their gates to the enemy. Valladolid and Segovia revolted against the garrisons to which they had been subjected, and took them prisoners or exterminated them. The inhabitants of La Mancha received the money that the generals of the enemies sent them in exchange for their grain, sent it to Philip V., kept the grain, and occupied the passes of the Tagus. All the cities of the two Castiles assured Philip V. of their faith, furnished him with all the resources that they could, arrested the couriers, captured or

[1] General Pelet, t. VI. pp. 137–384, and documents. Saint-Hilaire, III. 278–358.

[2] Voltaire assures us that at the news of the loss of Madrid, Vauban had proposed to Louis XIV. to send Philip V. to reign in the New World, abandoning Spain, and that this project was deliberated upon at Versailles. *Siècle de Louis XIV.*, ch. XXI.

massacred the detachments of the enemies. Andalusia raised sixteen thousand militia. July 28, Berwick, at the head of a small army-corps brought back from the Portuguese frontier, effected a junction, near Jadraque, on the Henares, with the French troops returning from the siege of Barcelona by the north of the Pyrenees. He reported himself on the advance. The generals of the enemies, Galway and Las Minas, felt the impossibility of preserving, before an adversary in turn superior in numbers, an irritated capital that cried *Long live Philip V.!* directly under their bayonets. They marched on Guadalajara, and there joined, August 7, the Pretender Carlos III., who had arrived from Saragossa with a few thousand soldiers. August 8, Madrid again raised the standard of Philip V. Despite the reinforcement brought by the Pretender, the position of the allied army was not long tenable: it was dying of hunger in the midst of a country infertile and wholly aroused against it. The French, on the contrary, reanimated by the energetic assistance of the inhabitants organized as guerrillas, resumed the offensive with full confidence; they took the baggage and sick of the enemies in Alcala, and inflicted on them check after check. September 1, the enemies, out of twenty-three or twenty-four thousand men, had already lost more than six thousand, besides deserters. They crossed the Tagus in the night, on rafts (September 8–9), and, pursued by Berwick and harassed by the inhabitants, they reached with difficulty the kingdom of Valencia. Berwick, instead of immediately following them thither, turned towards Murcia, raised the siege that an English corps recently landed had undertaken, and retook Carthagena (October–November), a recent conquest of the Anglo-Batavian fleet, which had also taken Alicante (August–September), and roused to insurrection the islands of Ivica and Majorca (August). Minorca had followed, in October, the movement of the Balearic Islands; but the castle of Mahon and Fort Saint-Philip, having remained steadfast to Philip V., were succored in January, 1707, by the French squadron of Toulon, which reconquered the rest of Minorca. A Franco-Castilian corps went in December to retake Alcantara, the chief place occupied by the enemy on the Portuguese frontier. The States of Castile were thus almost completely delivered before the end of the year, and the Franco-Castilian army found itself in a condition to attack in its turn the Aragonese States.[1]

The English had projected during this great struggle in Spain an expedition against Guienne; their Channel-squadron had em-

[1] *Mém. de Berwick*, t. I. pp. 338–372. Quinci, t. V. pp. 192–254.

barked a somewhat numerous corps, composed in great part of French refugees, which it was about to throw into Gironde, whence the refugees would be taken to Querci and Cévennes. The winds caused this design to fail. The French navy had obtained some successes in the West Indies. The French had ruined the English possessions of Saint-Christopher and Nevis, without seeking to establish themselves there. The loss of the English there was estimated at fifteen millions. The privateers also continued to inflict great damage on the enemies.

In another quarter, in Eastern Europe, diversions favorable to France were produced. The negotiations between the Emperor and the Hungarians, which had gone as far as the establishment of a truce, were definitively broken off in July. The Emperor, after the successes of the allies in Spain and Brabant, had rejected all the demands of the Hungarians, who punished him by gaining notable advantages over his troops. In September, another war, of greater dimensions, the war of the north, made an irruption into the heart of Germany. Charles XII., the conqueror of the Russians and the Saxons, pursued King Augustus into Germany across the Imperial domains of Silesia, and compelled him to renounce the throne of Poland in favor of Stanislaus Leczynski, by a treaty which he dictated in Dresden. French diplomacy made great efforts to gain the offensive alliance of Charles XII.; but Charles, while showing himself haughty and menacing towards Austria, cared little to engage in the quarrel of the West.

These incidents, and the return of good fortune that had manifested itself in Spain, were far from balancing the terrible reverses of Brabant and Piedmont. Louis XIV. felt France losing breath, and ready to fall beneath him! He attempted to negotiate. At the close of the preceding campaign, indirect advances had been addressed to certain members of the States-General, who were believed to be desirous of peace. Helvetius, a celebrated Dutch physician established in France, had been authorized to make known to these deputies that Louis XIV. would oblige Spain to cede Naples, Sicily, and Milan. The Dutch feared that he only wished to separate them from their allies, and did not yield to these overtures. After the catastrophes of 1706, Louis, comprehending that he had no right to expose France to perish in order to preserve the monarchy of Spain for his House, entertained the thought of causing Philip V. to cede Spain and the Indies to Carlos III., and Belgium to the Dutch, retaining only the States of Italy. The Elector of Bavaria, in October, 1706, wrote in behalf of the King

to Marlborough and to the States-General, to propose conferences to them. This was recurring to the policy of William III. The Dutch would have been favorable, but the other allies dissuaded them under the pretence that the King of France did not explain himself clearly enough. Louis could not explain himself with precision in advance, for fear of exasperating the Spaniards. The Imperial agents adroitly took advantage of this difficulty. Marlborough aided them in it and maintained, in the name of his Queen, that the whole succession of Spain belonged of right to Carlos III. Heinsius, full of prejudices against France, rendered ill service to his country by yielding, as usual, to the influence of Marlborough. It was agreed to propose to France, as the only preliminary, the principle of the integral cession. Still the Imperialists were not contented: they had the effrontery to insinuate the erection of the two Burgundies into a kingdom in order to indemnify Philip V., and the cession of Trois-Évêchés to the Duke of Lorraine.[1]

It was necessary to continue the contest: the Empire of Charles V. could not be left to be reconstructed by the hands of blinded Europe.

Louis XIV. raised twenty-one thousand militia, besides the recruits that filled up the gaps in the army. The enemies also increased their forces, intending to profit better by Ramillies and Turin than they had done by Hochstadt. A great political success had also just consolidated the power of the men who governed in the name of Queen Anne; the *Act of Union* between England and Scotland. Despite the repugnance of the Scotch people, wounded in its most cherished national traditions, the parliament of Scotland had consented to be merged into the English Parliament, and the two nations, so long enemies, then associated with each other while preserving their distinct existence, thenceforth constituted but a single political body, GREAT BRITAIN. The large nation had absorbed the small one (August 6, 1706). Marlborough and his ally Godolphin so much the more freely disposed of English blood and gold. Marlborough, as skilful in the cabinet as on the field of battle, obtained a success of another kind: he rid the allies of the fears inspired by the King of Sweden.

Charles XII., more sensible to the sufferings of the Lutherans of Austria than the Protestant allies had been to those of the French Reformers, demanded that the Emperor should restore liberty of worship to his Protestant subjects. Marlborough went in search of

[1] La Torre, t. IV. pp. 278–331.

Charles in Saxony and persuaded him not to enter Bohemia; the Emperor yielded, at least with respect to Silesia, and bowed his head before the proud Swede, in order to have his hands free against France and Hungary. The throne of Hungary had been declared vacant in a diet convoked by Rakoczi (May 1, 1707).[1] The Hungarians *burned their ships*.

The first blows in the campaign of 1707 were dealt in Spain.

The English fleet, which had been driven from the coast of Guienne by the wind, having finally set sail for Spain and landed at Alicante the troops with which it was freighted, the enemy began to move again in February. After some weeks of manœuvring on the confines of the kingdom of Valencia and of New Castile, April 25, Galway and Las Minas, wishing to anticipate the arrival of a reinforcement expected from France, attacked Berwick at Almanza. Singularly enough, the English were commanded by a French refugee (Ruvigni, Earl of Galway), and the French by a royal bastard of England. The enemy numbered, it is said, twenty-six thousand foot and seven thousand horse; the Franco-Castilians were somewhat inferior in infantry, somewhat superior in cavalry and artillery. The enemies had intermingled infantry and cavalry in such a way that those two arms would mutually sustain each other; the Franco-Castilians had, according to the usual order, the battalions in the centre, and the squadrons on the wings. Galway began the action by charging on the artillery of the Franco-Castilian right at the head of the English dragoons. The Spanish cavalry repulsed him, but was repulsed in its turn by the fire of the battalions mingled with the enemies' squadrons: five English battalions attempted to turn our right; Berwick precipitated on them a French brigade, which received their fire at thirty paces without reply and charged them with the bayonet. The Spanish cavalry completed the defeat of these battalions and drove before it the English dragoons. In the centre, the enemies had at first some advantage: the Dutch drove the Spanish infantry, and two of their battalions broke through our two lines of infantry; they had not time to widen the breach; two Spanish squadrons precipitated themselves on the Dutch and broke them; our infantry rallied. The French left, however, was pressing the enemy without decisive success, when the cavalry of the right, hastening to its aid, decided

[1] An incident that happened near our frontiers, attested, in the interval, the opinion entertained by our neighbors of the enfeeblement of France. The inheritance of the principality of Neufchâtel, disputed among several competitors, was adjudged by the Neufchâtel council of state to the King of Prussia, despite the opposition and threats of Louis XIV.

the contest. All the cavalry of the enemies fled, completely routed. The English, Dutch, and Portuguese infantry were cut to pieces: the Portuguese foot showed a courage less fortunate, but not less intrepid, than the Spanish cavalry. Another corps had fought with still greater fury, — the French refugees, commanded by Jean Cavalier, the renowned Camisard chieftain. They had engaged a French regiment, and the two corps had almost destroyed each other. Six battalions were surrounded and taken in a body. Thirteen other battalions, five English, five Dutch, and three Portuguese, retired, at evening, to a wooded hill; seeing themselves cut off from the mountains of Valencia, they surrendered themselves prisoners the next morning. Hochstadt was fully avenged. Five thousand dead, nearly ten thousand prisoners, twenty-four cannon, a hundred and twenty flags or standards, were purchased on the part of the conquerors by the loss of only about two thousand men. Many Frenchmen, taken at Hochstadt or at Ramillies, and enrolled by force in the ranks of the enemies, were delivered by the victory.

The Duke of Orleans reached the army the next day. This prince, a victim at Turin of the faults of others, had solicited of the King the opportunity to efface his reverses in Italy, and had obtained the privilege of being associated with Berwick. Though he had not participated in the victory, he contributed by his activity and intelligence to secure its results. He marched with Berwick on Valencia, which surrendered, May 8, without striking a blow. The generals of the enemies, both wounded,[1] retired with the wrecks of their armies towards the mouths of the Ebro. The whole kingdom of Valencia submitted, with the exception of three or four places. Berwick followed the enemy towards the mouth of the Ebro, whilst Orleans returned to meet a French corps that was coming by the way of Navarre and with this corps entered Aragon. Nearly all Aragon yielded without resistance.[2] Berwick joined Orleans by ascending the Ebro; they moved together on the Segre and began the blockade of Lerida, the bulwark of Catalonia. The lack of heavy artillery, then the necessity of sending aid to Provence, prevented them from entering upon the siege of Lerida till the middle of Sep-

[1] The mistress of the aged Las Minas was killed at his side like an Amazon.

[2] Berwick relates a strange anecdote on this subject. When the French suddenly appeared before Saragossa, the inhabitants imagined that the camp which they saw was only a phantom formed by magic art: the clergy went upon the ramparts to exorcise the pretended spectres. The people were not undeceived until they saw Hungarian hussars in the service of the French pursue the cavalry to the gates of the city and cut off the heads of the vanquished after the Turkish fashion. Berwick, t. I. p. 398.

tember. This renowned place, against which the great Condé had formerly failed, was not fortified in the modern style: it had double bastioned walls, but no outworks or even fosse. The trenches were opened October 2–3, the assault was made on the 12th. The city was carried and pillaged with immense booty. The trenches were opened before the castle on the 16th. The generals of the enemies made some demonstrations at the head of a small army, but they did not dare attack the positions of the besiegers: the castle of Lerida surrendered, November 11. A great part of the Catalan mountaineers laid down their arms.

The French marine, although we had no great fleet at sea, had contributed to prevent the enemies from retrieving their losses. Duguai-Trouin and Forbin, with a squadron of twelve ships and frigates, had attacked a large convoy that was carrying troops, equipments, and munitions to Spain, under the escort of five English ships of the line. Three of these five ships were taken; a fourth, of ninety-two guns, went down on fire with all its crew and five or six hundred officers whom it was carrying to the army of Carlos III.; many transports were taken (October). Forbin, before this combat, had done immense damage to English and Dutch commerce this year, which he had pursued into the Arctic Sea; he had taken or destroyed nearly a hundred vessels.

Fortune had favored the Franco-Castilians on the Portuguese frontier as in the States of Aragon; Ciudad-Rodrigo had been taken by assault, October 4, with the loss of more than three thousand men on the side of the enemy.[1]

The news of Almanza had everywhere reanimated the hearts of the French armies, at the beginning of their operations, and had given hopes that 1706 would be fully avenged.

The plan of the King had been to send Vendôme on the Meuse, to remove the war from our Flemish frontier, and to hurl Villars on Germany, as should have been done in the spring of 1706. The defensive was determined on the side of the Alps. As to the allies, Marlborough projected the invasion of French Flanders, after completing the conquest of Spanish Flanders; the Margrave of Baireuth, successor of the Prince of Baden, who had just died, was to attack Alsace; the Duke of Savoy and Prince Eugene were to besiege Toulon with the coöperation of the Anglo-Batavian fleet, whilst a corps setting out from Lombardy was to rouse Naples to revolt.

[1] *Mém. de Berwick*, t. I. pp. 378–419. *Mém. de Forbin*, pp. 534–594. *Mém. de Duguai-Trouin*, p. 641. Quinci, t. V. pp. 391–472.

The lack of forage and money did not permit the French army of the Netherlands to be assembled soon enough to attack Huy and Liege, as had been projected. By an immense effort, Louis XIV. had succeeded in giving to the Elector of Bavaria and Vendôme a hundred and twenty-four battalions and a hundred and ninety-three squadrons, a force superior to that of the enemy; but the remembrance of Ramillies weighed on the mind of the King: Louis tied the hands of Vendôme, who was burning for battle, and who communicated his ardor to his soldiers. Vendôme, unable to attack, at least hindered Marlborough from undertaking anything, obliged him even to fall back towards Louvain, and again carried the French encampments to the banks of the Gette which had witnessed our disaster. The detachments demanded for Provence weakened the army, and Marlborough, in his turn, manœuvred in such a manner as to bring back Vendôme towards the Sambre, then towards the Scheldt; but there was no serious engagement. The Dutch, on their side, restrained Marlborough. Sickness and desertion took more men from the allies than from the French. The campaign of the Netherlands ended in September with a purely negative result.

Operations were more exciting in Germany, where Villars had been at liberty to act. The Emperor, greatly preoccupied with Hungary, had furnished but indifferent resources to the new general of the army of the Rhine, Brandenburg-Baireuth; the German army was ill paid and in bad condition in its immense lines on the right bank, which extended along the Rhine from Philippsburg as far as Stolhofen, then, in a square, from Stolhofen to the Black Mountains by Bühl. May 22, the lines were attacked simultaneously at four points: a French corps crossed the Rhine in boats to the island of Neuburg, between Hagenbach and Lauterbourg; a second gained the right bank by the island of Marquisat, between Fort Louis and Stolhofen; a third detachment favored this double descent by a feigned attack on the island of Dahlund, above the island of Marquisat. Villars, in the mean time, had crossed the Rhine at Kehl with the rest of the army, and taken the lines in the rear by Bühl. The success was complete; the enemy fled into the mountains, abandoning artillery, baggage, and munitions, and did not stop till beyond the Neckar. The lines were razed; Swabia and a part of Franconia were put under contribution. Villars marched on Stuttgart, crossed the Neckar, and subjected the whole country to ransom as far as the Danube. The enemies in vain rallied and reinforced themselves with tardy contingents of the Empire; they could not

prevent Villars from laying under contribution the Lower Neckar, then the country between the Danube and Lake Constance, and from maintaining himself beyond the Rhine till he went into winter-quarters. French parties scoured the country as conquerors as far as the fatal field of Hochstadt. The circles of Swabia and Franconia, and the trans-Rhenish Palatinate, had reason to regret having lately repelled the offered neutrality.

Trifling advantages obtained in Hungary and Transylvania, and in part due to the coöperation of the Croats, who had finally followed the example of the Raitzes, and had repelled the advances of Rakoczi, offered the Emperor, but not Germany, an imperfect compensation.

Towards the Alps and in Lower Italy, the allies had not been stopped short as in the Netherlands, or anticipated by a victorious attack as on the Rhine. They had realized their offensive plans with very different success. A small Imperial army of eight or ten thousand men had traversed the States of the Pope by extorting his consent, penetrated into the kingdom of Naples, and occupied Capua, July 2, and Naples, July 7, with the acclamations of the people. The three castles of Naples were delivered up by the governor, a great Neapolitan seignior. Most of the Hispano-Neapolitan troops went over to the enemy. The monks were all hostile to Philip V., as in Catalonia, and the Archbishop of Naples, brother of the commandant of the three castles, had been the head of the plot. The Imperial agents had promised the conspirators, on the part of Carlos III., that foreigners should be excluded from all offices and benefices in the kingdom of Naples. It was not love of Austrian princes, but hatred of Spanish dominion and desire of independence, that had persuaded the Neapolitan nobility and clergy. The defeat of *Carlos III.* in Spain was precisely what attached them to him; they hoped to have a *King of Naples*. Abruzzo and Calabria at first hesitated to follow the movement of the capital. The Spanish viceroy, having taken refuge in Gaeta, defended himself there with considerable energy; but the revolt of a Catalan regiment obliged him to surrender, September 30, and the whole kingdom then ranged itself under Austrian rule. The Imperialists next attacked the presides of Tuscany; Orbitello was delivered to them in December, 1707, and they took Piombino January 18, 1708. Porto Ercole and Porto Longone resisted.

Italy thus offered the House of Austria an indemnity for the losses that it experienced in Spain.

Whilst an Austrian detachment had marched on Naples, the

main body of the Austro-Piedmontese army had moved against the south of France. The defence of the southeastern frontier had been intrusted to Marshal de Tessé, with an army-corps composed in great part of the capitulated garrisons returned from Lombardy. Tessé had a great extent of country to guard, for the distribution of the troops of the enemies inspired anxiety at once for Savoy, Dauphiny, and Provence. Tessé, in his correspondence with the King and the minister, showed himself far from confident: his troops were weakened and behind time, especially the cavalry; money did not come in; the soldiers, and even many of the officers, were reduced to army bread and water; the destitution of the inhabitants was much more cruel, and Tessé saw them so much cast down that he hoped for no resistance from them against invasion. "The people," he wrote, "have neither wherewith to own a gun, nor to supply themselves with a pound of powder." The King encouraged Tessé, promised him resources and reinforcements, and sent him memorials demanded from the aged Catinat, who in these grave circumstances raised his patriotic voice for the last time.

It was not till the last of June that the plan of the enemies was manifested by the concentration of their forces towards the passes that open from Piedmont to the county of Nice. As soon as they attacked by way of Nice, Toulon was evidently their aim: it was at our great maritime arsenal of the south that they were aiming their blows. The little French corps that occupied Nice, which could not be succored in time, evacuated that county, leaving detachments in Villafranca, Montalban, and Sospello, and fell back on the Var. Tessé ordered the greater part of the troops, scattered in Savoy and Dauphiny, to march on Toulon, and hastened to that city, which he found well defended on the side of the sea, but very ill protected on the land-side (July 10). The place had no terraced curtains, and a covered way was but just begun to be improvised. The glacis was covered with country-seats and convents, which were hastily demolished. Toulon could only be saved by establishing an intrenched camp under the ramparts, and by defending the heights that commanded the place. Tessé returned to hasten the march of his troops. The enemy, however, having descended into the county of Nice by the defile of Tende, had taken Sospello, July 6, then had moved directly to the mouth of the Var, leaving a reserve behind to complete the recovery of the fortresses of Nice. Thirty thousand foot and eight thousand horse deployed along the coast, supported by an Anglo-Batavian fleet of forty-eight ships of the line, without counting frigates, gal-

liots, and numerous transports freighted with artillery and munitions. The little French corps that had fallen back on the Var, attacked in front by a strong column which attempted to cross at a ford, menaced on its flanks, on the sea-side by gunboats, on the side of the mountains by troops that had crossed the Var higher up, retired in good order, with the exception of some provincial militia, which had been joined to it and which disbanded (July 11). This corps was in no better condition to arrest the enemy at the defile of Esterelle, between Cannes and Fréjus, a place renowned for the disaster of Charles V., and could only retire on Toulon. The Duke of Savoy and Prince Eugene entered Fréjus, July 17. Admiral Shovel was already before the isles of Hyères. The French troops arrived on their side by forced marches, from the banks of the Isère and the Durance. Toulon was the goal in the race between the two armies.

In the presence of such an adversary as Eugene, one seemed conquered in advance, in a contest of this nature; fortunately, Eugene was not alone. The Duke of Savoy, who had never been able to agree long with any one, agreed neither with Eugene nor with the English admiral. The enemies lost three days at Fréjus in waiting for a portion of their artillery that was coming by land; they then spent six days in making the journey from Fréjus to Toulon, and did not encamp before Toulon, between La Valette and the wood of Sainte-Marguerite, till July 26. Three French divisions, that the enemies believed still far distant, had arrived at Toulon from the 22d to the 25th, and twelve thousand soldiers occupied either the intrenched camp of Sainte-Anne, between the city and the mountains, or the summits of the mountains themselves; four or five thousand other soldiers and marines, and five thousand sailors, trained in the management of cannon, guarded the city and the port. Fifty-three ships of the line, disarmed, had been sunk in the port in order to shelter them from the bombardment: only two had been kept above water, and these were run aground to convert them into batteries. Galliots, fire-ships, flat-boats, defended the entrance to the smaller roadstead, and the galleys of Marseilles cruised along the coast to prevent the landing of light craft. A small corps of cavalry, coast-guards and militia, occupied the gorges of Ollioules in order to maintain the communications with Marseilles.

When Eugene knew the real state of things, he judged success so difficult that he proposed to renounce the siege. The Duke of Savoy was obstinate, and the fleet landed a hundred and twenty

cannon and a large number of mortars. On the 26th, the very day of their arrival, the enemies took possession of the summit of Faron, the most elevated point of the Toulonese mountains; the 30th, they carried the heights of Sainte-Catherine, much nearer to the city; August 31, they occupied the hill of La Malgue, which commands the two roadsteads, and established batteries on Sainte-Catherine and La Malgue. There their progress was arrested. Toulon was as yet besieged only on one side; to invest the city and the intrenched camp, it would have been necessary to be wholly masters of the deep valley that turns behind the mass of the Toulonese mountains, and debouches, with the torrent of the Las, into the smaller roadstead. The enemies, in fact, took position in this valley, but not in sufficient force, and, August 10, Tessé, who had assembled new troops at Aubagne, debouched by the left bank of the Las and forced the besiegers to evacuate all the lower part of the gorges. The investment of the place was thenceforth impossible: the corps brought by Tessé assisted the camp and the city; August 15, the offensive was resumed on the mountains; Faron and Sainte-Catherine were retaken; the upper batteries were destroyed, and the portion of the enemies' lines between the mountain and the torrent of Eigoutier was razed. The enemies attempted to avenge themselves by bombarding the city and the ports from the top of La Malgue; they burned a few houses, but did little damage to the port, from which the two ship-batteries replied by a terrible fire. They fruitlessly attempted to penetrate into the smaller roadstead and to make a descent at Cape Capet. The news from the interior was menacing for them. A detachment, sent by Tessé between the rivers Verdon and Argens, disturbed their communications with Nice and rendered their subsistence very difficult. The militia of the cities swelled the number of the regular troops; the peasants, at first despondent and inert, took up arms in a body to punish the ravages of the foreigners, and showed an ardor that happily belied the expectations of Tessé. Detached corps from the different armies defiled towards Toulon. The Duke of Burgundy and Marshal Berwick were expected in Provence.

The generals of the enemies were forced to resign themselves to a retreat that had become urgent. August 22, after reëmbarking their heavy artillery, they raised their camp and retook the road to Nice. Closely followed by the French army, harassed on their flanks by six thousand armed peasants, they owed their safety only to the rapidity of their march. On the 25th, they re-

gained Fréjus; the 27th, they repassed, not without difficulty, the defile of Esterelle; the 30th and the 31st, they crossed the Var. They then evacuated the county of Nice, with the exception of the posts of the Val de Bolta.

Thus miscarried the hopes founded on the expedition to Provence. The allies had counted, not only on destroying the French marine of the Mediterranean by taking Toulon, but also on penetrating into Languedoc and there reawakening, on a larger scale, the insurrection of Cévennes. Cavalier had returned from Spain to join the Duke of Savoy, and the fleet carried twenty thousand muskets designed for the malcontents of Languedoc and Dauphiny. These vast plans had ended only in enormous expense and the loss of at least ten thousand men.[1] The ill success of the allies seemed to attest once more that France is unassailable on the southeast.[2]

The Duke of Savoy and Prince Eugene sought some indemnity elsewhere. They undertook to wrest from France the last posts that remained to her beyond the Alps, and attacked Susa. Tessé was unable to succor Susa in time: this important position was not defended by sufficient forces; the intrenchments and the city were evacuated; the redoubt of Catinat was taken September 28, and the citadel was constrained to capitulate October 3. The bad weather and the concentration of French troops obliged the enemy to content himself with this advantage.[3]

The campaign of 1707 had greatly changed the general aspect of the war, and France had offered a new proof of the prodigious energy with which Providence has endowed her. What national power had been needed to pass through that double ordeal of 1704–1705, 1706–1707, and twice to rise from two disasters, the second greater than the first!

But it had cost dear! If, from the splendid theatre on which the armies were contending, we cast our eyes on the people and the government, we meet there a grievous spectacle. Call to mind the picture that we drew of France from 1697 to 1700, and judge how much had been added to it by seven years of a gigantic war! It is by following the progress of the financial administra-

[1] To this loss must be added that of Admiral Shovel, who perished by shipwreck when returning, on the rocks of the Scilly Isles.

[2] Of the fifty-three ships of the line, sunk in the docks, only two, of fifty guns, had been burned by hot shot; all the others were pumped out, and raised without accident after the departure of the enemy.

[3] General Pelet, t. VII. pp. 57–183. *Mém. de Tessé*, t. II. pp. 234-275. *Relation du siége de Toulon*, by H. Ferrand, 2d consul of Toulon, ap. H. Vienne, *Esquisses historiques*, p. 128; 1841. L. Guérin, *Hist. Maritime de France*, t. II. p. 166.

tion that we see at what a continually increasing speed the government was descending to ruin. In 1700, before the war, the government was carried on already only by dint of loans and *extraordinary transactions*. The expenditure that year was one hundred and sixteen millions; the net revenue only sixty-nine millions! We may imagine the advantage taken by the revenue farmers of such an administration! Their extravagant display showed to all eyes the scandalous source of their fortunes. Chamillart, in 1701, conceived the idea of forcing them to disgorge. The council of the King taxed the financiers, who had farmed the extraordinary affairs of the government since 1689, twenty-four millions; they had made, it was said, a hundred and seven millions in transactions that had yielded the King three hundred and twenty-nine millions, that is to say, they had received nearly twenty-five per cent. commission. When Colbert had prosecuted the revenue-farmers, it was in the midst of peace, and with the firm intention of thenceforth dispensing with loans. To attack the financiers at a time when the nation was about to plunge deep into expedients that made their coöperation indispensable, was absurd. The only thing gained by it was to pay much more dearly for their services; the twenty-four millions were soon compensated for with usury.

By an edict of March 12, 1701, the capitation-tax was reëstablished in a somewhat larger ratio than the first time. This was one of the least evil resources to which recourse could be had: this was also the case with the bureau of loans which, in 1702, was renewed, after Colbert's example, with an interest, it is true, much heavier than under Colbert, namely, eight per cent.! But a deluge of extraordinary edicts began at the same time to rain on the country: a multitude of new offices were created, ruinous to labor, to circulation, to the production of merchandise:[1] this destructive storm was not for a long time arrested. The encumbering of inferior tribunals and of all bodies became absolutely stupefying: the number of royal officers, already so superabundant, was almost

[1] We remark, among the number, offices of receivers of villain taxes in state districts where there had never been any, in Languedoc, for instance. Perpetual syndics were established in parishes where there were no *maires*. *Échevins*, *capitouls*, *jurats*, the last remains of elective institutions, became hereditary like the *maires*: the *maires* became alternate and triennial; that is, there were two or three *maires* in the same city, performing the duties of the office in turn: lieutenants were given them, also alternate and triennial. (Edict of March–May, 1702; January, 1704; December, 1706.) The hereditary *maires* were declared born deputies of the assemblies of states, which accomplished the annihilation of the representation of the Third Estate in the Provincial Estates. Paris and Lyons were alone exempt from hereditary *échevins* (April, 1704). Some cities ransomed their municipal liberties.

doubled. The direct injury resulting to the state was somewhat lessened by want of faith towards the new officers: a declaration of August 1705 revoked a part of the privileges that had been sold to them, under the pretext that the salaries and perquisites attached to their offices were sufficient to indemnify them.

Even that kind of material order, of mechanical regularity, which may be preserved even in extreme distress, and which at least enables one to know how he is ruined, no longer existed. The whole order of finances was reversed and utterly thrown into confusion. Chamillart lost himself entirely therein, and was no longer even capable of making out his balance-sheet at the end of the year. King, minister, and council of finances groped at random in the darkness in which the receivers and farmers of the revenue speculated and pillaged at their ease.

The emissions of *rentes* succeeded each other on conditions more and more onerous: from six and one quarter per cent. in 1702 of the revenue, seven and one seventh was reached in 1703, and the real rate was much higher still, for the purchasers, profiting by monetary revolutions, paid for the capital of this emission in depreciated currency. Most of the creations of offices were at eight and one third per cent., that is to say, twelve thousand livres were paid for an office yielding a thousand livres.

The triennial lease of the farmers-general, who had subscribed in 1700, on the basis of fifty-three millions annually, was adjudged in 1703 at less than forty-two millions, which was scarcely worth thirty-seven and a half millions on the basis of 1700, on account of the depreciation of the currency; in 1706, no one could be found willing to take the revenue-farms for three years; it was necessary to let them from year to year. The mass of coin continually diminished, was concealed, or left the kingdom, owing to a series of extravagant operations which completed the ruin of commerce. In 1700, the nominal value of the louis d'or had been reduced to twelve livres, fifteen sous; that of the crown to three livres, seven sous. In September, 1701, there was a general recoinage of specie: the louis was raised to fourteen livres; the crown to three livres, sixteen sous; the louis of the preceding coinage, although of the same weight, was received at only thirteen livres, and the old crown at only three livres, five sous. The object of this was to induce all to bring their specie to the mint; but the result was, that foreign nations attracted a great part of the French coin, uttering debased coin for it and gaining the difference. In two years, the royal mints recoined only three

hundred and twenty-one millions of specie, on which the King gained about twenty-nine millions:[1] according to Forbonnais, at least two hundred and fifty millions were recoined abroad, with a profit of twenty-two millions for foreigners. In 1703, there was another invention: pieces of ten sous were manufactured, which were intrinsically worth but six sous, three deniers, while the new crown was reduced to three livres, eleven sous, which made the mark represent thirty-one livres, nineteen sous, in crowns, and thirty-seven livres, ten sous, in ten-sous pieces. All payments were naturally made in ten-sous pieces, and foreigners attracted, in great part, the profit of the difference. In 1704, there was a new recoinage: the louis d'or was raised to fifteen livres, the crown to four livres. This again was much more unsuccessful: in two years, only one hundred and seventy-three millions were recoined; the rest was coined by foreigners or by French counterfeiters, who gained at least double what the King did; that is, nearly sixty millions. In the preceding recoinage, the plan had been adopted of not wholly reimbursing the proprietors in new coin for the values brought to the mint: for a part of these values, notes at long date, called *mint-bills*, were given them. This expedient was renewed, and, in order to attract the fugitive money, an interest of seven and a half per cent. was attached to the mint-bills. These bills were at first received at par, in trade; then they were multiplied without reason or measure; the treasury paid no longer in anything but mint-bills; at the same time, no fund was set aside to pay them on presentation, as if sure of obtaining indefinite renewals. The point was soon reached of paying no longer either principal or interest! September 17, 1704, payment was suspended in the bureau of loans till April 1, 1705. This was not calculated to revive credit!

In 1705, an attempt was made to arrest the utterance of debased coin that continued abroad, by reëstablishing equality of currency between the old coin and the new coin; all louis were fixed at fourteen livres, all crowns at three livres, sixteen sous. The following year, the louis was reduced to thirteen livres, five sous, and the crown to three livres, eleven sous, reducing the ten-sous pieces to nine sous, six deniers, which did not suffice to reëstablish the monetary equilibrium. The interest on the promises of the bureau of loans had been raised to ten per cent. (March 23, 1705),

[1] This profit consisted in paying the creditors of the State with a less weight of metal, by changing the relation of the currency with the mark, of the nominal value with the immutable standard.

in the hope that payment would not be exacted till April 1. This hope was deceptive. It was necessary to pay: payment was made half in money, half in special mint-bills. The mint-bills began to depreciate. The King's council decreed that they should be used to the amount of one fourth in all payments between private individuals, at Paris, but did not decree that they should be received at the treasury. This absurd distinction ruined all confidence, and the *forced paper currency* started under the most deplorable auspices. The perturbation was profound in all relations: the price of all commodities increased considerably; capitalists would no longer lend, except at excessive interest, on account of this fourth payment in paper. The mint-bills soon depreciated seventy-five per cent. The council finally decided that the treasury should receive them to the amount of one half in loans made to the bureau of loans, the minister passing them over to the contractors. In 1706, an order was issued to private individuals, at Paris, to receive mint-bills, no longer only to the amount of one fourth, but as specie, in payments over four hundred livres: it was prohibited to exact more than six per cent. exchange on the bills, under penalty of the pillory, banishment, etc. The result was, that, despite these threats, exchange rose to sixty per cent. between Paris and the provinces. Parisian trade was crushed. October 24, the council, recoiling before its work, decreed that at least one fourth of all payments should be made in coin. The interest on these bills was suppressed, and it was resolved to convert fifty millions of bills, one half into promises on the farmers-general at five years, with five per cent. interest, one half into bills on the receivers-general, the whole assigned to special funds. The King promised that, beginning with 1708, six millions annually should be set apart to redeem the rest of the bills remaining in circulation, and the bearers of the bills should be authorized to convert them into *rentes* or promises on the bureau of loans, on condition of lending to the King in specie a sum equal to the amount of their bills (October–November, 1706; January, 1707). No confidence was placed in this, and none profited by the permission. The converted bills depreciated as much as the other: the farmers themselves decried them, and bought them up at sixty and eighty per cent. loss, so as to pass them at par in the treasury! The *Turcarets* triumphed over the common ruin of the State and of commerce.[1] The government had reached the point with its

[1] Whilst the necessary conditions of commerce were overthrown, circulation was burdened with new duties, internal and external (1705).

creditors, either of unceasingly adding interest to principal, or of pledging nearly all the imposts. The war, waged on credit, cost a third more than under normal conditions. The ratio was to become still worse. The expenditure, from one hundred and forty-six millions, in 1701, reached two hundred and fifty-eight millions in 1707 (without reckoning the variation in the value of the currency)!

The finances of France and those of England offered a painful contrast: England, despite the enormous expenditures imposed on her by the war, sustained herself in that path of credit and administrative order that had been opened to her in the closing years of the past century, and the facile circulation of paper within the kingdom compensated for the vast exportation of specie necessitated by the payment of the armies.

The first efforts made in France to remedy the discredit of bills failed; a new course was taken; liberty was granted to individuals to stipulate for payment in specie (January, 1707); then the circulation of bills, hitherto confined to Paris, was authorized throughout the kingdom. A new revision of bills was ordered to the amount of seventy-two millions (May, 1707); there were, it is said, four hundred and thirteen millions, and one hundred and twenty-two millions were revised. The surplus was decried, and it was interdicted to give or receive them in payment. The holders had the right to convert them into bills on the receivers and the farmers-general, or into *rentes* on the Hôtel de Ville at seven and one seventh per cent., or even at ten per cent., in consideration of the loan of an equal sum in specie: this succeeded no better than the first revision. In November, the liberty granted in January was restored, and it was decreed that the revised bills should be used to the extent of one fourth in all payments. The evil only grew worse. A new fiscal operation was made, worthy of the preceding ones: twenty-sous pieces were manufactured that were worth only twelve sous, six deniers, — a deplorable gain soon compensated for. Private individuals paid the treasury only with these pieces, whilst the treasury was obliged to buy bills of exchange for the expenses of the armies abroad.[1]

Frightful signs of decomposition manifested themselves in the body social: a contraband trade in salt (*faux-saulnage*) was carried on, on an immense scale, by the unpaid soldiers. They overran the north and centre of France in bands of two and three hundred foot and horse, selling, arms in hand, the salt that they

[1] Concerning the finances, see Forbonnais, t. II. pp. 109–177.

took from the royal storehouses; one of these bands went as far as Meudon, under the eyes of the Dauphin.[1] The counterfeiting of coin was practised on an equally large scale. A large part of the higher nobility, in certain provinces, and particularly in Provence, turned their châteaux into workshops for counterfeiting. Troubles broke out in different places on account of a greatly unpopular edict imposing extraordinary taxes. After subjecting nearly all the contracts of civil life to registration (*insinuation*), this edict taxed the certificates of baptism, marriage, and sepulture, under pretext of securing the regularity of the registers kept by curés and controlled by royal officers (June, 1705). Many poor people, to avoid the tax, baptized their children themselves, and married in secret by simple consent before witnesses. Investigations were attempted; the peasants revolted in Querci and Périgord (March–April, 1707). It was feared that the conflagration of Cévennes would be rekindled, and the edict was allowed to fall into desuetude.[2]

Although the court did not change in appearance, — although ostentatious pleasures pursued their accustomed round, and the young and lively Duchess of Burgundy infused among the obligatory ceremonies of etiquette an impulse, a superficial gayety that diverted the aged King, — anxiety was at the bottom of all hearts, and the gloomy preoccupations that continued to increase, everywhere transpired under these conventional external appearances. If the most frivolous and the most indifferent to public affairs felt themselves forced to become serious, what must have been the anguish of men who had long foreseen the ruin, and who believed that they had at hand the means of exorcising it? Fénelon at Cambrai, Vauban at Paris, Bois-Guillebert at Rouen, were consumed with desire to act and with regret at their powerlessness. Fénelon had sent to his friends Beauvilliers and Chevreuse memorials on the means of avoiding, then of conducting the War of the Succession (1701–1702). Bois-Guillebert had penetrated to the presence of Chamillart, and had shaken that minister, too incapable to accomplish good, but too honest not to desire it. Vauban continually besieged the men who directed affairs. Each error, each new calamity confirmed him in his system of the radical change of taxation. He finally broke forth; he attempted to support, to impose, by outside opinion, what he had not been able to insinuate to

[1] Lémontei, *Addit. à Dangeau*, pp. 188, 189.

[2] Lémontei, pp. 182–184. Saint-Simon, t. V. p. 231. The establishment of a mutation-tax of one per cent. on all transfers of property, save inheritances in direct line and matrimonial donations, also belongs to this period.

statesmen in the privacy of the cabinet. He published, in the beginning of 1707, the *Dîme Royale*, and presented it to the King. A formidable cabal had surrounded Louis: intendants, officers of finances, partisans, and revenue-farmers, courtiers interested in the affairs of the farmers, — all that owed their wealth and power to the abuses of the collection of taxes, — were leagued against a plan that saved the people only by ruining their parasite caste. Chamillart himself, upright as he was, allowed himself to be drawn into the coalition. Beauvilliers and Chevreuse mingled in it through an ill understood respect for the system of their father-in-law, the great Colbert, and through lack of comprehending that for the profoundest ills the most radical remedies are needed. In short, the King, circumvented, irritated that an attempt should be made to enlighten him by force, received the project and the author very ill, and treated Vauban as a dreamer who disturbed the state with chimeras. Fifty years of immortal services were forgotten in a day. A decree in council, February 14, 1707, ordered that the book should be seized and exposed in the pillory. Vauban died six weeks afterwards (March 30), at the age of seventy-four. No doubt, chagrin had accelerated his end. France was not an accomplice in her King's ingratitude;[1] she mourned for the great man whose life and death had been consecrated to her; enemies themselves bowed before the tomb of Vauban, as they had formerly before that of Turenne, and the name inscribed on this tomb remains forever associated in history with those great types of the warrior-citizen which antiquity has bequeathed to us.

Bois-Guillebert, on his side, had issued, at the very moment of the appearance of the *Dîme Royale*, a little book entitled *Le Factum de la France*, in which he modified the views of his *Détail de la France* by borrowing from Vauban. He proposed to substitute for the capitation-tax — an ill-grounded impost, which imposed an equal tax on all of the same profession, whatever might be the inequality of their fortune — a tithe on all incomes, which would yield the King, he said, from eighty to one hundred millions, in-

[1] Louis, however, when he knew that Vauban was on his death-bed, suffered words of regret to escape him: "I lose a man well affected to my person and to the State!" Dangeau, t. III. p. 2. Concerning the end of Vauban, see Saint-Simon, t. V. p. 284. It is singular that the feudal Saint-Simon should admire Vauban and approve his plans, which suppress the pecuniary privileges of the nobility. Saint-Simon especially clung to political and honorary privileges. He claims that the church and the nobility approved, like himself, of the plans of Vauban; this is wholly improbable. See E. Daire, *Notice sur Vauban*, p. 5, prefixed to the *Dîme Royale*.

stead of twenty-five or thirty millions produced by the capitation-tax. The aids and customs were to be suppressed in proportion to this surplus, and the villain tax was to be preserved, its abuses being reformed. The tithe was to be received in money, and not in kind, as Vauban proposed, which was the least practical side of the theory. The proposition of Bois-Guillebert erred in the preservation of the villain tax, which was a useless repetition of the tithe. It would have been better, according to the plans of Vauban, to retain or establish indirect imposts not bearing on objects of prime necessity. Chamillart had some conferences with Bois-Guillebert, and did not seem to reject his principles, but put him off under the pretext that such a reform could not be undertaken in time of war. Bois-Guillebert refuted this conclusion of non-acceptance in a pamphlet so virulent[1] that the minister, irritated, subjected the *Factum de la France* to the fate of the *Dîme Royale* by a decree in council of March 14, and Bois-Guillebert was exiled for some time to Auvergne. Chamillart, however, through scruples of conscience, desired to make a partial trial of Bois-Guillebert's projects, at least with respect to the reform of the villain tax, in an election-district of the generality of Orleans; but his rule was too feeble for this; those in credit having, as usual, relieved the burden of their farmers to the detriment of the neighbors, the operation lacked basis.[2]

Although Chamillart, in his fits of vanity, wished to act the part of directing minister and to encroach on his colleagues, especially on the minister of foreign affairs, he felt himself morally and physically crushed by his double burden, and, after the disasters of 1706, he had already entreated the King to release him from one of his posts, declaring that he was *perishing* in them. "Well," replied Louis, "we will perish together!" a touching expression, had it been applied to a more worthy subject.[3] The campaign of 1707, while elevating our arms, having completed the ruin of the finances, Chamillart wholly lost courage. He had consumed, in anticipation, the year about to open,[4] and saw a new campaign approaching without funds for provisions, fresh supplies of horses, or recruits. Sick and worn-out, he sent to the King his resignation of the comptroller-generalship, and proposed for his successor

[1] *Supplément au Détail de la France.*

[2] Saint-Simon, t. V. p. 290.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 280.

[4] He had been able to pay the troops in part only by borrowing more than sixteen millions from Jewish bankers, more than eleven millions of which were from Samuel Bernard alone.

one of the two directors of finances, offices that he had created in 1701, in order to secure for himself auxiliaries. The new comptroller-general was Desmaretz, nephew of the great Colbert (February 20, 1708.) Chief clerk under his uncle, he had been dismissed, at the death of Colbert, for malversations, probably exaggerated by the enemies of his family. He remained twenty years in disgrace. In 1701, Beauvilliers and Torci vainly attempted to cause him to be sent to Spain, to reëstablish financial order there. His mind, fertile in resources, had finally won his recall to the council of finances. The prejudices of the King and Madame de Maintenon against him yielded to necessity. He was a new Pontchartrain, with the same brilliant and bold facility, the same gift of dazzling and persuading, but more special knowledge in matters of finance; the errors that had sullied his youth were never renewed. The language held to him by the King at the time of installing him into the comptroller-generalship proved that Louis was not deceived concerning the state of things. "I shall be obliged to you if you can find any remedy, and shall not be at all surprised if everything continues to go on from bad to worse!" [1]

The situation was, in fact, the most appalling possible. It was the chaos of the times of Mazarin, but with an exhausted nation, which seemed to have grown old like its king, instead of being full of ardor and buoyancy. Seven years of war had cost more than one thousand three hundred and forty-six millions, more than four hundred millions of which had been furnished by extraordinary transactions, three hundred and eighty-six millions by debts due, sixty-nine millions by anticipations on 1708 and the following years, etc. The ordinary revenue had furnished only three hundred and eighty-seven millions, much less than one third of the total expenditure! Deductions being made for offices and anticipations, there remained scarcely twenty millions disposable for 1708! Desmaretz began by two clearly defined measures. On one hand, he reëstablished full liberty to pay either in specie or bills, which brought to light the specie buried in the earth; on the other hand, feeling the necessity of securing the service of the army at all costs, he put off till 1709 the payment of the funds on 1708 consumed in advance, and by this suspension of payment, an irregular but necessary expedient, he procured means to subsist the armies. Creations of *rentes* at six and one quarter per cent., new creations of charges and offices more and more singular and

[1] Saint-Simon, t. VI. p. 108. *Compte-rendu de Desmaretz au régent*, ap. Forbonnais, t. II. p. 180.

parasitic, various extraordinary transactions, some anticipations as far forward as 1716, completed the resources of the year. Private individuals were authorized to purchase exemption from the capitation-tax by paying it in advance for six years, on which the King would pay them five per cent. interest (September, 1708). This was a new advantage granted to the rich at the expense of the poor, on whom the whole impost was then to relapse.[1] Transit duties and tolls were doubled on highways and rivers, which completed the paralyzing of commerce and circulation, and but too well balanced the abolition of the forced currency of paper-money. All this was deplorable; but life still lasted, and it was a great gain to live a season! One hundred and eighty-four millions were consumed for the year, and a portion of the arrears was covered to the amount of nearly forty-five millions.

Whilst Desmaretz was finding resources at any cost,[2] Chamillart, who remained minister of war, determined with the King the plans of the campaign. The little court exiled from Saint-Germain had suggested to the King's council a bold project, namely, to take advantage of the discontent caused among the Scotch by the Act of Union with England, and to throw the Pretender James III. into Scotland with six thousand French soldiers. They thought themselves sure that Edinburgh would proclaim James III. and that the Highlanders would descend in a body at the summons of the heir of the Stuarts. This formidable diversion within the realm of Great Britain could not fail to produce confusion in the designs and the armies of the allies: England would at least recall a part of her troops, and advantage might be taken of this to rouse the great cities of Belgium, which had again become wholly devoted to the *two crowns* since they had had the allies for masters: the severity with which they were subjected to ransom justified this revulsion of feeling. It was decided that the Duke of Burgundy, who had not reappeared in camp since 1703, should command in Flanders with the Duke de Vendôme; that the Elector of Bavaria

[1] The clergy had already purchased exemption for four millions per annum for eight years; the Estates of Languedoc, for their province, for three millions during the same number of years. The clergy granted besides 1,500,000 livres of subsidy in 1701, six millions in 1705, then nearly 1,800,000 livres per annum for ten years.

[2] The King aided him in it in person. Every one knows the scene of high comedy recounted by Saint-Simon concerning the Jewish financier, Samuel Bernard, presented to the King by the comptroller-general and taken by Louis the Great in person through all Marly, "with the graces that the King knew well how to employ when he had some purpose to accomplish." The Jew, who had refused a new loan to Desmaretz, was so happy and so proud that he lent all that was desired. Saint-Simon, t. VI. p. 178.

should go on the Rhine with Berwick for lieutenant; that Villars should be transferred from the Rhine to the Alps, and that the Duke of Orleans should remain alone at the head of the army of Spain. This was an unfortunate combination: Villars, the most active of our generals, and the fittest for great operations, was in some sort rendered useless by a petty defensive war in the mountains; the association of Burgundy with Vendôme was still worse conceived; it was impossible to associate two men less fitted to understand each other. We have already described the contrast of heroic virtues and shameless cynicism, the alternations of enthusiasm and torpor, that constituted the strange character of Vendôme.[1] The Duke of Burgundy was his antipodes. He carried reserve to coldness, chastity to austerity, devotion to scrupulousness, order and regularity to minuteness, circumspection to uncertainty. Apart from his love for his wife, the only passion which he had not stifled in his soul and which had grown by the suppression of all others, his only pleasures were the veritable recreations of a seminarist. He had been wrested too soon from his illustrious master: the religious philosopher that Fénelon had wished to mould had turned to the timorous devotee. On judging him superficially, one might at times have taken for a petty mind this prince of upright, sagacious, broad intellect, nourished by profound studies, this thinker who has left pages that our great moralists would not have disavowed: his intellect was less firm than broad; thus, he reasoned exceedingly well of war, and has written a remarkable fragment on this great art; but he was troubled, on the field, by too much reflection and too little decision: the spirit of opportuneness and tact were wholly lacking in him.[2]

A most detestable suite was given him, to accompany him in the army: the principal guide, the intimate counsellor imposed on him by the King, was that same D'O, that sailor of Versailles, who had prevented Count de Toulouse from profiting by the victory of Velez Malaga and probably from retaking Gibraltar!

In Spain, the choice of the Duke of Orleans was good: this prince, although already of very licentious habits, was not yet dulled by that careless indolence engendered by inveterate de-

[1] Saint-Simon accuses him of not preserving himself from the most ignoble of all vices, that against nature.

[2] See the writings of the Duke of Burgundy in his *Life*, by the Abbé Proyart, t. I. p. 294, and t. II. *passim*, and, in his correspondence with Fénelon, the efforts of the latter to conquer scruples and minutiæ in him. *Œuvres de Fénelon*, t. V.; *Lettres*, 1708. Saint-Simon, t. VI. p. 155.

bauchery; he showed himself, on the contrary, as bold as brave; but he lacked the means of action. The Spanish government, only partially restored by the devotion of the people, relapsed into its languor. King Philip V. was governed by his wife, who had rendered herself popular by showing courage and elasticity in extreme peril, but had neither the experience nor the reason necessary to direct the state; she was herself governed wholly by the Princess d'Orsini; the latter, a Frenchwoman of the house of La Trémoille and widow of a Roman prince, was a woman of great wit and powers of intrigue, who was satirically called the *lieutenant* of Madame de Maintenon in Spain, and who reigned in that country more directly and more ostensibly than Madame de Maintenon in France. Neither her political talents nor her services were of a nature to justify her singular domination. The cabinet of Madrid furnished neither provisions nor equipage to the army; the Duke of Orleans was obliged to do everything himself. He nevertheless maintained the superiority over the Archduke and continued his progress in Catalonia. He took Tortosa (July 11, 1708); but he was not in a condition to attack Barcelona, the only operation that could be decisive; only, at the end of the season, a detached corps accomplished the recovery of Valencia by the taking of Denia (October 12–17) and of Alicante (December 3).

The enemies largely indemnified themselves, by their success in the islands of the Mediterranean, for the checks that they experienced on the Spanish continent. The English Admiral Leake effected a descent in Sardinia; the Spanish viceroy had exasperated the islanders by appropriating to himself the monopoly of the grain-trade.[1] The whole island declared for Carlos III. (August). Leake then assailed Port Mahon; that important capital of the island of Minorca, saved the first time by the French, was badly defended against this second attack; it surrendered, September 29. The English established themselves there on their own account, as at Gibraltar: it was the second link in the chain with which they were seeking to clasp the Mediterranean.

On the side of the Alps, the campaign was tardy. The Duke of Savoy, left alone at the head of the Austro-Piedmontese by the departure of Eugene for the Rhine, was discontented with the Emperor, who made him wait a year for the investiture of Montferrat, confiscated from the Duke of Mantua: he did not march till he

[1] He sold this grain to the enemies of his own government, to the troops of the Archduke, which were suffering from the scarcity in Catalonia. See Saint-Simon, t. VI. p. 245.

received the investiture. His forces were greatly superior to those of Villars. In the latter part of July, he invaded Savoy, then, arrested before Chambery by the French, he fell back on Mount Genèvre and threatened Briançon. The entrance to Dauphiny being well defended, he reëntered the upper valleys of Piedmont, followed by Villars, who, before his eyes, drove his rear-guard from Sézanne, near the sources of the Little Dora (August 10). The position of Victor Amadeus was very embarrassing; for he was shut in between the French army and the castle of Exilles. The cowardice of the governor of Exilles extricated the enemy. This officer, attacked by the Duke of Savoy, surrendered, instead of resisting to the last, as he had been ordered to do (August 13). The Duke, master of the valley of the Little Dora, fell back into that of Clusone, took Perouse (August 16), and besieged Fenestrelle. Villars was unable to force the passes that would have allowed him to succor this fortress. The garrison of Fenestrelle surrendered themselves prisoners, August 31. Piedmont was thus closed to the French.

The Scottish enterprise had been attempted early in the spring. Its only chances were in great secrecy and celerity. The ministers of war and the marine could not make preparations speedily enough to anticipate the suspicions of the English; yet the descent would have been effected before the cabinet of Saint James could have been in a position to oppose it, if the Pretender, James III., on arriving at Dunkirk to embark, had not been seized with the measles. While confined to his bed by the fever, an English fleet appeared before the downs of Flanders. The winds drove off the enemy, and the Pretender set out, March 19, in a squadron commanded by Forbin. A storm caused the squadron to lose two days, and the English had time to arrive almost as soon as the French at the mouth of the Forth, near Edinburgh. They could have disembarked only sacrificing the squadron, incomparably weaker than the enemy's fleet, and they saw on the shore neither the movement nor the signals announced by the Jacobites. No attempt was made to reach Inverness, in default of Edinburgh. Forbin concealed his route from the enemy and brought the Pretender back to Dunkirk (April 7), having lost a single ship in his retreat.

The miscarriage of the Scotch expedition rendered the revolution that it had been hoped to excite in Belgium much more difficult, the enemies preserving their forces intact in that country. The intelligence, however, that had been established with the Flemish cities was still maintained, and the offensive was taken in May.

The Dukes of Burgundy and Vendôme had not less than ninety thousand men under their command, without counting a corps that guarded the coasts of French Flanders. The first operations, well conducted, obliged Marlborough, who was inferior, to fall back on Louvain, and to allow the French to forage in Brabant as far as the Demer. The irresolution of the King and the disagreement of Burgundy and Vendôme prevented anything further from being undertaken for a whole month.

The allies employed this time in changing their plan of campaign. They had at first counted on making their attack by the way of the Rhine and the Moselle with two armies of sixty thousand men each, under the command of the Elector of Hanover and Eugene, whilst Marlborough occupied the great French army in Flanders; but, the spring having come, Eugene was soon convinced that the German princes would not furnish the exorbitant levies, the promise of which had been wrung from them, and that only the ordinary contingents would be obtained, that is, that the two armies of the Rhine and the Moselle would each have little more than thirty thousand men. Another combination was therefore concerted between Eugene and Marlborough, namely, the renewal of the great manœuvre of Hochstadt. Eugene left the Elector of Hanover in the north of Swabia, behind the lines of Etlingen, which the allies had raised during the winter to replace the lines of Bühl at Stolhofen, and, with twenty-four thousand soldiers collected on the Moselle, he marched by the way of Coblentz towards Belgium (June 30). The French forces of the Rhine and the Moselle followed this movement; the Elector of Bavaria remained in front of the Elector of Hanover, and Berwick, with more than twenty thousand men, crossed the Moselle at Remich (July 7) to go into Flanders.

Events were precipitated in this latter country. After some weeks of immobility, the French army quitted, at evening, July 4, the camp that it occupied between Genappe and Braine-La-Leude, and reached the Dender, near Ninove, in a single march. A detachment, sent in advance at four o'clock in the morning, arrived at the gates of Ghent in twenty-four hours, and penetrated by surprise into this great city. The bourgeoisie received the French with open arms; the little garrison of the citadel capitulated the next day. Bruges, summoned by the French corps of West Flanders, also opened its gates without striking a blow, July 6. The fort of Plasschendaël, which commanded the canal between Bruges and Ostend, was carried by assault. We were less fortunate at Aude-

narde, the only position that remained to the allies on the Scheldt; the governor was succored in time by a detachment from the army of the enemies. It was, however, a glorious beginning. The plan was to recover all Flanders, and to clear the course of the Lys by taking Menin in the rear of the army, while the enemy should be arrested on the Dender or the Scheldt. For this purpose, it was necessary to mask Audenarde, since it had been impossible to take it by surprise. The Dender had been crossed, and, on July 6, Marlborough had established himself on the other bank, in front of the French camp. The Duke of Burgundy called a council of war. The dissensions broke forth there that had been brooding for a month, between the young prince and his suite on one hand, and the Duke de Vendôme on the other. Vendôme wished to defend the crossing of the Dender; Burgundy and his intimate counsellors preferred to defend the Scheldt alone. The majority ranged themselves on this side. Vendôme yielded with ill grace. Three days were lost in these debates. In the night of July 9–10, Vendôme, informed that the enemy was ascending the Dender in order to cross it, resumed the project of defending that river. They marched two hours with this purpose; then, after new discussions, retraced their steps and fell back on the Scheldt, near Gaveren. At ten o'clock in the morning, the enemy crossed the Dender at Lessines. Eugene, leaving the main body of his troops several days' march in the rear, had joined Marlborough on the 9th, with some cavalry. As at Hochstadt, the most perfect union reigned between the two great generals of the enemies, while confusion and disorder were in the councils of the French army.

The line of the Dender being lost, it only remained to cross the Scheldt in haste to prevent the enemy from debouching by Audenarde. Nothing was easier: the enemy had three times as far to travel as the French; but Vendôme, vexed, persisted in not stirring from Gaveren the whole of the 10th. The enemy, on the contrary, did not lose a moment. In the night of the 10th–11th, his vanguard threw bridges over the Scheldt, under the cannon of Audenarde, and, on the morning of the 11th, the whole allied army marched to cross the river. It was not till then that the French began to cross it also at Gaveren. The enemies debouched quite at their ease, and instantly faced about in the direction in which they were to encounter the French. The first corps of the vanguards met, in the afternoon, between the villages of Heurne and Beveren, on the road from Audenarde to Gaveren; the French, weaker, were repulsed with loss.

Other columns successively came to their aid; but the fault of a general officer prevented the occupation of a broken and wooded field, which Eugene and Marlborough seized on our right. Favored by this position, the generals of the enemy had time to bring the main body of their infantry into line, and to hurl masses against our right which was alone engaged. The Duke de Vendôme desired to precipitate the left wing on the enemy; the Duke of Burgundy retained it on the defensive, which allowed the enemy to turn the extremity of the French right and to take it in the rear. Yet, at nightfall, nothing was decided: the losses were nearly equal; none of our corps was routed; the whole of our left was intact, and the main body of the artillery had but just come up. Vendôme insisted with the greatest energy that the battle should be renewed the next day, and obtained authority, despite the lively opposition that manifested itself around the Duke of Burgundy. But, at this very moment, a few volleys of the enemy made the infantry recoil in some confusion; the cavalry of the right wing turned about towards Ghent without orders. The dispute was renewed at headquarters. Vendôme was told that, if he wished to stay where he was, he would be left alone on the field. "Very well, gentlemen," exclaimed Vendôme, exasperated, "you all will have it so, it is necessary to retire! Indeed, Monseigneur," he added, looking at the Duke of Burgundy, "you have long wished to do so!" A terrible and unjust saying, for the courage of the prince was incontestable. The Duke of Burgundy had self-control enough not to lose temper, a rare example of Christian patience. D'O and a few general officers urged the prince to quit the army in order to hasten to meet the forces that Berwick was bringing from the Moselle. Vendôme prevented Burgundy from taking this shameful course, and in some sort atoned for his offence by this service.[1]

The retreat was therefore effected on Ghent, but with very little order. A number of soldiers, mixed with the enemies, could not disengage themselves, and were taken during the night. Entire corps (at least nine thousand men) only escaped a like fate by making their way in a direction opposite to that followed by the army, and reaching Ypres, Lille, or Tournay. The army stopped in the rear of Ghent, at Lowendeghem, between the canal from Ghent to Bruges and the canalized river of Lieve, — an excellent

[1] See Saint-Hilaire, t. IV. pp. 128–152. Saint-Hilaire, commander of the artillery, a witness and actor, is much more worthy of faith than Saint-Simon concerning this affair. Saint-Simon, t. VI. pp. 249–260. Berwick, t. II. p. 511. Quinci, t. V. pp. 486–502. Lamberti, t. V. p. 106. General Pelet, t. VIII. pp. 9–88; 886–892.

defensive position that saved Ghent and Bruges, but left French Flanders open to the enemy. Eugene and Marlborough profited by it with their usual audacity. Marlborough dispatched two strong detachments up the Scheldt and the Lys, one of which established an intrenched camp at Helchin, between Audenarde and Tournay, and the other carried and razed the lines that covered the entrance to French Flanders, between Ypres and Comines. He closely followed this double vanguard and threw forward large parties into the heart of Artois and Picardy; although the peasants of Artois, at certain points, valiantly defended themselves against the hostile bands, the province, rather than suffer devastation, purchased exemption by a ransom of one million seven hundred thousand livres, in money and grain.

During this time, Eugene had gone in search of his army-corps, which was coming by the way of Louvain and Brussels. July 21, he set out from Brussels, escorting an immense convoy composed of flour and heavy baggage left behind by Marlborough. Vendôme, verbally, and Berwick by letter (he had arrived at Douai with his troops), urged the Duke of Burgundy to march to intercept the convoy; around the prince, impossibilities were found in everything; he did not march. The convoy joined Marlborough without obstacle (July 25). A second convoy, of heavy artillery, was prepared immediately afterwards at Brussels, and Eugene went again to seek it. It was evident that the generals of the enemy were projecting a great siege, and that everything should be risked to prevent it. Berwick put himself in motion; but he did not find himself strong enough to give battle to Eugene, and, for the second time, the great army did not stir. Berwick, in his Memoirs, accuses Vendôme; Saint-Simon, wholly hostile as he is to Vendôme, justifies him at the expense of the Duke of Burgundy. However this may be, the convoy arrived at Helchin, August 11, and there crossed the Scheldt. The 12th, Lille was invested. Eugene conducted the siege with over thirty thousand men, a hundred and twenty large cannon and eighty mortars: Marlborough covered it with sixty thousand soldiers, posted on both sides of the Scheldt, near Helchin.

The enterprise was bold: the place was defended by ten thousand soldiers, new levies, indeed, and by a courageous population, which forty years' union with France had wholly Frenchified.[1] A man of brilliant valor and firm character directed the defence: the aged Boufflers, Governor of French Flanders. The enemies were

[1] Two thousand young men and fifteen hundred citizens were enrolled.

entangled between two French armies and two fortified towns, Ypres and Tournay, having behind them as supporting points only Menin and Audenarde, and being able to procure provisions only from a distance. Eugene and Marlborough, firmly united by the similarity of their views and the solidity of their judgment, counted on the faults and disunion of their adversaries. The event justified their confidence but too well. The French generals were agreed upon nothing. Berwick proposed a diversion against Brussels; the other generals, as well as the King, desired that Lille should be directly succored. Berwick then offered to attack the lines of Eugene, whilst Burgundy and Vendôme opposed Marlborough. Vendôme preferred the junction of the two armies. The junction, owing to the procrastination of Burgundy and Vendôme, was not effected till August 29–30, on the Dender, and Berwick, unwilling to submit to the supremacy granted to Vendôme over the marshals, resigned his command, in order to remain as a private individual with the Duke of Burgundy. September 2, the Scheldt was re-crossed at Tournay, in order to march on Lille, after public prayers and a procession, in which the Duke of Burgundy employed time most precious in such a crisis. Marlborough fell back from the Scheldt on the Marque and rejoined Eugene between the Marque and the Deule, two small rivers that unite at Lille. September 4, at evening, the armies were face to face, the French occupying Mons in Puelle and Pont-à-Marque, the enemies deploying on the other bank of the Marque. It was thought impossible to reach them without opening roads for our columns across the wooded region, intersected with hedges, that extends between the sources of the Marque and the Upper Deule: from the 6th, if we may believe a letter from Vendôme to the King, the French, however, were in a condition to debouch into a plain almost a league and a half wide, on the enemy's front; but Berwick and the whole retinue of the Duke of Burgundy advised against attack, which the King desired as well as Vendôme. The question was referred anew to the King. The enemies thus had time to bar by strong lines the whole plain mentioned by Vendôme, which separated the Marque and the Deule, from Frétin to Noyelle. The 9th, the minister Chamillart arrived in camp, with orders from the King to press the attack. It was too late: the Marque was crossed without difficulty; but, after four hours' cannonading that did not even shake the parapets of the enemy's lines, it was perceived that success was impossible: the Marque was recrossed, then the Scheldt (September 14–16), without attempting to succor Lille on the side of the Lower

Marque, and the French were contented with placing themselves between the enemy and Brussels, in order to obstruct the re-victualling of the besiegers.

The besieged, however, resisted with admirable constancy and courage: every inch of ground in the outer works cost the assailants streams of blood. Several assaults were repulsed with terrible carnage. In the night of the 28th, eighteen hundred horsemen, loaded with arms and sacks of powder, penetrated into the city through the camp of the enemies; but, a few hours before, a grave check at another point had more than counterbalanced this success. The allied generals, seeing that they could obtain nothing more from Brabant, had secured another resource. They had succeeded in causing a great convoy of provisions to be sent from England to Ostend, and Marlborough had sent forward a strong detachment, which seized the canal from Nieuwpoort to Ostend, and which facilitated the passage of the convoy (September 27). The next day, the convoy encountered near Wynendaël a French corps greatly superior to its escort. Unfortunately, the commander was a certain Count de La Mothe, an inept protegé of Chamillart, who found means, with forces almost double, to permit himself to be defeated by the escort; the convoy escaped. The allies, when they received this succor, were on the point of raising the siege of Lille, for want of provisions. They remained, and continued to advance slowly, as it were, at the cost of a man for a blow, in their attacks on the outworks of the place.

Vendôme attempted to close the road to Ostend against provisions, by opening the dikes and inundating the country; but the enemy overcame this difficulty by means of flat-boats; the French opposed to these other armed boats, and finally took by assault the post of Leffinghen, which commands the canal from Nieuwpoort to Ostend (October 25). It was too late: the fate of Lille was decided. The brave governor, Boufflers, seeing breaches opened in two bastions of the body of the place, and unwilling to permit a city to be sacked which had shown itself faithful and devoted, had withdrawn all the artillery and munitions into the citadel, and capitulated for the city, October 22, on the most honorable conditions. Eugene, who nobly congratulated him on his admirable defence, permitted him to send to Douai the wounded, sick, equipage, and horses. The garrison, reduced to five thousand six hundred men (almost half), entered the citadel, October 25, against which operations were resumed, the 29th. The deputies of the States-General took possession of the city.

At the beginning of November, Chamillart returned to consult with the French generals near Tournay: Burgundy and Berwick were of the opinion that an army-corps should be left behind the canal from Ghent to Bruges, and that the rest of the forces should be brought back into Artois, in order to cover the French territory; this would have been reopening the communications of the enemies with Brabant, and renouncing any diversion in favor of the citadel of Lille. Vendôme opposed this, and Chamillart, on the part of the King, forbade the abandonment of the Scheldt to the enemies. Unfortunately, it was impossible to guard at once the Scheldt from Tournay to Ghent, and the canals from Ghent to Bruges, Ostend, and Nieuwpoort, without dispersing the army along an immense line.

Whilst discussions were being carried on in camp, Berwick received a secret despatch of the highest importance. His uncle Marlborough wrote to him, "that the present juncture was well adapted to the opening of negotiations of peace; that the proposition must be made to the deputies of the States-General, to Prince Eugene, and to himself, and that he would do his best to secure its acceptance." Marlborough, whose fortunes grew continually with war, had hitherto been strongly opposed to all compromise: what causes modified his sentiments, when victory continued to smile on him? This is a problem; but there is no reason to doubt that his overtures were sincere. Chamillart wrote to the King, "that the proposition of Marlborough arose only from the bad situation in which the army of the allies found itself!" Louis commissioned him to dictate the answer to Berwick, and the answer was such that Marlborough, offended, became more hostile than before to all idea of peace, and did not change again in this respect. King, ministers, and generals, — it seemed as if all were seized with madness.[1]

[1] Berwick, t. II. p. 5. This fact is the less conceivable, inasmuch as, before the first reverses of the campaign, and, consequently, in a much better situation, Louis had spontaneously made, as opening the way to peace, a very important concession to the interests of England and Holland. He had dictated to Philip V. a commercial regulation for Spain and the Indies, which conceded equality of treatment to the different nations (July, 1708). The French merchants had usurped everything since 1701. See *Mém. de Noailles*, p. 208. This regulation was an answer to a treaty which the English, skilful in turning everything to account, — even their own defeats and those of their allies, — had imposed on *Carlos III.* after Almanza. By this treaty, of July 10, 1707, English goods imported by the English into Spain were not to pay duties till six months had expired; the English were to be put on the same footing as the Spaniards in America, and the French were to be absolutely excluded.

At the close of November a diversion was attempted, which, executed sooner and under better conditions, might have had great results. The Elector of Bavaria, having returned from the Rhine, where the campaign had been fruitless, marched from Mons on Brussels, with twelve or fifteen thousand soldiers, and assailed this capital, with the hope that the inhabitants would rise at his approach; but the garrison, seven thousand men strong, restrained the people and sustained the attack (November 24–26). On the news of this, Marlborough and Eugene, leaving a heavy corps before the citadel of Lille, marched directly to the Scheldt with all the rest of their forces. Marlborough and one of his lieutenants surprised the passage of the river, under favor of a thick fog, near Kerkhoven and Gaveren; the French corps scattered along the Scheldt were thrown back, some on Ghent, the others on Tournay (November 27). Eugene then returned towards Lille, in order to prevent the citadel from being succored, and Marlborough pushed on towards Brussels. The Elector raised the siege, abandoning his cannon.

Louis XIV. lost patience: he wrote to Boufflers to capitulate the citadel of Lille, and recalled Burgundy and Vendôme, ordering them to put the army into winter-quarters on the side of Artois. Vendôme besought the King to permit him to establish himself with the main body of the army, not in Artois, but behind the canal between Ghent and Bruges. This was the last chance of arresting the progress of the enemy. Louis was obstinate: the army was separated, whilst Boufflers evacuated, December 10, with the honors of war, the citadel of Lille, which he had defended as generously as the city.

He had fought, night and day, during four months. Few victories could be more glorious to a general than such a defeat. The allies had paid for their success by immense losses; but what a success! The France of Louis XIV. encroached upon by the loss of the first conquest of the Great King, the first masterpiece of Vauban! That great man had closed his eyes in time not to behold such a spectacle.

The allies were not content with this triumph. Lille could not be really secured to them as long as the French remained masters of Ghent and Bruges. Scarcely had the citadel of Lille surrendered, when Ghent was invested. Ghent was occupied by a whole army-corps (fourteen or fifteen thousand men), and the population was well disposed, which compensated for the weakness of the fortifications; but the commander was that same La Mothe

who had so foolishly suffered himself to be defeated, September 28, at Wynendaël; after such a proof of incapacity, Chamillart had caused him to be maintained in the most important command that could be intrusted to a lieutenant-general! On the rumor of the siege of Ghent, Boufflers received orders to assemble the French army, but just separated in its winter-quarters; but Boufflers had only time at most to withdraw the troops from their garrisons; January 2, 1709, La Mothe marched out of Ghent, by capitulation, without even having fired a shot. Three days afterwards, heavy rains were followed by severe freezing weather, which would have rendered work in the trenches impossible, and would have probably forced the enemy to raise the siege. Bruges had also been evacuated without fighting. All Spanish Flanders was again lost after the capital of French Flanders.[1]

Such was the end of this deplorable campaign, which had brought discredit on the heir of the throne, the object of so many hopes,[2] ruined the reputation of the most vaunted of our generals, seen the bulwark of our frontier fall in the presence of a hundred thousand French soldiers, condemned to powerlessness and inertia, and, lastly, revealed the profound decline of things and persons in that government which had so long been the example and terror of all others. The present was sinister; the future, such that the mind dared no longer fathom its depths: men foresaw not only the abasement, but the ruin of France!

Nature seemed leagued with man against our unfortunate country. Chamillart had suggested to the King the design of retaking Lille during the winter: the frightful rigor of the season, still more than the insufficiency of resources, compelled its renunciation; unheard-of cold, which had begun in the south, froze all Europe; even the Rhone, the most impetuous of rivers, was arrested in its course; the sea froze on our coasts as in the polar regions; nearly all the fruit-trees perished; the most robust trunks snapped asunder as if by powder; rocks were cleft by the frost; the strongest ardent spirits congealed by the fireside; grain was frozen in the ground. Theatres, courts, and stores were closed; pleasure, business, every-

[1] Berwick, t. II. pp. 18–57. Saint-Simon, t. VI. pp. 260–412. Quinci, t. V. pp. 502–606. Saint-Hilaire, t. IV. pp. 153–195. General Pelet, t. VIII. pp. 39–168, 393–533.

[2] The Duke of Burgundy had completely lost the good opinion of the army, by the indifference he had shown before our reverses. When the capitulation of Lille was announced to him, he was playing at shuttle-cock, and did not interrupt his game. This was a spirit of indifference to worldly affairs very good in a monk, but very bad in a man called to govern the State. Saint-Simon, t. IV. pp. 368–406.

thing ceased; social life was suspended like the life of nature. Whole families were found dead of cold in their cottages and barns.

The cold disappeared (March), but the misery remained inexpressible, immense. As soon as it was known that the crops were destroyed, grain rose to exorbitant prices. As usual, fear and cupidity created an artificial dearth before the real one that was destined to follow the loss of the harvest. The finances, which Desmaretz was struggling, not to revive, but to keep from perishing, thus received a new blow. A decree in council, February 19, 1709, had just ordered the payment of the assignments of 1708 reassigned to 1709; the creditors of the State, satisfied at seeing that faith was kept with them, reloaned their funds to the treasurers, commissaries, etc.; the increasing dearness again restricted the circulation of money, and, on the other hand, obliged the comptroller-general to apply everything to the most pressing need, that is, to the subsistence of the army. All payments were again suspended, even, in part, that of the *rentes* of the Hôtel de Ville. The revenue-farmers, it is said, made use of their capital in criminal and inhuman speculations. Saint-Simon here raises a terrible imputation against the financial and police-officers. "It was believed," he says, "that the officers of finances possessed themselves of grain through emissaries dispersed throughout the markets of the kingdom, in order to sell it again at the price that they chose to put upon it, *for the profit of the King, without forgetting their own;*" and he accuses the intendants, the celebrated lieutenant of police at Paris, D'Argenson, successor of La Reinie, and Desmaretz himself. If we are to believe what is affirmed, men were punished who sold their corn in the markets *below* the price fixed on it by the authorities. The *league of famine*, that lugubrious tradition which sullies the last period of the monarchy, must, therefore, have made its first appearance in 1709. History is too deliberate to take the gloomy imagination of Saint-Simon without distrust, to consider that it has the right to affirm such things on his testimony![1] What is not doubtful, is the universal ruin in the midst of which some revenue-farmers, gorged with gold, triumphed, like the beasts of prey that fatten on dead bodies, — is the complicity of many

[1] Saint-Simon, t. VII. p. 101. The Princess-Palatine, mother of the Regent, exceeds Saint-Simon: she puts, in her Memoirs, Madame de Maintenon at the head of the monopolists, and accuses her of having "caused the purchase, in all the markets, of all the corn that was in them," and of thus having "gained money horribly." That cannot be taken in earnest.

courtiers with these revenue-farmers,[1] — is the slow death-struggle of the people, crushed at once by the enormous dearness of provisions and by the downfall of manufactures and commerce, — is hunger invading, by degrees, almost the whole community, and ascending from the cottage to the shop, from the shop to the manor, — is the petty bourgeoisie and the petty nobility reduced to ask alms in secret, instead of giving them to others, and disputing with laborers the overflowing beds of the hospitals, which, "ruined, vomited forth their poor again, to the public charge, that is, to die of hunger!" We may see in the Memoirs of Jamerai Duval, that pastor who became an illustrious savant, the simple and heart-rending picture of the French country-districts during this terrible year. The country had reached that excess of despair in which men die in silence. The suffering of the cities was much more noisy, and broke out into riots in the markets; placards, insulting to the government, and even to the person of the King, were posted at the corners, on the walls of churches, and even on the pedestals of the statues of *Louis the Great.*

The King, painfully affected, sought the means of relieving and appeasing these people embittered by misfortune; but, faithful to the end to his maxims, he sharply reprimanded the parliaments of Paris and Dijon, which had undertaken to interfere on their own authority in the police of grain, and sent commissioners to visit the granaries everywhere, and to punish the monopolists with the severest penalties. The monopolists were, it seems, too well supported, and the results of this mission were only illusory. The importation of a hundred and twenty thousand quintals of grain, obtained from the Barbary States and the Archipelago, and of other corn from Dantzic, was more useful. The most intelligent laborers, by sowing in the spring, either barley or spring-wheat, as yet little known among us, added to this importation a resource without which it may be affirmed that France would have perished with hunger! A poor-tax, apportioned among all people in easy circumstances, was another expedient to which the governing power had recourse. All these palliatives did not prevent the mortality from being twice as great this year as the average. A

[1] There is a very grave passage in the famous *Sermon on Alms* preached by Massillon before the Court, during Lent in 1709. "Do you not perhaps profit by the public misery? Do you not perhaps make indigence a barbarous opportunity of gain? Do you not perhaps complete the spoliation of the unfortunate, while affecting to extend to them a helping hand? And do you not know the inhuman art of setting a price according to the tears and necessities of your brethren?. . . ." &c.

great part of the people who survived, remained so enfeebled by privations, that the French race felt it even after the following generation. Neither was the enormous destruction of stock, already very insufficient, repaired in half a century.[1]

Louis XIV. bowed his head beneath the hand of Providence; he strove to renew, at the cost of the greatest sacrifices, that negotiation of peace which he had just suffered to escape from his hands. In the month of March, 1709, the King sent secretly to Holland a president of the grand council, Rouillé, with instructions to renew the offers made in the winter of 1706–1707, adding to them Milanais and the presides of Tuscany; that is to say, Philip V. was to have for his share only Naples and Sicily. The commercial conditions of the treaty of Ryswick were to be renewed, and the tariff of 1664 reëstablished. Louis demanded the restoration of Lille and the reëstablishment of the Electors of Bavaria and Cologne. "The Dutch," said Voltaire, "spoke as conquerors, and displayed towards the envoy of the proudest of kings all the haughtiness with which they had been overwhelmed in 1672." They obliged Rouillé to negotiate at Bodegrave, one of those burghs that the generals of Louis XIV. had formerly put to fire and sword. They demanded, to fortify their barrier, with Menin, which they already held, Ypres, Furnes, Condé, Tournay, and Maubeuge, and left but a vague hope that the States-General might consent to restore Lille. They did not at first seem strongly opposed to what concerned Philip V. and the two Electors; but Eugene and Marlborough, united at the Hague with the ministers of all the allied princes, knew well how to dissuade the States-General from any concession. The Dutch deputies disavowed the feeble hopes which they had insincerely permitted to the French envoy, and declared that it was necessary to cede the whole Spanish monarchy; that Lille should never be surrendered; that it was necessary to take for a basis, concerning the Empire, no longer the treaty of Ryswick, but the treaty of Westphalia, as it was interpreted by the Germans. No suspension of arms was permitted; if France did not treat immediately, the question must be decided by arms.

At this sad news, the King convoked his council to consult on the safety of France (April 28). Eight years and a half before, another council had been held to decide whether the House of Bourbon should accept the inheritance of an immense empire.

[1] We owe a part of these facts to a learned statistician, M. Millot. Saint-Simon, t. VII. pp. 105–204.

What a change in this interval! The question now was no longer whether France should reign over Europe, but whether she should fall or not among the second-rate powers! Louis showed, by the majesty of his misfortune, that he had, in some sort, gained in character what he had lost in the faculties of his mind. Moral strength, which had always been his essential quality, did not cease to increase in him with age and misfortune. To the same men who had formerly deliberated concerning the acceptance of the inheritance of Spain, was joined the Duke of Burgundy, who had had a seat in all councils since 1702, with Chamillart and Desmaretz, who had become ministers of state. Beauvilliers, whose anticipations had been only too well justified, showed, in the most pathetic terms, France lost, annihilated, if the opportunity to negotiate were suffered to escape. Chancellor Pontchartrain concluded in favor of peace at any cost. Chamillart and Desmaretz acknowledged that, in the state of the finances and the army, any catastrophe was to be feared. Tears flowed from all eyes. The King resigned himself to demolish the ramparts of Dunkirk, to cede Lille, Tournay, all the places exacted by the Dutch; to submit to the German interpretation of the treaty of Westphalia, and to restore Strasburg! He reduced the claims of Philip V. to Naples, without Sicily. Time was hastening: the campaign was about to open; the minister Torci offered to go in person to carry these offers to the allies. He set out in disguise, May 1, at the risk of being taken by parties of the enemies, and reached the Hague; on the evening of the 6th, the Pensionary Heinsius learned with astonishment that the French Minister of Foreign Affairs was waiting in his antechamber. This same Heinsius, *chargé d'affaires* of the Prince of Orange in France after the peace of Nimeguen, had been threatened with the Bastile by Louvois in a discussion; he remembered it too well: he was, it is said, a sincere and disinterested patriot, but he thought more of avenging the past than of securing the future of his country. Most of the influential personages in the United Provinces were, like Heinsius, intoxicated with that prodigious change of fortune which placed *Louis the Great* at the discretion of Holland, and did not perceive that they were the blind instruments of England and Austria. Heinsius did not fear to propose, at the suggestion of the Imperialists, that Franche-Comté should be erected into a kingdom to indemnify Philip V.

Louis strove to regain Marlborough, and offered him through Torci as high as four millions, if he would induce the allies to lessen

their demands. He did not seem offended; and it was precisely while protesting his respect and even his attachment for Louis XIV. that he trumpeted his honor and his conscience, calling God to witness his probity and his good intentions, with a tone that recalled the *Don Juan* of Molière. He did not accept. Disquieted by the intrigues that shook his credit with Queen Anne, he had need of war to sustain himself, and ambition still predominated in his heart over love of wealth. Torci, tossed from Heinsius to Marlborough, and from Marlborough to Prince Eugene, drank the cup of humiliation to its dregs. Eugene, a great and noble spirit, was neither false nor cupiditous like Marlborough; but his situation, more than his nature, had made him selfish: this prince, half French, half Italian, this warrior without a country, saw in the war only the development of his brilliant personality and the terrible expiation inflicted on the monarch whose pride had disdained his youth. He was, besides, bound by the implacable instructions of the Emperor. Louis XIV., resigned to extend his sacrifices still further, had authorized Torci to cede Newfoundland to the English, and no longer to insist on Naples, that is, completely to sacrifice Philip V. England and Holland were satisfied as to the basis, if not as to the guaranties; but the Emperor and the Empire were not so, and the allies were firmly resolved not to divide their interests. May 28, they presented to Torci their ultimatum under the form of preliminary articles. The Most Christian King was to recognize Carlos III. as king of the whole monarchy of Spain, and was so to act, that, within two months, the *Duke of Anjou* should restore Sicily to Carlos III. and should quit Spain: if the *Duke of Anjou* did not consent to this within the fixed delay, the Most Christian King and the allies "were to take proper measures in concert to secure the entire effect of the treaty!" All French princes were forever excluded from the whole or part of the Spanish monarchy. All dispatch of French trading-vessels to the Spanish Indies was absolutely interdicted. Strasburg and Kehl were to be restored to the Emperor and the Empire in their present condition, with a hundred guns, munitions, etc. Breisach was to be ceded, fully armed, to the House of Austria. Landau was not to be restored to France. The Most Christian King was to retain only the prefecture of the ten *imperial* cities of Alsace, as Austria had formerly done. All the French forts of the Rhine were to be demolished. Newfoundland was to be ceded to England; Dunkirk was to be razed and the port filled up. The Dutch were to have as a *barrier* the places of which we have spoken above, which were to be de-

livered to them fully fortified, and were provisionally to maintain garrisons at Liege, Huy, and Bonn. The Most Christian King was to restore Savoy and Nice to the Duke of Savoy, and to cede to him Exilles and Fenestrelle, former dependencies of Dauphiny. The demands and pretensions of the *former electors* of Cologne and Bavaria were to be postponed till the definitive negotiation of peace. Several princes and circles of the Empire, the Dukes of Savoy and Lorraine, etc., were moreover to have the right to make such demands as they might choose at the time of this negotiation. The cessions and demolitions of places agreed upon were to take place immediately, and the suspension of arms, agreed upon for two months, was to continue till peace "in case the monarchy of Spain should be surrendered to Carlos III. within the stipulated time," — that is, if Philip V., abandoned by his grandfather, should refuse to abandon himself and to quit Spain, Louis, after a truce of two months, was to find himself disarmed, despoiled of his best places, and forced to choose between the renewal of a war which it would be impossible to maintain, or coöperation with his enemies forcibly to dethrone his grandson.

The allies maintained that, if they relaxed this exorbitant condition, Louis XIV. would not fail to succor Philip V. indirectly, as he had succored Portugal against Spain after the treaty of the Pyrenees.

Louis XIV. refused, and addressed to the governors of the provinces of France a circular designed to inform the people of the *immense conditions* that he had offered, of the efforts that he had made to obtain peace, and of the insurmountable difficulties that his enemies had put in its way. "I am persuaded," he said, "that my people would themselves be opposed to receiving peace on conditions equally contrary to justice and the honor of the French name." Misfortune brought the monarchy back to those appeals to public opinion which had inaugurated the victories of Richelieu and which had ceased under the Great King (June 12, 1709).

The allies published, on their side, their ultimatum, in order to draw closer their bonds of union and to forbid each other to recede from them.

France, like her government, thought of nothing longer but of defending herself with the energy of despair.[1]

[1] In regard to the whole negotiation, see *Mém. de Torci*, pp. 555–686.

CHAPTER VI.

LOUIS XIV. (Conclusion.)

War of the Spanish Succession, continued and concluded. Chamillart replaced by Voisin. Loss of Tournay. Glorious Defeat of Malplaquet. Loss of Mons. Conference of Gertruydenberg. The Allies endeavor to force Louis XIV. to dethrone alone Philip V. Loss of Douai, Bethune, Aire, and Saint-Venant. Defeat of Philip V. at Saragossa. The Allies reënter Madrid. Vendôme in Spain. Victory of Villa Viciosa. The Allies repulsed in Catalonia. Loss of Bouchain. Ministerial Revolution at London. Negotiation with England. Death of the Emperor Joseph I. The Pretender of Spain becomes the Emperor Charles VI. Death of the Dauphin and the Duke of Burgundy. Desolation of the Royal House. Last Days of Fénelon. The Emperor and Holland refusing to treat, England withdraws from the Coalition. Loss of Quesnoy. Victory of Villars over Eugene at Denain. Recapture of Douai, Quesnoy, and Bouchain. Treaty of Utrecht with England, Holland, Savoy, etc. Newfoundland, Hudson's Bay, Nova Scotia, and St. Christopher ceded to the English. The Port of Dunkirk filled up. Furnes, Ypres, Tournay, etc. ceded as the *Barrier* of the Dutch. Lille, Bethune, Aire, and Saint-Venant restored to France. Philip V. retains Spain and the Indies. The Duke of Savoy becomes King of Sicily. War continued with the Emperor. Retaking of Landau. Taking of Freiburg. Peace of Rastadt with the Emperor. France keeps Strasburg and Landau. The Emperor keeps Naples, Milan, and Belgium. Catalonia alone continues to defend itself. Taking of Barcelona. End of the War of Succession. State of Finances. Partial Bankruptcies. Religious Persecutions. *Unigenitus* Bull. Edicts against the Protestants. Testament and Death of the King.

1709–1715.

The negotiations of the Hague showed clearly enough that the abasement and mutilation of France could alone satisfy the allies; France was to expect her safety only from her courage and her despair. But courage required the instruments of battle, and the government of Louis XIV. knew not, we will not say how it could reconquer its lost places, but how it could subsist an army: to live in 1708, it had been necessary to consume the future; to live in 1709, *a kind of miracle* was now needed, to use the expression of the comptroller-general himself. Spain, which had caused us so many ills, indirectly furnished us unexpected aid: French vessels, that traded to the Spanish Indies, landed in the spring, in our

ports, more than thirty million francs' worth of bullion.[1] Desmaretz asked the proprietors to carry all this bullion to the mint, and to lend one half of it to the King for drafts on the general receipts at ten per cent. interest. This was a first resource for opening the campaign. Unfortunately, Desmaretz used the abundance of specie, which reappeared for a moment, only for new operations on the currency, as bad as the preceding, and as well calculated to prevent regular operations from being reëstablished, and to enable utterers of debased coin and foreign speculators to profit by the losses of the French public.[2] An extraordinary impost of five hundred and fifty-eight thousand sacks of corn, in kind, on the provinces, at the price of from thirty to forty livres the sack, was more efficacious for the subsistence of the army:[3] the government strove to lessen the crushing effects of such a burden, in such a year, by announcing that this impost should be deducted from the taxes of the following years, that the villain tax should be diminished more than eight millions in 1710, and that impost duties and city-tolls should undergo a large reduction. The general cutting of the young growth in the forests of the State was ordered; an amnesty was sold to the peculators who had pillaged the department of the marine; advances were obtained at any cost from receivers, farmers, partisans; in short, as Voltaire says, the government continued to ruin the State in order to save it! It thus succeeded in seizing, by piecemeal, the elements of an expenditure, fixed, for the year, at two hundred and twenty-one millions.

It was no longer Chamillart who disposed of the funds so painfully collected by Desmaretz. The public cry, increasing from campaign to campaign, against this minister, his obvious incapacity, which Louis XIV. could no longer doubt,[4] would not have been

[1] From 1701 to 1716 the commerce of Spanish America brought to France more than two hundred millions of specie. See Forbonnais, t. II. pp. 198–209.

[2] In April and May, 1709, a new recoinage was ordered: the louis and the crown, somewhat increased in weight, were raised to twenty and to five livres; which restored the silver mark to forty livres. In order to attract specie, Desmaretz procured a decree that, in the recoinage, the mints should receive five sixths in specie and one sixth in mint-bills, the whole to be repaid in new specie. This was a feat of legerdemain, by which the public were but partially deceived, the change of nominal value making more than the difference of this one sixth. Forbonnais, t. II. p. 198.

[3] The cost of military supplies exceeded forty-five millions in 1709!

[4] Berwick (t. II. p. 4) relates that the King, at the beginning of 1708, said to him these very words: "Chamillart thinks he knows more, much more, than any general; but he knows nothing at all about it." And yet Louis retained Chamillart during the whole campaign.

sufficient to overthrow him, had he not been so imprudent as to quarrel with his protectress: when Madame de Maintenon went over to the side of the public against Chamillart, all was decided; June 9, Louis XIV. asked Chamillart to resign, and transferred the office of secretary of war to another creature of Madame de Maintenon, Voisin, ex-intendant of Hainault, who had, like Chamillart himself, formerly directed the affairs of Saint-Cyr. The management of a boarding-school for young ladies became the novitiate of ministers of war. Voisin, moreover, a rude, selfish, and hard personage, without being an eminent man, had more judgment, and understood affairs less ill than his predecessor. Chamillart was, Pomponne excepted, the only minister dismissed during the whole reign of Louis XIV., and yet he was the only minister regretted by the Great King, who was attached to him in proportion to his very mediocrity, and who softened his disgrace by a thousand marks of affection.

The first design of the King had been to send to the armies his son, his grandsons (the Dukes of Burgundy and Berry), and his nephew, and to abandon, as it were, his whole house to the fortune of this campaign. He renounced this design, doubtless comprehending that the recollections of 1708 would make the presence of the princes a cause of weakness rather than of strength. The Dauphin did not go to Flanders, nor the Duke of Burgundy to the Rhine: Villars passed from the army of the Alps to the great army — the army of Flanders; Berwick was sent to the Alps, and Harcourt into Alsace; as to the King's nephew, the Duke of Orleans, who had returned to court during the winter, a particular and very grave motive prevented him from being sent to Spain. In 1707–1708, seeing the allies decided not to compound with Philip V., and Louis XIV. disposed to sacrifice Philip in order to have peace, the Duke of Orleans had entertained the singular idea of substituting himself for Philip V. on the throne of Spain, and of procuring his acceptance by the English and Dutch as a compromise between Philip V. and Carlos III., as the Prince of Bavaria had formerly been accepted. There had been secret conferences with the grandees of Spain and the English general, Stanhope. The intrigue had transpired. Orleans affirmed that he had only thought of paving the way for opportunities for himself in case Philip V. should be constrained to renounce Spain; but the Princess d'Orsini, a personal enemy of Orleans, had persuaded Philip V. that Orleans wished to dethrone him, and inspired this young monarch with a resentment against his kinsman,

which was one day to have consequences equally fatal to France and Spain. Louis XIV. stifled the affair, not desiring a suit for high treason against his nephew and his son-in-law, but gave Orleans no command in future.[1]

A somewhat obscure marshal, Besons, was sent in the place of the Duke of Orleans to Spain, where nothing of great importance took place this year. The attention of Europe, as in 1708, was chiefly directed to Flanders; but it was not only on that side that France was menaced. France was to be encroached upon at once on the north and the east. Whilst the great allied army penetrated into Artois, the army of the Rhine and the army of the Alps were to penetrate, the latter into Bresse by the way of Savoy, the former into Franche-Comté by the way of Alsace, and to combine their operations.

By good fortune, the allies, who had prepared to put in motion formidable masses on the side of Flanders in the spring, were not ready so early in the east and southeast. The contingents of the German princes and circles assembled on the Rhine with their accustomed tardiness, and the Duke of Savoy made no haste to put his troops in line: the Emperor fulfilled his engagements towards him with very ill grace; after having made him wait more than a year for Montferrat, he still held back from him Vigevano, a fortified town of the Ticino, that depended on Lomellina, ceded to Piedmont by the treaty of 1703. Berwick, chief of the French army of the Alps, who had, at the beginning of the season, neither money nor provisions to give to his soldiers, thus had time to create some resources by collecting grain with the coöperation of the intendants, and by laying hands on the coffers of the receivers, without waiting for the ordinances of the comptroller-general. He was also able to prepare at his leisure an excellent system of defence for the whole line of the Alps: his defensive line curved in the form of a large bow from Antibes to Geneva, with the centre in advance, and the extremities in the rear; the pivot was an intrenched camp under the walls of Briançon. The principal passes debouching on this line were fortified, and flying corps were distributed in such a way as to support the posts on which the enemy might direct his efforts. Berwick had left outside of the defensive line the passes of the Little Saint Bernard and Mont Cenis, and when the enemies, greatly outnumbering him, moved at the beginning of July, he did not prevent them from descending

[1] *Œuvres de Louis XIV.*, t. VI. p. 202. Saint-Simon, t. VII. p. 290. *Mém. de Noailles*, p. 217.

into Savoy; but he awaited them in an excellent position, deployed behind the rivers Arc and Isère from Valoire to Montmeillan, and able to cover, according to need, Lyons, Grenoble, or Briançon. The Austro-Piedmontese pushed their cavalry towards the Rhone; but Berwick was in a position to prevent their crossing it, when the news that they received from Alsace determined them to renounce their enterprise: feeling the impossibility of maintaining themselves in Savoy during the winter, they reëntered Piedmont at the close of September.[1]

The Germans had not taken the offensive in Alsace till in the month of August. Marshal Harcourt, with over twenty thousand men, had covered himself with the lines of the Lauter: the Elector of Hanover, who had crossed the Rhine at Philippsburg with superior forces, did not attack Harcourt, and strove to amuse him whilst eight or nine thousand Germans, left in Swabia with General Merci, moved rapidly on Neuburg, between Huningue and Breisach, and, violating the territory of Basel, by the tacit consent of the Swiss, seized this post and established there a tête-du-pont in order to enter Upper Alsace. Hanover was to recross the Rhine and follow Merci with his whole army; but he had not time. Harcourt sent Lieutenant-General Dubourg in haste, who took five or six thousand men from the garrisons of Alsace and went straight to Neuburg. Merci, instead of guarding his tête-du-pont and awaiting reinforcements, accepted battle in the field and was completely defeated (August 26). Nearly all his corps were killed, taken, or driven into the Rhine. The Elector of Hanover recrossed the river and retired behind the lines of Etlingen.

The dangerous flank-attack, that was to have seconded the principal attack in front against France, was therefore repulsed, although a diversion hoped for by Louis XIV. in Italy had failed, 1708–1709, the Pope having been forced, after some resistance, to submit to the exactions of the Emperor, and the other Italian princes not having dared to break out against Austria.[2]

[1] *Mém. de Berwick*, t. II. pp. 61–72.

[2] Quinci, t. VI. pp. 219–235. There were two powers in Europe that never abandoned their pretensions, however superannuated: these were the Pope and the Emperor. The Emperor, the so-called Cæsar, since the Franco-Spanish had been obliged to evacuate Italy, assumed to revive, in all its rigor, the old Imperial domination over the Italian States, which he treated as vassals and tributaries. In the spring of 1708 he had reclaimed the suzerainty over Parma, invaded the territory of Ferrara, and demanded Comacchio for his vassal the Duke of Modena. The Pope threatened to defend himself by spiritual and temporal arms. The Emperor braved both, seized the ecclesiastical property at Milan and Naples, and cruelly ravaged the States of the Church by his troops. A project of a league had been

However important might be the advantage obtained in the east, it decided nothing: the great blows were dealt in the north.

Villars, despite his habitual confidence and audacity, had been appalled by the state of the army, on arriving on the frontier at the beginning of spring. The corps were tolerably full; the destitution that depopulated the country districts, peopled the armies; the famished countrymen and artisans went to seek under the colors a morsel of bread, which they did not even find there! for, if men were not lacking, everything else was wanting; there were no clothes, no provisions, no arms! The soldiers were seen selling even their muskets in order not to die of hunger. Villars strove to collect resources, whilst he did his best to raise the *morale* of the soldiers: he had in the army, not like Vendôme, the bad popularity that is founded on tolerance of disorder, but the good, that is acquired by paternal care and a benevolent but firm justice. When he passed along the ranks, encouraging the soldiers to patience, these poor people, who often had had only half-rations, both morning and evening, shrugged their shoulders and regarded him with a look of resignation, saying, "The Marshal is right; one must suffer sometimes!"[1] The virtue and firmness of the soldiers are marvellous, said Villars in one of his letters.

The touching patience of this brave and unfortunate army did not suffice to give it the means of acting: it was impossible to undertake sieges or great manœuvres, when during the whole campaign it scarcely ever had bread twenty-four hours in advance. Villars could only post himself so as to defend the entrance of Artois, between Bethune and Douai, sheltering himself behind embankments of earth, swamps, and the canal between Douai and Lille. The enemies, well provided with magazines and implements, and unfettered in their movements, debouched by Lille in enormous masses: the design of Eugene and Marlborough was to defeat the French army, inferior in forces, then to take the fortified towns on the Upper Lys, to capture Boulogne, with the aid

formed between the Italian States, France, and Spain; but it ended in words: the Duke of Savoy was not yet ready to separate from the Emperor; of the other States of the Peninsula, Genoa alone armed itself; the rest had lost all elasticity, all energy, and Louis XIV., through lack of confidence in them, and also through lack of resources, did not do all that he might have done to bring them into it. The Pope, being abandoned, capitulated, left Comacchio provisionally in the hands of the Emperor, and, what was the chief aim of the latter, recognized Carlos III., first, as the *Catholic King of Spain*, then, without further equivocation, as the *King of Spain*, without intending, he said, to wrong Philip V., or to confer a new right on Carlos III. (January–October, 1709).

[1] *Mém. de Villars*, pp. 175–179.

of the Anglo-Batavian fleet, and to descend from there on the Somme. When the enemies had reconnoitred the strong position of Villars, between Pont-à-Vendin and Cambrai, the deputies of the States-General absolutely opposed the attack; Eugene and Marlborough, obliged to change their plans, fell back on Tournay (end of June). The city and the citadel were besieged at the same time. Villars was able neither directly to succor Tournay, nor to attempt anything important enough to divert the enemies from their siege. Tournay, well fortified, had a garrison of more than six thousand men, which would have been sufficient, had it been seconded by the inhabitants; but the people of Tournay, a singular thing in old French citizens like them, showed themselves much less well affected towards France than the denizens of Lille. The governor surrendered the city, July 29, and retired into the citadel with four thousand five hundred men: this was an excellent stronghold that might have held out a long time; but the want of provisions necessitated its capitulation, September 3.[1]

The same day of the capitulation, a corps of the enemy marched to invest Mons: the main body of the army took the same route the next day. Villars, who had moved between the Scarpe and the Scheldt, covering Douai, Condé, and Valenciennes, endeavored to precede the enemy, sent a vanguard towards the lines of the Trouille, which defended Mons on the south side, and followed closely with a corps of cavalry. The vanguard of the French arrived on the Trouille at the same time that the vanguard of the enemies was crossing the Haine at Obourg, above Mons. Unfortunately, Villars believed that the whole army of the allies was already over the Haine: the main body of the French infantry was some leagues behind; Villars did not deem himself in a condition to defend the lines of the Trouille, and fell back on Quiévrain (September 6). This error allowed the enemies to cross the Trouille after the Haine, September 7, and to place themselves between Mons and the French. In the night of the 8th–9th, Villars, with all his forces united, reached the gap of Malplaquet, which opens between two forests into the plain of Mons. The enemies were facing him, at Aulnoit. The 9th and the 10th were passed in observation and cannonading. Villars wished to await the attack, and not to attack himself in the open country with new levies ill equipped, ill

[1] It is said that the commander of the citadel, who was the very engineer that had constructed it, wounded that he should have been subordinated to the governor of the city, less capable and less experienced than himself, showed an ill-will in the defence amounting to treason: after the surrender of the citadel, the old commander went over to the service of the enemies.

mounted, weakened by privations, an army perfectly organized and superior by thirty thousand men. The enemies, when complete, had one hundred and sixty-two battalions and three hundred squadrons, all very strong, against a hundred and twenty battalions and two hundred and sixty squadrons of indifferent strength, that is to say, about a hundred and twenty thousand men against ninety thousand, and a hundred and twenty cannon against eighty: such masses had never before been seen opposed to each other. Despite apprehensions expressed by the deputies of the States-General, Eugene and Marlborough took the offensive in the morning of the 11th.

Villars awaited them in a strong position. His two wings, composed chiefly of infantry, occupied, on the right, the forest of Lasnière, on the left, the forest of Sars; abattis of trees and embankments of earth protected the wings and were prolonged before the centre, a small sloping plain towards which ascended two ravines, and which was bounded on the opposite side by the little river Honneau; the two wings were curved, like the points of a crescent, on this centre, which was furnished with the rest of the infantry; in the rear all the cavalry was deployed on the plateau. "It was altogether," says the panegyrist of Prince Eugene, "a kind of infernal throat, a gulf of fire, sulphur, and saltpetre, which it seemed impossible to approach without destruction." Villars, seeing the enemy in motion, took the command of the left wing, and gave the right to the aged Boufflers, who, although his senior in the marshalship, had cordially put himself at his disposition to aid him and to take his place in case of misfortune, — an inspiration worthy of the patriotism and disinterestedness of this loyal soldier.[1] The soldiers deserved to have such chiefs: bread had just been distributed to them, — they had had none since the night before; they threw away part of it to run more lightly to battle.[2] Both wings

[1] Boufflers had just rendered the State another service. He had appeased, rather by persuasion than force, a riot raised at Paris by the excess of destitution. The government distributed some aid; public works had been opened, August 6, to employ men to level a bank near the Porte Saint-Denis; the workmen in these works were only paid with a piece of bread, which was not given to them very regularly: one day, when the bread did not come, they rose, pillaged the bakeries, and attacked the house of the lieutenant of police: the King's household troops were sent against them, and important consequences would have resulted had not Boufflers been at hand to harangue the desperate crowd with heart-felt eloquence. The same day the carriage of Madame de Maintenon was insulted in the faubourg Saint-Antoine. See Dangeau, t. III. p. 110.

[2] Voltaire, *Siècle de Louis XIV.*, chap. XXI.; according to the testimony of Villars.

were assailed at once, the left by the English of Marlborough, who was seconded by Eugene in person, the right by the Dutch of Count de Tilli and Prince Frison of Nassau. A triple tier of intrenchments, bristling with cannon, covered the French right; the Dutch carried the first two lines, but they were stopped at the third, riddled with grape-shot, then driven back with the bayonet beyond the starting-point; five of their lieutenant-generals were left on the field. The Prince of Nassau, who hoped to conquer the stadtholdership by a brilliant action,[1] brought back his battalions to the charge and planted the Batavian flag himself on the French intrenchments; he only succeeded in causing his best troops to be exterminated around him, and was forced to fall back anew, abandoning a part of his colors and cannon.

It was by exceeding his orders that the Prince of Nassau brought this terrible check on the allies. Eugene and Marlborough had only desired a musketry engagement on that side, whilst they themselves directed the main attack against the forest of Sars. The English were at first repulsed by the French left, as the Dutch by the right; but the French post was not so strong there as on the right: the English succeeded in turning it by crossing a morass which had erroneously been judged impassable, and constrained our battalions to abandon the woods and debouch in their rear into the plain. Villars had sent in great haste for a part of the infantry of the centre: he hurled forward thirty battalions with fixed bayonets, and was charging at their head, when a ball shattered his knee. He was borne, fainting, from the field of battle. The troops that had been hurled forward none the less drove back the enemy into the woods, and maintained the ground that they had reconquered; but there was no one longer to watch over the whole field of battle and to put the weakened centre again in a state of defence, as Villars would not have failed to do. Eugene and Marlborough, informed of the weakening of our centre, threw thither masses of infantry, forced the lines and penetrated them with their squadrons under cover of the fire of the infantry. Boufflers hastened from the right to the centre, and put himself at the head of the French cavalry, which had suffered cruelly from cannon on the plateau where it was ranged exposed, but which nevertheless charged with irresistible vigor; it broke the squadrons of Eugene five or six times; but the latter constantly rallied under shelter of their infantry. If, at this moment, the French right had left its post to

[1] Heinsius, it is said, favored this pretension. The Prince of Nassau was accidentally drowned in 1711.

take in flank the corps of the enemies that had pierced our centre, the battle would probably still have been gained. Boufflers did not give orders to do this, and the general whom he had left with the right wing dared not take it upon himself to act. The enemies, however, were continually increasing in the centre, and communication between the two wings was at last wholly broken. Nothing remained to do but to effect a retreat. The two parts of the army retreated separately in the most admirable order, facing about from time to time and holding the enemy at a distance by charges of cavalry and by a violent fire of artillery. They recrossed the Honneau at two points, and rejoined each other the next day between Valenciennes and Quesnoy, where Boufflers placed his camp. Never had the conquered shown a prouder bearing, and never had the conquerors paid dearer for the possession of a field of battle. The allies acknowledged, in their reports, more than twenty thousand men killed or disabled, eleven thousand of whom were Dutch; and it is probable that their loss was in reality much greater! The French reports acknowledged eight thousand killed or wounded; the commander of the artillery, Saint-Hilaire, says fourteen thousand. It was the greatest and most sanguinary battle of all the wars of Louis XIV.[1]

This was a strange victory; yet it was a victory, since the allies attained their end, — since they besieged Mons with their mutilated army and the French army made no attempt to oppose it, although Villars, from his bed of suffering, counselled "marching again on the enemy." The French succeeded only in throwing a few battalions into Mons, which had but a feeble Spanish garrison, and which, after a resistance somewhat animated, but of too short a duration, surrendered, October 21. The Dutch took possession of it, as of all the other places that fell into the hands of the allies in the Netherlands. This was a consolation for the massacre of their army.

After the fall of Mons, the armies took up their winter-quarters. The energy of the French troops revived; but, although the enemy

[1] *Mém. de Villars*, pp. 176–187. Lamberti, t. V. pp. 861–875. Saint-Hilaire, t. IV. pp. 197–218. Quinci, t. VI. pp. 148–207. Saint-Simon, t. VII. p. 370; he is full of errors concerning everything that preceded the battle. General Pelet, t. IX. pp. 7–115, 287–405. Dumont, *Batailles et Victoires du prince Eugène de Savoie*. Foreigners were so much in the habit of copying the French in whatever pertained to arts as well as letters, that the Dutch artist who designed the plates of Dumont stole in great part his faces from Van der Meulen, the painter of the victories of Louis XIV. It was the same in music. One of the national songs of England is an air composed by Lulli for Louis XIV.

had been unable to penetrate into the interior of the kingdom, he had added to his conquests two great frontier towns which fortified his base of operations for the coming campaign, and how could France sustain this campaign? It was already incomprehensible how she had sustained that which had just ended. There was reason to expect that the State, "that old dilapidated machine that continued to go from the impulse formerly given to it, would finally break down at the next shock."[1]

Louis, although he must have expected to see the arrogance of the allies increased still more by their new successes, resigned himself to solicit for the third time that peace which had been so harshly refused him. October 28, England, by a special treaty, had just guaranteed to Holland, for her famous *barrier*, nearly all the fortified places of the Spanish and French Netherlands, including Furnes, Ypres, Condé, Valenciennes, and Maubeuge, still to be conquered from France. The cabinet of Versailles had maintained a correspondence in Holland since the rupture of the conferences of the Hague. The King let it be known that he would accept the too famous preliminaries drawn up by the pensionary Heinsius and subscribed to by the allies, provided that "some modifications" should be agreed to in articles 4 and 37, that is, concerning the agreement to be established to oblige Philip V. to evacuate the Spanish States, and concerning the truce of two months, which, according to the preliminaries, was not to continue if the evacuation were not effected at the end of two months. Louis could not obtain the opening of public and general conferences at the Hague. The States-General only granted private conferences and secret discussions with their agents in the fortress of Gertruydenberg, on the outskirts of Moerdyk. Louis charged his envoys to declare that, if Philip V. were not contented with a "moderate share," (he would have accepted for him Navarre, in the last extremity,) not only would he withdraw from him all assistance, but would punish whomsoever should aid him, and that he would break with him, if Philip received Frenchmen in his service. Louis offered to give as a pledge to the Dutch four places of his own choice. The abandonment of Philip was an accomplished fact, for all the French troops had been recalled from Spain in the winter, despite the complaints of the cabinet of Madrid; the ambassador, Amelot de Gournai, who for some years had shared with the Princess d'Orsini the direction of the Spanish govern-

[1] *Mémoire sur la situation de la France* (end of 1709); ap. *Œuvres de Fénelon*, t. V. p. 140.

ment, and tempered the inconveniences of that capricious female sway, had asked for his recall, in order not to witness the imminent ruin of a prince whom he had aided with his counsels.[1] All French subjects were forbidden, by declaration of the King, to go to serve in Spain. The plenipotentiaries of the King, the Marshal d'Huxelles and the Abbé de Polignac, arrived at Moerdyk, March 9, 1710. They were isolated as much as possible, in order to interdict to them counsels and communications from private individuals, and contact with the people, who would perhaps have welcomed them warmly, through desire of peace; a ridiculous and humiliating semi-incognito was imposed upon them, in order to avoid rendering to them the honors due to their rank. It is sad to read their correspondence. The representatives of the proudest of Kings and of the first of nations seem grateful when men are not wanting in the commonest respect towards them! What an expiation for our pride!

The Dutch imperiously demanded, as an explanation of articles 4 and 37, that the King should unite his forces with those of the allies to expel his grandson from Spain: a sort of shame had prevented the formal expression of this exorbitant demand in 1709. And again, the Dutch, this point laid down, reserved the *ulterior demands* that each of the allies might make. They let it be understood, that, on their part, Valenciennes, Douai, Cassel, and an indemnity for the expenses of the sieges of Mons and Tournay were in question; they did not explain themselves as to their allies; Alsace was to be demanded for the Duke of Lorraine, Trois-Évêchés for the Empire, etc. In these *ulterior demands* lay *the whole mystery*, as the Dutch plenipotentiary, Buys, the confidant of Heinsius, afterwards avowed.[2] The *mystery* was, that they did not desire peace. The French envoys not accepting these strange pretensions, they were given to understand that the continuation of conferences was superfluous; they remained, however, under the pretext that the signification of leave had no official character.

Louis made a painful effort: he offered the allies a subsidy of a million per month against his grandson, if they offered Philip Sicily and Sardinia for his share and Philip refused, provided

[1] The beautiful letters in which Philip V. protests to his grandfather against any dismemberment of the monarchy of Spain, and declares himself ready to die rather than abandon his people, are the work of Amelot: Philip would not have been capable of writing them (1706–1708, 1709). *Mém. de Noailles*, pp. 196, 206, 212. *Mém. de Louville*, t. II. p. 165.

[2] *Secret Memoirs of Lord Bolingbroke*, p. 40.

peace should be secured to France after the expiration of the two months within which Philip was to accept. Louis consented to cede Alsace and Valenciennes, provided that further *ulterior demands* should be renounced, and his allies of Bavaria and Cologne should be reëstablished in their domains and dignities. By a very characteristic contrast, whilst he resigned himself to sacrifice his grandson and to mutilate his kingdom, he repelled every concession that would have encroached on political and religious despotism: he refused to grant to French Protestants naturalized in Holland the liberty of coming to trade in France like Dutch subjects.

The campaign, however, had recommenced, and the beginning of operations was favorable to the allies. No attention was paid to the enormous concessions of the King. Heinsius urged the States-General no longer only to maintain the preliminaries in all their rigor, but to exact that Louis should *alone* undertake to drive his grandson from Spain within two months. If the King of France did not, within two months, put the whole Spanish monarchy in the hands of the allies, war was to be resumed against France. At the most, the allies would consent to permit their armies of Catalonia and Portugal to aid the French in expelling Philip V. It was useless to discuss such monstrosities longer: after swallowing humiliations during four months and a half, the French plenipotentiaries set out on their return, July 25.[1]

The season for battle had reopened under the most deplorable conditions for France. In vain had the comptroller-general, in order to obtain anew resources for the treasury,[2] seized on the happy idea of making the receivers-general undertake the *extraordinary transactions* gratuitously, instead of letting them to the revenue-farmers at a discount of twenty-five per cent. (November, 1709). The *bureau of the receivers-general*, which replaced the bureau of loans, that had failed through default of payment, seemed to promise great aid to the State. But this aid was not immediate: in order that money might be attracted to the public bureaus in preference to the coffers of the revenue-farmers, it was first requi-

[1] *Mém. de Torci*, pp. 635–660. *Actes de la paix d'Utrecht*, 12mo., t. I. pp. 88–142. *Vie du cardinal de Polignac.*

[2] One of the imagined extraordinary resources introduced an important modification into the condition of the magistracy: the offices of justice were hereditary only in consideration of the concession that the King should renew them every nine years, at the price of an annual tax, and compelling the holders from time to time to purchase increase of salary. The King suppressed the annual tax and promised to impose no further purchase of increase of salary, on condition that the holders should pay a sum equal to sixteen times the annual tax. *Anciennes Lois françaises*, t. XX. p. 545.

site that money should be again put in circulation, and the species of reaction that always takes place in consumption, and consequently in indirect imposts, after a year of scarcity, could scarcely make itself felt before the harvest of 1710. In the mean time, the only course to pursue was that of extortion.

"The funds of all the cities are exhausted," wrote Fénelon; "the revenues of these funds for ten years in advance have been taken for the King, and the government is not ashamed to demand of them, with threats, other new advances, double the amount of those already made. All the hospitals are overflowing. . . . The intendants take away even the public dépôts; the service can no longer be continued but by pilfering on every hand; there seems to be a universal bankruptcy of the nation. Notwithstanding the violence and fraud, the government is often compelled to abandon certain very necessary works, as soon as an advance of a couple of hundred pistoles is required. The French prisoners in Holland are dying there of hunger, through want of payment on the part of the King. . . . The wounded lack broth, linen, and medicine. The bread is almost all of oatmeal. The soldiers are in want of money: the subaltern officers suffer still more in proportion." [1]

As the climax of misfortune, Villars, suffering greatly from the effects of his wound, was not in a condition to rejoin the army in good season: he had asked for Berwick as an auxiliary; Berwick ought to have been sent at once in his place; nothing was done, and the command of the frontier was provisionally left to a mediocre general, Marshal de Montesquiou. There was no forage, which necessarily retarded the reassembling of the army till the middle of May, and it was imagined that the allies, on their side, would not march before June. They marched the middle of April. Eugene and Marlborough rapidly collected sixty thousand men, and fell on the lines of Artois which they had not dared to attack when Villars was behind them. Montesquiou, surprised, with eight or nine thousand men, near the canal between Douai and Lille, had not time to unite his forces, and retired on Cambrai. The enemies crossed the lines and invested Douai (April 22–25). The French army was not in a state to approach the besieged city till a month had elapsed. At the close of May, Villars and Berwick debouched by the way of Cambrai and offered battle to the allies in the plains between Arras and Douai. They may have had ninety thousand men: the enemies, who had made prodigious efforts, had at least a

[1] Fénelon, t. V. p. 141. The usurers took eighty per cent. discount on *bills of subsistence* delivered to officers instead of money! Villars, p. 192.

hundred and thirty thousand; but they had to guard the canal between Douai and Lille, against French parties, and their siege-lines against the garrison of Douai, which was seven or eight thousand strong and very well commanded. They did not accept open battle and remained behind the intrenchments that they had raised between Vitri on the Scarpe and Hennin-Liétard, near the Lille canal. It was impossible to force them to it. Villars retired under Arras, and Berwick left him to go to put himself at the head of the army of the Alps. The Governor of Douai, hoping no longer for aid, capitulated, June 25, with the honors of war.

Villars had posted himself so as to cover at once Arras and the places that remained to us on the Scheldt. The enemies returned against Bethune (July 14–15). Bethune, a small place poorly fortified, was bravely defended, and did not surrender till August 29. In order to be able to penetrate further into France, it was necessary to pass over the corps of Villars, who had planted himself between the sources of the Scarpe and the Canche, protecting Arras and Hesdin, and ready to reach Boulogne in advance of the enemies. Eugene wished to open the attack; the Dutch, who remembered Malplaquet, refused. Instead of pushing forward, the enemies besieged at once Aire and Saint-Venant in their rear (September 6). Saint-Venant, a wretched little place, had scarcely any defence but the facility of surrounding itself with water: the drought had in part deprived it of the means of doing this; yet it defended itself till the 30th of September. Aire, which had formerly been greatly renowned, was much larger and better fortified; the rains of October facilitated the inundations which had failed at Saint-Venant; it resisted with extreme energy; it was finally obliged, however, to capitulate, November 9. The enemy thus occupied the whole course of the Lys.[1]

The French troops had everywhere done their duty: the campaign was none the less unfortunate, since the enemies had wrested another shred from the frontier. France defended herself inch by inch; but her fall seemed to be no longer for her adversaries but a question of time and perseverance.

As in 1709, however, the allies had failed in their attacks on the southeast. Towards the Rhine, the armies had contented themselves with observing each other; towards the Alps and the Mediterranean, on the contrary, the allies had marked out a somewhat formidable plan. Count de Thaun, with the main body of the Austro-Piedmontese army, descended by the pass of Argentiere

[1] Villars, pp. 188–197.

into the valley of Barcelonnette (July 21). His project was to push on to Gap and assist the *new converts* of Dauphiny, who were to take up arms and assemble at Die; Vivarais, where there had been some movements in 1709, was to rise on its side and to arouse Cévennes, and the mountaineers were to descend into the plain of Languedoc to join the foreign troops landed at Cette. Then, Languedoc and Dauphiny in insurrection were to unite their arms, and the army of Berwick was to be cut off from Lower Provence. All this miscarried. Berwick stopped Count de Thaun short, although superior in forces, and hindered the movement in Dauphiny from breaking out. Languedoc had not time to move. Two thousand English, commanded by the refugee Saisson, had been landed by an English squadron at Cette, had possessed themselves of this port, then of Agde, almost without resistance, and threatened Béziers. The Duke de Noailles, commandant of Roussillon, received news of this at Boulou, on the extreme frontier of Spain, July 25, in the evening; he turned his troops towards Languedoc with such celerity, that, the 29th, he reëntered Agde, evacuated by the enemies, and in the morning of the 30th retook by assault the fortress and port of Cette. The English precipitately reëmbarked. Before the arrival of Noailles, they had already been repulsed, in attempting a descent at Frontignan, by the inhabitants armed with muskets. Count de Thaun recrossed the Alps in the middle of August.[1]

The events of Spain soon disturbed the consolation brought by this success. The departure of the French auxiliaries had, however, at first exalted the Spanish instead of discouraging them. When the French were among them, they willingly left them to sustain the burden of the war; abandoned to themselves, they displayed the power of resistance which characterizes them; the trades-companies, the cities, the clergy, the nobility, emulously despoiled themselves to put their King in a state of defence. They raised regular regiments and guerrillas. They recalled from Flanders all the Spanish or Walloon troops that remained there, and succeeded in maintaining, without the French, as they had done with them, two army-corps, one on the frontier of Portugal, the other at the entrance of Catalonia. Philip V. went to take command in person of the army of Catalonia (middle of May). The devotion of the Castilians could not supply the place of the art of war. They were ill commanded, and they had to contend with the most skilful of the German generals, Stahremberg. After two

[1] *Mém. de Berwick*, t. II. pp. 98–110. *Mém. de Noailles*, p. 225.

months' operations on the Segre and its affluents, the Castilians met with a repulse at Almenara that reopened Aragon to the enemies (July 27). Carlos III. and Stahremberg marched on Saragossa. Philip V. was there before them. The Castilians, who had suffered greatly, had only about seventeen thousand men against twenty-three or twenty-four thousand. The want of provisions and resources decided them to risk everything. The two competitors retired to a distance whilst their followers slaughtered each other for them; Philip V., at least, had a fever for an excuse, and his courage was not suspected. The Spaniards, despite the valor of their cavalry and of the Walloon battalions, were defeated and driven towards Navarre (August 20). Aragon fell again almost entire into the hands of the conquerors. The conquered retired by Tudela on Aranda-de-Duero; Stahremberg wished to pursue them everywhere, to completely overwhelm them, and make it impossible for Philip V. to reconstruct an army. Fortunately for Spain, this plan was not executed. The commander of the English auxiliaries, Lord Stanhope, had more power in the army than the general-in-chief; he declared that the Queen, his mistress, designed that Carlos III. should be brought back to Madrid; he prevailed in the council of war, and the allies directed their course towards Madrid, whither Philip V. had returned. At their approach, Philip left the capital, followed, as in 1706, not only by all the public officers, but by the élite of the population; those who remained were no better disposed towards the *Archduke;* the few individuals who applauded Carlos III. on his entrance (September 28) were knocked down. Philip V. returned to Valladolid and put himself in communication with his small army, that was defeated but not destroyed.

As soon as Louis XIV. had learned of the disaster at Saragossa, he had renewed his efforts with his grandson to conjure him to abdicate and sacrifice himself to European peace. Philip, inspired by his wife and sustained by his own tenacity, his only political quality, refused anew any compromise that did not leave him Spain and the Indies. The grandees of Spain wrote to the King of France a collective letter, in which they protested their readiness to immolate themselves for their prince, and besought Louis to give his support to their country (September 18). Louis resigned himself to unite anew his fortune to that of his grandson. Some time before the battle of Saragossa, he had granted to the prayers of Philip a general in default of an army: this was Vendôme, who had remained in disgrace since the unfortunate campaign of 1708.

Vendôme crossed the Pyrenees a few days after the defeat of Philip V., and joined that prince at Valladolid, at the moment when the enemies were retaking possession of Madrid. Some French troops began to reënter Spain after him. The popular impulse, in all the Castilian provinces, was not less energetic than in 1706. Philip V. and Vendôme were soon in a condition to put their troops again in motion: they advanced from Old Castile into Leon, and from the Douro to the Tagus, in order to place themselves between Carlos III. and the Portuguese, who desired to unite with the Pretender, and who were arrested on the Guadiana by the second Spanish army, that of Estremadura. The guerrillas began again on every side to torment and harass the enemies, who were masters only of the land they had under their feet, and who were destined to acknowledge, a second time, that to hold Madrid was to hold nothing: the manifold and diffuse life of Spain is found by no means in this artificial capital. November 11, Carlos III., much weakened, abandoned Madrid and fell back on Toledo, whence he set out again for Barcelona with an escort, leaving his army to extricate itself as it could.

Stahremberg began his retreat, November 22: his rear-guard burned, on setting out, the Alcazar of Toledo, a magnificent work of Charles V. The Spanish army, thirsting for vengeance, pursued the enemy. The difficulty of procuring provisions had obliged Stahremberg to divide his army into several corps: Stanhope, who formed the rear-guard with four or five thousand English, lost twenty-four hours at Brihuega in securing the safety of his baggage and his booty; he was surprised and surrounded in this little city, in the night of December 8–9, by the cavalry, then by the army of Philip V. and Vendôme. After a whole day's battle, the city was forced, and the entire English corps surrendered themselves prisoners. The next morning, Stahremberg, who was hastening with aid, found himself in the presence of the Castilians, at Villa Viciosa, two leagues from Brihuega. Although much inferior, he vigorously sustained the shock: his infantry even drove back the battalions of the new levy that formed the Spanish centre, and Vendôme believed the battle lost, and gave orders for retreat; but, during this time, the Spanish cavalry had defeated the squadrons of the enemies, and had taken in rear and partially broken their infantry: night prevented the Spaniards from returning to the charge, and Stahremberg was able to resume his retreat towards Aragon. His army melted away on the road: he did not attempt to maintain himself in Aragon; the population, although

sympathizing little with Philip V., had not the energetic and obstinate hostility of the Catalans against him. Stahremberg reëntered Catalonia at the beginning of January, 1711, with five or six thousand soldiers, the mournful wrecks of the conquerors of Saragossa.

Philip V. resumed possession of Aragon, whilst the governor of Roussillon, Noailles, reinforced by eighteen thousand soldiers arrived from France, effected a diversion in the north of Catalonia, besieged and took Gerona (December 15, 1710–January 31, 1711). The whole line of the Pyrenees, on the one hand, and, on the other, the whole line of the Ebro, were swept of enemies. The Pretender was reduced to the maritime centre of Catalonia.[1]

The depression of minds was such in France that many saw with more disquietude than joy this return of fortune, which seemed a new obstacle to peace. They had believed themselves rid of Spain! The state of the country almost excused this strange feeling. The harvest had again been indifferent: although the indirect imposts had yielded somewhat more than the previous year,[2] Desmaretz judged it impossible to live in 1711 without recourse to expedients more extraordinary, more crushing than he ever yet had employed. That *royal tithe*, by which Vauban wished to replace nearly all the imposts, Desmaretz caused to be decreed, in addition to all other imposts; so that the non-privileged citizens, after having already borne direct and indirect contributions, much beyond their ability, were again constrained to pay, in common with the privileged, a tenth of their gross income (October 7, 1710). It was promised that the tithe should be suppressed at peace. It was, indeed, necessary to count on the patience or the patriotism of the people, and on the evidence of the fact that everything had been attempted in vain to obtain peace. Foreigners were astonished and appalled to see that the tithe was paid without murmuring or sedition: they asked whether France, which was always represented to them as expiring, was inexhaustible and indestructible.

The tithe, however, did not yield all that was hoped from it: the government was far from collecting a real tenth of the revenue; the exhaustion of the people, the intrigues of the powerful and the rich, who knew well how to prevent the establishment of a true *propor-*

[1] Noailles, p. 217. Berwick. t. II. pp. 105–514. Saint-Hilaire, t. IV. p. 268. Lamberti, t. VI. pp. 162–174. Quinci, t. VI. pp. 406–467. He is inaccurate.

[2] The five great revenue-farms, which were managed by the government, in default of letting them, produced, in 1710, forty millions, instead of thirty-one, as in 1709.

tional equality, in fine, the malversations of the collectors, caused only twenty-four millions to be derived from it.[1]

The government no longer paid either its creditors or its officers; at the most to holders of *rentes* a quarter here and there, one quarterly payment out of three or four. Desmaretz undertook to reduce this chaos to some kind of order, however arbitrary it might be. He fixed all *rentes* at five per cent., at whatever rate of interest they might have been issued; but, at least, in reducing them thus, he began again to pay them; at the same time he ordered the conversion into five per cent. *rentes* of the assignments for anticipations, the debts of the bureau of loans, the tickets of subsistence, the remaining mint-bills, and generally all circulating paper, that is to say, all credits on the State, the capital of which was due, were converted into simple interest-bearing stocks (October, 1710). This was ruin to business-men and merchants, who reckoned on capital, and not on interest.[2] The capital rendered disposable by these measures did not suffice for the needs of 1711, and, no one being willing thenceforth to advance anything on assignments, Desmaretz was constrained to pledge, to the bureau of the receivers-general, what remained disposable of the villain tax, the capitation-tax, and the tithe of 1711. At this price, in the beginning of 1711, he obliged the receivers-general to pay ready money for the first months of the year, and to give notes for the other months, which dispensed, at least in part, with the usurious discounts exacted by bankers and contractors. Extraordinary edicts, among which we remark forced loans and a tax on the usurers and the stock-jobbers who had trafficked in the King's notes, completed the resources of 1711. By combinations, disastrous to a multitude of interests, but skilfully adapted to the immediate end, Desmaretz thus attained the means of securing the existence of the army and its disposibility in March, 1711.

This was an advance on 1710, however dearly it was purchased. But, before military operations had been resumed, incidents of the highest importance had transferred the question to other grounds, and Louis and his ministers had turned their attention elsewhere

[1] Saint-Hilaire, t. IV. p. 206. Forbonnais, t. II. p. 218. The clergy purchased exemption from the tithe by paying eight millions at once; Alsace, by paying two millions at once.

[2] The discredit of the mint-bills had already involved Samuel Bernard, the richest banker in Europe, in an enormous bankruptcy, at the commencement of 1707. He had twenty millions' worth of these bills, and owed almost as much to Lyons, which his fall overthrew. Desmaretz aided him greatly in retrieving his position, and it was maintained that he gained largely by his bankruptcy. See Saint-Simon, t. VII. p. 108.

than to the fields of battle. It was England that attracted their attention and their hopes. A revolution in the cabinet, which tended to change the whole policy of Europe, had begun in a domestic revolution. Marlborough governed the Queen of England through his wife, and Lady Marlborough had just been overthrown by the intrigues of a subaltern favorite, her mutinous tool, Mrs. Masham, or rather by her own haughtiness and caprice, which had finally exhausted the patient good-nature of Queen Anne; it seemed, in their relations, as if Sarah Jennings were the Queen and Anne Stuart the follower. The Tories skilfully profited by this disgrace to reawaken the old inclination which the Queen had had for them. Sunderland, Marlborough's son-in-law, was deprived of the secretaryship of state; then the high treasurer, Godolphin, the right hand of the great captain, fell in his turn (August 19, 1710). The Bank, the East India Company, the principal corporations, protested to the Queen against the change of ministry, — a surprising thing at first sight, the party of money and credit was for the war; the moneyed interest was Whig; the landed interest was Tory. Outside of party engagements, it should be observed, that in England as in France, although in a less degree, the capitalists were enriched by the public distress: finance is not commerce; commerce was ruined by our privateers;[1] the public treasury, although well administered, was exhausted; the money-lenders alone gained in proportion to the losses of all the rest. The Queen at first protested that these changes would have no further consequences; that her confidence in Marlborough was not altered; but facts soon belied these protestations: Marlborough remained general-in-chief, but lost the title of plenipotentiary and the appointment to military posts: the Whig Parliament was dissolved.

Two men were at the head of this reaction: the one, Harley, an energetic and skilful mind, but with no other law than his interest, and who was Tory only because the high positions were taken up in the Whig party;[2] the other, St. John, a free and profound thinker, but whose principles were more definite in philosophy than in politics, — a personage, moreover, more honor-

[1] Our sailors, to whom the glory of great naval battles was no longer permitted, indemnified themselves by individual exploits of extraordinary splendor. April 29, 1709, Captain Cassart having fallen, with a single vessel, into the midst of a squadron of fifteen English ships, fought for twelve hours, sunk an English ship, dismasted two more, and escaped the rest. See Quinci, t. VI. p. 291.

[2] It is difficult to comprehend whence Voltaire, who made a kind of hero of him, took the Roman character which he gives to him. *Siècle de Louis XIV.*

able in his life and character than Harley: he was destined to figure largely in the philosophic history of the eighteenth century, under the name of Lord Bolingbroke. Harley and St. John saw in peace the only means of overthrowing Marlborough: it may be admitted that considerations of humanity had some share in the resolution of St. John. It was evident, moreover, that England had no interest in exhausting herself in order to destroy the equilibrium of Europe in favor of Austria. The last events in Spain attested that the allies were deceived concerning the possibility of speedily terminating the war. England held what her ambition had craved, Gibraltar and Mahon: she was certain of obtaining cessions of territory in North America, with concessions for her commerce and safety: she had no reason for perpetuating a struggle from which she suffered cruelly, while causing others to suffer.

France, however, discouraged by the issue of the conferences of Gertruydenberg, watched and waited. The new English ministers made the first advances. About January 20, 1711, Abbé Gauthier, a French priest, a frequenter of London, and secret correspondent of the minister of foreign affairs, arrived at the residence of that minister at Versailles. "Do you want peace?" he asked of Torci. "I come to bring you the means of concluding it, independently of the Dutch." To ask a minister of His Majesty at that time whether he desired peace, was like asking a man attacked with a long and dangerous disease whether he desired to be cured.[1] Gauthier was charged by the English minister to request the King to propose to the Dutch the reopening of conferences. The negotiations once resumed, Holland would be prevented from opposing the conclusion. The King replied that he was no longer willing to treat through the Dutch, after such unworthy conduct on their part, but that he would willingly treat through England. The English entreated the King to communicate to them his propositions, which they would send to the Hague, which was a sort of headquarters of the coalition. After divers conferences, Louis sent them the plan of a treaty by the Abbé Gauthier (end of April). The Dutch then began to feel the mistakes to which their blind resentment had impelled them: they made overtures to the King to endeavor to bring back the negotiation to their country; it was too late: Louis proudly repelled their advances; the negotiation was pursued at London. The Dutch were reduced to the necessity of discussing through the medium of the English, while waiting for the negotiation to become general.

[1] *Mém. de Torci*, p. 666.

A very important event aided the peace-party in England. The Emperor, Joseph I., just as he had attained the summit of prosperity, — just as he had seen that Swedish power, which had so much abased his fathers and humiliated himself,[1] falling by the hands of others, without costing him an effort, — just as he had succeeded in overcoming, after eight years of battle, the great Hungarian insurrection,[2] — just as he held Germany in his hands, and Italy under his feet, died, aged thirty-two, April 17, 1711. He had no male heir but his brother Charles, the Pretender of Spain. It was, therefore, to reunite, on a single head, the colossal empire of Charles V., that the allies had to prosecute a war begun in the name of European equilibrium!

Hostilities, however, were reopened in the spring. The English ministers did not feel themselves strong enough to stop the armies at the commencement of negotiations: they still feared Marlborough and the Whigs too much. As in 1710, the conferences continued simultaneously with the military operations, but under circumstances and with a result quite different. The poet-diplomatist, Prior, brought to Versailles the demands of England under the form of preliminaries. These were: first, securities against the union of the two crowns of France and Spain; *barriers* for Holland and the Empire; the restitution of conquests made from the Duke of Savoy and others; in short, the satisfaction of all the allies; then, and this was the knot of the question, the particular conditions of England, namely, the recognition of Queen Anne and the Protestant succession, with the expulsion of the Pretender from France; the dismantling of Dunkirk, and the destruction of its port, so formidable to English commerce; a treaty of commerce with France; the cession of Gibraltar and Mahon by Spain; the transferral to English commerce of the *asiento*, that is, the privilege of the slave-trade in the Spanish colonies, granted to the French in 1701; commercial equality in Spain with the most favored nations; the cession of Newfound-

[1] Charles XII., having plunged into the steppes of Red Russia, had been conquered at Pultowa, July 11, 1709, less by Peter the Great than by the climate. He had taken refuge in Turkey.

[2] The loss of Neuhausel, the chief stronghold of Rakoczi, in September, 1710, had caused the reduction of the whole country between the Danube and the Theiss. Upper Hungary was overcome in turn. Agria (Erlau) and Eperies succumbed before the end of 1710. Many chiefs submitted, or entered into a negotiation that became general in February, 1711. Prince Eugene and the English ambassador, Peterborough, pressed the Emperor to negotiate. A general amnesty was granted, with restitution of property and liberty of worship according to the Hungarian laws (April 27, 1711). Rakoczi disavowed this treaty and retired to France.

land, Hudson's Bay, and Hudson's Straits by France, each keeping what she held in the rest of North America.

The expulsion of Philip V. was no longer in question; Spain and the Indies were no longer disputed to him. The Tories returned to the original plan of William III., so much exaggerated and perverted by Marlborough.

Louis XIV. sent to London Ménager, a member of the Council of Commerce, to negotiate on these propositions (middle of August). He granted almost all that England asked, even what was most painful to his generosity and his monarchical religion, — the dismissal of the exiled Stuart, on condition that the French should preserve the right of fishing and drying fish on the coast of Newfoundland; that the islands of Cape Breton and St. Mary should remain ours, and that the English should restore Nova-Scotia, which they had taken. He had made an exposition of his demands in opposition to those of England; but the English referred the claims of France to the general conferences, and would treat separately only concerning their own interests. They promised, if England were satisfied, to support France in the Congress.

This manner of treating left much to be desired! Louis, however, contented himself with it. He was aware that the interest of the Tories answered to him for their sincerity. The preliminaries with England were signed at London, October 8. The news from Canada removed, meanwhile, a grave difficulty: the English had fitted out an expedition by land and by the St. Lawrence against Quebec, and claimed that Canada should remain theirs, if they were masters of it at the moment when the peace was signed: the attack failed,[1] and they had nothing more to claim. Harley and St. John secretly assured Torci of their good intentions, and the instructions given to the English ambassador in Holland were in conformity with their promises. The French cabinet, on its side, withdrew from Dutch ships the special passports which it granted them to traffic in the ports of France, and no longer issued these passports except to English ships.

Whilst diplomacy was exchanging notes, the generals had retaken the field in good season. Marlborough, Eugene, and Heinsius, who saw with anxiety their *triumvirate* near its close, would have gladly forced the action of the English government by dealing a great blow to France; but the French found themselves ready, this time, as soon as their enemies, and, at the moment when Eugene and

[1] Part of the transports were wrecked in the St. Lawrence: on their return, a seventy-gun ship blew up with its crew.

Marlborough were moving to besiege Arras, Villars put himself in motion to retake Douai (end of April). They mutually paused: they held each other in check for some weeks; Villars wished to open the attack in the plains of Arras; the King forbade him, and ordered him to limit himself to defending the new lines, while awaiting the issue of negotiations. These lines extended from the sea to the Meuse: they were formed by the Canche, the Scarpe, the Sanzet, the Scheldt, and the Sambre, with embankments that closed up the spaces between these rivers; they left out the territory of Boulogne and half of Artois, a great portion of our frontier, already so reduced. Till the end of July the enemy had no other advantage than that of subsisting on our territory. Eugene had left the allied army with a very strong detachment, to go to Germany to protect the electoral diet of Frankfort, which was preparing to elect the Pretender of Spain Emperor in the place of his brother; a heavy corps had equally been detached from the army of Villars to reinforce the French army of the Rhine, which gave tokens of disturbing the Imperial election. Towards the close of July, Marlborough made a movement towards the Upper Lys, as if to threaten Saint Omer; then returned rapidly towards Douai, the reinforced garrison of which had just occupied a crossing of the Sanzet, a little river between the Scarpe and the Scheldt. The allied army, crossing the Sanzet, penetrated within the lines, which Villars called, it is said, the *ne plus ultra* of the enemies; it found itself in a kind of peninsula formed by the Sanzet and the Scheldt, when Villars, hastening by forced marches to the vicinity of Cambrai, closed the base of this peninsula. Had Villars immediately pushed forward upon the enemy, he would have surprised him occupied in crossing the Scheldt, — an extremely perilous situation: Villars dared not transgress the explicit prohibition to open the attack that he had received; he hoped to be attacked himself, and thus to give battle without disobeying; but Marlborough, on his side, could no longer risk being defeated without staking his head. He followed his plan, crossed the Scheldt (August 7–8), and invested Bouchain. Villars encamped at Marquette, on the other side of the Scheldt, and reëstablished his communication with Bouchain through the marshes; but two general officers, to whom he had confided the guarding of this communication, suffered it to be surprised almost without resistance: Villars in vain took a few posts of the enemy; this did not repair the reverse of his lieutenants, and he had the mortification of seeing Bouchain obliged to surrender, September 12.

Marlborough had desired next to besiege Quesnoy; the States-

General feared that their infantry would be ruined in an autumnal siege, and it was, besides, exposing themselves to lose Bouchain again, which Villars would not have failed to assail. The allies, therefore, contented themselves with putting this important conquest again in a state of defence, — important, not as to the place itself, which is very small, but as to its position, which separates Valenciennes and Condé from Arras and Cambrai. Winter-quarters were taken up in October.[1]

The situation of Germany had promised to render the campaign on the Rhine interesting. It was long since the Imperial succession had been seen completely open; there was no King of the Romans, and the electoral college was, in right, absolutely free. But no prince was in a position to dispute the sceptre to Austria. The Elector of Saxony, scarcely reëstablished on the throne of Poland by the reaction of the victory of the Russians at Pultowa, had some pretensions, which ended in smoke. Marshal Harcourt undertook nothing serious, either against the Duke of Würtemberg, who was first opposed to him, or against Eugene, who returned from Flanders to take the command at the close of July. The whole season was spent in observation. The aim of Louis XIV. had been little else, in strengthening his army of the Rhine, than to oblige the enemies to weaken themselves in Flanders; he had no real interest in preventing the *pretender*, Charles of Austria, from obtaining in Germany a title that would be the strongest argument with the English for refusing him Spain.

The Archduke Charles was elected Emperor, October 12, at Frankfort. The Electors of Bavaria and Cologne had not been convoked by the Elector of Mayence, the arch-chancellor of the Empire, and this exclusion had been confirmed by the electoral college; but the *perpetual capitulation* which the college imposed on its elect included a disapprobation, in general terms, of treatment arbitrarily inflicted on two of the principal members of the Empire, and stipulated that the Emperor should reëstablish in their possessions the electors or other members of the Empire who might have been despoiled before having been condemned by a general diet. This was also an important step towards European peace.

Charles of Austria had embarked at Barcelona, September 27, on an Anglo-Batavian fleet, leaving his wife with the Catalans as a pledge of his return. He landed near Genoa, without entering that city, which refused to salute him as King of Spain, and went to receive the Imperial crown at Frankfort, December 22.

[1] Villars, pp. 199–206. Saint-Hilaire, t. IV. p. 291.

The war was almost as fruitless on the side of the Alps and in Spain as on the Rhine. The Duke of Savoy wellnigh repeated the campaign that had been made by Count de Thaun in 1709, that is, he invaded Savoy by Mont Cenis; Berwick suffered him to advance as far as Montmeillan and Chambery, and there, well posted near Barraux, stopped him short between the Isère and the mountains. The Duke returned into Piedmont without retaining anything in Savoy (July–September).

As to Spain, the French reposed on the conquest of Gerona. The enemy had received succors by the way of the sea. The Spanish government, relieved the second time from extreme peril, fell again into its beaten track after Villa Viciosa as after Almanza; Castile had been exhausted by the effort of her second deliverance. Vendôme could undertake nothing of importance.

The war by sea, which for a long time had offered nothing more than partial encounters, collisions between small squadrons, was signalized, this year, by an expedition analogous to that sack of Carthagena which had terminated, in America, the war of the League of Augsburg. In August and September, 1710, a small French squadron had attacked the capital of Brazil, Rio de Janeiro: the disembarked soldiers, too few in number, had been overwhelmed in the city itself, whither they had penetrated; those who remained having surrendered, the Portuguese had destroyed a part of them, with the commander. It was resolved to avenge them. Duguai-Trouin, the terror of the allies,[1] set out with eight ships of the line and seven large frigates, equipped at Brest and Rochefort; two thousand five hundred soldiers were given him, besides his crews. September 12, 1711, he forced the double strait that protects the bay of Rio. The 13th, he possessed himself of a little island that closes the port, within gunshot of the city. The 14th, he landed troops and cannon. From the 16th to the 19th, he established batteries on the little island and on a neighboring peninsula. The principal fort that defended the harbor was taken between these two fires on its flanks and a ship of the line in front. The enemies burned their magazines, and blew up or sunk four Portuguese ships of the line stranded under their fort, and other vessels. The 21st, the French assailed the city and found it abandoned. The enemy had carried away all that he could; yet the booty was enormous. The forts surrendered September 23. The enemy, to save the

[1] Within the twenty-three years that he had been engaged in warfare, he had taken sixteen ships of the line or large frigates, and more than three hundred merchant-ships.

city from being destroyed, after it had been pillaged, paid a ransom of one million eight hundred and sixty thousand francs, and the French squadron set sail again, November 13, taking with it two frigates of thirty-five guns. The loss of the Portuguese amounted to at least twenty millions, of which only eight millions fell to the share of the ship-owners. The success of the expedition was unfortunately purchased by the loss of two ships, of sixty and of seventy-four guns, which were wrecked, on their return, near the Azores, and perished with all on board.[1]

Since the close of the campaign in Flanders, the attention of Europe had been wholly directed to the negotiations, and London became the theatre of a diplomatic warfare more active, more infuriated, than the warfare of battlefields had been. Heinsius and his adherents, who had chained Holland to the interests and passions of the House of Austria, were as dismayed as irritated at the unforeseen change that was about to break the coalition by detaching from it the principal link, England. They clung, with a kind of despair, to the preliminaries of 1709; they sent to London the negotiator of the Hague and of Gertruydenberg, Buys, to endeavor to persuade Queen Anne to dismiss her new ministers. Buys failed. The Tory ministers easily refuted his complaints concerning the defection of England. None of the allies was any longer fulfilling its engagements: Holland, who, in truth, had made enormous pledges, had relaxed from them since 1707; lately, she had not furnished more than one third of her contingent on sea, and, in all, not more than half of her part agreed upon; Buys was forced to acknowledge that she was not in a condition to fulfil her promises. England, on the contrary, had always fulfilled, often exceeded her engagements, but succumbed under the weight: she was expending £7,000,000 per annum! The Imperial ambassador, Galas, was listened to no better than Buys, and even caused himself to be forbidden the presence of the Queen, in retaliation for his intrigues against the ministry. The agents of the heir-presumptive of England, the Elector George of Hanover, were not more successful: the Elector was a great enemy of France, who gave asylum and protection to his competitor, the Pretender, James III.; but he had no credit with Queen Anne, who, in her heart, saw only with chagrin the crown of the Stuarts destined to pass, after her, to a foreign house. The only result of the manœuvres of the ambassadors was that Queen Anne imperiously insisted, with the States-General, on the speedy opening of general

[1] See *Mém. de Duguai-Trouin*, pp. 650–661. Quincl, t. VI. p. 608.

conferences in Holland, and entreated Louis XIV. to confide to her, in secret, the definitive conditions that he was disposed to offer to the allies. The King sent them to her by the Abbé Gauthier (end of November, 1711). He consented to cede Ypres and Furnes for the *barrier*, in consideration of the restitution of Aire, Bethune, Saint-Venant, Douai, and Bouchain; he demanded the restoration of Lille to compensate for the demolition of Dunkirk, and offered to Holland the commercial tariff of 1664, and the suppression of the duty of fifty sous per ton, on condition that the Elector of Bavaria should have Belgium, over which Philip V. was disposed to cede him all his rights; he suggested that the Duke of Savoy should be made King of Lombardy. In consideration of the reëstablishment of the Electors of Bavaria and Cologne, he offered to surrender Kehl, to raze the forts on the Rhine dependent on Strasburg, and all the forts on the right bank of the river, and to exchange Breisach for Landau.

The time had gone by when Lille and Alsace were offered without obtaining a hearing!

The States-General could no longer defer sending, through the medium of England, the passports for the French plenipotentiaries. Utrecht was the place designated. Louis XIV. had objected to the Hague, in order to avoid Heinsius. Holland, Prussia, and Savoy intrusted their interests to the Queen of England, but Holland did not cease to insist on the basis of the preliminaries of 1709. Louis XIV. consented that the representatives of Spain and of the two Bavarian Electors should not be present at the opening of the conferences, and should not be presented until the status of their masters had been determined upon by the allies. France was there to defend her absent friends.

The Austrian party and the Whigs were by no means resigned. The Whigs had not for their sole motive their hatred of Louis XIV. or the interests of their leaders; they suspected, prematurely, as it appears, a plan concerted between the Queen and her ministers against the *Protestant succession*, and for the recall of the Pretender to the throne after his sister. The most ardent among them wished to prevent this peril at any cost, and had already projected a rising at London, which did not take place. Meanwhile the new Parliament met that had been convoked by the Queen (December 18). Anne, in her opening speech, distinctly announced a speedy peace. The Whigs in the Upper House bitterly inveighed against any treaty that would not give up the Spanish monarchy integrally to Austria: they had a majority of one in the

House of Lords; but the Tories, whom the ministry had aided with all the royal influence in the elections, prevailed, by a large majority, in the House of Commons.

The Austrian party attempted a last resource: it sent its hero, Eugene, to London, to second Marlborough in politics, as formerly in war. The new Emperor had commissioned Eugene to promise the Queen that, if she would continue the war, he would raise his contingent to over a hundred and thirty thousand men, would send thirty thousand of them to Spain, would contribute money as well as soldiers, &c. An address of the House of Lords, in favor of the war, was to serve as a preface to the propositions of Eugene. They hoped to move the people of London by exhibiting to them the two great captains united in demanding the means of subduing France; they counted on influencing the House of Commons by popular intimidation, and the Queen by the House; lastly, on violently overthrowing the ministry, perhaps of doing even more! The rumor ran of a new 1688 in the interest of the Elector of Hanover. The ministers anticipated the blow: Marlborough was deposed from the generalship, replaced by the Duke of Ormond, and accused of enormous peculations; the House of Commons decided that he should be compelled to render an account, and did not admit that victory covered everything. The creation of new peers changed the majority in the House of Lords. When Eugene arrived (January 16, 1712), he found all the positions lost, all the means of action annulled. The Queen could recriminate with much more reason against Austria than against Holland, and argued the little that the House of Austria had done for herself against the immense sacrifices which had been imposed on England, and which she could no longer continue.[1] Eugene, Marlborough, the envoy of Hanover, and the leaders of the Whigs, agitated, it is said, the most violent designs; neither plot nor riot, however, broke out, and Eugene, after losing two whole months at London, returned to the Hague, March 31, to prepare to reenter the field without his formidable companion-in-arms.

The conferences for a general peace were opened, January 29, at Utrecht. The English plenipotentiaries, the Bishop of Bristol and the Earl of Strafford, had repaired thither about the 15th, and

[1] The Emperor had contributed nothing to the expenses of the war in Spain save the pay of two thousand men in 1711, whilst England had paid fifty-six thousand men there, from 1709 to 1711, on her own account, besides thirteen battalions and eighteen squadrons on account of the Emperor. It is true that the fifty-six thousand men were not all under the flags, and that many guineas remained in intermediary hands; — the general-in-chief knew something about them!

the French on the 19th: these were the Marshal d'Huxelles and the Abbé de Polignac, whom the King thus compensated for their painful mission at Gertruydenberg, and Ménager, the negotiator of the preliminaries at London. The representatives of the Emperor, who had at first protested against sending any one, arrived February 9; the conferences were held in French, "which," it was declared, "should involve no consequences, the ministers of the Emperor being required to speak only Latin." [1] France presented her offers, February 11. The allies replied, February 19, by counter-propositions; England alone answered directly. The French refused to discuss by writing, and wished to negotiate *viva voce*, according to custom; the congress, which had promised to advance rapidly by the pressure of England on the rest of the allies, was, on the contrary, suspended during several months. Mournful events had supervened in France, the recoil of which was felt at Utrecht and at London, where the real negotiation continued to be much more than at Utrecht.

Louis, Dauphin of France, the only legitimate son of Louis XIV., had died in his fiftieth year, April 14, 1711, a few days before the Emperor Joseph. It could scarcely be said that he had ever lived to history. Without vices and without virtues, without passions and without will, he would have left no trace, had not a flash of intelligence and humanity one day illuminated this soul buried in matter — it was the day when he endeavored to oppose the revocation of the Edict of Nantes!

By the death of the Dauphin, the Duke of Burgundy, named Louis like his father and his grandfather, had become the immediate heir to the throne. We have already seen figuring more than once in this history this celebrated pupil of Fénelon, a character as strongly marked as that of the preceding dauphin had been undefined. We have given an account of his education, more fruitful than the lessons of Bossuet to his father; we have shown him, from his earliest youth, studying, with the attention and sagacity of a grown-up man, the condition and interests of the people which he was to be called to govern. His *début* in war, in 1702 and 1703, had been tolerably successful; but the fatal campaign of 1708 had produced a violent reaction in public opinion against him, which was carefully kept up by the cabal of Vendôme. The friends of Vendôme formed the little court of the Dauphin, and counted on reigning before long under the name of the feeble son of Louis XIV., putting the grandson aside. The Duke of

[1] Quinci, t. VII. p. 18.

Burgundy, for some time dejected under this blow, then encouraged by the letters of Fénelon,[1] and the counsels of Beauvilliers, Chevreuse, and Saint-Simon, strove to retrieve his position and to amend the faults, not of heart, but of conduct, which had alienated the public from him. His father died in the mean time. He had never been loved by him. The Dauphin felt in his son, so austere and so well instructed, a living reproach to his loose habits and profound ignorance. Louis XIV. himself, who, despite his practical regularity and the too renowned pledges given to his faith, never had a taste for the life of a devotee, had often treated with somewhat disdainful impatience the monastic scruples of the young prince and his part of mute censor amidst the pomps of Versailles. The playful graces of the Duchess of Burgundy were needed to win pardon for the rigidity of her husband. The death of the Dauphin completely united the grandfather and the grandson. The new Dauphin did what was requisite to make himself agreeable and necessary to the King: Louis, who felt the decline of age hastening, became strongly attached to his young heir; the simple presence in councils, with the right of discussion without voting, granted to the Duke of Burgundy in 1702, was transformed into an effective participation in affairs, almost into a share in the royal authority. Louis XIV. sent the ministers to deliberate with the Dauphin — he, so jealous of maintaining his power alone like that of God! A few words of the King, addressed to a deputation of the assembly of the clergy, publicly explained these innovations which had astonished the court. "Here," said the King to the prelates, "is a prince *who will soon succeed me*, and, by his virtue and piety, will make the church still more flourishing and the kingdom happier!"[2]

In changing position, the new Dauphin seemed to change character. That unsocial timidity, that inert resignation, which separated him from the world, gave place to a sort of efflorescence: the better understood sentiment of his duties obliging him to go out of himself, to communicate himself to men, to develop the faculties that he had shut within himself through distrust or humility, to give emphasis and authority to his speech, he soon saw public opinion returning to him with impetuosity, as if to indemnify him for having been too severe towards him. He was no longer, as

[1] The master and the pupil had seen each other but twice since the exile of Fénelon, when the Prince passed Cambrai in 1702 and 1708. We have touching narratives of these interviews, in which fear of the King suppressed their mutual love.

[2] Dangeau, t. III. p. 178. Saint-Simon, t. IX. p. 374.

formerly, only enveloped in the halo of his master, to whom popularity remained faithful after fifteen years of exile: he had his personal popularity, and the public identified in its hopes the heir of the throne and the great exile of Cambrai, the minister or inspirer of the future reign. The expectation of a reparative reign took possession of all minds: the aged King himself, as we have seen, gave a touching welcome to the idea of leaving to his people repose and happiness after a glory so dearly bought. The Dauphin had on his side the devotees, whose model he was, the free-thinkers, and the dissenters, who counted on finding in the pupil of Fénelon the practical tolerance of his master: his charming wife secured to him the youthful and frivolous part of the public, who could not believe that pleasures would disappear with such a queen, however grave and rigorous the King might be. Each fashioned himself a future according to his wishes.

The young Dauphiness had had a great part in this happy change: she had become the tie between her husband, on one hand, and, on the other, the King and Madame de Maintenon, whom she subjugated by her adroit and naïve charms. Piquant, original in her whole person as well as in her irregular and seductive features, affable to the small as to the great, gay, sportive, sparkling with wit, animation, and coquetry, with the form and bearing "of a goddess walking on the clouds," as was said in the mythological saloons of Versailles, she was the last ray that rejoiced the old age of the Great King, the life and soul of the court, the idol of the French youth; while the old men fancied that they saw again in her Madame Henrietta and the palmy days of infant Versailles.

The winter of 1711–1712 had begun under auspices much less gloomy than the preceding winters: peace made, or nearly so, with England, general peace in prospective, on conditions so different from those to which France had been on the point of submitting, seemed to promise that 1712 would be the end of public calamities. All hearts were dilating, when, suddenly, February 5, the Dauphiness was seized with fever; violent pains were felt in her head, and reddish marks appeared on her skin. The 11th, the Dauphiness was so ill that confession was suggested to her. She dismissed her Jesuit confessor and asked for a monk of another order, an incident that caused a lively sensation, quickly effaced by a much more violent emotion. On the evening of the 12th, Marie Adelaide of Savoy expired at the age of twenty-six.

The Dauphin, who had not left his wife during the first days of her illness, had been seized with the fever in his turn, the night before the catastrophe. He was carried from Versailles to Marly, with the King and Madame de Maintenon. The effort that he made to stifle the outburst of his grief and to accept his affliction in a Christian spirit, redoubled the inflammation: the same marks that had appeared on his wife showed themselves on his body, but "more livid than reddish," says Saint-Simon. On the morning of the 18th he died. He was not yet thirty years old.

The young couple that had just passed away left two sons, five and two years old. Both children were seized with the same malady as their father and mother: the elder, who had borne the title of Duke of Brittany, died the 8th of March. The other, the Duke of Anjou, was not carried off by the crisis of the disease, but remained so weak that it was expected that he would soon follow his parents and brother to Saint-Denis.

It is impossible to describe the effect of these terrible blows on the King, who felt the consolation and support of his old age, the future of his state and his race, destroyed; on Fénelon and his friends, who, overwhelmed at once in mind and heart, saw buried in the grave, with the object of their love, their ideas of public good and regeneration, at the moment when they believed everything ready for their realization; on France, lastly, who, losing her future chief at the very instant when she adopted him as the child of her affection, relapsed into darkness and an unknown future! Men could not resign themselves to bow beneath the hand of nature, the instrument of the mysterious designs of Providence. The public grief was eager to find crimes under all these misfortunes, and sought an expiatory victim on the very steps of the throne.

The Duke of Orleans, the nephew and son-in-law of the King, had no one between the throne and himself, if the Duke of Anjou should also die, but the King of Spain, to whom all Europe interdicted the union of the two crowns, and the Duke of Berry, the last of the grandsons of Louis XIV. The Duke of Berry, as much of a cipher as his father had been, was the son-in-law of the Duke of Orleans, and wholly governed by his wife, a young princess of violent temper and depraved heart. The most revolting rumors were current concerning this family: incestuous relations were suspected between the father and the daughter.[1] The ambition of Philip of Orleans had been not less assailed than his morals, since

[1] Saint-Simon, a friend of the Duke of Orleans, defends him with warmth; but all appearances were against the Prince. Saint-Simon, t. VIII. p. 304.

his projects concerning Spain, greatly exaggerated, as it seems, by his enemies. Even his good qualities turned against him in this moment of anguish and delirium: his taste for the sciences and arts threatened to be more fatal to him than his vices or the impiety of which he made a parade; with a mind active and curious to know the secrets of nature,[1] he was a student of chemistry, still little known; chemistry was as yet to the populace only the art of making gold or of brewing poison. The public cry was fearful: "Philip has struck the blow; his daughter, the accomplice of his pleasures and his labors, is another Brinvilliers!" The multitude threatened to tear the Duke of Orleans in pieces on the day of the funeral. The unhappy Prince went to the King and demanded the Bastile and judges. Louis was still more unhappy, if possible. His grandchildren were the victims: his son-in-law and granddaughter[2] were perhaps the assassins; he who, it is said, called the Duke of Orleans a *boaster of crimes*,[3] on account of his bravadoes of impiety, now doubted whether he were not, in fact, the most execrable of criminals. The physicians and surgeons who had opened the bodies were divided on the question of poison. The aged King, however, preserved the necessary strength of soul and presence of mind to refuse to the accused the irreparable scandal of the trial which he solicited; but this frightful burden weighed long on the head of Philip: time, and above all the life of the little Duke of Anjou, who, by surviving, deprived him of all the fruits of his pretended crimes, were alone able to justify him, finally, in the eyes of France. It was at last understood that there had been no other poison than a scarlet, malignant, and imperfectly broken out fever (a purple measles), which had an epidemic character during this fatal winter.

The regrets excited by the premature death of the Duke of Burgundy did not disappear with the sinister interpretation of this death. The tradition of these regrets has been perpetuated to our days: our generation may have yet heard old men express the idea that the grandson of Louis XIV. would have regenerated, would have saved the monarchy. Men attached to the recollections of the past have not ceased to mourn in him the purest representative of their faith; philosophers, men of modern times, have also paid

[1] He had even, in his youth, sought to know *supernatural* secrets; for he had bravely used every effort to see the devil. The occult sciences of the Middle Ages were thus mingled in him with incredulity. See Saint-Simon, t. XII. p. 199.

[2] The mother of the Duchess of Berry was a daughter of the King and Madame de Montespan.

[3] Saint-Simon, t. XI. p. 346.

mournful homage to this tomb closed over so many hopes. There is, in such unanimity, a sentiment that honors the human heart, and it throws around the object of so many tears a kind of halo that history should respect. The man, in fact, in the Duke of Burgundy, merited the respect of all; but would the prince have given to France all that was expected of him? Would he have conducted her in the path of her true destiny? Would he have, we do not say resolved, the monarchy could not do it, but at least long postponed the terrible questions of the future? We do not think so, and it is from his master's writings and his own that we draw this negative opinion.

We have elsewhere[1] analyzed the works written by Fénelon for the education of the Duke of Burgundy, and have sought in them the theories of this great man. As to the application, he laid down the indices with his own hand in November, 1711, in a memoir transmitted to the young prince by the Duke de Chevreuse. These are the means that Fénelon proposed to reëstablish the State — the renewal of sumptuary laws; the renunciation of all expenditure for arts and construction till the payment of the debt, and the reduction of appointments; the reduction of the debts to three and one third per cent. interest (namely, bankruptcy palliated in his eyes by ecclesiastical aversion to interest); the establishment everywhere of assessments (for the reapportionment of the impost), as in Languedoc, and of the Provincial Estates, to which were to be attributed the police and the destination of the funds, etc., the abolition of the salt-taxes, the five great revenue-farms, the capitation-tax, and the royal tithe; the reduction of the ordinary impost to the villain-tax generalized and rectified. The King was to demand the sum; the Provincial Estates were to order and levy the impost destined to produce this sum. There were to be no more intendants; envoys of the King were to go from time to time to inspect the provinces; the States-General were to be reëstablished, but on a more aristocratic basis than formerly: they were to be composed of bishops, a seignior of high nobility, and an influential man of the Third Estate, elected in each diocese: they were to deliberate on the funds for extraordinary charges, on war, and on all matters. They were to be triennial and to deliberate as long as they chose: their authority was by way of representation; there were to be no more ministers; a council of state, always presided over by the King, and six other councils composed of great personages, were to regulate all the affairs of the kingdom.

[1] See *ante*, p. 266, and following.

As to what concerned the church, continued Fénelon, it was less free in certain respects in France than the simply tolerated churches in non-Catholic countries, which elected, deposed, freely assembled their pastors. The King, in practice, was more truly the head of the Church than the Pope: the Gallican liberties were liberties with respect to the Pope, servitude with respect to the King. The lay judges ruled the bishops as the Third Estate (by the ministers and by the robe) ruled the *first seigniors*. Fénelon desired the reciprocal independence of both powers: the Church might excommunicate the prince, the prince might execute the pastor; the Church should have no right to elect or depose kings. Ecclesiastics should contribute to the burdens of the State according to their incomes. The intercourse of bishops with their head should be free, as well as the provincial councils. It was proper that the King should put bishops in his councils for mixed affairs. This liberty demanded by Fénelon for bishops he was far from willing to share with curés, for his conception of the Church, like that of the State, was very aristocratic. He proposed a plan for rooting out Jansenism — to demand a new bull from Rome; to cause the bishops to be deposed who refused to accept it, and to remove all the doctors, professors, etc., imbued with Jansenism.[1] This was in his eyes a great heresy which should be overthrown at any cost.

As to the nobility, to them should be given all the offices of the civil and military household of the King. The nobles should everywhere be preferred for grades in the army. Every noble house should have an inalienable *majorat*, as in Spain. The nobles should be free to engage in wholesale commerce, without derogation from their dignity. Unequal alliances should be interdicted. Still other measures should be taken to *separate* and strengthen the nobility. Nobles should be preferred to plebeians, their merit being equal, for judicial offices. Wherever it was possible, magistrates of the sword should be substituted for magistrates of the robe.

Vendibility of offices should be abolished. All customs should be corrected and united in one good code. There should be few free dispositions of property: the law should regulate transmission almost absolutely. There should be severe reprobation of all trade in money by way of usury, except through bankers, with whom it was impossible to dispense.[2] Examination should be

[1] This is precisely the course that it was soon attempted to follow in the *Unigenitus* Bull.

[2] Bossuet has written a treatise in the same sense.

made in the States-General and Provincial Estates as to whether it was necessary to abolish import and export duties. Manufactures should be established, but without prohibition of foreign merchandise. There should be free commerce with the English and the Dutch — France was rich enough if she sold her corn, oil, wine, linen, whatever her soil produced, at a good price. There should be a board of merchants, which the Estates and the council of the King should consult on all these general dispositions. There should be a kind of *pawnbroker's shop* for those who wished to traffic and had not the necessary advances (this was evidently the boldest and newest thing proposed: it was credit given by the State). There should be a limited navy. There should be no differential duties in favor of the merchant-shipping.[1]

The political and economical opinions of the Duke of Burgundy, we are certain, from his writings, which have been published by his biographer,[2] and from the long narrations of Saint-Simon, were generally in conformity with the propositions of Fénelon. It is therefore indubitable, that the administration of the young prince would have been, on most points, to the theories of Fénelon what the administration of Louis XIV. had been to the theories of Bossuet, with this difference, however, that whilst Louis XIV. had exceeded Bossuet in his theory of absolutism,[3] his grandson, on the contrary, would have fallen short of Fénelon in what regarded liberty of mind and religious tolerance. Fénelon recognized that "no human power could force the impenetrable intrenchment of the liberty of the heart," and was inclined to grant to all civil tolerance.[4] The Duke of Burgundy was very far from this liberalism. One can scarcely comprehend that the fragments which he has left concerning the affairs of the Protestants are from the same hand that wrote reflections so judicious and so humane. They are full of a narrow and sectarian spirit as to ideas, and of passion and blindness as to facts. The Prince completely justifies

[1] *Œuvres de Fénelon*, t. V. pp. 190–202. Another document, probably anterior, should be read with this memorial, the *Examen de conscience concernant les devoirs de la royauté*; remark in it what regards the galley-slaves retained, by a monstrous abuse, after the expiration of their punishment. *Ibid.* p. 2.

[2] *Vie du duc de Bourgogne*, by Abbé Proyart, t. I–II. *passim*.

[3] Louis, however, conceived in his old age some doubts on the absolute right to dispose of the property of his subjects. On the occasion of the royal tithe, in 1710, he consulted his confessor, Le Tellier, successor of Father La Chaise, who consulted the most skilful doctors of the Sorbonne, who decided without reservation that all the property of his subjects was his own. Saint-Simon, t. IX. p. 14.

[4] *Examen de conscience*, etc.; *Œuvres de Fénelon*, t. V. p. 89. *Vie du duc de Bourgogne*, t. II. pp. 76–86–13[illegible]

the revocation of the edict of Nantes, and the persecution, which he calls a *moderate procedure*. He sets out from the maxim, "that a Christian prince cannot permit evil to take place in his states:" to stifle every innovation by immediate chastisement, is to him one of the fundamental principles of the governing power. He obstinately shuts his eyes to the consequences of the Revocation, and is even unwilling to believe, on this subject, the memorials of the intendants! In short, he seems no longer to possess his free will or the use of his intellect when religion is in question. The spirit of scrupulousness and terror — terror of hell, it must be said — is what rules here. It is this same negative and timorous spirit that inspires the prince with fear of professional scholars, of men of letters, of theorists, of thinkers: he has a presentiment of their formidable flight in the new century, and would fain arrest it. Towards the fine arts also, much more rigorous than Fénelon, he is a veritable Jansenist; he entirely renounces theatrical exhibitions, will perhaps forbid them when he is king: all this is only an occasion of sin.[1]

We can therefore sum up, almost with certainty, what would have been the characteristics of the reign of the grandson of Louis XIV. These were, a rigid economy; a wholly Christian solicitude for the people and the poor; a tendency for the prince to limit his own power by fixed rules, independent of caprices and circumstances; respect for the traditional rights of all; efforts rigidly to reform the morals of the country, even at the expense of national sociality and splendor; duty laid down as an ideal instead of glory; nothing more of that mystic adoration of royalty in itself, which had been a religion to Louis XIV. — a king, in the eyes of the Duke of Burgundy, was only a man laden with a heavier burden than other men, and who should entreat God for strength to bear it; in the mind of Louis XIV., the king had, *by right*, as it were, that divine inspiration, that temporal infallibility, which the Duke of Burgundy humbly implored; the abolition of onerous taxes and of all indirect taxes; taxation laid only on the revenue of the soil, — a specious principle which we shall soon see become that of a great economic sect, the *physiocrats*, but which Vauban, a man of practice as well as of theory, had taken good care not to propose, — he who felt that industry adds a real value to the value of the products of the soil, and that personal revenue ought to be reached by taxation as well as landed revenue;[2]

[1] *Vie du duc de Bourgogne*, t. II. pp. 56–184.

[2] The Duke of Burgundy eulogizes Vauban highly in his writings, but does not seem to have read or comprehended him.

the sacrifice of manufactures and the marine to agriculture; the substitution of aristocratic for monarchic forms in affairs of administration and finances; oligarchic councils, oligarchic states, replacing bourgeois ministers and bourgeois intendants; consultative aristocratic monarchy; in religion, a narrow and oppressive orthodoxy — persecution, under Louis XIV., fell on the Protestants and the Jansenists, and passed by the unbelievers, still shrouded in twilight; under the Duke of Burgundy it would have fallen everywhere, in proportion as the new philosophy grew; ancient Gallicanism itself would have fallen into disgrace in favor of a mitigated ultramontanism; Fénelon would not comprehend that, so long as Catholicism was the religion of the State, so long as the Church was a political body and a positive authority, the Gallican and parliamentary barriers were necessary to the national independence. In politics as in religion, in spite of humanitarian ideas and audacious economic innovations, the new reign would have turned towards the past, not towards the future. A kind of St. Louis strayed into the generation of Voltaire, the Duke of Burgundy would have ruled in an inverse direction of the spirit of the eighteenth century: the age belonged to the unlimited affranchisement of minds; the Prince would have gladly brought everything again under the old religious authority; the age tended to the mingling of classes, to civil and political equality; the Prince would have aimed to establish the ancient hierarchy, undermined by the kings themselves, and to constitute in France what had never existed there, — a governing aristocracy. Fénelon, for a time, would have moderated him, would have covered him with his sympathizing and conciliating genius; but, after Fénelon, a new reaction, this time definitive, would soon have appeared, both against the errors and even the virtues of the monarch. . . . Better was it for him to die in the flush of youth and popularity: he had no reason to complain of Providence!

He who was most to be pitied was his grandfather, that old man, who had not even the right to shroud his head in his mantle and immure himself in his grief. The gravest interests pressed upon, commanded the attention of, Louis XIV. It was necessary to provide *alone* for everything, since the aid which Louis had given himself had disappeared. How true that action is the best consolation for these deep and strong natures!

The misfortunes of the royal family were destined to produce a reaction abroad dangerous to France. England, uneasy at seeing Philip V. separated by a single degree from the throne of France,

sought new guarantees, and demanded that Philip should yield his eventual rights to his young brother, the Duke of Berry (end of March). The idea of Louis XIV. had always been that, if the King of Spain should become the eldest of the House of Bourbon, he should pass to the throne of France, transmitting Spain to a younger brother. Louis replied at first to the proposition of the English, that such a renunciation was contrary to the laws of the kingdom, "laws which God alone could abolish."[1] Despite this strange answer, he wrote soon after to Philip V., to ask him to decide upon it, then to engage him formally to consent (April 9–18). Time was needed to settle this grave event. Weeks, however, followed each other: spring again returned without peace, and Prince Eugene thought only of resuming military operations, despite the repugnance of the English government. Eugene was evidently about to push forward with a kind of fury to a decisive contest, and it might be reckoned that, if victorious, he would neglect the French places in his rear, and make his way to Paris through the opening made for him by Bouchain between Valenciennes and Cambrai. France was forced to put herself again on the defence. A touching scene occurred at Marly, when Villars came to take leave of the King before setting out for the army. The iron mask which covered Louis' countenance fell: the aged King wept before his favorite general. "You see my condition, marshal," said he; "there have been few examples of what has happened to me — to lose in the same month my grandson, my granddaughter, and their son, all of great promise, and all most tenderly loved! God is punishing me; I have well deserved it; I shall suffer less in the other world." Then rising, heroically, "Let us leave my domestic misfortunes," said he, "and see how to avert those of the kingdom. I confide to you the forces and the salvation of the State. Fortune may be adverse to you. If this misfortune should happen to the army you command, what would be your feeling as to the course which I should take in person?" Villars remained for some moments in silence. "I am not astonished," resumed the King, "that you do not answer me promptly. While waiting for you to tell me your idea, I will tell you mine. I know the reasonings of the courtiers; almost all wish me to retire to Blois, if my army should be defeated. For my part, I know that armies of such size are never so much defeated that the greater part could not fall back upon the Somme, a river very difficult to cross. I should go to Peronne

[1] *Mém. de Torci*, p. 711.

or Saint-Quentin, gather there all the troops that I had, make a last effort with you, and we would perish together, or save the State." [1]

This was perhaps the day of his life on which Louis best merited the name of *the Great*, if true greatness is above all in character.

Villars rejoined the army at the end of April. He found it extended on the lines of the Crinchon, near Arras, to Estrun, on the Scheldt, the front covered by the Scarpe and the Sanzet. The main body of the enemy was on the Scarpe, between Douai and Anchin. During the winter, Marshal de Montesquiou, who commanded on the frontier, had destroyed the bridges and sluices on the canal between Lille and Douai, and had partially filled up this canal; the communications by water between Ghent and Douai were found momentarily interrupted, and the enemy, finding no land route for his wagons, had been retarded in his project of establishing large storehouses at Douai. By way of compensation, indeed, he had shelled and burned the French forage storehouses on the ramparts of Arras (March 2). The affected delays of England also fettered Eugene, happily for the French, whose resources were ill assured, and whose forces were not available in the spring.

Negotiations had continued, not between the plenipotentiaries assembled at Utrecht, but between the cabinets of Versailles, St. James, and the Escurial. England had proposed that Philip V., if unwilling to renounce his eventual rights in France, should exchange the throne of Spain for the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily and the Duchies of Savoy and Mantua, which States, with the exception of Sicily, should be reannexed to France, should Philip V. become the head of the House of Bourbon. The crown of Spain should pass to the Duke of Savoy. The proposition was extremely advantageous to France; Louis XIV. warmly supported it with his grandson; but Philip V. preferred renouncing his old country to the new, and consented to abandon his rights of succession in France. The courier, who carried to London the resolution of the King of Spain, crossed on the way an English courier, who carried to Louis XIV. Queen Anne's consent to a two months' truce, provided that the King should surrender Dunkirk in deposit to England, until Holland should have accorded an equivalent for it to France. The King demanded four months' truce instead of two, promised Dunkirk as a deposit to the English; consented to add to the cession of Newfoundland that of Acadia and the French part of the island of St. Christopher, and to renounce Landau; this

[1] *Mém. de Villars*, p. 207.

was the furthest limit of concessions. At this price, Louis hoped that England would impose peace on her allies. June 17, Queen Anne communicated to Parliament the state of the negotiations: both houses replied by addresses in favor of peace. The essential question was settled with Philip V.; as to guarantees, the English cabinet demanded of the King that the renunciations of Philip V. to the throne of France and the French princes to the throne of Spain should be ratified by the States-General of France. Louis XIV. would have regarded an appeal to the States-General as the overthrow of the monarchy: he replied that "the authority which foreigners attributed to the States was unknown in France," he promised only to accept the renunciation of Philip V., and to cause it to be published and registered by the parliaments, as well as those of the French princes, and to revoke the letters-patent of December, 1700, which had reserved to Philip his eventual rights.[1]

The armies had begun to move towards the close of May. The English had not effected a junction with the Austro-Batavians until the 20th of this month, on the Scarpe, and, the 23d, Villars had received information from Versailles that the new English general, the Duke of Ormond, had orders to avoid all participation in offensive measures. May 26th, the hostile army crossed the Scheldt at Bouchain, leaving a large body between the Scheldt and the Scarpe, and deployed from Bouchain to Cateau-Cambresis. Villars extended his forces in a square on the Scheldt and the Sanzet, with his headquarters at Cambrai. Eugene would have been glad to attack by debouching from the forest of Bohain, between the sources of the Scheldt and the Somme. Villars was resolved to accept battle only on the plateau of Vermandois, at the north of St. Quentin. The Duke of Ormond excused himself from co-operating in the movements of Eugene until he had received new instructions from his court. Eugene, obliged to renounce his first design, fell back on Le Quesnoy, which he invested (June 8). Villars asked Ormond whether the English would oppose the enterprises which the French army might undertake to succor Le Quesnoy. Ormond entreated the French general to undertake nothing until the notification of the truce; after which, he assembled the commanders of the German corps in the pay of England, and told them that the Queen, his mistress, had agreed upon a four months' truce with the King of France. The German generals replied that they should obey Prince Eugene, so long as they had no contrary orders from their sovereigns; all the German

[1] *Mém. de Torci*, p. 712 *et seq.*

mercenaries, captains and soldiers, knew only Eugene and Marlborough; Eugene and the deputies from the States-General to the army, had gained them over without difficulty by promising them that the Emperor and Holland would take the responsibility of their pay, if England ceased to pay them. One of the English plenipotentiaries to Utrecht, the Earl of Strafford, having repaired meanwhile to the camp of the allies, to notify them of the four months' truce, and to ask the Austro-Batavians to subscribe to it, Eugene and the Dutch deputies demanded a delay in order to consult the States-General and the plenipotentiaries of the Emperor (June 25). During these negotiations, Le Quesnoy, ill defended, surrendered July 4, without anything having been undertaken by Villars.[1]

Eugene thus found himself master of the ground between the Scheldt and the Sambre. He continued to proceed towards his ends, despite the *defection* of the English. The capture of Quesnoy, and the disobedience of the Anglo-German mercenaries, encouraged Heinsius and his friends to reject the truce, in concert with the Imperialists. Orders were sent to the commanders of the places conquered from France, not to receive the English troops within their walls. The separation between the English and their ancient allies was consummated, July 17, by the departure of the Duke of Ormond, who abandoned his quarters, near Douai, to retire to maritime Flanders. He carried with him only eighteen battalions, and two thousand cavalry, native Englishmen, and a very small German and Liege corps, fifteen or sixteen thousand men perhaps in all, out of more than fifty thousand that had been in British pay; England had carried on this great war almost exclusively with the blood of Germany. The Dutch closed the gates of several cities to Ormond, but could not prevent him from occupying Ghent, the castle of which already had an English garrison (July 23). Ormond forced all the troops in the pay of Holland to quit Ghent, and also seized Bruges and the posts situated on the canal between Bruges and Ostend. July 19, five thousand English, landed at Dunkirk, had taken possession of the forts and ramparts, as the price of the truce and guaranty of the promises of the King of France.

Eugene, despite the retreat of the English, was still superior to Villars, the Emperor having sent to the Netherlands twenty-three thousand soldiers that he needed no longer in pacified Hungary. On the very day of Ormond's departure, Eugene fell back from Quesnoy upon the Selle, the little river of Cateau, as if to march

[1] *Torci*, p. 718. *Lettres de Bolingbroke*, t. I. p. 195. *Villars*, p. 209.

on the French. Villars crossed the Scheldt, and went to meet the enemy. Eugene extended his troops on the left, instead of advancing, and invested Landrecies. The plan of Eugene developed itself; it was formidable but hazardous — to leave behind, on one side, Valenciennes and Condé, on the other, Maubeuge, Charleroi, and Namur, to hold the Upper Scheldt by Bouchain, the Sambre by Landrecies, the interval between these two rivers by Le Quesnoy, and, once assured of this base, to march forward. By entering by Bouchain, he would have been forced to take or turn Cambrai; but, if he entered by Landrecies, he had nothing more between him and Paris but the little feudal town of Guise. The hostile army was divided into three corps: the first, under the Prince of Anhalt Dessau and General Fagel, besieged Landrecies; the second, the strongest of the three, under Eugene in person, was established on the Escaillon, to cover the siege; the third, under the Earl of Albemarle, an English general in the service of Holland, was posted in an intrenched camp, at Denain, on the Scheldt, between Valenciennes and Bouchain, to secure the convoys from the storehouses at Marchiennes to the camp at Landau. The old French lines of 1709, repaired and increased, barred the country between the Scheldt and the Scarpe, and made a communication under cover between the camp at Denain and Marchiennes, where the allies had established their general éntrepôt. The allies called these two parallel lines the *road to Paris*.

This was a rashly extended base of operations in the presence of such an adversary as Villars. The allied army held twelve or fifteen leagues of country. Eugene had too far forgotten his own campaigns on the Adige! The forced timidity of Villars, in 1711, had inspired the hostile chief with exaggerated confidence. he imagined that the French general had been forbidden to hazard anything in any case.

The movements of Villars began to cause Eugene to change this opinion: the marshal deployed his troops between Cambrai and Landrecies, crossed the Selle near its source and appeared disposed to assail the circumvallation of the besiegers. Eugene concentrated his forces to support the siege-lines; these lines were very strong, and victory seemed assured to him. The lieutenants of Villars also thought their leader very audacious. On the evening of July 23, notwithstanding, the army was ordered to march on the besiegers; but, during this time, a large body of cavalry returned and crossed the Selle, descended the river, and guarded its crossings; the French hussars scoured the plain to arrest informers and spies; a body of

infantry returned straight to the Scheldt and threw bridges across at Neuville, between Bouchain and Denain. Suddenly, the main body of the army wheeled about to the left and followed these detachments, to the great discontent of the soldiers, who believed that they were turning their back on the enemy. They soon changed their mind, and understood that they were going to the camp at Denain. The honor of the project belonged to the Marshal de Montesquiou: the General-in-chief had only adopted and elaborated the idea of his second.[1]

On the morning of the 24th, the bridges at Neuville were finished without opposition, thanks to the precautions taken, and to the negligence of the commander of Denain, Albemarle. Villars, hastening to the vanguard, crossed, not without difficulty, a little marsh beyond the Scheldt, which would have been easy to defend, had the enemy arrived in time; but the enemy was not even in a position seriously to defend the lines. The parallel on the side of Bouchain was carried at once, and a convoy, with its escort, was captured in the lines. Albemarle fell back with his troops into his intrenched camp, and the French vanguard put itself in communication with the garrison of Valenciennes, which had issued forth to take the enemy in the rear. Eugene, notwithstanding, apprised only that morning of the march of the French, had hastened at full speed with his staff. He reinforced Albemarle with a few battalions posted towards Thian, on the right of the Scheldt, conjured him to do all in his power to maintain his ground until the arrival of the main body of the allies, and placed himself on a height, on the other side of the Scheldt, to watch for and direct his forces. In the distance, on the plateaux, the head of the enemy's columns was already perceived.

Villars felt that it was necessary to carry the victory by storm. He did not take time to make fascines to fill up the fosse of the camp. "The bodies of our men will be our fascines!" said he. They offered up a prayer, then rushed into the fosse, under a frightful fire of cannon and musketry. Happily, the fosse was shallow and the embankment unsubstantial: the parapet gave way, and our infantry intrepidly threw themselves into the intrenchment. A moment afterwards the cavalry made a breach at another point.

[1] According to Voltaire, well informed of what concerns Villars, a curé and a counsellor of the parliament of Flanders, while walking together towards these quarters, first imagined that Denain and Marchiennes might be easily attacked. The counsellor gave his opinion to the intendant of the province; the latter to Montesquiou; Montesquiou to Villars. *Siècle de Louis XIV.*, chap. xxiii.

The enemy endeavored to rally in the village and abbey of Denain. They were forced from there; the Earl of Albemarle and several German princes were surrounded and taken. All the rest of the enemies precipitated themselves utterly routed towards the pontoon bridge which they had on the Scheldt. The bridge broke under the fugitives: almost all were killed, captured, or drowned; four generals perished; seventeen battalions, that had defended the intrenchments, were almost annihilated before the eyes of Eugene. This prince, exasperated, had put himself at the head of his first columns and was attempting at this moment to debouch by another bridge which the allies had laid at Prouvi, between Denain and Valenciennes; but the bridge of Prouvi was already in the power of the French, and Eugene succeeded only in causing a few hundred more of his men to be killed there. The deputies of the States-General, by force of entreaties, compelled him to cease the attack and retire, with rage in his heart. The enemy had lost eight thousand men and twelve guns, the French not more than five hundred men; Villars sent more than sixty flags to Versailles, whose mourning walls had become unaccustomed to these glorious hangings!

On the same day of the battle, a French corps had gone to mask Marchiennes: from the 25th to the 26th, other corps assailed and carried Saint-Amand, Anchin, Mortagne, all the posts occupied by the enemy along the Scarpe, from Douai to the junction of the Scarpe and the Scheldt. All efforts were then concentrated on Marchiennes, which surrendered on the 30th. More than four thousand soldiers were taken there, fifteen hundred sailors, who performed the service of the convoys by water, horses and provisions, and a hundred cannon, sixty of which were siege-guns; in a word, all the reserve magazine of the enemy. The garrisons of Valenciennes, Ypres, and the maritime towns, had joined the army, and Villars was superior to Eugene, who could do nothing to prevent the destruction of all the troops possessed by the allies on the left of the Scheldt. From June 24 to June 30, the allies had lost from fourteen to fifteen thousand men, against an almost nominal loss on the side of the conquerors. This was only the most trifling result of the victory. Villars pushed his successes vigorously. After razing the enemy's intrenchments on the Scheldt and the Scarpe, he invested Douai, July 31, discovered and employed to reconquer this city, a part of the lines which the enemy had erected to take it in 1710 and which he had had the arrogance not to raze, as if all offensive return had been forever interdicted to

the French. Eugene had been forced to raise the siege of Landrecies on the 29th, by the impossibility of subsisting his army after the loss of his magazines and communications. He recrossed the Scheldt at Tournay, repaired to Secklin, between Lille and Douai, then reconnoitred the vast circumvallation of Villars at Pont-à-Rache, between Douai and Anchin. This was the most vulnerable side; but Villars had fortified it by good intrenchments and by forcing the Scarpe through its fosse by a dam. After having encamped a fortnight in sight of the French camp, Eugene acknowledged attack impossible and retired (August 27). The same day, Fort Scarpe capitulated: September 8, the town of Douai did the same, after an assault which had given the French nearly all the outworks. Three thousand soldiers, the rest of the garrison, remained prisoners. The whole course of the Scarpe was reconquered.

Villars and the main body of the army had already left Douai when the town opened its gates. Villars, on the information that Eugene had again crossed the Scheldt near Tournay, had set out, on the morning of September 8, on his side to cross this river at Valenciennes. Eugene, foreseeing new enterprises as soon as Douai should have fallen, wished to cover Le Quesnoy, where he had deposited all his siege-parks on raising his camp at Landrecies, and to threaten Maubeuge, to endeavor to divert Villars from besieging Bouchain. Villars anticipated his adversary, and Le Quesnoy was invested on the evening of the 8th. Eugene did not appear until the 10th, when he saw the French between him and Le Quesnoy, along the little river Honneau. He was as powerless to succor Le Quesnoy as Douai. The place capitulated, October 4: an equipage of war was found there twice as important as at Marchiennes: one hundred and sixteen large siege-guns, exclusive of field-pieces, one hundred and forty mortars, and immense munitions; the whole worth three million francs. Eugene, in despair, had departed, September 29, so as not to witness this new disaster.

Before Le Quesnoy had surrendered, Bouchain had been already invested, despite the autumnal rains. It capitulated, October 19. This was the crowning event of the celebrated campaign of 1712, which had, suddenly and without transition, raised France from the depths of despair to that glorious eminence from which she had long since fallen!

Men were so accustomed to calamity that they could not believe in this return of fortune. It seemed like a dream of the glorious days of the past; they feared to awake! Many had at first imag-

ined that the affair of Denain was only a trifling success inflated by the vanity of Villars! They were forced, however, to acknowledge in the end that the terrible victor of Hochstadt, Turin, Audenarde, and Malplaquet was conquered in turn, and that military France had at last resumed its sway.[1]

Everything had been concentrated in the Netherlands: in the rest of Europe, the war appeared near dying out obscurely. The campaign had been nominal on the Rhine and the Alps: the Duke of Savoy was wholly occupied with arranging his peace by the mediation of England. In Spain, the government of Philip V. was without resources to complete the work of Villa Viciosa, and the celebrated captain who had redeemed in Castile his fallen renown in Flanders, Vendôme, had died, June 11, an inglorious death, from the effects of indigestion, at the age of fifty-eight.[2] The enemy, reinforced by the Imperial troops who had just taken Porto Ercole, one of the presides of Tuscany (May 5), attempted to profit by the death of Vendôme, and marched forward more than thirty thousand men in two corps, the larger on the Segre, the other against Gerona. But, in the interval, news arrived of the truce between France and England. Towards autumn, the English troops quitted Catalonia and Portugal; the King of Portugal,[3] to whom neither the Emperor nor Holland had furnished any subsidies for a year, and who saw his colonial possessions cruelly devastated by maritime war,[4] thought only, like the Duke of Savoy, of making his peace with *the two crowns* by the mediation of the English; his agents signed at Utrecht, November 7, a truce, in the sequel of which the Portuguese auxiliaries evacuated Catalonia, as the English had done. The Austro-Batavians and the Catalans, greatly weakened by this double defection, fell back on Barcelona and Tarragona, and raised the siege of Gerona, before Berwick arrived from the Alps (January, 1713). The Imperialists could not hold out long in Catalonia, if the French remained there in force.

During the successes of Villars in Flanders, the cabinets of Versailles and St. James had continued to labor for peace, the chances

[1] Villars, pp. 210–216. Lamberti, t. VII. pp. 94–187.

[2] Philip V. caused him to be buried at the Escurial, in the vault of the Infants of Spain.

[3] The young Don John V. who had succeeded his father, Pedro II. December 9, 1706.

[4] Santiago of Cape Verd was treated, in 1712, by the privateer Cassart as Rio de Janeiro had been, in 1711, by Duguai-Trouin. Cassart also ravaged, the same year, Dutch Guiana and the lesser English Antilles, St. Christopher and Montserrat.

of which these successes increased daily. After agreeing upon the renunciation of Philip V., the two courts had somewhat lengthy discussions on the interests of the Duke of Savoy and the Elector of Bavaria; one of Queen Anne's two secretaries of foreign affairs, St. John, whom Anne had just created Lord Bolingbroke, crossed to France at the end of August, to accelerate negotiations, and was received there as an angel of peace. He would have been glad to have been authorized to conclude immediately between France and England a definitive treaty, as was demanded by the French government, but Lord Treasurer Harley, Earl of Oxford, was opposed to it, through secret regard for the Elector of Hanover, the heir of the British throne, and Bolingbroke could only regulate the truce until the end of December, after which epoch it was prorogued. The last difficulties, on various important points, were settled verbally between Bolingbroke and Torci.

The reverses of the allies had, notwithstanding, greatly modified the disposition of the Dutch, still so proud before Denain, and they had solicited the mediation of England, in order to renew the conferences of Utrecht, suspended in fact since the beginning of April, although the plenipotentiaries had not quitted the city. The King consented, but instructed his envoys to lay down as a stand-point the restitution of Lille as a compensation for the destruction of Dunkirk, to except Tournay, Condé, Valenciennes, and Maubeuge from the *barrier* demanded in 1709 by the Dutch; lastly, to exact the restitution to France of the places lost since 1709. The positions were changed indeed. "We are playing the part," wrote the Abbé de Polignac, "that they played at Gertruydenberg, and they are playing ours; it is a complete revenge."[1] The Dutch yielded concerning Lille. Their very humiliation became advantageous to them. Public opinion, in England, had had great difficulty in accepting a reconciliation with France; it returned to the Dutch as soon as it saw them seriously disposed to make peace, and would not permit the British government to sacrifice too much the interests of Holland to those of France. Louis XIV. judged it prudent to make an important concession — to renounce Tournay. Queen Anne, fifty years old, had completely ruined her health by the abuse of spirituous liquors; her death might suddenly bring to

[1] *Mém. de Torci*, p. 729. Another conversation, attributed to the Abbé de Polignac, has remained celebrated: at a moment when the Dutch, excited by the Austrian ambassador, Sinzendorf, who "keenly felt his decline," made a show of rejecting the propositions of France and of breaking-up the congress, "We will treat with you, in your own country and without you!" exclaimed Polignac.

the throne of England a prince exceedingly hostile to France. Louis, on his side, felt his robust constitution failing by degrees; he was seventy-four, and the terrible shocks of 1712 had greatly shattered his old age, hitherto so green. He did not wish to bequeath to France a minority with war. England accepted the conditions set by the King on the relinquishment of Tournay, and caused them to be accepted by Holland. January 27, 1713, the two maritime powers signed between themselves a treaty which annulled the compact of the *barrier* of October 28, 1709, and which reduced the *barrier* to the places agreed upon with Louis XIV., namely, Furnes, Fort Knocke, Ypres, Menin, Tournay, Mons, Charleroi, Namur, the citadel of Ghent, and some fortresses in the neighborhood of Ghent and Bruges, which places were never thenceforth to be ceded to France or to a French prince. The King had consented to cede Furnes and Ypres in order to recover Bethune, Saint-Aire, and Saint-Venant. It was agreed that the Elector of Bavaria should provisionally retain the useful domain of Luxemburg, Namur, and Charleroi, until he had been reëstablished and indemnified by the Emperor, to whom was attributed the Spanish Netherlands; that he should become, besides, King of Sardinia; and that the Duke of Savoy should be King of Sicily.

Nothing longer opposed the signature of the treaty between France and the two maritime powers: it was still deferred some time, to endeavor to induce all the belligerent states to sign together. March 14, the Imperialists, still holding out on the main question, concluded with France, by the mediation of England, a special agreement for the evacuation of Catalonia and the islands of Majorca and Ivica, and for a truce in Italy and the Italian islands. Austrian pride could not resolve to treat directly with the *Duke of Anjou*, as Philip V. was still called at Vienna;[1] an amnesty was granted to the Catalans by the convention, although the prince who was to accord the amnesty was not named in the document. The Queen of England promised her good offices to solicit the maintenance of the privileges of Catalonia; the privileges of Aragon, so ancient and illustrious, and which had in part survived the tyranny of Philip II., had just been abrogated after the recovery of this kingdom by Philip V., and Aragon subjected to the laws of Castile. The treaty of evacuation was wholly for the interest of the Emperor, whose wife and troops were in Catalonia,

[1] Philip V. had written the year before to Carlos III., who was not yet Emperor, to ask him to compound, in the name of religion. The Austrian sent back his letter. — *Mém. de Noailles*, p. 240.

and who had been unable either to succor or to withdraw them; Louis XIV. had been obliged to make this concession to Queen Anne in favor of the ancient ally of England. Once assured of being able to evacuate Catalonia, and of not being attacked in Italy, the Emperor no longer desired peace.

On the same day of the treaty of evacuation, the Duke of Savoy concluded a truce with France. March 26, Philip V. transferred to an English company, for thirty years, the privilege of the *assiento*, or the transportation of negroes to the West Indies.

England had assigned April 11 as the final limit to all her allies for the acceptance of the offers of France: after this time, France was no longer bound to anything, England no longer guaranteed anything. April 11, peace was signed between France, on one hand, England, Holland, Prussia, Portugal, and Savoy, on the other. We have already mentioned the principal conditions fixed upon between Versailles and London. These conditions seemed almost mild for France in comparison with the disastrous treaties which she had nearly been forced to endure; nevertheless, they were painful in themselves. In North America France renounced vast possessions which she had long disputed advantageously with England, and where she was at that very moment victorious: these were Hudson's Bay and Straits, with all their coasts, the principal seat of the peltry trade; the large island of Newfoundland, and the peninsula of Nova Scotia, which shut in between them the Gulf of St. Lawrence: the French retained only, with the island of Cape Breton and the other islands of the St. Lawrence, the right of fishery and drying on the coast of Newfoundland, from Cape Bonavista to the northern extremity of the island, and, beyond, turning to the west, to Point Rich. Canada, hemmed in thenceforth on all sides by the English possessions, found itself in great danger. In the West Indies the French half of St. Christopher was ceded. In Flanders, France suffered considerable losses: Tournay, on the Scheldt; Menin, on the Lys; Ypres and Furnes, between the Lys and the sea; she only reserved the part of Tournaisis situated on the Scarpe, that is, Montagne and Saint-Amand; but especially, the hardest thing of all, she endured the military and maritime annihilation of that formidable Dunkirk, which had launched, since 1702, seven hundred and ninety-one privateers against the Anglo-Batavian marine. It was agreed that the navigation of the Lys, above its confluence with the Deule, should be free from all toll; that the duties, until terms should be made with the Emperor, should be replaced in Belgium, with respect to French, English, and Dutch

traders, on the footing of 1680, the Dutch having no commercial privileges, even in the places of the *barrier*.

By the treaty of commerce concluded between France and England, as a supplement to the treaty of peace, it was stipulated that the respective subjects should mutually enjoy all the privileges granted by either to the subjects of the most favored nation, and that all duties on merchandise should be replaced on the footing of 1664, except whalebones and whale-oils, cloths, ratteens and serges, sugar and salt-fish, imported by the English into France, which remained subject, not to the tariff of 1664, but to that of 1667. The duty of fifty sous per ton, established in France on English ships, and that of five shillings per ton, established in England on French ships, were abolished. The principle that "free ships make free goods," that is, that the flag covers the merchandise, with the exception of what is contraband of war, was fully admitted, and it was interdicted to search neutral merchant-vessels otherwise than to take cognizance of their clearances and certificates verifying the nature of the cargo. Both parties were interdicted search and confiscation of imported merchandise, under pretext of fraud or defectiveness in the manufacture, the sellers and buyers being left at full liberty in their transactions. The monopoly of tobacco was abolished in France, and traffic in it was permitted to the English. The treaty of commerce between France and Holland, by reëstablishing almost integrally the clauses of the treaty of Ryswick, placed the Dutch on the same footing as the English. France and the United Provinces mutually interdicted each other to accord to their subjects any immunities, *gratuities* (premiums), or other advantages, to the detriment of the subjects of the other state.[1] The full disposal of their personal property, by donation or by testament, was accorded to the Dutch residing in France, and reciprocally; the treaty with England bore the same clause; the right of aubaine, a relic of the barbarous ages, completely disappeared.

By the treaty with Portugal, France renounced all claims on the part of Guiana called the Lands of Cape North, between the Amazon and the Oyapok, and recognized the sovereignty of the King of Portugal over both shores of the Amazon, interdicting all trade south of the Oyapok. This was again a concession wrested from France by England, to its advantage more than to that of its allies, or rather its vassals. Portugal, since the celebrated

[1] This equality of treatment towards private individuals of both states did not abolish acquired rights or constituted privileges in the hands of companies.

treaty of commerce dictated by the English ambassador, Methwen, in 1703, had linked itself more and more to the commercial suzerainty of England. The *Methwen treaty* seemed, however, one of mutual advantage: it secured to Portuguese wines, by the remission of one third of the duties which other wines continued to pay integrally,[1] the monopoly, or nearly so, of English consumption, in exchange for the privileged importation of English woollen fabrics; but this treaty coincided with the recent discovery of gold mines, and the great increase of the working of them in Brazil: the mines of Brazil were the ruin of Portugal, as the mines of Mexico and Peru had been the ruin of Spain; all manufactures fell into insane contempt; ere long, the English supplied the Portuguese, no longer only with cloths, but with all merchandise, all commodities, to salt fish and grain. After their gold, the degenerate sons of the Albuquerques and Gamas abandoned even their soil: the very vineyards of Oporto were finally bought by the English with Brazilian gold, which had only passed through Portugal to be dissipated in England. We are assured that, from 1696 to 1754, 2,400,000,000 francs were extracted from the mines of Brazil, and that, in 1754, Portugal possessed but 25,000,000 francs in specie!

During the conferences at Utrecht, one of the Portuguese ambassadors, seeing with dismay the dependence into which his country was sinking, had made some overtures to the French plenipotentiaries for an alliance between France and Portugal, with a treaty of commerce for Europe and the two Indies: far from closing the Amazon River, he wished to open through it a new road to Peru. These projects resulted in nothing: the French government feared perhaps to embroil itself with England.[2]

The first King of Prussia, Frederick I., had just died, February 25, 1713; it was his son, Frederick William I., who had treated with Louis XIV. Louis ceded Spanish Gelderland to the King of Prussia, with the authorization of Philip V., which was

[1] According to the treaty of Utrecht, French wines were to be placed on an equal footing with Portuguese wines. See La Hode, *Hist. de Louis XIV.*, t. V. p. 231, and the continuer of Hume. But this arrangement excited loud outcries, and England was not long in derogating from it. The free introduction of silks, linens, and French papers was no better welcomed, and English commerce appeared to consider the treaty disadvantageous as a whole. The French could produce many articles at a lower price than the English. Parliament did not therefore ratify the treaty of commerce as a whole, and the French government, on its side, rescinded the clause concerning tobacco. The greater part of the other clauses were, however, maintained by tacit and mutual consent. See *Lord Chesterfield's Letters*, of December 11, 1750.

[2] Flassan, *Hist. de la diplomatie française*, t. IV. p. 375.

very displeasing to the Dutch. Louis recognized the King of Prussia as sovereign of Neufchâtel, and Frederick William renounced all pretensions to the Principality of Orange, on his own behalf and on that of the Nassaus, his coheirs, whom he undertook to indemnify. He promised to furnish to the army of the Empire, while the war should last, only his federal quota of four thousand six hundred men, instead of the thirty-five thousand soldiers which he had kept in the field.

The treaty between Louis XIV. and Victor Amadeus restored to the latter Savoy and Nice, ceded to him Exilles and Fenestrelle, Château-Dauphin, a Dauphinese fortress situated at the entrance of the province of Saluzzo; finally, all that belonged to the *depending waters* of the Alps, towards Piedmont. Victor Amadeus ceded to France the valley of Barcelonnette, which rectified the Dauphinese frontier. The kingdom of Sicily was guaranteed to the Duke by Louis XIV., who recognized the House of Savoy as substituted for the House of Bourbon on the throne of Spain, in case the direct posterity of Philip V. should become extinct.

Of all the combined German princes, the King of Prussia alone had separated from the Emperor, a token of the affranchisement of his new royalty. The day on which all these treaties were signed (April 11), the Emperor and the Empire not having accepted the offers of France, notice was given them of a new delay until June 1. Louis still offered the barrier of the Rhine, together with Landau, and, in the name of Philip V., Naples, the presides of Tuscany, and the Spanish Netherlands enlarged by the portions of Flanders ceded by France, on condition that the Electors of Cologne and Bavaria should be reinstated into their possessions and honors, the Upper Palatinate remaining, however, in the hands of the Elector Palatine,[1] and the Elector of Bavaria becoming King of Sardinia by way of compensation. The plenipotentiaries of the Emperor and the Empire quitted Utrecht without reply, April 15; the ambassador of Spain arrived there a month afterwards; Philip V. ratified the engagements made in his name by his grandfather, and, July 13, peace was signed between France and England.[2]

It was, it is said, by the counsel of Eugene that the Emperor had refused to sign the peace at the same time with his allies: the haughty obstinacy which was common to Charles VI. with all the

[1] The Upper Palatinate had been dismembered from the Electorate Palatine during the Thirty Years' War, and given to Bavaria. The Emperor, after Hochstadt, had restored it to the Palatine.

[2] See the treaties of Utrecht in Lamberti, t. VIII.

princes of his House, well sufficed to explain his refusal. The age of Louis XIV., his failing health, the infirmities of Queen Anne, whose presumptive heir was one of the most decided adversaries of peace, made the cabinet of Vienna believe that it was for its interest to gain time, and not to lay down its arms. Louis XIV., who had counted on peace, had not put himself in a position to act early upon the Rhine, the only point of contact that remained between the belligerent powers, since Italy was neutral, and Belgium in pledge in the hands of the Dutch. When the King saw the last limit fixed approaching without any appearance of a treaty, and the Emperor obtaining a subsidy from the Diet (from four to five million crowns), and a loan from Holland, and bringing the Italian garrisons to the Rhine, he repaired the lost time at great expense, and sent Villars at the head of the army of Alsace, subordinating to him a second army-corps, formed at the confluence of the Moselle and the Sarre, under Marshal de Besons. On his arrival at Strasburg, May 26, Villars found ready at hand but forty-five thousand men. He learned that Eugene had already sixty thousand, and would have a hundred thousand when his force was complete. Eugene was behind the lines of Etlingen, with detached corps stationed from Mayence to the Black Forest, and was preparing to mass his troops in order to cross the Rhine at Philippsburg; but he lacked the necessary resources to do so speedily: Villars anticipated him, and compensated for his momentary inferiority by concentrating his forces and operating with the same celerity as at Denain, but over a broader space. He feigned to threaten the lines of Etlingen, precipitated his army by forced marches in front of Philippsburg, masked the tête-du-pont of this fortress, and occupied Speyer (June 4–6). The army had made sixteen leagues in twenty hours.

Landau was thus cut off from the enemy's army. A large body of cavalry pushed forwards from Speyer to Worms, and detached parties to Coblentz. A corps arrived from the Moselle, took Kaiserslautern, and finally secured to the French the portion of the Palatinate between the Sarre and the Rhine. All the troops that had formed the different French armies rallied successively to Villars, who, at last, had at his disposal an overwhelming force, — two hundred battalions and more than three hundred squadrons. June 11, the army-corps of the Sarre invested Landau: the rest of the French forces, apportioned among several camps, guarded the Rhine from Mayence to Huningue. The garrison of Landau was numerous, from eight to nine thousand men; the excellent fortifi-

cations of Vauban had been again increased by the allies since 1704. Villars, regarding his position as unassailable, assured of his subsistence by the good discipline of his army, and the extent of country subjected to his contributions, showed more regard for his soldiers' lives than he had been accustomed to do, and suffered the siege to proceed methodically by sapping and mining. Eugene judged succor impossible, and did not even endeavor to cross the Rhine to attempt a diversion. The means of action came to him but slowly: English gold was no longer at hand to give life and motion to the heavy Germanic masses. Eugene had, nevertheless, at last, in the course of August, one hundred and twenty-five battalions and two hundred and forty-four squadrons; but, on the 20th of this month, the commander of Landau had surrendered himself prisoner with his garrison.

Villars did not content himself with this advantage. After putting Landau again in a position of defence, he set out from Speyer, September 11, for Fort Louis and Strasburg, left Marshal de Besons at Fort Louis with his army-corps to hold Eugene in check, crossed the Rhine at Kehl, September 18, and followed his vanguard, which, after feigning to wish to proceed towards the sources of the Danube, took the road to Freiburg. The 20th, the army was in sight of the capital of Brisgau. The enemy had been strongly fortifying, for some years past, Freiburg and its surroundings: he had intrenched the mountain of Holgraben, three leagues from Freiburg, and, quite near the city, the mountain of Roshkof, where terminated the lines which ran from Hornburg, and which barred all the space between the valleys of the Kinzig and the Treisam. The French marched straight to the camp of Roshkof; eighteen battalions garnished the crest of this height, and could be rapidly reinforced by other corps. As at Denain, Villars assailed redoubts and half-moons, without fascines, without tools, *with men*. He precipitated before him five hundred grenadiers, and followed at the head of one of the attacking columns; the declivity was so steep that his horse stumbled under him and nearly flung him down the precipice. He climbed it on his hands and knees, aided by the grenadiers, and surrounded by a choice body of young princes and courtiers. Everything was carried at three points at once, almost without loss to the conquerors. The main body of the enemy's infantry threw itself into Freiburg; the cavalry plunged into the gorges of the Black Forest; Villars pursued it with a strong detachment, found the lines of Holgraben abandoned, seized all the passes, pushed on to the sources of the

Danube, sent parties to lay the country beyond this river under contribution, then returned to find the main body of his army under Freiburg.

Despite the easy conquest of the lines of the Black Forest, the siege of Freiburg was still a hard undertaking. Freiburg was protected by thirteen thousand combatants, and by a quadruple row of fortresses disposed like an amphitheatre on the slope of the mountain which commands the city. This siege was much more sanguinary than that of Landau; the season, which was advancing, the lack of forage, the fear of the attempts of Eugene, who had advanced to Holgraben, permitted it no longer to be conducted step by step as at Landau. The outworks were carried with great loss. A single assault, in the night of October 14–15, cost more than fifteen hundred dead and wounded. These sacrifices at least attained their end: Eugene, perceiving the advancement of the siege and the way in which the mountain passes were guarded, despaired of succoring the place and returned to Etlingen. Villars so much the more energetically hastened his operations. The very number of the garrison was destined, in his opinion, to abridge the siege. The means of subsistence could not be in proportion to the needs of this multitude, still increased by all the nobility of the country and the wives and servants of the officers of the corps defeated on the Roshkof. Villars refused to permit the women to depart. October 30, as preparations were being made to storm the body of the place, the governor apprised Villars that he had retired into the forts, and that he abandoned the wounded, the sick, the families of the soldiers, and the city to the humanity of the French. The city saved itself from pillage by a ransom of a million francs, and the refugees were permitted to go into the surrounding country; but, as to the wounded and the families of the soldiers, Villars signified to the governor that it was for him and not for the French to feed them. The governor wished to refuse; but his soldiers mutinied to oblige him to give bread to their unhappy comrades who were left to die of hunger. He sent only half of what was necessary. Villars was inflexible. At length, after long negotiations, Eugene sent the governor permission to surrender the forts, on condition that the garrison should not remain prisoners (November 16). They marched out, November 20, still seven thousand men strong.

The capture of Freiburg ended this campaign, which, like the preceding one, had recalled the days of old, and gilded with a few rays of glory the close of the great reign. The setting *sun* dis-

pelled the clouds which had so long shrouded it, and beamed with a last splendor.[1]

Germany, punished, with justice, for its obstinacy in sustaining a cause which was wholly foreign to it, grew weary at last of sacrificing itself to Austrian pride. After the siege of Landau, the Elector Palatine and the Prince of Baden-Dourlach had made overtures to Villars: during the siege of Freiburg, the four circles which suffered most from the war had held a meeting, in spite of the Emperor, to provide for their common safety, and had entreated the court of Vienna no longer to oppose peace. The events expected by Charles VI. did not happen, and it became clearly manifest that the Emperor and the Empire, even with the sword of Eugene, were no longer in a condition to cope with France, however enfeebled she might be by her long calamities.

Austria bowed her head with ill grace. The Emperor, even before Freiburg had surrendered, sent full powers to Eugene. Villars had them from Louis XIV. and accepted Rastadt as the place of conference. The two great captains had an interview there, November 26. It must have been painful to Eugene to be forced to negotiate with the man who had been the rock on which his military fortunes had split, and who had deprived him of the title of invincible; the Prince suffered nothing of it to appear, and was philosopher enough or enough master of himself to treat Villars as an old friend. The negotiation however still presented some difficulties. The court of Vienna seemed to think that it was according a favor to France by consenting to peace. It was forced to change its tone. The Emperor was obliged to accept the treaty of Ryswick as a basis, and to consent to the entire reinstatement of the two Electors of Cologne and Bavaria;[2] he preferred surrendering the Upper Palatinate to the territory of Bavaria to ceding to it Sardinia, reserving the right of *promising*[3] this island to the Palatine as an indemnity. There was much dispute concerning Landau; Austria yielded at last; Landau was indeed generously paid for by the restitution of Freiburg, Kehl, and Breisach! As to Italy, Louis XIV. pledged himself never to disturb the House of Austria in the possession of the states which she then held there; this was all that could be asked of him, the Emperor wish-

[1] Villars, pp. 217–226. Quinci, t. VII. pp. 216–292.

[2] Louis XIV. had promised his unfortunate ally a more magnificent indemnity: by a secret treaty of February 20, 1714, France pledged itself, at the first vacancy, to labor to transfer the Empire to the House of Bavaria. See Lémontei, t. V. p. 234.

[3] To *promise*, we say; for, in fact, the Palatine had nothing.

ing no direct negotiation with Philip V. Louis thus subscribed implicitly to the conquest of Mantua by Austria. The territorial questions were wellnigh adjusted in a fortnight: the political questions caused much more delay; the Emperor claimed that the King should engage to secure the maintenance of the privileges of the Catalans, and refused, on his side, all concession to Prince Rakoczi, the protégé of Louis XIV.; he also absolutely refused a demand presented by Louis by the entreaty of Philip V., and which the English minister zealously supported in order to obtain favorable commercial conditions at Madrid; the point in question was a *sovereign* principality, with a revenue of thirty thousand crowns, to be created in Belgium in behalf of the Princess Orsini. The Maintenon of Spain was far from having the good sense and prudence of her compeer of France, and her strange fancy, blindly espoused by Philip V., contributed for some time to hold in suspense the peace of the world. The cabinet of Versailles abandoned Madame Orsini, and the Emperor abandoned the Catalans, whose quasi-republican franchises Philip V. was irrevocably determined not to permit to subsist. In consideration of the Queen of England, he had offered them, instead, the privileges of Castile, that is, the right to traffic and settle in the West Indies: commercial in exchange for political privileges.

Peace between France and Austria was signed March 7, 1714. The obstinacy of the Emperor in not treating at Utrecht had gained France Landau and Fort Louis, which was not demolished.[1] The definitive and general treaty was not terminated until September 7, at Baden in Aargau.[2]

The war, since the end of 1713, had ceased everywhere except in Catalonia. After the Emperor had in fact renounced Spain, indomitable Barcelona still persisted in prolonging a hopeless struggle; the cabinet of Vienna had encouraged it by vain hopes, and had furnished it the means, by failing to execute loyally the treaty of evacuation of March, 1713. By this treaty, the general of the Emperor, Stahremberg, was to commence the evacuation by surrendering Barcelona or Tarragona, as he might choose, to the troops of the *other power* (Spain), and holding the other of these cities until the embarkation of the last of the Imperial troops. Stahremberg first evacuated Tarragona (the middle of July, 1713), but without

[1] The other forts which France had rebuilt on the islands of the Rhine, and the têtes-de-pont which they had thrown across the right bank, were destroyed, in conformity with the treaty of Ryswick.

[2] Villars, pp. 226–284. Quinci, pp. 292–325. Lamberti, t. VIII.

apprising the Spaniards, so that the city would have fallen into the power of the insurgent Miquelets, had not the inhabitants spontaneously summoned the troops of Philip V. As to Barcelona, the Austrian general, before embarking on the English squadron, suffered the insurgents to occupy at their leisure the city and Mont Juich: the Cardinal de Sala, bishop of Barcelona, the devoted agent of Austria, had convoked the *Trois-Bras* (States) of Catalonia at the episcopal palace, and had assured them that the Emperor, as soon as they should repulse the French from the frontiers of the Empire, would aid Catalonia to erect itself into a republic under his patronage; the provincial assembly, called *Deputation of Catalonia*, had the hardihood to declare war against Spain and France. The majority of the nobility and a portion of the clergy vainly opposed it: the monks, always inclined to extreme courses, led on the people. The court of Madrid, besides, had its own violence to blame as much as the bad faith of the Austrians; nothing was talked of, around Philip V., but pillage and hanging for the rebels who did not hasten to profit by the amnesty: a generous and proud people are not disarmed in this way. Barcelona having rejected the summons of the viceroy sent by Philip V., all the Spanish forces, rendered free by the truce concluded with Portugal,[1] began to blockade this great city (end of July, 1713). These forces scarcely exceeded thirty thousand men. The insurgents had about thirteen thousand combatants in the city, of whom four thousand were foreign soldiers, who had deserted with the consent of Stahremberg, together with a flying camp on the heights, and bands of Miquelets that scoured the country far and near. Majorca and Ivica had followed the example of Barcelona: these islands transmitted to the Barcelonese assistance which the Spanish navy was not in a condition to intercept; successful sorties furnished the city with new resources, and the powerlessness of Spain to subdue the Barcelonian rebellion became evident.

Philip V. raised his hands again to his grandfather. Louis XIV. could do nothing for him until after peace with the Emperor: once rid of the war on the Rhine, Louis prepared to interfere vigorously by land and sea. While forces were being equipped at Toulon and in Languedoc, the war increased in Catalonia: a tax exacted by Philip V. roused the province which had been for a moment almost entirely subjugated; every one took up arms again, from the Segre to the sea, and from the Ebro to the Ter: the Spanish detachments, dispersed through the country, were exterminated or

[1] Peace was signed between Portugal and Spain, February 14, 1715.

forced back into the fortified towns, and the war assumed a character of extreme cruelty between the Catalans and the Castilians. The Barcelonese, however, warned of the preparations of Louis XIV., and knowing how the Emperor had abandoned their interests at Rastadt, attempted to compound; they offered to recognize Philip V., and to pay three million francs towards the costs of the war. Philip wished them to surrender at discretion. They sent all the useless mouths they could to Majorca and Italy, and prepared to fight to the death. A ridiculous piece of obstinacy of Philip V. procured them three months' respite. The Queen of Spain had died, at twenty-five, February 14, 1714; her death made no change in the conduct of the Spanish cabinet, except that the Princess Orsini governed the King directly, instead of indirectly. Madame Orsini clung with insane obstinacy to the idea of carving out for herself a principality in the Catholic Netherlands; the signature of peace between Spain and Holland was suspended for several months,[1] because the cabinet of Madrid required Holland absolutely to guarantee this principality. When Louis XIV. renounced the exaction of this concession from the Emperor, Philip, or rather his female minister, protracted the treaty with Holland so much the more, in the hope that the Dutch, injured in their commercial interests, would force the Emperor to yield. Louis XIV., justly indignant at such a diplomatic scandal, signified to the King of Spain that he would give him neither troops nor vessels until war was terminated with Holland. Madame Orsini pretended at first to cope with the Great King and to take Barcelona without him: it was not until the absolute impossibility of success had been demonstrated to her that she would permit Philip to defer to the remonstrances of his grandfather.[2] The treaty with Holland was

[1] The negotiations of Spain with England had been terminated, December 9, 1713, by a treaty of commerce, which placed relations again on the same footing as in the times of Charles II.; the Spanish Indies were interdicted to foreign ships, save the important exception of the negro slave-trade in favor of the English. Spain engaged never to cede any post in the Indies either to France or to others. The English, in the European states of Spain, were admitted to the same advantages as the French or the most favored nations; an entrance-duty of ten per cent. was substituted for the different duties imposed on foreign merchandise, except in the Basque provinces, and except the ancient duties called *alcavala*, *cientos* and *milones*. See Lamberti, t. VIII.

[2] *Mém.* de Berwick, t. II. p. 165. Madame Orsini was not long in paying the penalty of her presumption. Too old to marry Philip V., as she would not have failed to do if the thing had been possible, she remarried this Prince, without consulting Louis XIV., to a princess of Parma, counting on governing with this new queen as she had done with the first. But the Parmesan was a demon of pride and dissimulation: she set out from Italy with the determination to remove at all costs

at last signed, and Louis XIV. dispatched against Barcelona an army commanded by Berwick, and a squadron under the orders of Ducasse.

Berwick arrived before Barcelona, July 7, 1714. The Spanish army, reduced to twelve thousand men (there were still Frenchmen among the number), had been unable, for some time, to do more than to observe the city and throw shells into it. The Barcelonese had sixteen thousand men under arms. After the junction, Berwick had at his disposal from thirty-five to forty thousand fighting men, without counting the corps scattered through the province. The attack was not made on Mont Juich, the trenches were opened, July 12, on the opposite side, in the direction of the river Besos. After effecting a breach, the first two assaults were repulsed with great carnage (August 12–14). The Barcelonese had hoisted a black flag with a death's-head. The priests and monks came to the breaches to cross bayonets with the French grenadiers. The friends of the Barcelonese without were less successful: twelve thousand Miquelets and *sommetans* (mountaineers), who were advancing to succor the city, were defeated and dispersed by a detached corps of the besieging army (August 22–24). September 3, Berwick summoned the besieged to surrender, offering them life and property as the sole conditions. The *Trois-Bras* refused. Provisions were lacking in the place: the besieged wished the women and children to leave. Berwick gave orders to fire upon them! Seven breaches were open in the ramparts: the weather was becoming unfavorable; Berwick resolved to end the matter. The general assault was made, September 11. The three tottering and open bastions comprised in the attack were speedily carried; but a furious and desperate resistance was found beyond: each street, each convent was a citadel; the troops could only penetrate into the city and stretch along the ramparts, at the price of rivers of blood. The bastion of St. Peter was taken and retaken eleven times! It was not until after eleven hours' fighting that the

the haughty woman to whom she owed the crown. The cabinet of Versailles had no difficulty in acting in concert with her on the subject; Philip V., who began to feel the yoke heavy, but who would have never dared break it with his own hand, probably received his lesson by correspondence. When the Princess Orsini went as *camerera mayor*, to meet the young Queen, the latter, who had full powers from the King, sought a quarrel with her on some frivolous pretext, ordered her to be forced into a carriage, without giving her time to take provisions, or to change her dress, and to be conducted to the frontier by an officer of the guards (end of December, 1714). The female prime minister, so suddenly cast down, retired to Italy, where she died in 1722. She had been hostile to the Inquisition, for which credit is to be given her.

Barcelonese, finally forced back from the old town into the new, asked to capitulate. Both parties, almost equally exhausted, suspended the struggle, and the next morning the submission took place in consideration of life and baggage, and the payment of a ransom in redemption of the right of pillage. This great siege had cost the besiegers ten thousand dead or wounded, the besieged six thousand, of whom five hundred and forty-three were monks or priests.

The ancient Catalan liberties, liberties somewhat privileged and aristocratic, like almost all those of the Middle Ages, were buried beneath the ruins of the ramparts of Barcelona. The people were disarmed and the laws of Castile were established in Catalonia. Berwick, at least, prevented Philip V. from imitating the Austrian customs and sullying a victory due to the arms of France, and not of Castile: there were imprisonments, exiles, but no scaffolds.

The Balearic Isles held out still some months after the reduction of Catalonia. The bad weather retarded a Franco-Spanish expedition fitted out at Barcelona, and which did not set sail until the beginning of the summer of 1715. Majorca, to which the Emperor had transmitted assistance from Sardinia and Naples, had considerable means of defence: it made no use of them, and its two principal towns, Alcadia and Palma, surrendered almost without striking a blow (June 20–July 2, 1715). The submission of the Balearic Isles terminated the war of the Spanish succession, the vastest witnessed by Europe since the crusades.[1]

The war of the succession had considerably modified the respective position of the European States. France, which, attaining the maximum of her power at the time of the treaty of 1684, had made a first retrograde step by the treaty of Ryswick, had just made a second, and lost another shred of her northern frontier and the first conquests of Louis XIV. She was besides much more weakened by the internal malady which was preying upon her than by her territorial losses. The future would show whether the transplantation of a branch of the Bourbons to Spain would be worth to France what it had cost her. As to Spain, it could be already foreseen that she would gain by it. The dismemberment of her prodigious monarchy, so much dreaded for its pride, had reinstated her into possible conditions of existence. She had regained her self-consciousness in struggling against foreign invasion. Penetrated, although slightly, with an infusion of French spirit,

[1] Berwick, t. II. pp. 161-195. Quinci, t. VII. pp. 825–891.

she was about to shake off the lethargic tradition of Austria, and to rise, slowly it is true, from the depths of the abyss into which she had sunk. The population, which had not ceased to decrease since Charles V., was about to resume an ascending movement, which, there, as in the rest of Europe, was not again to be interrupted until our days.

In the dismemberment of the monarchy, Spain had preserved precisely what the directors of the coalition, the governments of England and Holland, had most wished to take from her — the West Indies. The necessities of war, by obliging the two maritime powers to concentrate their efforts in Europe, had preserved Spanish America. England encroached, at least by commerce, upon the vast countries which she had been unable to encroach upon by arms: the slave-trade was to serve her as the pretext for an immense contraband trade without rivalry, and without peril. She found besides, for the conquests which she had failed to make, compensations in French America, and, what was much more important, in the Mediterranean: two positions of the first importance gave her the western basin of that sea in which nature has assigned her no place: Gibraltar annulled Carthagena; Port Mahon held Toulon in check. Holland, on her side, had obtained continental positions, the line of defence, so long coveted; but these acquisitions, increasing neither her population nor her maritime resources, and giving only the right of military occupation, gave her only a factitious strength; she had gained nothing on the sea, nothing for her commerce; the policy of Heinsius, a policy of vengeance and not of foresight, had paved the way for her speedy decline in favor of England.

Imperial Austria seemed indemnified for the loss of her sister, Spanish Austria, by the acquisition of those Spanish domains to which she clung with the passion of the vulture for its prey, and by the dominion which she had recovered over Germany, thanks to the German rancor against France. But this dominion, strengthened by war, was about to become relaxed by peace, and there was rising in the face of Austria a young power, wholly German, under a Slavic name,[1] — Prussia, — which a strong military organization was to render very formidable in a not far distant time. The dominion over Italy was no longer of absolute firmness. The future would show that the real success of Austria was less in having acquired Naples or Milan than in having recovered Hungary.

When the West, ceasing to be absorbed by its own quarrels, was able to direct its glance outside itself, on the other half of Europe,

[1] More exactly, Lithuanian.

it saw that a revolution had been wrought there not less important than its own, and of a nature to react powerfully on its own destinies. Of the two wars, in some sort parallel, which had convulsed the continent, when that of the west and the south was finished, that of the north and the east was not yet terminated; but its fate had been determined since 1709, in favor of a new actor who appeared with éclat on the European stage. The accession of Russia to European society had been long since foreseen by politicians; Henri IV. and Sulli had predicted it. The day had come. Russia, shut up in her vast plains, on the north by Sweden, on the south by Turkey, had opened to herself access to the Black Sea at the expense of Turkey, then had thrown herself on Sweden to conquer the outlet of the Baltic. The greatest writer of the eighteenth century has recounted the struggle of the two extraordinary men in whom were personified the two rival nations.[1] The political superiority belonged to Russia over Sweden. Charles XII. had the qualities of a hero rather than those of a statesman. Peter the Great, after studying with his own eyes, in his travels, the mechanism and instruments of civilization, threw down in his dominions the two castes which were the obstacles to absolute unity of power, the clergy and the soldiery,[2] made himself an army and a priesthood absolutely his own, and organized with genius the resources of a great barbarous people, which knew not how to use its vast and confused forces. Charles XII., on his side, exhausted the mediocre forces of a small heroic people, without knowing how to give them, as Gustavus Adolphus had done, the best possible direction. He had the perception of an excellent idea, the reorganization of Poland, but one which he could only accomplish by allying his policy to that of the West, by siding with France and Hungary, by imposing peace on Germany, by humbling Austria, and by contenting himself with repulsing and restraining the Russians, still incapable of acting successfully outside their own dominions. He did precisely the contrary: he isolated himself from the West; he refused to act in concert with Louis XIV. and with Rakoczi, while Peter the Great, eager to meddle by all means with Europe, made offers to France and Hungary, at the same time that he negotiated with the Great Alliance. The issue is known: Charles XII., drawn on by the defection of the hetman of the Cossacks, a success which became fatal to him, penetrated into Red Russia, and lost his army there (July, 1709).

At the news of Pultowa, the Saxons and Danes again took up

[1] Voltaire, *History of Charles XII.* and *History of Peter the Great.*

[2] The Strelitz, an anarchical soldiery, analogous to the Turkish janizaries.

arms: Augustus of Saxony returned to Poland, aided by the Russians, and expelled the national King, the friend of Charles XII., Stanislaus Leczynski; the provinces of the Eastern Baltic fell successively into the power of the Russians; the German provinces of Sweden were invaded in turn; the Prussians, then the Hanoverians, joined the Danes and Saxons. Sweden, deprived of her leader and her army, defended herself intrepidly, but her very successes exhausted her almost as much as her reverses, against enemies constantly springing up anew. Charles XII., taking refuge in Roumania, at Bender, strove to arm the Ottoman Empire, which had let slip, without acting, the great opportunities of the wars of Hungary and Poland. Turkey rose tardily, at the end of 1710. Czar Peter imitated the mistake of Charles XII.: he assumed the offensive; he rashly penetrated into Moldavia, and suffered himself to be surrounded on the Pruth by the Ottomans. He was on the point of destruction; Falczim was on the point of avenging Pultowa and of long checking the fortune of Russia. The incapacity of the Grand Vizier saved the Czar: the Ottoman minister sold peace to the enemy whom he might have annihilated (July 12, 1711); Peter was released by surrendering Azof, and by a vain promise to the Turks to cease to meddle in the affairs of Poland and the Cossacks, and to suspend the execution of his projects on the Black Sea.[1] What might have been ruin was therefore but a partial check to Russia, which scarcely retarded the march of her destinies, and Peter indemnified himself at the expense of Sweden, while the Turks, turning from their true enemies, fell on the Venetians.

The most evident result of the two wars of the West and the North was therefore, in short, the aggrandizement of England and Russia, and the entrance of the latter state into European politics. In the North, Russian influence was about to replace Swedish influence, which had ruled since the Thirty Years' War. Had not Sweden experienced the disaster of Pultowa, she would still have lost finally a preponderance which her real strength no longer permitted her to sustain, now that great states were making war with all their resources at once, with masses of men and masses of gold.

The government of Louis XIV. did not witness with indifference this revolution in the North; although he had had little cause to praise Charles XII., Louis XIV. sent pecuniary assistance to the Swedish generals who were defending the wrecks of Pomerania; and, when Charles XII., despairing of obtaining anything from the Ottomans, had finally regained his invaded territory, France attempted, but in vain, to interpose her mediation (end of 1714).

[1] See the treaty in Dumont, t. VIII. p. 275.

April 8, 1715, Louis XIV. promised, by a formal treaty, one million eight hundred thousand francs' annual subsidy to Charles XII. for three years, and his good offices to obtain for him the surrender of the Swedish possessions in Germany.[1]

It was good policy to labor to arrest Sweden on her descent to destruction. The policy of Louis XIV. was less circumspect in his relations with England after the Treaty of Utrecht. While Louis XIV. pledged himself officially not to trouble in any manner the transmission of the British crown in the Protestant line, and withdrew from the so-called James III. the asylum which he had given for twenty-four years to him and his followers, the head himself of the English cabinet, Harley, Earl of Oxford, who demanded of him these pledges in the name of Queen Anne, induced him secretly to favor a plot designed for the restoration of the exiled prince, and the exclusion of the Protestant line. Fidelity to monarchical right prevailed over fidelity to treaties in the mind of the Great King, and, besides, he could not have many scruples in violating his treaty at the instigation of the very government with which he had treated. Queen Anne was, at least in intention, the accomplice of her minister, and asked nothing better than to secure her succession to her younger brother, in consideration of guaranties for the church and the established laws. Oxford gave the Pretender, who had taken refuge in Lorraine, and the court of France, to understand that it was necessary to postpone the revocation of the law of succession until after peace. Meanwhile, the Jacobites, according to instructions from the Pretender, actively seconded the Tories, and aided them to checkmate the Whigs and to make peace as they wished. Peace attained, Oxford postponed from month to month, under divers pretexts, the accomplishment of his promises; the health of the Queen was failing frightfully, yet Oxford did nothing to secure the succession to the Jacobites, whom he had evidently misled. Was it in behalf of the Tories? Yes, at first, but not in the end; for he did nothing more to strengthen the Tories and to enable them to impose conditions on the Protestant heir. Oxford had thought only of himself, and, since the decline of the Queen, he had become reconciled in secret to the Whigs, *the Hanoverians*. Tories and Jacobites, Bolingbroke, Ormond, etc., united at last to overthrow him, and obtained his removal from the Queen (August 7, 1714): it was too late; a few days after, an attack of apoplexy terminated this reign, which had offered so striking a contrast between the glorious activity of the nation and the complete insignificance of the royal person (August 12). This contrast was des-

[1] Flassan, t. IV. p. 349.

tined to become almost normal in the Parliamentary government of Great Britain. The Jacobites remained motionless. The Tories hastened to meet the Elector of Hanover, to win pardon for the past by their eagerness to salute *King George I.* The transmission of the crown of the Stuarts to the House of Brunswick was effected without the slightest opposition.

The new King of England entered at once into a dispute with France for an important object, but foreign to the interests of the Pretender. Louis XIV. had accomplished the most grievous of the conditions of peace: he had filled up the harbor of Dunkirk, opened the dikes and the piers, and undermined the sluices; but, while destroying the magnificent works which had been the glory of his best years, he could not resign himself to abandon all maritime position on this coast, and had opened, at the west of Dunkirk, bearing towards Mardyck, a new canal, a league in length, capable of sheltering vessels of eighty guns. George I., scarcely arrived in England, addressed warm representations to the cabinet of Versailles, maintaining that this was in violation of the treaty of Utrecht. The French cabinet claimed that the canal of Mardyck was only designed to prevent the submersion of the country, and to carry off the waters of the four canals which had formerly flowed into the sluices of Dunkirk (October–November, 1714). Early in the ensuing year, a new English ambassador, the Earl of Stair, renewed the entreaties of his predecessor, Prior, with an arrogant harshness which acutely wounded the King.[1] Louis was unwilling to appear to yield to remonstrances which resembled threats, and the minister Torci even broke off diplomatic relations with Stair; notwithstanding, the works of Mardyck were suspended, or at least slackened.

The court of France hoped soon to indemnify itself. The factions had been speedily reawakened in England by the exclusive policy of the new King. The advances of the Tories had been rejected, the Parliament dissolved, Oxford set aside contemptuously, Marlborough reinstated into his offices. The Whigs, restored to the full possession of England, inveighed fiercely against the last minister, who, they said, had betrayed the allies of Great Britain

[1] According to President Hénault (*Abrégé chronol. de l'Hist. de France*), Louis XIV. said to Lord Stair — "Mr. Ambassador, I have always been master in my own house, sometimes in others; do not make me remember it." Voltaire affirms, from the testimony of M. de Torci, that this conversation never took place. Historical sayings are rarely authentic. On the affair of Mardyck, See Flassan, *Hist. de la diplomatie française*, t. IV. p. 351. Lamberti, t. VIII. p. 678, t. IX. p. 143. Saint-Simon, t. XII. p. 128.

and sacrificed the national interests by a disgraceful peace. Criminal prosecutions were commenced against the ministers of Queen Anne, and Bolingbroke arrived a fugitive in the same France where he had lately appeared as the all-powerful arbiter of peace. The persecuted Tories associated themselves with the Jacobites: Bolingbroke and his friends entered into a vast conspiracy, which rapidly extended throughout England and Scotland, and which Marshal Berwick, the brother of the Pretender, supported energetically at Versailles. This reaction became a matter serious enough for the disloyal Marlborough, while covered with favors from George I., to think it incumbent on him to make secret protestations to James III., in order to be prepared for the chances of any event.[1] Louis XIV. refused the conspirators the troops which they asked of him, but promised them indirect aid.[2] The Duke of Ormond, ex-commander-in-chief of the English troops, removed by George I., was to put himself at the head of the movement: threatened with arrest, instead of giving the signal for insurrection, he embarked and gained the coast of France. Despite this disappointment, the preparations were continued: Louis XIV. secretly provided the Pretender with a ship, officers and arms for ten thousand men, and induced Philip V. to lend him one million two hundred thousand francs, which he was not in a position to advance from his own treasury. The plan of the Jacobites was to draw Louis XIV. beyond his intentions, and to plunge France again into war despite herself; such was the state of affairs in August, 1715, and there was every appearance that the Jacobites would succeed in drawing the aged King into this error, still more fatal than that which he had made formerly in recognizing James III., at the death of James II.[3]

The idea of a new war was indeed terrible to whomsoever considered the state of France. France was like a worn-out courser which, by dint of courage, reaches the goal, and, once there, falls without power to rise again. Statistics tell the whole story, in an economic point of view: in 1712, the expenditure had attained two

[1] See Lémontei, *Hist. de la Régence*, t. I. p. 87. We can judge by this of the morality of the great military leader. In April, 1718, he wrote to the Elector of Hanover, "I entreat you to be persuaded that I shall be always ready to expose my life and fortune in your service." In October of the same year, he declared to a Jacobite agent that he had rather cut off his hand than do anything prejudicial to the interests of King James. — *Stuart's Papers.*

[2] Villars, on signing peace with the Empire at Baden, had already sounded Prince Eugene on the disposition of the Emperor, in case France should aid in the reëstablishment of the *legitimate* prince in England (September, 1714). Villars, p. 288.

[3] *Mém. de Berwick*, t. II. pp. 195–231. *Mém. secrets de Bolingbroke.* Voltaire, *Siècle de Louis XIV.*, ch. XXIV.

hundred and forty million francs; the taxes amounting to less than one hundred and thirteen millions, from which seventy-six millions must be deducted for expenses and necessary losses,[1] less than thirty-seven million francs remained in the treasury: there had therefore been anticipated, to 1717, on the capitation-taxes, nearly twenty-three millions; on tithes, twenty-six millions; on various other taxes, thirty-five millions five hundred thousand, and ninety-three millions obtained on extraordinary transactions, yet nearly thirty-eight million francs' expenditure remained, which there were no means of meeting. Desmaretz, nevertheless, still provided for the campaign of 1713 by expedients of the same kind, anticipations, alienations of demesnial rights, *rentes* created on the villain taxes at eight and one third per cent., with reimbursement by annuities, forced loans from officers of finances, *maires* of towns, etc., under the form of taxation reimbursable from the villain taxes, advances wrung from the receivers-general by promises which were not kept,[2] etc.; when he saw a general peace approaching, he began to make some efforts to rise from this gulf, or rather, to tell the truth, to make existence possible therein. He ceased to alienate the crown lands: he restored the entry duties and tolls, doubled for the last few years, to the former footing, and diminished the salt-tax. He found himself in the presence of an enormous accumulation of *rentes* arising in part from the consolidation of notes of all kinds; all the *rentes* anterior to 1709 had been already placed again at five per cent.; they were no better paid; in October, 1713, two whole years were already due; an edict of this month converted into new contracts at four per cent. all the *rentes* acquired on the Hôtel de Ville since 1702, and added to the capital the two years' arrears. The edict enacted that *rentes* on aids, salt taxes, five large farms, and a few others, sold since 1702, and thus fallen into the hands of speculators and stock-jobbers, should be admitted to this conversion only on the footing of three fourths of the capital, and even three fifths, for the most recent; that the same *rentes*, retained by their holders since 1702, should be admitted at par. The contingent annuities, created from 1702 to 1710, were reduced one fourth; those subsequent to

[1] That is, the remission of taxes in case of absolute inability to pay them, and even direct aid from the King to the most suffering provinces.

[2] This was ill-requiting the service they rendered in taking upon themselves extraordinary transactions with no other commission than the interest of their advances. It is true that this disinterestedness was only apparent; all accountability being annihilated, the receivers-general indemnified themselves by the use of the money of the State, which they collected as soon, and paid out as late, as possible. See Bailli, *Hist. financière de la France*, t. II. p. 34.

1710, one half, as well as the tontine *rentes*. However, *rentes* were exempted from tithes and all charges. The four per cent. *rentes* created by this operation amounted to thirty millions, and the public expenses were thus reduced fourteen millions annually.

This compulsory reduction was, in reality, a partial bankruptcy, into which a relative equity was introduced: the unrestrained and fraudulent gambling which had been practised in the public funds, the trade in which was as yet neither regulated nor authenticated, legitimized the differences established between the different categories of creditors: what was excusable in no respect was the operation on the currency which accompanied the reduction of the *rentes*. The advance of the currency had been most injurious; but the evil was done: it should have been let alone, the nominal and the cash value being indifferent in itself. Desmaretz set about *depreciating* the currency, under the pretext of bringing it back to a so-called *just value*, as if there were, between the real value, the weight, the stamp, and the names by which it is agreed to call the coin, a relation that is not purely arbitrary. He reduced therefore, in two years, the silver mark from forty-two livres, ten sous, to thirty livres, ten sous, ten deniers.[1] This was a new destruction in an inverse direction, a new overthrow of all transactions, the veritable ruin of farmers, merchants, all debtors. We cannot conceive such ignorance in a man so able in the details of financial administration. His uncle, the great Colbert, had not set him such examples; in a ministry of twenty-two years, Colbert had scarcely modified the nominal value of the currency.

The expenditure of 1713 had been two hundred and twelve million francs; that of 1714 was two hundred and thirteen millions five hundred thousand, upon which, at the end of the year, there remained one hundred and sixteen millions, which there was no fixed means of meeting, the *rentes* and pensions, which were beginning to be again paid, compensating for the reduction made in expenses since the war. It was in the royal magnificence and the pensions which chained the upper nobility to court that the largest economy might have been realized; but this luxury and this liberality were at once habit and system; to touch them would have been sacrilege against monarchy, and in the most extreme distress, it had been necessary to secure the service of the court, almost before that of the army itself.[2] During the last seven years, the

[1] Law estimates that this depreciation of currency cost the treasury one hundred millions. See *Mém. sur les banques*, ap. *Économistes financiers*, p. 599.

[2] Once only, as we have seen, had the princes and courtiers returned to the King a

average expenditure had been two hundred and nineteen million francs per year: the ordinary revenues, with the tithe and the capitation-tax, having produced but seventy-five millions per year, expenses deducted, it had been necessary to obtain annually one hundred and forty-four million francs by extraordinary means, which made more than a thousand millions for seven years, of which, at the end of 1714, there remained more than three hundred and sixteen million francs on which the government knew not what security to give. After the immense conversions and consolidations which had taken place, there was still found, September 1, 1715, an accumulation of notes in circulation which Desmaretz estimated at nearly four hundred and ninety-two million francs, but which, including paper of all kinds, amounted to five hundred and ninety million francs!

Desmaretz continued to proceed, by partial bankruptcies, to the reduction of the burdens which weighed both on the treasury and the country. He suppressed a great number of new offices, reimbursing, by the creation of one million five hundred thousand livres' *rentes* at four per cent., the holders who had treated, in general, at the rate of eight per cent.[1] He suppressed all the ennoblements purchased since 1689, and the exemptions from taxes sold to subaltern officers. He created two millions' worth of *rentes* at five per cent. to redeem the capitation-tax and tithe, which continued to be collected, despite the royal promise to suppress them on the occurrence of peace. This last operation was good and lawful, but it was stifled as it were by the rumor of a financial catastrophe which Desmaretz could not avoid. In April, 1715, the fund of the receivers-general, which had been the great resource of late years, became insolvent, the government being at last unable to meet its notes. It was the breaking of the last anchor! Foreseeing this, Desmaretz had striven to revive the old loan fund, by beginning the reimbursal in series of the notes or *promises* of this fund, fallen into discredit (December 13, 1714); he was unable to keep his word,

portion of what they received from him, by liquidating some new levies. See the curious statement of expenditure for 1715 in Forbonnais, t. II. p. 352. We see in this that the House of Orleans cost the treasury nearly two million francs per year; *James III.* and his mother, six hundred thousand francs, the other ordinary pensions and gratuities, four million five hundred thousand francs; the extraordinary gratuities and other expenses not specified, fifteen million francs.

[1] An important declaration of September, 1714, restored to cities the free election of their municipal officers, provided the communities of the cities should indemnify the incumbents of the mayorships, lieutenant mayorships, aldermanships, etc. *Anciennes Lois françaises*, t. XX. p. 687. This proves that the suppression of the wrecks of municipal liberties, become so easy, had arisen from the raising of extraordinary taxes much more than policy.

and suppressed the loan fund, August 2, 1715, by an edict announcing that the *promises* would be consolidated into four per cent. *rentes*, if they had not been negotiated. *Promises* negotiated were to lose fifty per cent.; meanwhile, the stock-jobbers negotiated them at eighty per cent. below the nominal value. It was revolving from bankruptcy to bankruptcy!

In the summer of 1715, it seemed as if the situation could not grow worse, — no more public or private credit;[1] no more clear revenue for the State; the portion of revenues not pledged anticipated on the following years.[2] Neither labor nor consumption could be resumed, for want of circulation; the capital was shut up in the coffers of the farmers of the revenue, or dissipated at Paris in barren luxury; usury reigned on the ruins of society. The alternations of high prices and the depreciation of commodities finally crushed the people. Provision riots broke out among the people and even in the army. Manufactures were languishing or suspended; forced mendicity was preying upon the cities. The fields were deserted, the lands fallow for lack of implements, for lack of manures, for lack of cattle, which had perished in 1709; the houses were falling to ruin.[3] Monarchical France seemed ready to expire with its aged King. Louis XIV. had been unwilling to employ the violent and systematic remedy which would have healed this great, diseased body, but which would have transformed it and impelled it towards innovation. The malady seemed about to prove fatal. Empirics could do nothing for it.

Desmaretz, even before the fall of the two funds which had ren-

[1] To procure 8,000,000, the minister was one day obliged to give the farmers of the revenue 32,000,000 francs' worth of notes; the notes lost therefore seventy-five per cent.

[2] Official Report of Desmaretz. Colbert had left, in 1683, 85,000,000 francs of effective revenue.

[3] The government vainly strove to revive agriculture and industry. In 1704, the prohibition enacted under Colbert, to seize, except for rent, the looms, tools, etc., used for woollens and cloths, had been extended to all other branches of industry. In case of bankruptcy, the artisan was to be left his tools, under condition of ultimate payment of their value. In 1708, there was a renewal of the prohibition to seize cattle; from 1709 to 1718, privileges to whoever should make abandoned lands again valuable; August 27, 1709, prohibition of East India cotton cloths; June 11, 1714, prohibition of China silks; January, 1712, establishment of a manufactory of Persian carpets at Paris; January, 1718, prohibition to manufacture brandy from grain (to favor the wine-growing provinces). *Anciennes Lois françaises*, t. XX. pp. 458, 530, 541, 542, 572, 583, 639, 645, 648. Those of these measures which would have been most effectual in ordinary times passed by almost unperceived.

In August, 1715, a sedition broke out among the garrisons of Flanders and Alsace, because they were obliged to take bread of the commissariat at a higher price than in market. The movement was only quieted with money. Lémontei, *additions aux Mém. de Dangeau*, p. 272.

dered existence possible to him, had perceived that the state of affairs was infinitely worse than at the accession of Colbert, and that it was impossible again to find the same remedies: Vauban had told him this while there still was time. At the end of 1714, Desmaretz had therefore presented to the King a plan for the public salvation. He proposed to suppress, as had been promised, tithes and capitation-taxes; to charge the clergy, the states, the generalities, the provinces, and the cities, with the payment, in a fixed number of years, of the capital of sixty millions' revenue alienated since 1683; to suppress and reimburse all offices created since 1683, by means of an increase of two sous per livre on the villain-tax and the farms, and to revise and liquidate all debts still floating, as had been done for those consolidated into four per cent. *rentes*.[2]

This was too much or not enough: it was exacting great enough sacrifices and injuring the interests of privileged persons sufficiently to excite the warmest resistance, and it was not enough radically and definitively to change the system of taxation. It was also an illegal, although to all appearance a daring reform. The King hesitated, and nothing was yet decided in August, 1715.

As if the material ruin of the country were not enough, the religious persecutions and quarrels were renewed, to add new moral sufferings to this misery. The King's confessor, Father La Chaise, who, save a few eclipses of favor caused by his differences with Madame de Maintenon, had been a kind of minister of ecclesiastical affairs, had died in 1709. His successor, Le Tellier, caused him to be much regretted. He was a fanatic after a politician, a spirit of violence and scandal after a spirit of temporizing, moderation, and worldly prudence. The fanaticism of Le Tellier was of the worst kind — of that which takes its rise not in exalted but in malignant passions, and which joins hypocritical means to thorough conviction, if blind and savage obstinacy can be called conviction. By a strange contrast, this persecutor had begun his career by being, if not persecuted, at least ill-treated by Bossuet and the Cardinal de Noailles, for having defended tolerance and philosophy in the affair of the *Chinese ceremonies;* he made amends, at the expense of the Protestants and Jansenists, for his charity towards the Chinese; in both cases he had but one end — the interest of his Company, the object of his insane devotion.

While the war lasted, the Protestants had been left to breathe: the terrible lesson of Cévennes spoke too loudly; the public wretchedness itself was of advantage to the Reformers; funds being lack-

[1] See the project of Desmaretz in Forbonnais, t. II. p. 274.

ing to support the public schools, they were no longer obliged to send their children thither. The King had pardoned, at different times, till May, 1713, the meetings held in spite of the ordinances, and, at the time of the signature of the peace of Utrecht, he had accorded to the entreaties of Queen Anne the freedom of the unfortunates still held in the galleys on account of religion. There were only one hundred and thirty-six; the rest were dead or had been freed before the rebellion of Cévennes. After peace, everything changed. The government quibbled so adroitly concerning the liberty promised to the galley-slaves that a number were still at the oars in September, 1715.[1] In March, 1712, a royal ordinance had enjoined physicians, under grave penalties, to warn their patients to confess in case of danger; on the third day's sickness, the physician was to refuse his assistance if a certificate of confession were not presented to him. The same year, the King was warmly urged to declare illegitimate all children of parents not married by the Church. The aged D'Aguesseau, still listened to with attention in the Council of State, succeeded in dissuading Louis XIV. from this; but Le Tellier was not rebuffed; Chancellor de Pontchartrain, who had a certain loftiness of sentiment, and who was attached in opinion to the severe congregation of the Oratory, would never have lent himself to the schemes that were being concocted; but he resigned his office, meanwhile, to devote himself wholly to his salvation, and the minister of war, Voisin, was substituted for him, — a man ready for anything, and who found himself impelled at once by the Jesuits and by Madame de Maintenon. Proceedings became harsher and harsher towards the Reformers. March 8, 1715, an ordinance appeared which far exceeded the most terrible excesses of the persecution of 1685! The King thereby revived his edict of April 29, 1686, concerning *new converts* who, at the point of death, should refuse the sacraments and declare their persistence in the so-called Reformed religion, — a revolting edict which, for long years, had been suffered to fall in disuse. "We learn," he said, "that the abjurations having been often made in provinces remote from those in which our said subjects die, or in such great numbers at once, that it would have been impossible to keep an exact register of them, our judges, to whom those who relapse into heresy at death are denounced, find it difficult to condemn them, for want of proof of their abjuration. . . . . The sojourn of those who have been of the so-called reformed religion, or who are born of reformed parents, in

[1] Dangeau, t. III. p. 268. Limiers, *Hist. de Louis XIV.*, p. 328.

our kingdom, since we have abolished all exercise of the said religion, is more than sufficient proof that they have embraced the Catholic religion, without which they would have neither been suffered nor tolerated." The direct conclusion was, that, *since there were no more Protestants in France*, every Reformer who died without the sacraments was reputed a backslider, and was to be drawn on a hurdle and buried on the highway. The indirect consequence, which the edict did not enunciate, but which was its principal end, was that, since *there were no more Protestants in France*, whoever was not married in the Catholic Church was not married at all, and could bring into the world nothing but bastards.[1]

"There are no more so-called Reformers in France, otherwise they would have been neither suffered nor tolerated." This would not have been differently expressed, if the revocation of the Edict of Nantes had banished the Protestants, and if every door had been open for them to quit the country. Now, the edict of revocation had guaranteed safety to the person while prohibiting religious worship, and scarcely eighteen months had elapsed since, September 18, 1713, another edict, clearly recognizing that *there were still Protestants in France*, had repeated *to all subjects of the King, of the so-called Reformed religion, or new converts*, the prohibition to quit the kingdom. The edict of March, 1715, extorted by a wretch from the enfeebled old age of the Great King, was veritably the masterpiece of that spirit of falsehood which France has baptized by the name of *Jesuitism*. We do not believe that such a stain exists on all our ancient legislation. The most infamous tyrants have invented nothing worse than this scheme which branded with dishonor a whole people at once in the cradle and on the death-bed, and which created a tribe of Pariahs in the France of the eighteenth century.[2]

While the Protestants relapsed, from the tacit tolerance of late years into the horrors of 1685, another persecution, less cruel, but affecting more directly the mass of the nation, had commenced anew against Jansenism, and everything akin to it.

The Jesuits had been for some time at a low ebb, in the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Cardinal de Noailles, Arch-

[1] The absorption of civil society by the Church was not, however, so complete in Catholic France, the Protestant question aside, that up to the seventeenth century no traces remained of ancient civil marriage, Gallo-Roman or Germanic marriage. The senior master of requests at the time of the Fronde, named Gaumin, having been married by simple civil contract, these unions were called Gaumin marriages. Rulhière, p. 874.

[2] Rulhière, pp. 300–458. *Anciennes Lois françaises*, t. XX. pp. 605–640.

bishop of Paris, then ruling the King through Madame de Maintenon, and himself submitting to the direction of Bossuet. The imprudence of the Jansenists, their indefatigable spirit of dispute, restored to their enemies the opportunity to retrieve their position. In 1702, forty Sorbonne doctors resuscitated the celebrated question of *fact* concerning the five propositions of Jansenius, and maintained that, in the presence of the decisions of the Church on points of fact and not of dogma, a respectful silence sufficed without internal acquiescence. Some other propositions of a Jansenistic tendency accompanied this leading question. Bossuet hastened to interfere to stifle the matter, and to induce the doctors to retract. Cardinal de Noailles, who, it is said, had at first secretly approved the propositions, receded, and followed Bossuet, as in the quarrel of Quietism. Thirty-nine doctors retracted out of forty. The King forbade the publication thenceforth of anything concerning these matters, but, in his own name, and that of Philip V., entreated Pope Clement XI. to renew the constitutions of his predecessors against Jansenism. Papers seized at Brussels, in the house of Father Quesnel, the Oratorian, who had succeeded the great Arnaud in the direction of the sect, had revived the old antipathy of Louis XIV. to everything pertaining to Jansenism. There was a contract, by which the Jansenists had formerly purchased the Island of Nordstrand, on the coast of Holstein, in order to make it an asylum for their sect; there were also traces of a project which they had conceived, to have themselves included in the European truce of 1684, under the name of Disciples of Saint-Augustine, as if they had been a political body like the Lutherans or the German Calvinists. Louis XIV. too easily took these reveries for the plots of a great party.[1]

Clement XI. responded to the King's wishes by a Bull which fell in the midst of the assembly of the clergy in 1705. Cardinal de Noailles, who presided, made reservations against the infallibility

[1] This aids to explain the strange anecdote related by Saint-Simon, which shows Louis XIV. preferring Atheism to Jansenism: "Among those who were to be of the suite of the journey to Spain, in 1707, the Duke of Orleans named Montpertuis. At this name, the King put on an austere air. "What, my nephew, Montpertuis, the son of that Jansenist, that mad-woman, who pursued M. Arnaud everywhere! I will have no such man with you!" — "Upon my word, Sire, I do not know what the mother has done, but the son is not a Jansenist, I assure you, for he does not believe in God." — "Is it possible, my nephew?" replied the King, softening. — "Nothing is more certain, Sire." — "Since this is so, there is no harm; you can take him."

It is probable that the Duke d'Orleans embellished this anecdote a little in relating it to Saint-Simon.

of the Church in affairs of fact. The assembly, animated with a Gallican spirit, accepted the Bull, but established that the constitutions of the Popes bind the whole Church only "when they have been accepted by the bodies of the pastors," and that this acceptance on the part of the bishops is made "by way of judgment." The court of Rome was greatly offended that the bishops should claim to *judge* after it, and this gave rise to long negotiations: the King induced the bishops to offer to the Pope extenuating explanations. The Jesuits, however, regained the ascendency at Versailles, and prepared against Cardinal de Noailles a formidable engine of war. Father Quesnel, before becoming the leader of the Jansenists, had published *Moral Reflections on the New Testament*, a work often reprinted and greatly esteemed; Father La Chaise, and the reigning Pope himself, it is said, had eulogized it. The edition of 1693 had received the episcopal approbation, with great praises, from Noailles, then Bishop of Châlons. In 1699, in consequence of numerous objections, Noailles, become Archbishop of Paris, caused the *Moral Reflections* to be examined anew: Bossuet undertook the revision, but his corrections having been executed only in part, his work was not published, and the revision was made alone by the doctors of Cardinal de Noailles. The clamor continued against the amended book, and reached the Pope. Clement XI., in his turn, undertook the examination, although not very eagerly; the congregation of the Index pronounced unfavorably, and a decree of the Holy Father prohibited the book (1708). This was a rude assault on Cardinal de Noailles. The decree, however, was not received in France, through a question of form, or rather, perhaps, because the King was then dissatisfied with the Pope, on account of the concessions of Clement XI. to the House of Austria. The Jansenists gained nothing thereby. At this very moment, a terrible blow was about to fall on the dearest and most legitimate object of their veneration. Like the ancient *formulary* of 1655, the papal constitution of 1705 had been presented for the signature of all the secular and regular clergy; the nuns of Port-Royal-des-Champs had refused to subscribe it without restriction. The Pope subjected them, by a bull authorized by the King, to the Abbess of Port-Royal of Paris, who did not share their Augustinian faith (1708). They resisted. Meanwhile, Father La Chaise died, and Le Tellier succeeded him. The affair was carried to the most extreme violence. Cardinal de Noailles, a man of pure soul and feeble character, was persuaded, in order to prove that he was not a Jansenist, to cruelty, despite

himself, towards the *rebellious* nuns. They were torn from their monastery and dispersed through different convents (November, 1709). The illustrious abbey of Port-Royal, hallowed, even in the eyes of unbelievers, by the name of so many great men, by the memory of so much virtue, was utterly demolished, by the order of the lieutenant of police, D'Argenson.[1] Two years after, as if it were designed to exile even the shades that haunted the valley, the dead of Port-Royal were exhumed, and their remains transferred to a village cemetery (at Magny).

Noailles, while he entered into this persecution, took the same course, nevertheless, as the nuns of Port-Royal, by refusing to retract the approbation which he had given to the *Moral Reflections*. Le Tellier caused him to be denounced to the King, by several bishops, as the abettor of innovations. After useless negotiations, in which the Dauphin, strongly opposed to Jansenism, like his master, Fénelon,[2] interfered, the King prohibited Quesnel's book by a decree in council (November 11, 1711), and demanded of the Pope a new condemnation of this book, in a form that could be received in France. The reply of Clement XI. was delayed until September 8, 1713;[3] this was the celebrated *Unigenitus* Bull, the work of Le Tellier far more than of the Pope, and which, instead of the general terms of the Bull of 1708, expressly condemned one hundred and one propositions extracted from the *Moral Reflections*.

[1] The *Maison des hommes*, which had been inhabited by the solitaries and their pupils, is still standing on the height which overlooks the valley, in the bottom of which was the demolished abbey.

[2] The Duke of Burgundy, become Dauphin, wrote a memorial to the Pope concerning this affair, in which he gives very rational motives for his opposition to Jansenism. See his Life, by Abbé Proyart, t. II.

[3] In the interval, an incident occurred worthy of remark. The court of Rome, by the accommodation of 1698, between Innocent XII. and Louis XIV., had obtained the concession that candidates for university grades should be no longer compelled to support the Declaration of 1682. Clement XI. wished to go farther, and, in 1718, refused bulls of investiture to the Abbé de Saint-Aignan, appointed by the King to the bishopric of Beauvais, because this abbé had supported the Declaration, that is, the Holy Father claimed tacitly to erect Gallicanism into heresy. The spirit of Bossuet revived in the old King, stung to the quick in what he held dearest, his authority: Louis wrote to the Cardinal de La Trémoille, *chargé d'affaires* from France to Rome, a letter designed to be communicated to the Pope, and which was a veritable summons to execute the concordat of Francis I. and to deliver bulls to every bishop elected, "the doctrine of which cannot be taken back." — "His Holiness," observed the King, "is too enlightened to undertake to declare heretical the maxims which the Gallican Church follows, as being those of the Primitive Church." The Pope receded. The bishop appointed had his bulls. See *Œuvres de d'Aguesseau*, t. XIII. p. 424. Despite this enterprise, quickly abandoned, Clement XI. was of a pacific spirit, and gave the *Unigenitus* Bull only reluctantly.

We have elsewhere [1] endeavored to characterize the Jansenist doctrines. We will not revert to them, but will only observe that these doctrines, in this book revised and modified as it had been, were little more than a tendency, consisting in a general disposition to view the relations of man with God from the point of view of grace rather than that of liberty. Many of the maxims condemned would certainly have never been so before the progress of Molinism: the Bull dared condemn the very words of St. Augustine and of St. Paul himself; there were propositions, on other matters than grace, the condemnation of which was and should have been scandalous, and seemed veritably the triumph of Jesuitism over Christianity; for example, those concerning the necessity of the love of God. It had dared to condemn this: "There is no God, there is no religion, where there is not charity." This was giving the pontifical sanction to the Jesuitical theories most contrary to the general spirit of Christian theology. It was the same with the maxims relative to the Holy Scriptures. The Pope had anathematized the following propositions: "The reading of the Holy Scriptures is for all. Christians should keep the Sabbath-day holy by reading the Scriptures; it is dangerous to deprive them of these." And also this: "The fear of unjust excommunication should not prevent us from doing our duty." This was overturning all political Gallicanism.

At the news of the Bull, Cardinal de Noailles attempted a middle course and prohibited the book in his diocese, without specifying the maxims condemned. This was not enough for his enemies. The King, excited by Le Tellier, convoked a great number of bishops to proceed to the acceptance of the Bull. Noailles and seven other prelates protested; forty accepted the Bull, but addressed to their flocks explanations which seemed excuses (January, 1714), and which were ill received at Rome. The eight opposing prelates wrote to the Pope, in order to explain their opposition, and to ask explanations. The King forbade their letter to be sent, and caused the Bull to be issued and registered by the parliament, which did not conceal its displeasure, but dared not resist, and only made its reservations (February 15). Fénelon and sixty other prelates rallied to the support of the forty acceptors, each one interpreting the Bull more or less in his own way; opposition to Jansenism prevailed in Fénelon over the sympathy with which some of the condemned maxims should have inspired him, and perhaps the Archbishop of Cambrai remembered somewhat too

[1] See *Martin's Histoire de France*, t. XII. p. 81 *et seq.*

well the part which the Archbishop of Paris had had in the condemnation of Madame Guyon and the *Maxims of the Saints*.[1] Noailles did not yield; conviction inspired him with an energy above his nature; he entered into an open contest with the Pope, and, what was more dangerous, with the King; he forbade, by a mandate, all ecclesiastics to receive the Bull in his diocese, under penalty of suspension (February 25). The Sorbonne, notwithstanding, received, or rather submitted to the Bull, under the violent pressure of the royal authority, which exiled the principal opponents; the other universities also bent beneath the yoke. The sacred Roman congregation issued a decree, by order of the Pope, against the mandates of Noailles and several other bishops, as *savoring of schism*. The dissenting prelates were but fifteen in all, and had no mitred adherents outside of France, the episcopate of Spain and Italy was too much accustomed to papal servitude;[2] but in France they had behind them the leading religious orders, the Benedictines, the Dominicans, the Oratorians, the Carmelites, the Canons of St. Genevieve, the majority of the doctors of the Sorbonne and the curés of Paris, and the public, which always took the side opposite to the Jesuits. It was no longer only the Jansenist sect, but all Gallicanism that was concerned. The Jesuits and the Bull had brought over few, besides the majority of the bishops, but the Franciscans and the celebrated seminary of Saint-Sulpice. Noailles took away the power of preaching and confessing from almost all the Jesuits of his diocese; but he dared not go logically as far as the King's confessor.

It was endeavored to stifle by terror public opinion contrary to the Bull: exiles, imprisonments, were multiplied from day to day; Le Tellier paved the way for more striking acts of violence: he induced the King to address to the parliament a declaration by which every bishop was bound to subscribe *purely and simply* to the Bull, in default of which he was to be prosecuted in conformity with the rigor of the canons. The aim was to cause the Cardinal-Archbishop of Paris to be deposed by a national council, after which Rome would have taken away his hat. The temporizing character of the Pope, and the extreme repugnance of Rome to all councils, retarded the execution of this design, and prolonged the negotiations with Noailles. 1714 and two thirds of 1715 passed away in this

[1] He was logically bound to accept the Bull. See *ante*, p. 555. His last writings are *Dialogues On Grace and Free Will*, which are, moreover, well worthy of him.

[2] See an interesting passage in Saint-Simon, t. XV. p. 345, on the Church of Spain: it is a sort of confession of the Archbishop of Toledo.

manner. Le Tellier lost patience and urged the King to carry his declaration to a bed of justice in the Parliament: despite the warm remonstrances of the first president, and especially of the attorney-general, the younger D'Aguesseau, whom his own merit, and the long services of his father had raised to this important post, Louis had resolved to follow the prompting of his confessor: the attorney-general was to be suspended; the Parliament violated as the Sorbonne had been. Time and strength were lacking Louis to strike this last blow.[1]

The Great King, in fact, was verging towards the tomb, and should have thought only of dying in peace. The aspect of the court would have been quite sad enough without the harsh clamor of this theological warfare, which gave an air of the Lower Empire to the last days of a reign long compared with advantage to the Augustan age. All the joy and splendor of Versailles had vanished with the young Dauphiness; ennui weighed on the aged King like a leaden mantle which Madame de Maintenon had no longer strength to throw off. The third of the King's grandsons, the Duke of Berry, had died in the spring of 1714, and his end, after a brief sickness, at a moment when he had just *rebelled* in some sort against his wife, who tyrannized over while deceiving him, had renewed the sinister rumors of 1712. The void about the King was becoming broader and broader.[2] The great generation of which Louis had been the soul was almost entirely extinct: the following generation, which had aspired to replace him and to reign by other principles with his grandson, was disappearing in turn before him; Catinat had died almost at the same time as the Duke of Burgundy; Chevreuse followed the young prince in a few months; Beauvilliers died in August, 1714; Fénelon, January 3, 1715, went to rejoin those he loved, at the age of sixty-four. With him was broken the last bond between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It has been thought that, if he had lived, he might have modified to a certain point the new period about to open;[3] but it was decreed

[1] *Hist. de la constitution Unigenitus*, t. I. *Journal of the Abbé Dorsanne*, t. I. Dorsanne was grand vicar and official of the diocese of Paris.

[2] There were no longer, except the Duke of Orleans, any but very young princes of the blood: the Prince de Condé, the Duke de Bourbon, his son, and the Prince de Conti having died in 1709 and 1710.

[3] The Duke of Orleans, after the death of the Duke of Burgundy, had approached Fénelon, who had at first shared the terrible suspicions of the public against him; from 1713 to 1714, the Prince had a remarkable correspondence with the Archbishop of Cambrai: Philip asked Fénelon to clear up his doubts concerning God, the immortality of the soul, and free will; he addressed, not the Catholic theologian, but the metaphysician. Was this policy, or a sincere desire to be enlightened? Perhaps both.

that France should pass without transition from one epoch to another absolutely opposite. Louis XIV., in his last days, alone before the new world which was arising, — a world as different from that of which Fénelon and the Duke of Burgundy had dreamed as of that in which the Great King had reigned, — Louis lived only amidst the shades of all his vanished age!

He was himself nothing longer but a shade! Nothing can be more painful than the spectacle of this old man, importuned in his conscience by the fanaticism of an implacable monk, who forced him to sully his white hairs by iniquitous deeds; importuned likewise in his affections and habits by the ambition of an adulterous son, who extorted from him favors contrary to public right and morality! His aged companion herself, whose charming and ingenious wit had so long refreshed him from the cares of power, now tormented him instead of watching over his repose; the loss of the Duchess of Burgundy who, to the advantage of all, had subjugated Madame de Maintenon, had thrown her again under the yoke of the Duke du Maine, her pupil and adopted son, who, through her, influenced the King. This eldest son of the King and Madame de Montespan, witty, weak, and false, devoid of courage in war, with no other talents than those of conversation and intrigue, ruled, impelled by a vain and capricious wife,[1] had risen from catastrophe to catastrophe on the graves of the royal family, keeping alive, and taking advantage with adroitness and perfidy of the doubts which at times still crossed the King's mind concerning the pretended crimes of the Duke of Orleans.

Louis had always had a great weakness for his natural children, *the children of his person and not of his rank*, as Saint-Simon says. He had done much for them, long before the strokes that had fallen on his legitimate posterity. The children that he had had by Madame de Montespan, born of a double adultery, being in quite a different position from those of Madame de La Vallière, he had legitimized them by acts in which the name of their mother was not mentioned, a wholly singular innovation; then he had invested with important offices, governments, and commands, those of the sons who attained the age of manhood, the Duke du Maine and the Count de Toulouse, and had married the daughters *in the clouds*, to use the hyperbolical expression of Saint-Simon, that is, to princes of the blood, the Duke de Bourbon and the Duke de Chartres (now Duke of Orleans). In 1694, a royal declaration had ranked the Duke du Maine and the Count de Toulouse next

[1] The Duchess du Maine was a Condé, granddaughter of the Great Condé.

to the princes of the blood, and before foreign princes naturalized in France, and peers. In 1711, the two bastards were admitted to the honors of princes of the blood. But a single step remained: it was taken. An edict of July, 1714, declared the legitimized sons of the King eligible to succeed to the crown after the princes of the blood; then the rank of princes of the blood was formally bestowed on them (May, 1715). This was the overthrow of all received traditions and ideas.[1] The King was considered, not as the proprietor, but as the usufructuary of the crown, substituted from male to male, in a direct or collateral line, until the extinction of the legitimate posterity of the first Capet; the last legitimate descendant having disappeared, no other person could claim to inherit from him, and the nation recovered the right of election which it had alienated. Such was the theory of monarchical hereditary transmission, formulated and accredited by time, whether in accordance or not with original fact.[2] The monarchy, after throwing down all the forces which limited it, finally attacked its own essence, by making itself personal instead of traditional: it was the last step to autocracy. Louis XIV. shocked the moral sense not less than the public right by thus rehabilitating the violation of the fundamental laws of society: if justice and reason reprove too rigorous laws against bastardy,[3] a simple reparable irregularity, they recognize an enormous distance between simple illegitimacy and adulterous births. There was too strange a contrast between the enthroning of the children of adultery and the religious austerity professed by Louis since his conversion.

The dominion exercised over Louis by this bastard whom no one loved or esteemed, the miserable discord arising from the *Unigenitus* Bull, the persecutions of the Protestants, who were pitied more as the Catholic spirit grew weaker in the nation, contributed, with the continuance of destitution since peace, to render the King unpopular and to cause the end of this reign, which seemed eternal, to be looked forward to as a deliverance. Louis felt it and descended to the tomb without even having the hope of carrying with him the regrets of a people that he had made so great and so wretched. He must have more than once regretted not having

[1] The proverb, "The King makes princes of the blood only with the Queen," very clearly expressed the monarchical right.

[2] The right of election had never been formally alienated: vestiges of it had subsisted for several generations after Hugh Capet. It will be comprehended that we speak here only of relative and historical right.

[3] Our laws are still such as regards inheritance.

died enveloped in his last glory, on the morrow of Denain or Freiburg!

So many honors and such brilliant possibilities were not enough for the Duke du Maine: his ambition was more positive and more immediate. In default of written law, custom, in conformity with the general spirit of monarchical right, conferred the regency, in case of royal minority, on the first prince of the blood, if the King had no mother.[1] The future regent, if events were left to their natural course, was therefore that Duke of Orleans who had been pursued by such horrible imputations. The aged King could not resign himself without horror and dismay to this thought. His ministers, in accordance with the Duke du Maine, presented to him, as it appears, a daring project to set aside Orleans. This was to convoke the States-General and to cause them to designate the regent during the life of the King. It was counted that, under the pressure of the court, Maine would be chosen. This was asking Louis XIV. to contradict his whole life. He refused to resign his trembling sceptre to the hands of the States-General.[2]

He comprehended besides that he could not wrest his birthright from Philip of Orleans without danger of disturbance and civil war; the Duke du Maine urgently remonstrated with him that, at least, it was necessary to leave to Duke Philip only a vain title; that it was necessary to raise up before him, by his last wishes, a rival capable of protecting the young heir. Aided by Madame de Maintenon, he pursued the old man with truly inhuman importunity to extort from him a testament. Louis yielded. August 27, 1714, he sent for the first president and the attorney-general, and confided to them a packet containing his last wishes, bearing date August 2; a niche was excavated in the wall of a tower of the palace and the mysterious testament deposited therein under a double iron door. Louis, in this document, instituted a council of regency, of which the Duke of Orleans was to be only the chief with a casting vote in case of division: the other members were to be the Duke de Bourbon,[3] when he should have attained the age of twenty-four, the Duke du Maine, the Count de Toulouse, the chancellor, the chief of the council of finances (Villeroi), the Marshals de Villars, d'Huxelles, de Tallard, and d'Harcourt, the four secretaries of state and the comptroller-general. The Duke du Maine was

[1] This custom was not absolutely fixed by precedents; for the sister of Charles VIII. had been preferred for the regency to the first prince of the blood.

[2] Lémontei, t. I. p. 14.

[3] The grandson of the great Condé had borne, during his father's lifetime, the title of Duke de Bourbon instead of that of Duke d'Enghien. At his father's death, he did not take the title of the Prince de Condé. His son imitated him.

charged with watching over the safety, preservation, and education of the minor King; the Marshal de Villeroi was appointed governor of the King, under the authority of the Duke du Maine. The officers of the guard and the King's household were to obey the Duke du Maine in what concerned the person of the minor King, his guard and his safety. If the Duke du Maine should die, he was to be replaced by the Count de Toulouse. Louis recommended to the council of regency and the future King to maintain the edicts against the Protestants and against duelling, and to keep up the institutions of the Invalides and Saint-Cyr.[1]

A few words from Louis XIV. to the two magistrates who received the deposit from his hand, then to the Queen of England (widow of James II.), attest what he thought of that which had been imposed on him. "I have made a testament," said he to this princess; "they insisted that I should make it; I had to purchase my repose; but, as soon as I am dead, it will be of no account. I know too well what became of my father's testament!"[2]

He was forced, notwithstanding, still to add to this testament, which he himself judged so little efficacious, a codicil by which he placed his military household under the orders of Villeroi, from the moment of his decease until the opening of the testament, with an injunction to Villeroi to install the young King at Vincennes, after conducting him to the Parliament for the said reading[3] (April 23, 1715).

Louis XIV., cruelly shaken since 1712, had been wasting slowly since the summer of 1714; his first physician, Fagon, himself enfeebled by age, did not perceive in time the slight hectic fever which was undermining the King, or profit by the resources still offered by his powerful organization. After August 11, 1715, Louis XIV. never again left the château of Versailles. The fever increased. Sleep vanished. August 23, new importunities, which no longer came only from Madame de Maintenon and the Duke du Maine, dictated to him a second codicil, which appointed Fleuri, who had resigned the bishopric of Fréjus, preceptor of the Dauphin, and Le Tellier his confessor; a fanatic and an intriguer. We know one but too well; we shall have to speak at length of the other, destined to play a most important part in the political world. The next day, one of the King's legs, which had caused him violent pain, began to show spots of gangrene. August 25, Louis received the sacraments with calmness and firmness. He manifested some

[1] Dumont, *Corps diplomatique*, t. VIII. p. 434.
[2] *Mém. de Berwick*, t. II. p. 244. *Mém. de Saint-Simon*, t. XI. pp. 259–264.
[3] Dumont, t. VIII. p. 448.

scruples concerning what he had been made to do relatively to the *Unigenitus* Bull.[1] He wished to see his archbishop, Noailles, and become reconciled with him; means were found to prevent this. The 26th, he bid adieu, in touching words, to the leading personages of court, to all who *had admission to it*, entreating them all to contribute to union, and sometimes to remember him. He likewise bid adieu to the princes and princesses, addressed kind words to the Duke of Orleans, as if to drive away evil designs from his heart, if he had conceived them, then ordered the Dauphin to be brought to him, a beautiful child of five years of age, the sole remnant of all his legitimate line in France. "My child," said he, "you will soon be the King of a great kingdom. Never forget your obligations to God; remember that you owe to Him all that you are. Try to preserve peace with your neighbors. I have loved war too well; do not imitate me in this, any more than in my too lavish expenditure. Take counsel in all things. Relieve the distress of your people as soon as you can, and do what I have had the misfortune to be unable to do myself." [2]

Touching, but vain words! The successor of Louis XIV. was not reserved for a work of reparation, but a work of dissolution and ruin.

The King then regulated what was to be done after his death, with the precision and detail in which he had delighted through the whole course of his life. He happened more than once to say, "At the time when I was King." He showed marvellous serenity in a man who was believed to be so strongly rooted to earth. "I

[1] Saint-Simon relates, from Amelot, ex-ambassador to Spain, become ambassador to Rome, a person well worthy of credence, an anecdote which proves that the court of Rome was forced to action by the court of France in this affair, as in that of *Quietism*. Clement XI., dismayed at the disturbance caused by the bull, confided to Amelot his regrets at having issued it. He had done so only in the persuasion that no one would oppose the least difficulty to the will of the King. Upon which, Amelot asking him why this odd number of *a hundred and one propositions* was condemned, the Pope began to weep. "Ah, M. Amelot, what could I do? Father Le Tellier had told the King that there were more than a hundred censurable propositions in the book; he did not wish to pass for a liar; they held their foot on my throat to make me name more than a hundred, to show that he spoke the truth, and I only named one more!" — Saint-Simon, t. XIII. p. 293. We must not be too much moved by the tears of Clement XI., who abused the gift of weeping. It is certain, however, that Le Tellier was, for some years, almost as much the tyrant of Rome as of France. The Abbé Dorsanne affirms, in his *Journal pour servir à l'histoire de la Constitution Unigenitus*, t. I. p. 453, that the King had been affiliated to the Company of Jesus ten years before his death, and that, during his sickness, Le Tellier made him take the *fourth vow*.

[2] These words were inscribed at the head of the bed of the heir of Louis XIV. Voltaire, *Siècle de Louis XIV.*, ch. xviii. Saint-Simon, t. XII. p. 488.

had thought it harder to die," said he to Madame de Maintenon. And, as two of his servants were weeping at the foot of his bed, "Why do you weep?" said he; "did you think me immortal?" On the morning of the 28th, he said to Madame de Maintenon that what consoled him in quitting her was the hope that they should soon rejoin each other again; she did not respond to this rendezvous in eternity, and appeared to see in this mark of affection only a token of selfishness. Thinking the end near, she set out the same evening for Saint Cyr; the next day, Louis, having still full consciousness, asked for her; she returned, but to depart again definitively on the evening of the 30th, abandoning on his deathbed the man who had so constantly loved her. Some old persons of an exquisite nature preserve a sensibility which grows more tender as they approach another life; those, on the contrary, in which the heart no longer has sway, wither morally as well as physically on advancing towards the end of the present life. Madame de Maintenon was one of the latter. Her excuse was the extreme weariness of existence that Louis had caused her. He had weighed her down with his absorbing personality; she had not had, for more than thirty years, a single day to herself; the necessity of perpetually finding new resources to occupy and interest this active and unfruitful mind, accustomed to live, as it were, on the substance of others, had exhausted, crushed her. This was the secret of the profound grief into which she had been thrown by the loss of the Duchess of Burgundy, who aided her so happily in fulfilling the heavy task of amusing the King. She saw, in the political nothingness to which she was about to return in the recesses of her beloved institution of Saint Cyr, only an asylum in which to separate herself from every one and everything, to rest and be silent.[1]

Du Maine and Le Tellier had also abandoned the dying man, from whom they had nothing more to expect. Louis had only gleams of consciousness. The day of the 31st passed in this way; the gangrene was extending. Louis revived in the night, and recited, with the clergy, the prayers for the dying. He repeated several times, in a strong voice, "*Nunc et in hora mortis:* . . . " "Oh, God, come to my aid! . . . " then entered into a long death-struggle. September 1, at a quarter past eight in the morning, the King rendered his last sigh.

[1] She bid an eternal adieu, even to her nieces. Nevertheless, this absolute isolation was not maintained; habit prevailed, and she renewed her correspondence with her former friends on all external things. She died in obscurity in 1719, aged eighty-four.

He had lived seventy-seven years, reigned seventy-two, governed fifty-four. It was the longest as the greatest reign of our history.

It was not a man, it was a world that ended!

Before descending, in the sequel of feudality, into that night of the past where plunge one after another the perishable forms of eternal society, monarchy, that symbolic form of national unity, had put on a supreme personification which will remain forever engraven on the memory of nations. Louis XIV. was, and will remain forever the King, the royal type, for foreign nations as for France. All that monarchy, after bringing back under the same yoke the divergent elements of the multifold world of the Middle Ages, had been able to produce in the plenitude of its power, it produced with Louis the Great. Blooming into manhood with the Great King, it grew old with him. The signs of decay were multiplying; gangrene was manifesting itself on it as on him, and if monarchy did not expire on the same day as the monarch, the sullen work of decomposition was never more to be arrested in its organs. We shall witness the decomposition of this vast body, until the day when veritable unity, the SOVEREIGN NATION, breaks this worn-out shell, to appear, for the first time, in its own essence, without figure and without symbol.

We have shown Louis XIV. in action; we have set forth his character, his ideas, his system, too elaborately to render it necessary to recur to them at the moment of quitting this great figure. A few words will suffice. France prospered under Louis XIV. as long as he continued the idea of Richelieu; it suffered, then declined, when he became unfaithful to it. He himself condemned the excesses of his wars and his expenditures; we have shown elsewhere that his expenditures for luxury and art — very considerable, doubtless — have been greatly exaggerated by tradition; as to his wars, they were some justifiable, others excusable in their principle, but not in the inhuman character which he permitted to be given them, nor sometimes in their political conduct. France required its natural complement, and, in the respective state of nations, the action of France, in order finally to become again the great Gaul, sufficed to destroy the equilibrium of Europe, and to provoke coalitions. Louis XIV. was wrong in claiming more, and, above all, in causing his claim to be believed. The two gravest reproaches which he has merited are not, however, those for which he has condemned himself: they are, in the economic order, of having caused the evil and repulsed the remedy, ruined the finances, and rejected the radical reform which might have

reëstablished them; in the religious order, of having destroyed the great work of Henri IV. maintained by Richelieu. But the responsibility of the Revocation should be divided, as we have shown; the revocation of the Edict of Nantes was the logical consequence of monarchy according to Bossuet, and this great state crime condemns monarchy still more than the monarch. The more we reprove the monarchical theory, as contrary to the true ends of the man and the citizen, the more we are disposed to indulgence towards the prince whom this theory hurried away by an almost irresistible fatality.[1]

When the new world, bursting forth amidst the tempests sixty years ago, has found its form and place, when free and democratic society is definitively founded and undisputed, when parties are no longer obliged to seek weapons in history, the name of Louis XIV. will no longer excite the anger of the people, as the expression of an inimical principle, and his statue, by turns adored and destroyed, will at last repose for ages among the great images of the national Pantheon. If the people do not forget the culpable and fatal errors of Louis, they will also remember that Louis has deserved to be identified with the most brilliant age ever yet witnessed by modern civilization. France pardons willingly, too willingly perhaps, all those who have loved her, even with a personal and tyrannical love, — all those who have made her glorious, even at the expense of her happiness; she is implacable only to the memory of leaders who have degraded her.

[1] We find a very curious document concerning Louis XIV. in the *Lettres sur la Russie*, by M. X. Marmier, 2d edit., p. 165, 12mo. There is in the Imperial library at St. Petersburg a rich collection of historical documents purchased here and there in France by a Russian diplomatist at the time of the revolutionary dispersion of the nobiliary and monastic archives. "Among the MSS.," says M. Marmier, "I was shown a sheet of paper on which Louis XIV. had written, six times in succession, in large characters formed with difficulty, *Homage is due to kings; they do all that they please.* This was the sage maxim which his master had set him as a copy."

END OF VOL. II.

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

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